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It is commonly believed that more and more people are going to court without a lawyer, both in 
New Zealand and in other common law jurisdictions. The right to appear in court in person is 
essential to the legitimacy of the courts. That legitimacy would be harmed if the courts were only 
accessible to those with the means to pay for legal representation. When litigants take up their 
right to appear in person, they encounter a system primarily designed for lawyers, however. So 
they confront a fundamental contradiction: the courts must appear to be accessible to litigants but 
they cannot grant too much access or they will be choked by the demand. Furthermore, the right 
of access in person lacks substance in many cases, because the system cannot easily be navigated 
without a lawyer.  
Using several qualitative methods including interviews, document review and participant 
observation, this thesis asks, first, why are litigants going to New Zealand’s civil courts without a 
lawyer? Second, what is their experience of litigating in person? Third, how do the inhabitants of 
the court system – the judges, lawyers and court staff – perceive litigants in person and respond to 
them? The research participants included litigants in person (LiPs) (34), court staff (8), lawyers (16) 
and judges (13), so that their different perspectives could be considered. The study began with a 
detailed exploration of the perspectives of LiPs, who participated either in interviews or via a case 
study. Only after this aspect of the research was complete did I interview court staff, lawyers and 
judges. By studying all participants in the court process and using multiple methods of qualitative 
inquiry, the emphasis was placed on systemic explanations for LiPs’ interactions with the court 
system.  
The thesis begins by considering why people decide to litigate in person. It then traces the 
experience of being a LiP, and the perceptions judges, lawyers and court staff have of LiPs, through 
the different stages of the court proceedings: before court, when proceedings are filed and LiPs 
seek advice and information; then at the courtroom door, when negotiations take place; in court, 
where LiPs present their case; and finally after court, when the judgment is handed down and 
issues about costs, enforcement, appeals and complaints arise.  
The thesis argues that there is a contradiction underlying the promise of LiP access to the courts. 
The courts promise a forum to vindicate citizens’ rights. Without this forum, their rights are empty, 
merely occurring on the books and not in reality. Yet the courts do not have the resources to hear 
all the claims citizens have. Even expansion of their resources would not be sufficient, as demand 
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is elastic. So, to appear to provide justice and control their process, the courts must both promise 
and limit access simultaneously. Normally lawyers play a central role in mediating such access, by 
screening and translating claims, and negotiating clients towards settlement. LiPs come straight to 
the courts, however, and threaten this delicate balance. They also struggle to access the courts in 
a meaningful way, not necessarily because of any particular personal deficits, but because there are 
so many complexities and conflicts that cannot be easily overcome by a litigant advocating their 
own cause. Various subtle means of discouraging access are deployed to steer LiPs away from 
accessing the courts in person while trying not to undermine the appearance of accessibility.   
The thesis considers various policy reforms and encourages a re-evaluation of the stereotypical 
view of LiPs, as a means by which the delicate balance between projecting accessibility and 
protecting the scarce resource of court time might be somewhat restored. It also argues that 
reforms within the court system alone cannot offer a complete answer. Broader social responses, 
that address access to justice for people likely to become LiPs, must look beyond the courts, to 
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It is 10am but the Judge has not yet arrived. The raised dais is empty, attended only by 
the carved figures in the coat of arms that hangs above the Judge’s chair. At the desk 
below the dais, the court taker shuffles paper and picks up the phone: “We are ready 
for you, Sir, in Courtroom 2. Are we gowned?”. Still holding the phone to her ear, she 
shakes her head at counsel, we are not to be gowned. Counsel for the defendant take 
off their gowns and bundle them out of sight. The plaintiff remains seated. He has no 
counsel: he is appearing in person. He quips, “T-Shirts and jandals today!”.1 Everyone 
laughs lightly, uncomfortably. My heart rate has quickened and I have that queasy 
feeling of anxiety and anticipation that comes before beginning a case. Except I am not 
counsel today. I watch this scene from the public gallery while scribbling research notes. 
I am nervous because I know what this litigant is facing. My legal experience warns me 
that this case is a labyrinth of procedure, evidence and complex law. If I was asked to 
argue it, I would be rushing to brief senior counsel. But the litigant is full of optimism. 
He is smart, educated and has worked hard to prepare himself for this day. He has 
never been to court before. It is not until much later, when what he then calls the 
“ordeal” is over, that he shares the knowledge that quickens my nerves. By then it is 
too late. 
This litigant was exercising his right to argue his case in person. He is not alone. It is commonly 
believed that more and more people are going to court without a lawyer, both in New Zealand 
and in other common law jurisdictions.2 When they do, they enter a system designed primarily 
with lawyers in mind. This thesis asks, first, why are litigants going to New Zealand’s civil courts 
without a lawyer? Second, what is their experience of litigating in person? Third, how do the 
inhabitants of the court system – the judges, lawyers and court staff – perceive litigants in person 
(LiPs) and respond to them?  
The increase in LiPs, either perceived or actual, has been accompanied by continued calls for more 
empirical evidence to inform the response to the phenomenon. New Zealand’s Law Commission 
joined this appeal more than a decade ago:3 
Empirical research in New Zealand is limited. We do not know for certain whether 
their numbers in courts are increasing, whether some who are unrepresented are in this 
situation by choice or whether they would have preferred or really needed 
                                                          
1 Jandals are a rubber sandal called “flip flops” in other countries. 
2 Reliable evidence of an increase in New Zealand is not available. See discussion Chapter 2, pages 13-15.  
3 Law Commission Delivering Justice for All: A Vision for New Zealand Courts and Tribunals (NZLC R85, 2004) at 25. 
2 
 
representation (by lawyer or otherwise). Nor do we know the profile of unrepresented 
litigants. 
New Zealand’s Ministry of Justice (MoJ) responded to this observation by undertaking exploratory 
research on LiPs in the criminal summary and family jurisdictions which provided some limited 
data on LiPs.4 While there are some high quality studies in other common law jurisdictions, there 
is no other empirical research on LiPs in New Zealand.5 Nor do the overseas studies answer all 
the questions. So appeals have continued internationally for more empirical information about 
who LiPs are, what motivates them, and what responses are effective.6 This thesis aims to 
contribute to the empirical base, answering the call for more qualitative research on LiPs to 
complement the collection of quantitative data.7  
The research questions were investigated by employing several qualitative methods: interviews, 
analysing litigation documents, and participant observation. The research participants included 
LiPs, court staff, lawyers and judges, so that their different perspectives could be included in the 
investigation. LiPs do not exist in a vacuum. They are a group that is created and defined in 
opposition to another group: represented litigants who appear by way of an agent, a lawyer. 
Lawyers, judges and court staff are the regular inhabitants of the courts and LiPs are a disruptive 
addition to this system. If LiPs are examined in isolation there is a risk of placing too great an 
emphasis on the personal strengths or supposed failings of individuals, focussing too much on 
their education, literacy, ability to interact with bureaucracy, their character, and ability to 
comprehend and marshal the assistance given them.8 By looking at all the participants in the court 
process and using multiple methods of qualitative inquiry, the emphasis can instead be placed on 
systemic explanations for the interactions LiPs have with the court system, related to the structure 
of legal services, the aims of the civil justice system, and courtroom organisation.  
Using multiple methods of qualitative inquiry, particularly participant observation, was also 
intended to provide some protection against the potential bias I have as a member of the legal 
profession, a profession that does not usually welcome LiPs. I therefore designed a study that 
                                                          
4 Melissa Smith, Esther Banbury and Su-Wuen Ong Self-Represented Litigants: An Exploratory Study of Litigants in Person 
in the New Zealand Criminal Summary and Family Jurisdictions (prepared for the Ministry of Justice 2009). 
5 The MoJ is currently undertaking a study of the 2014 reforms to the family justice system, which includes research 
on LiPs in the Family Court since the reforms. That research is not yet available. 
6 E Richardson, Tania Sourdin and Nerida Wallace Self-Represented Litigants: Literature Review (Australian Centre for 
Court and Justice System Innovation, Monash University 2012); Hazel Genn "Do-it-Yourself Law: Access to Justice 
and the Challenge of Self-Representation" (2013) 32(4) Civil Justice Quarterly 411 at 432. 
7 E Richardson, Tania Sourdin and Nerida Wallace Self-Represented Litigants: Gathering Useful Information, Final Report - 
June 2012 (Australian Centre for Court and Justice System Innovation, Monash University, June 2012) at VII.  
8 Barbara Bezdek "Silence in the Court: Participation and Subordination of Poor Tenants' Voices in Legal Process" 
(1991) 20 Hofstra Law Review 533. 
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began with a detailed exploration of the perspectives of LiPs so that, as far as is possible, I could 
understand their perspectives before returning to the more familiar territory of lawyers and courts.  
Part of understanding LiPs in context is to understand the New Zealand court system and legal 
profession. I therefore open with a brief survey of the right to litigate in person in New Zealand, 
the right of appearance in New Zealand courts and tribunals, and the structure of legal advice 
services.  
I. The New Zealand Context 
As a former English colony, New Zealand’s history of litigating in person begins in England. In 
this section I survey the evolution of litigation in person and representation through to the modern 
era. Twenty-first century New Zealand’s court system has diverged from England’s, but still 
follows many reforms (often in modified form) that are introduced in the UK. The second part of 
this brief survey sets out the New Zealand legal advice landscape as a backdrop to the discussion 
about litigating in person in the civil courts.  
A. Evolution of Litigating  in Person, Representation and Financial Assistance to 
Litigants 
1. Civil Courts in 11th to 19th Century England9 
In the early history of the courts, all litigants were required to appear in person and present their 
case in their own words: the outcome of the case turned on the litigant’s exact words and the 
notion of agency had not yet developed.10 The idea of a legal representative, someone who stood 
as the litigant’s agent before the court, evolved throughout the 12th and 13th centuries and by the 
reign of Edward I (1272-1307) the legal profession as we know it today had begun to take shape.11 
The rule that only approved practitioners (such as attorneys, serjeants and barristers) have a right 
of audience before the court had emerged.12 The legal profession’s evolution and its 
monopolization of the courts was so rapid that, while litigating in person had previously been 
mandatory, in 1259 the King felt it necessary to reinstate the right to litigate in person by decree 
(with the exception of pleas of the Crown, pleas of land and pleas of unlawful distraint).13 
                                                          
9 Litigation in person in criminal proceedings is historically distinct. See Rabeea Assy "Revisiting the Right to Self-
Representation in Civil Proceedings" (2011) 30(3) Civil Justice Quarterly 267; Note "Right to Counsel in Civil 
Litigation" (1966) 66 Columbia Law Review 1322. 
10 Frederick Pollock and Frederic William Maitland The History of English Law: Before the time of Edward I (2nd ed, 
Cambridge University Press, Cambridge, 1911) at 211. 
11 At 215. 
12 Duncan Webb "The Right Not to Have a Lawyer" (2007) 16 Journal of Judicial Administration 165 at n 45. 
13 Pollock and Maitland, above n 10 at 217. 
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Courtroom architecture evolved, with increasing segregation of participants and portioned zones 
“as a result of turf wars about who can legitimately participate on the legal stage and the respect 
which should be afforded them”.14 In the superior courts, the procedure gradually became so 
complex and litigating in person so difficult that by the 1850s “only the most sanguine or foolhardy 
litigant would plunge into the procedural thickets that protected the courtrooms”.15 Rather than 
the norm, LiPs had become the exception.  
There was, however, a concern with the ability of the poor to access the courts. One of the ways 
this was addressed was by allowing the poor to file a suit in forma pauperis, which initially only waived 
otherwise prohibitive court costs but was later expanded to provide attorneys to indigent civil 
parties.16 The in forma pauperis procedure was gradually eroded: “By the mid-eighteenth century the 
plaintiff had to pay for counsel’s opinion as to the merits of his case, an effective barrier to poor 
potential litigants”.17 The other mechanism to ensure access to the courts for the poor was the 
development of tribunals with simplified procedures including the Courts of Requests (originally 
called the Court of Poor Men’s Causes) and the General Eyre.18 In practice these courts were 
imperfect mechanisms for securing indigent litigants’ access to the courts, being costly and slow.19 
Although of limited efficacy in practice, both mechanisms show a concern with securing access to 
the courts for those who could not afford to instruct a lawyer, a concern that sailed with the 
immigrants to colonial New Zealand.   
2. Civil Courts in 19th and 20th Century New Zealand 
New Zealand became a colony by the Royal Charter of 16 November 1840 and established a 
Legislative Council to make law and put in place a court system.20 At its first meeting in June 1841 
the Legislative Council passed an ordinance establishing the Courts of Request, a first instance 
civil court for summary proceedings to recover small debts, and barred advocates, requiring all 
                                                          
14 Linda Mulcahy Legal Architecture: Justice, Due Process and the Place of Law (Taylor and Francis, Hoboken, Online, 2010) 
at 39. See also Judith Resnik and Dennis Curtis Representing Justice: From Renaissance Iconography to Twenty-First-Century 
Courthouses (2007) at 136-137. 
15 William Cornish and others The Oxford History of the Laws of England Volume XI: 1820–1914 (Online ed, Oxford 
University Press, Oxford, 2010) at 816 noting that “One unwanted consequence of the High Court being so costly 
was that some determined or desperate men and women dispensed with the services of lawyers and the courts began 
to be infested with litigants in person”: citing the (1877-8) 22 Solicitors Journal 85, “It is impossible to conceal the 
fact that the litigant in person is fast becoming a serious nuisance in the court”. 
16 Note, above n 9 at 1326. 
17 Syd Holm A History of Legal Aid in New Zealand (Appendix 1 of Access to the Law: A Research and Discussion 
Paper, Department of Justice, 1981) at 1. 
18 Note, above n 9 at 1326.  
19 At n 23. 
20 Laws of New Zealand Courts: Introduction (online ed) at [1]. 
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parties to appear in person.21 Later in the same year the Legislative Council passed the Supreme 
Court Ordinance 1841 establishing both the New Zealand legal profession and the Supreme Court 
(now the High Court) of New Zealand.22 The Ordinance provided the legal profession with an 
exclusive right of audience in the Supreme Court but allowed parties to appear in person. The 
procedure of in forma pauperis was imported to New Zealand in accordance with the principle that 
colonial settlers had the rights and protections of English law, and New Zealand followed English 
procedure having no rules of its own on the matter.23 In forma pauperis assisted only a pauper, 
defined in 1896 as being someone “not worth the sum of £25, his wearing-apparel and the subject-
matter of the action only excepted”.24 It was not until the Legal Aid Act 1969 that New Zealand 
had any form of civil legal aid for those of “small or moderate means”.25 
The legal profession extended its rights of audience in 1867 when the Courts of Request (where 
advocates were barred) was merged with the Resident Magistrates Court and it was decreed that 
parties could “appear and act personally or by a barrister or solicitor of the Supreme Court and 
not otherwise”.26 The legal profession’s exclusive rights of audience were not without challenge 
however, with two Bills coming before the House of Representatives “allowing anyone, lawyer or 
not, by whom a party wished to be represented, to appear in Court”.27 The legal profession 
ultimately prevailed and maintained both an exclusive right of audience in the superior courts and 
barriers to entering the profession.  
In 1976 the Small Claims Tribunals Act 1976 established what is now known as the Disputes 
Tribunal, for common forms of low-value disputes. The law on the Disputes Tribunal denied the 
legal professional any audience, making litigation in person mandatory. The Disputes Tribunal is 
also private, with no public audience allowed. Spiller has suggested that a motivation for the 
formation of the Disputes Tribunal and the exclusion of counsel was an anti-lawyering sentiment, 
“a desire to return to the supposed ideal state of nature, where reasonable and self-reliant men 
                                                          
21 Courts of Requests Ordinance 1841 4 Vic 6, s 10 “And be it further enacted and ordained, That no person whatever 
shall be permitted to appear and act in the Courts of Requests in any suit for or in behalf of any plaintiff or defendant 
in such suit unless it shall be first proved to the satisfaction of the Commissioner of such Court that such plaintiff or 
defendant is prevented by some unavoidable necessity or some good and sufficient cause from attending such Court 
in person”.   
22 Supreme Court Ordinance 1841 (5 Vict No 1).  
23 Brown v Bayly (1896) 15 NZLR 39 (CA); Wasteneys v Wasteneys (1896) 15 NZLR CA 41. 
24 Brown v Bayly, above n 23. 
25 Legal Aid Act 1969, Long Title. 
26 Resident Magistrates Act 1867 (No 9), s 30. The District Court Act 1858, s 33 contained a similar restriction on 
rights of audience.  
27 Bruce Cameron "Legal Profession" in AH McLintock (ed) Te Ara - Encyclopedia of New Zealand (Online ed, Ministry 
for Culture and Heritage - Te Manatū Taonga, Wellington, 1966) . 
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settled their differences without intervention of legal professionals, arcane rules of law, or 
unnaturally complex procedure”.28  
3. Civil Courts and Tribunals in Contemporary New Zealand 
The general rule is that it is an offence for someone other than a lawyer to appear “as an advocate 
for any person” or represent “any other person ... in proceedings before any New Zealand court 
or tribunal”.29 The right to litigate in person is retained however as the law “do[es] not prevent any 
person from representing himself or herself in proceedings before any court or tribunal”.30  
There are a number of statutory exceptions to this general rule. Today there are over 100 tribunals 
in New Zealand, 19 of which determine first instance civil disputes.31 Their enabling legislation 
often allows either lawyers or lay advocates to represent parties (as in the Human Rights Review 
Tribunal32 and the Employment Relations Authority),33 or their legislation makes litigation in 
person mandatory (as in the Disputes Tribunal).34 Lay advocates are also entitled to appear in the 
Employment Court and District Court (both for individuals in limited circumstances, and for 
corporations).35   
New Zealand allows a LiP to have beside them in court a litigation assistant or McKenzie friend.36 
The purpose of a McKenzie friend is to assist the litigant, and provide advice and support, but 
they may not speak on behalf of the litigant except in special circumstances and they are not 
entitled to receive a fee.37 They are lay advisers, often people with previous experience as litigants 
(represented or unrepresented), or some legal professional experience. The Law Commission 
recently considered the role of McKenzie friends, opining that they should continue to be allowed 
but their role should be spelt out in a new Courts Act where LiPs would easily be able to locate 
                                                          
28 Peter Spiller The Disputes Tribunals of New Zealand (2nd ed, Brookers, Wellington, 2003) at 3 quoting Eric Steele "The 
Historical Context of Small Claims Courts" (1981)  American Bar Foundation Research Journal 293. 
29 Lawyers and Conveyancers Act 2006, s 24.  
30 Lawyers and Conveyancers Act 2006, s 27(1)(a).  
31 Law Commission Table of all Bodies that may be Considered Tribunals (NZLC OP2, 2008). 
32 Human Rights Act 1993, s 108(3): “A person who has a right to appear or is allowed to appear before the Tribunal 
may appear in person or be represented by his or her counsel or agent”.  
33 Employment Relations Act 2000, sch 2(2): “Any party or person involved in a matter before the Authority … may 
be represented by an officer or member of a union; or by an agent; or by a barrister or solicitor”. 
34 Disputes Tribunal Act 1988, s 38(7) (referees have no discretion to allow legal representation); Motor Vehicles Sales 
Act 2003, schl 1, cl 9 (does allow the adjudicator some discretion to admit representation). 
35 Employment Relations Act 2000, sch 3(2); District Courts Act 1947, s 57. 
36 The term originates from the UK case McKenzie v McKenzie [1970] 3 All ER 1034. 
37 Law Commission, above n 3 at [92]; Mihaka v Police [1981] 1 NZLR 54. 
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information on them. The Law Commission noted that, ironically, the right to have a McKenzie 
friend is rooted in common law, the last place a LiP is likely to be able to find out about them.38  
In the same report the Law Commission also considered the role of amicus curiae, or “friend of 
the court”. The Law Commission noted the wide range of circumstances in which an amicus might 
be appointed, including appearing where there is an unrepresented party in certain limited 
circumstances, but summarised the important point that: “The function of the advocate to the 
court is to give the court assistance on the relevant law and its application to the facts of the case. 
It is not his or her function to represent anyone”.39  
4. The Special Position of Body Corporates 
In 1984 the Court of Appeal, in Re GJ Mannix, affirmed that “a natural person of sufficient age 
and capacity cannot be denied the right to present his case in person” but held that only a barrister 
can represent a body corporate in the superior courts.40 This rule can be traced to at least the early 
17th century41 and the court in Mannix justified its continuation on the grounds that it is an 
expression of the rule that only lawyers and litigants in person have a right of audience: as a 
corporation is not a natural person it cannot appear in person and therefore must be represented 
by a lawyer.42 The justifications advanced by the Court in Mannix also included the arguments that 
courts (particularly the superior courts) are best served by those who owe duties to the court43 and 
that there is greater judicial efficiency where a professional advocate presents a case.44 The Rules 
Committee considered amending the rule in 2011 but retained the status quo.45 The court retains 
a residual discretion to hear lay company representatives and the rule in Mannix does not apply in 
the District Court.46 
                                                          
38 Law Commission Review of the Judicature Act 1908: Towards a New Courts Act (NZLC R126, 2012) at para 15.14-15.15. 
39 Law Commission Review of the Judicature Act 1908: Towards a Consolidated Courts Act (NZLC IP29, 2012). 
40 Re G J Mannix [1984] 1 NZLR 309 (CA) at 312. 
41 Re Sutton's Hospital Case (1612) 10 Co Rep 23a; 77 ER 960. 
42 Re G J Mannix, above n 40 at 311 per Cooke J. The justifications for the rule in Mannix relating specifically to the 
status of a company include that companies have a special privilege in the form of limited liability and that being 
represented by counsel is a price of that special privilege (Chesterfields Preschools Limited v Commissioner of Inland Revenue 
[2012] NZHC 2629 at [30]; GB & JZ Chambers Ltd v AEL Corporation Ltd (1994) 7 PRNZ 635) and that that lay 
representatives may not have authority to bind the company (Chesterfields Preschools Limited v Commissioner of Inland 
Revenue, above n 42 at [26]). Cf Peter Watts who notes that an unauthorised agent would be personally liable for a costs 
order by the court: Peter Watts "Should Companies be Entitled to Lay Representation in our Superior Courts?"  [1998] 
Company and Securities Law Bulletin 86 at 87).  
43 Re G J Mannix, above n 40 at 311; GB & JZ Chambers Ltd v AEL Corporation Ltd, above n 42 at 640.  
44 Re G J Mannix, above n 40 at 312; GB & JZ Chambers Ltd v AEL Corporation Ltd, above n 42 at 640. 
45 Don Mathieson "Reforming Civil Procedure" (2012) 43 Victoria University of Wellington Law Review 127 at n 42; 
New Zealand Law Society "Problems seen with any changes to company representation in court" (8 August 2011)  
<www.lawsociety.org.nz>. 
46 District Courts Act 1947, s 57(2) “A corporation may appear by any officer, attorney, or agent of the corporation”.  
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B. Current Legal Advice Landscape in New Zealand 
1. Changes to the Legal Profession’s Practising environment 
This study took place against a backdrop of very significant shifts in the practising environment. 
The most obvious of these was the closing of six of the 63 District Courts and shifting the registries 
of seven other District Courts, creating hearing-only courts in these seven small centres, with their 
registries operating from the nearest major centre.47  
There were also significant changes to the criminal bar. Beginning in 2009, a pilot programme of 
the Public Defender Service (PDS) began for criminal defendants. It was then rolled out to major 
centres nationwide in 2012. The private defence bar’s work has been considerably affected with 
50 per cent of defence work in major metropolitan areas now going to the PDS. Anecdotally, this 
has created pressure on workflows in other practice areas as former defence lawyers look for 
alternative streams of work.  
The change with the most direct bearing on this study was the introduction of significant family 
justice reforms in March 2014. Among these was a requirement that, with some limited exceptions, 
litigants may not be represented by a lawyer in Care of Children Act 2004 (COCA) proceedings.48 
Litigants can, however, access four hours of legally aided advice (if they meet the criteria for legal 
aid) during this process.49 The role of lawyer for child in COCA applications has been greatly 
reduced, with appointments made only in specific circumstances, rather than routinely.50 The 
emphasis is on controlling government spending and encouraging disputants to take individual 
responsibility for resolving their matters.51  
                                                          
47 Ministry of Justice "Changes to Court Services" (2013)  <www.justice.govt.nz>. The changes were billed as changes 
to “modernise and improve how we deliver court services” but some of the changes were also related to closure of 
buildings because of the findings of seismic risk assessments undertaken after the Canterbury Earthquakes.  
48 Care of Children Act 2004, s 7A(4)(a), inserted on 31 March 2014 by s 5 of the Care of Children Amendment Act 
(No 2) 2013. For further discussion of the reforms see: Tim Black and others The New Family Justice System - Fundamental 
Change (New Zealand Law Society Continuing Legal Education, Wellington, 2014); Mark Henaghan and Meghan 
Nicholson "Family Law" (2014) 2 New Zealand Law Review 321 at 347-353. 
49 There is no limit on the amount of privately funded legal advice a litigant may source. 
50 The parties must generally contribute to the cost of the appointment of lawyer for child: Care of Children Act 2004, 
above n 48, s 135A. Early anecdotal indications are that this concern may not be borne out, with a lawyer for child 
appointed more frequently to assist the Court: Sasha Borissenko "Does Self-Representation Provide Access to 
Justice?" (15 March 2015) 860 LawTalk 7 at 8. 
51 Mark Henaghan "Changing Politics of Family Law in New Zealand" (2012)  International Survey of Family Law 
253 at 256 says that “the primary thrust of the review is fiscal” and also notes queries raised about the reliability of 
figures on which it is based that supposedly show significant increases in spending. Similar reforms occurred in the 
UK in 2013 with the introduction of the Legal Aid, Sentencing and Punishment of Offenders Act (LASPO) 2012. 
LASPO did not make litigating in person mandatory but did remove legal aid for most private family cases and an 
increase in LiPs was an anticipated consequence of the reform: Ministry of Justice Proposals for the Reform of Legal Aid 
in England and Wales, Consultation Paper CP12/10 Cm 7967 (TSO, 2010). See also John Eekelaar and Mavis Maclean 
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2. Legal Aid 
The introduction of the PDS and the 2014 family justice reforms are part of the Government’s 
strategy to reduce spending on legal aid.52 In addition, the thresholds for accessing legal aid for 
general civil matters were lowered, fees were introduced for accessing legal aid, and interest 
charged on legal aid loans.53  
Together these changes have meant that legal aid spending dropped from $172 million in 2009/10 
to $125 million in 2012/13. The budgeted amount for 2014/2015 was $109.5 million.54 The 
changes that have occurred within what was already a small protected area of work have arguably 
created an environment where the legal profession has become highly defensive, a profession 
under siege. Buckingham has argued that “the shrinking allocation of state litigation resources” 
has put systemic pressures on New Zealand’s legal profession, creating ethical strain at an 
individual level.55 
3. Availability of Free Legal Assistance 
There is a nationwide network of Community Law Centres (CLCs), providing advice and advocacy 
for those who do not qualify for legal aid but who cannot afford to pay for a lawyer. The CLCs 
are independently governed but belong to a national network and contract for community legal 
services from the MoJ. Some also have local governmental or non-government funding.56 They all 
have some paid staff but also rely on the contribution of pro bono advice from the profession and 
assistance from law students. The services offered vary from centre to centre, depending on 
funding and expertise of the staff and volunteers.  
During the course of this study there was no coordinated pro bono service in existence. There 
have been repeated calls for such a service and one is proposed.57 A few of the large legal firms 
have a pro bono programme, and many individual practitioners do offer a pro bono service on an 
                                                          
Family Justice: The Work of Family Judges in Uncertain Times (Hart Publishing, Oxford, 2013) at 184-207 for a discussion 
of the philosophical orientation of the UK family justice reforms.  
52 Spending on legal aid had increased from $111 million in 2006/07 to $172 million in 2009/10 Ministry of Justice 
"Legal Aid Factsheet: Changes to Manage Legal Aid Spending" (April 2011)  <www.justice.govt.nz>. 
53 Legal Services Regulations 2011 regs 5 and 6. The thresholds increase with the number of dependent children. The 
median personal income from all sources per person in 2013 was $28,500 Statistics New Zealand 2013 QuickStats about 
Income (2014) at 12.  
54 The Treasury "Vote Justice: Estimates of Appropriations 2014/15" (July 2014 )  <www.treasury.govt.nz>. 
55 Donna Buckingham "Legal Governance in New Zealand - Reporting Academically from the Co-Regulatory 
Ramparts" (Keynote Address, Australia New Zealand Legal Ethics Colloquium, 28 November 2013). 
56 Community Law "Supporters" <www.communitylaw.org.nz>. 
57 Helen Winkelmann "Access to Justice – Who Needs Lawyers?" (2014) 13(2) Otago Law Review 229 at 239; Chris 
Gallavin "A Professional Obligation to Act Pro Bono" (4 July 2014) 847 LawTalk 19. 
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ad hoc basis, but there is no centralised service or point of contact for litigants seeking pro bono 
assistance.  
II. Scope of Inquiry 
This research examines the LiP phenomenon in one of our “central and emblematic legal 
institutions”:58 our core trial courts. As mentioned, New Zealand has an extensive system of 
tribunals, including two high volume tribunals: the Disputes Tribunal for general small claims of 
up to $15,000, which in 2014, disposed of 14,757 cases, and the Tenancy Tribunal, which, hears 
all tenancy disputes and disposed of 20,299 cases in 2014. Rather than study these tribunals, 
designed with LiPs in mind, the research is on LiPs in the civil courts, the traditional province of 
lawyers. It covers the District Court (which has jurisdiction over civil disputes up to a value of 
$200,000, and disposed of 590 defended civil cases in the 2014 calendar year), the Family Court (a 
division of the District Court, with by far the highest number of cases of any civil court, disposing 
of 60,768 cases in 2014) and the High Court (which has unlimited jurisdiction over civil disputes 
and disposed of 2,473 civil cases plus 302 civil appeals in 2014).  
I chose to limit my study to cases where only one party was a LiP and the other was represented. 
Cases where both parties were LiPs, at least before the Family Court reforms, were thought to be 
less common. In cases where only one party is a LiP the potential for unfairness, and the absence 
of shared professional norms and etiquette, are also most stark.  
This research focusses primarily on LiPs who actively engage with the court process. It is likely 
that the general population of LiPs contains many “inactive” litigants who take no active role in 
their proceeding.59 Why LiPs are inactive and whether they have problems gaining access to justice 
remains a separate topic for future investigation. This research considers those who actively engage 
with the court process, their experience of doing so, and the perceptions of the judges, lawyers 
and court staff to their attempts to access the courts.  
A. Terminology 
While conducting this research, I used the term “self-represented litigant”. Self-representation is, 
of course, a contradiction in terms: to “represent” means to act on another's behalf. “Litigant in 
person” is the dominant term within the legal profession, but is opaque to the uninitiated and I 
                                                          
58 Marc Galanter "A World without Trials" (2006) 2006 Journal of Dispute Resolution 7 at 33. 
59 Richard Moorhead and Mark Sefton Litigants in Person: Unrepresented Litigants in First Instance Proceedings (2/05, United 
Kingdom Department of Constitutional Affairs Research Series 2005) at 62-63 record a large number of inactive 
litigants in family cases and civil cases and note at 62 that “Inactivity is difficult to interpret. It may involve resignation 
to court proceedings, perceived irrelevance or a form of resistance to the legal process”.  
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was concerned its use may therefore alienate, or be incomprehensible, to the main subjects of the 
research. “Unrepresented litigant” carries with it an implication that something is missing (a lawyer) 
and I prefer to avoid that implication. “Lay litigant” is sometimes used by the legal profession, but 
the corollary of that term is that those who are represented are “professional litigants”. That is 
nonsensical, as all litigants who are not also lawyers are lay (although some may consider persistent 
litigants almost professional).60  
The fieldwork and writing led me to the conclusion that LiP is the preferable term. While I still 
consider it is a difficult term for those outside the profession to understand, it has several 
advantages. First, it places the litigant at the centre of the discussion on policy reform. Litigants 
are either appearing in person, or by an agent (a lawyer), whereas the opposite of self-represented 
or unrepresented is represented, emphasising the place of lawyers. Second, while LiP is a difficult 
term for non-legally trained people, the participating LiPs had mastered a range of legal terms and 
legal discourse. So it was not beyond their understanding and some used it in interviews. Third, 
the risk of using “self-represented litigant” is that it implies a person can be one's own lawyer. One 
of the arguments in the thesis is that this is not possible, as there are conflicts between the roles 
of litigant and representative. One LiP participant in my research counselled that advice to LiPs: 
… should also be prefaced with 'Remember, you're not detached'. So who are you? Are 
you your own counsel? In which case you are schizoid. ... Do I talk in the third person 
or do I talk in the first person? That has always been an issue. Do I formalise it or do 
I personalise it? (High Court LiP) 
The term LiP suggests a clearer answer to this problem: that the litigant is not their own lawyer, 
but someone appearing in person. For these reasons I have used LiP as the best of the imperfect 
options. 
B. Organisation of the Thesis 
In the next chapter I review the literature that is relevant to the research questions, as well as 
providing an overview of the possible responses that may be made to LiPs seeking access to the 
courts. Chapter 3 discusses the methods and methodology employed in this study, along with 
extended discussion of ethical issues raised.  
Presentation of the research findings begins in Chapter 4 which examines decisions to litigate in 
person. It is followed by a short chapter containing four litigants’ stories (Chapter 5); the 
                                                          
60 Other terms more readily dismissed were the Latin tag “pro se”, which is almost unknown in New Zealand and, as a 
Latin term, even more alienating than “LiP”. The Family Court has adopted the term “self-litigant” on its website but 
this is not widely used inside or outside the legal profession, and is specific to New Zealand. 
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construction of these is explained in Chapter 3 on methods. Their purpose is to give the reader a 
greater sense of the experience of litigating in person than the ordered presentation and analysis 
of findings can provide. The litigant stories are drawn on in the analysis in the chapters that follow.  
The subsequent chapters are organised according to the usual chronology of the court process: the 
process before court (Chapter 6), negotiation and settlement at the courtroom door (Chapter 7), 
appearing in court (Chapter 8) and finally judgment, appeals, enforcement, costs and complaints 
after court (Chapter 9). I chose this structure because I wanted to take the reader through the 
experience of litigating in person and the challenges each stage presents. Many LiPs never make it 
further than the process before court discussed in Chapter 6. The first half of each of these 
chapters presents research findings concerning the participants’ perspectives. The second half 
discusses these empirical findings in the context of the major arguments in the thesis.  
Chapter 10 draws together the themes developed in the chronological exploration of the court 
process and examines potential policy responses to the findings of this research. In this fashion 
the thesis attempts to answer the questions: Why do litigants become litigants in person? What is 
their experience of litigating in person? How do judges, lawyers, and court staff respond to them 








There have been three recent reviews of literature on LiPs, in the United Kingdom (UK), Australia 
and the United States (US).1 All note that, despite the concern and the range of programmes being 
implemented to solve the LiP “problem”, there is little high quality data that answers questions 
such as, how many LiPs are there? In what kinds of cases do they appear? Who are they? What 
motivates them to litigate in person? What strategies assist them? This chapter focuses on the 
evidence and scholarly discussion that provide the foundation for my research questions, and on 
material concerning the New Zealand context.  
I begin by reviewing what we know about the numbers of LiPs in New Zealand and who they are, 
including those who are considered persistent or vexatious. I then review literature relating to my 
first research question, why people litigate in person.  
In the second section I turn to the broader question of LiPs’ place in the civil justice system, their 
right to litigate in person and explanations of attitudes towards them, as well as the purpose of the 
civil justice system. This section looks at what lawyers offer their clients and the legal profession. 
It reviews what we know about outcomes for litigants who proceed without a lawyer.  
The final section surveys the various possible responses that have been proposed, or have been 
implemented in some jurisdictions, to the apparent rise in LiP numbers. It arranges these responses 
in a taxonomy that I will refer to again in Chapter 10 when considering what my research suggests 
about the efficacy or appropriateness of these responses.  
I. How Many, Who and Why? 
A. How Many? 
There is very little data in New Zealand on the number of LiPs in the courts. As in the other 
common law jurisdictions, such data as there are is often collected in a piecemeal fashion, 
                                                          
1 Kim Williams Litigants in Person: A Literature Review (Ministry of Justice, United Kingdom, 2011) at 3; E Richardson, 
T Sourdin and N Wallace Self-Represented Litigants: Literature Review (Australian Centre for Court and Justice System 
Innovation, Monash University 2012) at [3.3]; Stephan Landsman "Pro Se Litigation" (2012) 8(1) Annual Review of 
Law and Social Science 231 at 240-241. 
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sometimes by individual courts or judges, or sometimes by the Ministry responsible, and its 
accuracy and reliability are variable.2 The data are often collected for differing reasons (usually 
record keeping, not analysis) and therefore lack the scope and detail on issues that researchers 
might want to answer. There are also definitional issues about who is counted as a LiP. For 
example, whether a person is represented can change over the life of a case, and defendants who 
take no steps, including not appointing counsel, might be better characterised as “inactive”, rather 
than as LiPs.3 
Data currently cited in New Zealand, collated from the few Court registries that collect LiP 
statistics, should therefore be treated with caution. In the High Court, the reported percentage of 
cases involving one or more LiPs is 35 to 40 per cent in judicial review cases, and 20 to 30 per cent 
in appeals (in the Wellington and Auckland High Courts respectively).4 As discussed in the 
following chapter, my attempts to collect data on LiP numbers using MoJ records were 
unsuccessful.5 The MoJ study is the only one conducted in New Zealand and it surveyed only the 
summary criminal and family jurisdictions.6 The MoJ study counted LiPs by asking registrars to 
record the number of litigants appearing in person in proceedings in five different courts over a 
period of four to six weeks, or where available, it extracted this data from the case management 
system.7 The study found that 7-17 per cent of cases in the Family Court involved LiPs (varying 
across different geographic locations), and that LiPs were most likely to appear in cases arising 
under the COCA or the Domestic Violence Act 1995.8 
There is a perception that numbers of LiPs are rising in New Zealand but there is no data available 
to show whether this perception is correct.9 The MoJ is currently undertaking a study to look at 
                                                          
2 See for example Julie Macfarlane The National Self-Represented Litigants Project: Identifying and Meeting the Needs of Self-
Represented Litigants, Final Report (May 2013) at 33 on data collection in Canada. This problem has long been identified, 
see for example Paula Hannaford-Agor and Nicole Mott "Research on Self-Represented Litigation: Preliminary 
Results and Methodological Considerations" (2003) 24 Justice System Journal 163 at 164. 
3 Richard Moorhead and Mark Sefton Litigants in Person: Unrepresented Litigants in First Instance Proceedings - Department of 
Constitutional Affairs Research Series (2005). 
4 Helen Winkelmann "Access to Justice – Who Needs Lawyers?" (2014) 13(2) Otago Law Review 229 at 8. 
Winkelmann J also reports that 25 per cent of active civil files in the Court of Appeal involve a LiP, and 32 of the 60 
applications for leave to appeal filed in the Supreme Court in 2014 were LiPs.  
5 For further discussion see Chapter 3, pages 53-54. 
6 Melissa Smith, Esther Banbury and Su-Wuen Ong Self-Represented Litigants: An Exploratory Study of Litigants in Person 
in the New Zealand Criminal Summary and Family Jurisdictions (prepared for the Ministry of Justice 2009). 
7 Smith, Banbury and Ong, above n 6 at 28. The period of data collection varied from four to six weeks but no 
explanation is given as to why there was a variation in the period or how the time periods were selected i.e. whether 
they were random. This may have some effect on the validity of the data.  
8 At 6 at 33-35. 
9 At 32. More than two thirds of the informants thought the number of LiPs was rising. Note this mirrors the finding 
in Moorhead and Sefton’s study where “court staff, lawyers and judges we spoke to tended to suggest either that they 
were uncertain about medium and long term trends or that there had been a substantial increase in numbers”. That 
study could only report limited data from information from trials in civil cases which showed a slight increase in 
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changes in numbers of LiPs in the Family Court before and after the 2014 Family Court reforms. 
That data is not yet available but obviously the expectation is that, as legal representation has been 
prohibited by law in the early stages of many family cases, an increase will be recorded.  
The data available internationally is of limited relevance to New Zealand, as distinct factors that 
can be expected to affect LiP numbers, such as legal aid eligibility, the legal advice market, and the 
courts’ structure and procedure, are different in each country. The data gives some context, 
however, about the magnitude of the issue in other common law jurisdictions and helps explain 
why it has received increasing attention in recent years. In the UK, the Moorhead and Sefton study 
found that in civil cases the number of LiPs who actively participated in cases in the civil 
jurisdiction ranged from 3 per cent (individual claimants in the High Court) to 28 per cent 
(individual defendants in the County Court). The number of active LiPs in Family Court cases was 
15-21 per cent (for ancillary relief, injunctions and Children Act cases) to 60-64 per cent (for 
adoption and divorce cases). A recent UK MoJ study led by Trinder said that number has likely 
increased, as the UK has recently introduced sweeping reforms to legal aid.10 Studies of the 
Australian Family Court found around 30 per cent of litigants were LiPs at first instance.11 In the 
Australian Federal Magistrates Court, from 2009 to 2012, approximately 36 per cent of cases had 
at least one LiP party.12 Macfarlane characterises the numbers of LiPs in the Canadian courts as 
“extraordinary”.13 Family Court LiPs in Canada constitute 40 per cent or more of litigants, and the 
first instance courts (excluding small claims) have 20-30 per cent of litigants appearing 
unrepresented.14  
1. A small portion of the whole 
It is useful to keep these numbers in context: people who become litigants (with or without 
representation) are only a fraction of those who have a legal problem. As Felstiner, Austin and 
Sarat argued in their seminal 1980 article, disputes themselves are social constructs, and before 
they can emerge as legally cognisable problems, people have to name, blame and transform them 
                                                          
numbers of LiPs after 2001 (when the Access to Justice Act was introduced) but otherwise did not “support an 
increase in litigants in person, rather, the opposite”, though they noted it was possible there had been an increase in 
the number of LiPs whose cases did not proceed to trial: Moorhead and Sefton, above n 3 at 19 and 60-61.  
10 Liz Trinder and others Litigants in Person in Private Family Law Cases (Ministry of Justice, United Kingdom, 2014) at 
2. 
11 Richardson, Sourdin and Wallace, above n 1 at 25-26.  
12 At 26.  
13 Macfarlane, above n 2 at 32.  
14 At 33-34.  
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into disputes.15 Once this process is achieved, only a portion of those disputants will go on to bring 
legal action. In 2006, the New Zealand Legal Services Agency conducted a national survey of 
unmet legal needs, based on the English and Welsh Civil Law and Social Justice surveys.16 Twenty-
nine per cent of those surveyed had experienced at least one non-trivial problem in the last 12 
months.17 However, of those experiencing a non-trivial problem, only nine per cent had resolved 
their problem after a court or tribunal action, and another 10 per cent were either currently 
involved in or intending to use court or tribunal action to solve the problem.18 LiPs are, therefore, 
only a portion of the fraction of people who use the formal justice system to resolve disputes.  
B. Who are they? 
The New Zealand data on who LiPs are very limited. The MoJ study found that most Family Court 
LiPs are New Zealand European men aged 30-49.19 There is no demographic data available on 
LiPs (or any litigants) bringing claims in the High Court or the District Court (Civil).  
The international material is again of limited use as we have different socio-economic factors at 
play in New Zealand which might influence the demography of LiPs. Williams’s literature review 
concluded that the international evidence suggests that LiPs:20 
… were more likely to have lower incomes and educational levels than those who 
receive representation, and were likely to be younger. … [M]en were more likely to be 
unrepresented than women, and were usually the respondents in proceedings. 
                                                          
15 William LF Felstiner, Richard Abel and Austin Sarat "Emergence and Transformation of Disputes: Naming, 
Blaming, Claiming ..." (1980) 15 Law & Society Review 631. 
16 Legal Services Agency Report on the 2006 National Survey of Unmet Legal Needs and Access to Services (Legal Services 
Agency, 2006). The methodology was peer reviewed by Pascoe Pleasance. They surveyed 7,200 New Zealanders and 
questioned them about problems with a legal aspect for example employment, debt, and family breakdown. 
17 At 15. 
18 At 27-28. 
19 137 LiPs were identified in the MoJ Study and information about their gender was extracted from the case file. This 
was a sufficiently large sample to give reliable results about the gender composition of LiPs in the Family Court. It 
found that 66 per cent of LiPs are male and 34 per cent female compared to a division of 33 per cent male and 50 per 
cent female in cases where both parties are represented (12 per cent being organisations such as CYF and 5 per cent 
unknown). The age data was also extracted from the case file and showed that most LiPs (but also most represented 
litigants) were aged 30-49 years. The age of a significant proportion of litigants (28 per cent of the LiPs and 38 per 
cent of the represented litigants) was unknown. The ethnicity data’s accuracy is also limited by the large number of 
people litigants with unknown ethnicity (18 per cent of LiPs and 32 per cent of represented litigants). There was a 
significant difference between the number of New Zealand Europeans in the LiP sample (59 per cent) and in the 
represented litigants sample (34 per cent). There was no statistically significant difference between the number of 
Māori, who made up 14 per cent of the LiP sample and 16 per cent of the represented litigant sample. The other 
demographic data (income and education) was gathered from interviews with the LiPs. Only 37 per cent of the LiPs 
were interviewed. It is therefore not possible to say within any certainty that the interview data can be extrapolated to 
the general population. 
20 Williams, above n 1 at 4. 
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Williams also reports that there is evidence that LiPs “sometimes displayed indicators of 
vulnerability”, including “being victims of violence, having depression, a problem with 
alcohol/drug use, having a mental illness or being extremely young parents”.21 The Trinder study, 
published since Williams’s review, examined and identified further vulnerabilities in the LiP 
population, concluding that over half that study’s sample of LiPs “suffered one or more 
vulnerabilities”.22  
Genn argues that it is necessary to develop a typology of LiPs to be able to tailor measures to assist 
them in court.23 She gives the example of “‘paradigm’ one-shotter individual LIPs [who] will have 
varying degrees of education and general competence”. 24 She suggests that those with “high levels 
of competence and determination” will benefit from information and advice, but those with lower 
education or general competence might need more assistance.25  The Council for Civil Justice 
Working Party report (of which Genn was an author) takes a similar approach, suggesting that part 
of the solution would involve “more flexibility, more triage, more choices for individuals, more 
allocation to different types of dispute resolution according to different types of people, different 
types of case, different types of circumstances”.26  
While there is intuitive appeal to identifying the characteristics of LiPs and tailoring responses 
accordingly, the Trinder study found: “There appeared to be no clear relationship between being 
highly educated, professional and articulate and being able to handle family law proceedings 
effectively”.27 Similarly, Macfarlane found that educated and knowledgeable litigants reported they 
had underestimated the intellectual and practical challenges of the system and found the system 
“difficult to understand”.28  
This suggests that a more helpful categorisation of LiPs is one that locates them in the context of 
the particular proceedings in which they are engaged. The Trinder study developed such a 
typology, identifying eight types of “working” and “not working” LiP hearings.29 Rather than 
                                                          
21 At 4. 
22 Trinder and others, above n 10 at 26-27. The further sources of vulnerability identified were: physical disability/ill-
health; behavioural disorders such as ADHD and Asperger Syndrome; learning difficulties – including two LIPs with 
borderline mental capacity to make decisions on their own behalf; dyslexia; difficulty controlling emotions; extreme 
nerves and anxiety – causing sleeplessness, vomiting and panic attacks; language difficulties.  
23 Hazel Genn "Do-it-Yourself Law: Access to Justice and the Challenge of Self-Representation" (2013) 32(4) Civil 
Justice Quarterly 411 at 444. 
24 At 444. 
25 At 444. 
26 Civil Justice Council Access to Justice for Litigants in Person (or Self-Represented Litigants) (November 2011) at [64]. 
27 Trinder and others, above n 10 at 24.  
28 Macfarlane, above n 2 at 31.  
29 Trinder and others, above n 10 at 60-68. 
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concentrating on demographic characteristics of the LiP, this typology takes a more interactional 
approach. LiPs were typed by their approach to the case. Characteristics that facilitated working 
hearings included LiPs being calm, settlement oriented, confident and prepared. Characteristics 
that made hearings less workable were LiPs being volatile, litigious, over-confident, overwhelmed 
or poorly prepared. Other factors that affected whether the hearing was “working” or “not 
working” were also part of the model, including the style of the judge, the approach of opposing 
counsel, and the features of the case (complexity, risk, and conflict).30 
Earlier work by Conley and O’Barr examined discourse employed by LiPs in a small claims court. 
They developed two categories: “relational” litigants and “rule-oriented” litigants.31 Rule-oriented 
litigants’ accounts meshed better with the adjudicator’s orientation, as these litigants interpreted 
their disputes in terms of rules and principles that applied irrespective of social status. Relational 
litigants’ accounts were perceived by the adjudicator as rambling and imprecise, as they focused 
on social status and social relationships, not rules and principles. Hunter, referring to this work,32 
developed three categories of LiPs “defined by their experiences of and behaviour within the 
appeal process”: the vanquished, the procedurally challenged, and serial appellants.33 The Trinder 
study suggested a fourth category of “legally challenged”, to be added to Hunter’s categories.34  
I suggest these categorisations are more helpful than looking at who LiPs are in isolation. As 
Bezdek explains, “we erroneously narrow the frame if we limit the discussion to individual 
competence and capability”.35 A study of LiPs must attend to not just who they are in isolation, 
but their interaction with the other participants.  
1. Unusually Persistent Litigants – a sub-category of LiPs? 
The literature on LiPs sometimes delineates between “genuine” or “deserving” LiPs, on the one 
hand, and litigants variously described as “difficult”, “persistent”, “querulant”, or “vexatious”, on 
the other.36 Moorhead and Sefton propose that “[t]he obsessive litigant … has a popular and 
                                                          
30 At 67-68. 
31 John Conley and William O'Barr Rules Versus Relationships (University of Chicago Press, Chicago and London, 1990). 
32 Rosemary Hunter and others The Changing Face of Litigation: Unrepresented Litigants in the Family Court of Australia (2002) 
at 133 suggests "rights orientation" should be added to Conley & O'Barr's schema as many LiPs drew on a general 
rights discourse which has percolated through society to argue their cases. 
33 At 103-104. 
34 Trinder and others, above n 10 at 25. 
35 Barbara Bezdek "Silence in the Court: Participation and Subordination of Poor Tenants' Voices in Legal Process" 
(1991) 20 Hofstra Law Review 533 at 537. 
36 See for example Genn, above n 23 at 426. 
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powerful place in the legal imagination”.37 They note a tendency for lawyers, academics, court staff 
and others “to speculate on a link between [obsessive] litigants and mental health problems”.38 
Defining and describing the various categories of people who exhibit persistent or obsessive 
disputing behaviour has been the topic of discussion in psychiatric literature dating back to at least 
the early twentieth century.39 There remains no consensus on whether difficult and persistent 
disputing behaviour has a pathological cause, or, if so, what that might be. The early literature 
classified problematic disputing behaviour as “querulant paranoia” but that diagnosis fell out of 
favour, along with psychiatric interest in the topic, over the latter part of the twentieth century.40 
In the most recent thorough psychiatric review, Mullen and Lester argue that “vexatious litigants 
and unusually persistent complainants” are better understood as people exhibiting “a constellation 
of behaviours and attitudes, which may, or may not, be characterized by delusional phenomena”.41 
They note such litigants are often functional individuals before becoming involved in a dispute, 
but “with the benefit of hindsight certain vulnerabilities can often be recognised”.42 These include 
personalities that are marked “more frequently than might be expected” with “obsessional traits, 
self-absorption, and more than usual levels of sensitivity and self-reference”.43  
There is a small but growing legal literature on vexatious or persistent litigants, as well as judicial 
engagement with the topic.44 Moorhead and Sefton suggest:45 
There are three main species of behaviour which, although not uncommonly found in 
the same litigant, can individually or collectively lead to the judgment that a litigant is 
difficult or obsessive: 
• The making of far fetched or totally meritless claims; 
                                                          
37 Moorhead and Sefton, above n 3 at 79. 
38 At 79. See for example Tania Sourdin and Nerida Wallace "The Dilemmas Posed by Self-Represented Litigants: 
The Dark Side" (2014) 24 Journal of Judicial Administration 62 at 63.  
39 Paul Mullen and Grant Lester "Vexatious Litigants and Unusually Persistent Complainants and Petitioners: From 
Querulous Paranoia to Querulous Behaviour" (2006) 24(3) Behavioral Sciences & the Law 333 at 334 survey the 
psychiatric literature, citing articles from 1904 onwards. See also Olli Stålström "Querulous Paranoia: Diagnosis and 
Dissent" (1980) 14(2) Australian and New Zealand Journal of Psychiatry 145 at 147, tracing the term “querulous 
paranoia” back to Prussia in 1793. 
40 Mullen and Lester, above n 39 at 334-335. For discussion of the problems with the psychiatric diagnosis of querulous 
paranoia see Stålström, above n 39. 
41 Mullen and Lester, above n 39 at 334. 
42 At 343. 
43 At 343. Mullen and Lester also refer to vulnerabilities involving limited social networks, at 344. 
44 Michael Taggart "Alexander Chaffers and the Genesis of the Vexatious Actions Act 1896" (2004) 63 Cambridge 
Law Journal 656; Michael Taggart "Vexing the Establishment: Jack Wiseman of Murrays Bay"  [2007] New Zealand 
Law Review 271; Didi Herman "Hopeless cases: race, racism and the 'vexatious litigant'" (2012) 8 International Journal 
of Law in Context 27; Ian Freckelton "Querulent Paranoia and the Vexatious Complainant" (1988) 11(2) International 
Journal of Law and Psychiatry 127; Ian Freckelton "Editorial: Vexatious Litigant Law Reform" (2009) 16 Journal of 
Law and Medicine 721; Sourdin and Wallace, above n 38. Corbett v Western [2011] 3 NZLR 41 at [8]. 
45 Moorhead and Sefton, above n 3 at 80. 
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• The making of repeated claims (or applications within cases) of a similar type 
and/or against the same or similar litigants (relitigation or harassment of 
individuals); 
• Behaving in an abusive and/or uncooperative manner. 
Moorhead and Sefton do not use the term “vexatious litigants” because that is a “term of legal 
art”, but those declared vexatious will likely have engaged in some or all of these forms of 
behaviour.46 Herman critiques the use of vexatious litigant declarations in the UK, pointing to the 
overrepresentation of non-white/immigrant litigants who have been declared vexatious. He urges 
an examination of the social and political contexts of so-called vexatious litigation, rather than 
pathologising individuals. Mullen and Lester also caution that:47 
Querulous behaviour has to be separated from the over-enthusiastic, and even 
disruptive, pursuit of justice that remains within normal limits, or is legitimized by the 
social agenda being pursued.  
Actions that may appear obsessive and paranoid may become justifiable when another cultural or 
political lens is applied. As Herman argues, vexatiousness can be seen as a “passionate search for 
justice, as opposed to, or at least as well as, an ‘obsession’”, and a “melancholic attachment” to the 
pursuit of a particular agenda can “can underpin human agency and social change”.48  
Such readings may only receive, at best, impatient attention from those encountering such 
litigants.49 While small in number, these litigants are of great concern to court staff and judiciary 
to the extent that discussion of LiPs in general may be subsumed into discussion of these persistent 
litigants. Genn posits that “because of the challenges it presents to the legal system, [the category 
of difficult or vexatious litigants] distracts minds and discussion, and can overwhelm the attention 
of the judiciary”.50 Moorhead and Sefton suggest that the “‘mad, dangerous and stupid’ litigants” 
distracted the attention of the judiciary because “they posed the greatest challenge to their 
resources and skills, or that they provided better stories”.51  
In the face of such distraction, it is important to remember that such persons represent only a 
small fraction of litigants. Moorhead and Sefton found that in UK first instance courts the number 
                                                          
46 At 80. 
47 Mullen and Lester, above n at 340. Similarly, discussing the use of the diagnosis of “querulous paranoia”, Stålström, 
above n 39 at 147 argues, “that the label may easily become one used primarily for dampening or devaluing social or 
political dissent”. 
48 Herman, above n 44 at 28-29. 
49 Genn, above n 23 at n 77 refers only to Herman’s argument in a footnote as a “sympathetic reading of vexatious 
litigants”. 
50 At 427. 
51 Moorhead and Sefton, above n 3 at 89-90. 
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of obsessive and difficult litigants was very small, with respondents describing the numbers as “de 
minimis”, “a fraction of a per cent” and “a tiny proportion, very, very, tiny”.52 The fraction is 
probably greater in the higher courts.53 It should also be remembered that not all difficult and 
persistent litigants are unrepresented. The Trinder study on private family law disputes, for 
example, found that, of the small numbers of serial applicants, half were LiPs and the other half 
were represented.54  
The number of litigants declared vexatious is even smaller. The New Zealand Law Commission 
notes that the declaration is an “extreme measure” and that there are “only a handful of orders 
under s 88B in existence”.55 Some have proposed that this may be due to the difficulty involved in 
obtaining such a declaration, not due to the small number who warrant it.56 In 2012, the Law 
Commission recommended the introduction of a graduated system of orders for restraining 
vexatious actions, similar to that introduced in the UK, but this is not yet in force.57   
C. Why Litigate in Person? 
A number of studies in the UK, USA, Canada and Australia have gathered evidence about why 
people are litigating in person, either as part of a survey or from interview data. The reasons for 
litigating in person are sometimes presented as a dichotomy between having to do so for financial 
reasons and choosing to do so.58 It has also been proposed that different assistance might be 
required by those choosing to litigate in person versus those who are motivated by financial 
reasons.59 Some studies that include interviews with LiPs, rather than only surveying judges, 
lawyers and court staff, note that LiPs often give a number of reasons for litigating in person.60  
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58 See for example Rosemary Hunter "Litigants in Person in Contested Cases in the Family Court" (1998) 12 Australian 
Journal of Family Law 171 at 172. 
59 See for example Richardson, Sourdin and Wallace, above n 1 at [2.8]. 




The most important reason for the decision to litigate in person, identified in most studies, is that 
litigants cannot afford a lawyer and do not qualify for legal aid, or their legal aid funding ceases.61 
The New Zealand MoJ study found that more than half the LiPs in the Family Court litigated in 
person because “they were ineligible for legal aid but still felt unable to afford a lawyer”.62 Hunter 
and others’ study of the Australian Family Court found there were a significant number of litigants 
who did not qualify for legal aid, but were unable to pay for a lawyer.63 In addition, their claim may 
be of small economic value:64 
Lawyers are charged with the task of assisting individuals in making use of law and 
enforcing their rights, but violations of those new rights [generated by the welfare state] 
often generate claims of a small economic value, so that lawyers cannot economically 
handle them. 
LiPs may make a cost-benefit analysis and decide that instructing a lawyer is not the best use of 
their scarce resources.65 
2. Perceptions about the case and litigant 
Part of the cost-benefit analysis may relate to a perception that the case is simple enough to handle 
themselves.66 Genn reports this as the most common reason for litigating in person, and Mather 
as a primary reason, along with financial motivations.67 LiPs may also believe they are better 
positioned than a lawyer to convey the details of the case to the court because they know these 
intimately and are more motivated to win.68   
It is also possible that a lawyer’s perceptions of the case affect representation decisions: that is, a 
lawyer may have refused to act because they consider the case is unarguable. Trinder’s study noted 
that while this was a possible reason it was rare within the study group.69 Alternatively, if lawyers 
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perceive a litigant is likely to complain or to be a demanding fixed-fee client (e.g. legally aided), the 
litigant may have difficulty securing representation.70  
3. Keeping Lawyers Out – disenchantment and maintaining relationships 
Some people may litigate in person because they are disenchanted with the legal profession. In the 
MoJ study, a fifth of the LiPs cited a previous bad experience with lawyers as the reason for either 
beginning the case as a LiP or leaving representation during the case.71 Macfarlane also found that 
a significant number of their participants had chosen to litigate in person after becoming 
dissatisfied with their counsel “doing nothing”, not being interested in settling the case, not 
listening or explaining, or making mistakes.72  
UK research suggests that businesses, in particular, may wish to proceed unrepresented to avoid 
the dispute being perceived as too adversarial and damaging ongoing relationships.73 This is of less 
relevance in the New Zealand High Court where bodies corporate must be represented.74 The 
concern for maintaining relationships may be of particular importance in the Family Court where 
parents have ongoing relationships with their ex-partner, for example.75  
4. Openness of the court and availability of non-legal assistance 
Mather has argued that courts have a way of communicating their degree of openness to LiPs and 
so influence the number of people willing to attempt to litigate without a lawyer, although Williams 
states “there is little empirical evidence for this [claim]”.76 The New Zealand MoJ study reports 
that lawyers and court staff believe that people litigate in person because the Family Court is trying 
to be more litigant friendly.77 Moorhead and Sefton also conclude that the “openness and 
supportiveness of courts to unrepresented litigants” is a reason for why people go unrepresented.78 
It stands to reason that at least the attitude communicated by the court staff will influence whether 
people feel encouraged to appear as a LiP. Moorhead and Sefton give the example of court staff 
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believing that an applicant should be represented in injunction proceedings, and so, in an effort to 
put them off appearing in person, would warn them “about having to personally serve the 
respondent, and undertake cross examination at hearings, both of which were likely to be 
harrowing experiences for unrepresented litigants”.79  
Some authors suggest that people may simply want to take a matter forward themselves, perhaps 
because they want “to understand and to participate actively in their personal legal affairs”, as part 
of the reason for an increase in LiPs.80 Wide availability of legal information on the internet may 
also encourage it.81 
II. Civil Justice, Lawyers and Litigants in Person 
Having considered why a litigant might proceed in person, I now consider the alternative on offer 
– lawyers, the service they offer and the structure of the legal profession. I then review what we 
know about how litigants fare in the civil justice system without a lawyer, before turning to 
consideration of the judicial process itself, its purpose, and the position of LiPs within it.  
A. What is the alternative? The service and structure of the profession 
As I emphasised at the outset, LiPs only stand out as a group when defined in opposition to some 
other group, notably lawyers and their clients. To set the stage, it is therefore useful to briefly 
review some of the rich literature on the legal profession. There are two major strands to this 
literature. One explores the legal profession’s origins, structure, stratification, and market control, 
centred particularly on the US and the UK. The other strand, newer but now established, examines 
the relationship of lawyers and clients. Both are useful to thinking about why litigants might 
proceed in person, and how proceeding in person affects their experience and the responses to 
them of judges, lawyers and court staff. The following section therefore briefly reviews aspects of 
the literature on lawyers and their clients and the legal profession.  
1. Litigation lawyers and their clients 
Litigation lawyers perform many different tasks for clients, though the tasks performed vary 
between individual lawyers, their areas of practice, and their clients.82 Mather found that even 
                                                          
79 At 18.  
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amongst US lawyers working in one practice area, divorce proceedings, all “tend to listen, counsel, 
advise, negotiate, and occasionally litigate”, but there was variation as to what lawyers did 
“according to whether they specialize in family law and according to the class of clients they 
typically represent”.83 Some lawyers emphasised achieving “suitable case outcomes” while others 
emphasised their role in helping clients “solve their personal problems through the legal process”.84 
Specific tasks might include reframing a client’s personal or commercial problem into a legally 
cognisable problem (or advising that they have no legal claim), advising them on a solution to the 
problem (through legal or other avenues) and the likelihood of success, constructing a narrative of 
the problem, speaking on the client’s behalf (in court or to the other party and their lawyer), 
offering strategic and business advice (when to settle, how to maximise pressure on the other party, 
or how to reconcile with the other party), and providing a sympathetic ear for the client’s 
problems.85   
(a) Negotiating with their Clients 
How lawyers achieve these goals depends, in part, on the outcome of negotiations with their own 
client. This is an aspect of litigation practice that, as Ingleby noted, is an “often under-rated feature 
of out-of-court processes”.86 Studies of the lawyer-client relationship, often in the context of 
divorce lawyering, have established that lawyers and clients negotiate about the strategy and the 
negotiations involved in the dispute.87 Power does not always lie with the lawyer but is contextual, 
negotiated and shifting.88 Lawyers do have a number of tools at their disposal, however, and can 
engage in “cynical manipulation” and “peddle the language of the law, legal symbols” to shape 
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85 Richard Abel and Philip Lewis "Putting Law Back into the Sociology of Lawyers" in Richard Abel and Philip Lewis 
(eds) Lawyers in Society: An Overview (Online ed, University of California Press, Berkeley, California, 1995) provides an 
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86 Richard Ingleby Solicitors and Divorce (Clarendon Press Oxford, Oxford and New York, 1992) at 149. 
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client goals.89 Clients who are poor and possess less interpersonal power are more likely to be 
subordinated to their lawyers, in this way.90  
Cain argues that even for one-shot clients91 the lawyer’s most common practice is to translate 
client goals into legal form, rather than control: “Control, in the form of either transformation or 
refusal to translate, is a minority practice even at this 'bottom' end of the occupation”.92 While a 
bad translator may subordinate the client, the effective translator can enhance the litigant’s 
position:93  
By speaking through a translator, one can be heard and understood in places 
where otherwise one is mute. The translator does not silence the speaker but 
rather seeks to enhance the speaker's voice by adding her own. 
LiPs are not exposed to this negotiation and shaping of goals.94 This process is important for 
litigants as most litigants labour under what Ross and Ward call “naïve realism”, a belief that one’s 
own position is more correct and reasonable than one’s opponents.95 Ross, Leper and Ward, 
summarising the research on naïve realism, say:96  
In analysing and interpreting the words and deeds of their peers, even the most 
skilled “intuitive psychologists” fail to appreciate the extent to which they, no 
less than their peers, see actions, events, and even facts through the lenses of 
their own experience, the received wisdom of their group, and the often-
distorting influence of their personal needs, hopes, and fears. … The most 
obvious consequence of naïve realism is that people expect other reasonable 
and objective perceivers to share their views and understandings – if not 
immediately, then at least after they have enlightened those others about the 
ways things really are.  
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They explain that people labouring under naïve realism will “sincerely feel that “objective” third 
parties should take their side”.97 Where a third party does not share the person’s view then they 
will attribute this to one of three possibilities: (a) that the third party lacks all the relevant 
information and once it has been put before them they will agree; (b) the third party may be “lazy, 
irrational or otherwise unable or unwilling to proceed in a normative fashion from the objective 
evidence to reasonable conclusions; or (c) the third party is biased.98 Without a lawyer, a litigant 
does not have a trusted adviser to challenge their naïve realism before engaging in negotiation or 
reaching court.  
(b) Justice Broker 
Kritzer proposes that the dominant conception of lawyers’ work, and that closest to the lawyer’s 
self-conception, is the professional expert. In this conception, lawyers use “specialized, abstract 
knowledge” to act as “the client’s dispassionate ‘alter ego’ – doing for clients what the clients would 
choose to do if they had the professional’s expertise and were able to look ‘objectively’ at their 
own situation”.99 Kritzer argues that complementary to this conception, is that of the lawyer as a 
“justice broker”.100 The justice broker is an intermediary bridging the gap between the litigant and 
the other participants in the litigation, in return for a fee. This role reflects some of the day-to-day 
reality of the routine work of non-elite lawyers. LiPs, therefore, are not just bypassing a 
professional expert, but also an intermediary between them and the system, who possesses inside 
knowledge.101 
(c) Power and the “level playing field” 
One function that a lawyer can arguably perform for a client is to provide them with a source of 
power, thereby evening inequalities between opponents in the litigation. Engler argues that a skilled 
lawyer’s knowledge of substantive law and the forum can give a relatively powerless litigant “repeat 
player” status.102 This is Galanter’s idea that those who are repeat players in the court system, those 
“who are engaged in many similar litigations over time” (who tend to already occupy a place of 
advantage in society), have a litigation advantage over “one shot” litigants “who have only 
occasional recourse to the courts”, an advantage which is augmented and reinforced by the 
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system.103 Typical examples of this dynamic would be relations between a landlord (who has many 
tenants) and a tenant, a company and a consumer, and between a government agency and a 
beneficiary. Adding a lawyer to the weaker side evens up the game. 
Engler and Abel therefore argue that the presence of a lawyer may lessen the inequality between 
these types of parties.104 Galanter, however, says that repeat players still have the advantage of 
being able to retain good quality legal assistance and have “greater continuity, better record-
keeping, more anticipatory or preventative work, more experience and specialized skill in pertinent 
areas, and more control over counsel”.105 One-shot players therefore cannot expect their lawyer to 
neutralise the repeat player’s advantage, particularly when they hire a lawyer who specialises in one-
shot litigants (e.g. a family lawyer who acts for parents against State claims for protection of 
children). The lawyer for the one-shot litigant usually belongs to a lower prestige segment of the 
profession, they cannot mobilise clients for mass action because of ethical constraints and limited 
information exchange between clients, and the one-off nature of the work, with limited fees, tends 
to produce uncreative lawyering that simply treats the case as an isolated one to be processed, and 
the lawyer has ethical constraints that prevent “them trading off some cases for gains in others” 
(unlike insurance company lawyers and prosecutors).106  
A powerless party’s representation by a lawyer may not therefore put them on equal footing with 
a more powerful opponent, but the adversarial system makes no assumption that the parties are 
on an equal footing. Swank, quoting Judge Posner’s view of the US adversarial system, said:107  
‘The court states: An underlying assumption of the adversarial system is that both 
parties will have roughly equal legal resources.’ This has never been an assumption of 
the adversarial system. We do not put a cap on the amount of money that a litigant can 
spend on lawyers; we do not inquire whether the litigants had roughly equal legal 
resources; we allow one to outspend the other by as much as he pleases. We count on 
the courts not to be overawed by the litigant with the higher-priced counsel. 
However, even if a lawyer does not put a litigant on a level playing field with the other represented 
party, it might at least improve the litigant’s footing. This comes down to the empirically difficult 
question of whether a lawyer improves a litigant’s chance of success in court, which is considered 
below. 
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2. Social Closure 
Another significant strand of socio-legal inquiry concerns the legal profession’s efforts to control 
the legal market and its motives for doing so. These inquiries draw on social theorists including 
Durkheim, Weber, Parsons, Friedson and Larson.108 Abel, taking a Weberian perspective, argues 
that a profession must not only construct a marketable commodity (as does an occupation), but 
must also “seek social closure” through “market control and collective social mobility”.109 Social 
closure – constructing a closed group with its own identity to monopolise a resource (the provision 
of legal services) - is difficult to achieve and hard to maintain.110 Abel argues that in the US and 
UK the legal profession’s market control has been eroded by direct competition from alternative 
service providers, while simultaneously entry barriers to joining the profession have decreased as 
more lawyers are trained, and these new lawyers are drawn from a much wider population, 
including women and ethnic minorities.111 In New Zealand, lawyers’ protected areas of work have 
already been seriously curtailed.112 Maintaining social closure in this environment is therefore 
increasingly challenging.  
One method through which a group may maintain its place in society is by promulgating social 
stereotypes about outgroups.113 The stereotype of the outgroup is often “modelled on a minority 
of the worst” while an image of the ingroup is modelled on a “minority of the best”.114 Tajfel 
argues that social stereotypes serve several functions including justifying actions against the 
outgroup, and providing “a positive differentiation of the ingroup from selected outgroups at a 
time when such differentiation is perceived as becoming insecure and eroded”.115 The legal 
profession, its monopoly under threat, might be more willing to use stereotypes to differentiate 
itself.  
Fiske considers another function of stereotypes: that they anchor people to a starting point when 
they deal with someone from the stereotyped group, telling them “how most people in the group 
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supposedly behave, what they allegedly prefer, and where their competence supposedly lies”.116 
Stereotypes allow people to arrange complex information and come to easy judgments, rather than 
considering others on an attribute-by-attribute basis.117 This may mean that powerful ingroups are 
more likely to engage in stereotyping than powerless outgroups:118 
The powerless are stereotyped because no one needs to, can, or wants to be detailed 
and accurate about them. The powerful are not so likely to be stereotyped because 
subordinates need to, can, and want to form detailed impressions of them.  
Even where outgroups do stereotype, their beliefs may exert less control than those of the 
powerful ingroup.119 These ideas may explain why lawyers and judges might adopt a common set 
of beliefs about LiPs modelled on the most difficult LiPs: stereotypes act as an anchor for thinking 
about the group’s competence and can help to maintain professional identity against incursion.  
This literature provides a framework for thinking about what lawyers do as a group, how they act 
towards their clients and how they view LiPs. It also begs the question: does the involvement of a 
lawyer make a difference to case outcomes, or can LiPs do just as well?  
B. LiPs’ Outcomes and Experiences of Adjudication 
Whether lawyers change case outcomes is very difficult to determine empirically. There are many 
confounding factors, including what counts as a good outcome, how outcomes can be measured, 
the strength of the case, the quality of the lawyer, the ability of the litigant, the nature of the forum, 
the approach of the judge, and the complexity of the law on the issue. Despite these limitations, 
there is some empirical evidence available, including data on whether representation effects the 
rate at which litigants abandon their case (often referred to as “lumping it”),120 or the rate at which 
they settle or successfully adjudicate their claim or defence.  
1. Lumping It 
There is evidence to suggest that LiPs are more likely than represented litigants to abandon their 
case. Hunter found that fully unrepresented LiPs (as opposed to LiPs with some legal assistance) 
had high rates of dismissals and default judgments against them, as well as withdrawals and 
abandonments, suggesting that fully unrepresented LiPs “find the litigation process too difficult 
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to navigate, and are defeated by their incapacity to conform to the Court’s rules and procedures”.121 
Genn has identified the potentially catastrophic consequences of people “lumping it”, particularly 
when one legal problem, such as a debt, creates a cascade of other problems.122 
2. Settlement 
There is consistent though not conclusive evidence to suggest that LiPs who do not lump it are 
less likely to settle than represented litigants.123 The literature suggests a number of reasons for 
this, including the possibility that LiPs are less likely to understand the settlement-orientation of 
litigation,124 and that they do not have a good sense of “where a reasonable ‘settlement range’ 
lies”125 so settle too easily or do not settle because they mistrust their opponent and are worried 
about “being taken for a ride”.126 Moorhead and Sefton identify two other explanations favoured 
by lawyers, court staff and judges: that the LiP had “something to hide” (and therefore did not 
want to engage in a frank discussion) or “wanted to have their day in court”.127 Trinder and others 
also note that lawyers said it was “virtually impossible” to negotiate with LiPs because it was either 
“like ‘communicating with a black hole’, or the opposite: challenging because of the multiple non-
professional communications coming from the LIP”.128 The current evidence certainly suggests 
that settlement is less likely when a LiP is a party. 
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3. Adjudicated outcomes 
Judges believe, and often state, that LiPs are disadvantaged by the absence of a lawyer and that 
this reduces their chances of obtaining a favourable adjudication.129 Numerous studies have 
concurred, finding that represented litigants are more likely to be successful in an adjudication than 
LiPs, although most have not been able to disaggregate the factors that might produce this effect.130 
Sandefur undertook a meta-analysis of US studies that attempted to measure whether represented 
litigants had different outcomes to LiPs. (She remained “agnostic” about whether these outcomes 
were “better” in the sense of “making them more legally accurate or substantively just”).131 She 
found that: “lawyer-represented people do better – on average, lawyer-represented people are more 
likely to win than are unrepresented people in every study.”132 However, “just how much better 
varies considerably across studies”. Sandefur concluded that the difference in outcomes between 
litigants who are represented and not represented is greatest where the procedure is more 
complex.133  
More recently, however, Greiner and Pattanayak have suggested that the substantial literature 
“purporting to measure quantitatively the effect of legal representation in civil disputes” (they 
footnote three pages of studies) “provides no information on representation effects that would 
not already have been available from instinct and conjecture”.134 They conclude that even 
Sandefur’s well-designed meta-analysis is of little value because of the limitations of the studies 
analysed.135 It is therefore possible to hypothesise that having a lawyer does matter, but we cannot 
be sure it does, and, if it does, we do not know why or how much difference it makes.   
4. Procedural Justice 
While there is much uncertainty about whether (and how much) legal representation affects the 
outcome in litigation, the substantive outcome is not the only aspect that matters. Thibaut and 
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Walker found, in psychological research, that people’s perceptions of whether a process is “just” 
depends as much on their views on the fairness of the process as on substantive outcomes.136  
There are several theories on why procedural justice matters.137 One theory, proposed by Thibaut 
and Walker, is that people care about fair procedure because sound procedure facilitates the 
adjudicator’s ability to make an accurate decision. However, Tyler and Lind found that field 
research with litigants pointed away from concern about outcomes:138 
Litigant concerns were consistently found to be about issues that had very little to do 
with the gain or loss of resources. They were instead about being treated disrespectfully, 
about distrust in the motives of authorities and about feelings that those making 
decisions did not listen to and consider their concerns. 
Tyler and Lind conclude that the research now firmly points in the direction of a “relational” 
theory: procedures are important because the messages they send affect a person’s feeling of self-
worth. This theory assumes that “people are predisposed to belong to social groups”, partly 
because “groups provide a source of self-validation”.139 Tyler says that, “[P]eople attempt to 
maintain high status within groups and use the justice of their experiences to evaluate their group 
status”. This relational theory of procedural justice suggests that formal procedural justice, for 
example turn-taking, is not sufficient. People also need to be treated with politeness and dignity 
and they are attentive to violations as these communicate to them that they are of low-status in 
the group.140  
Tyler summarises the variables that are now thought to influence perceptions of procedural justice: 
“opportunities for participation [often referred to as the ‘voice effect’], a neutral forum, 
trustworthy authorities, and treatment with dignity and respect”.141 Where these factors are 
present, litigants are likely to perceive they have been treated fairly. Tyler’s research also suggests 
that people decide how much to defer to an authority, and whether to follow its decisions, primarily 
by making judgments about the fairness of its process.142 This research demonstrates that LiPs’ 
                                                          
136 John Thibaut and Laurens Walker Procedural Justice: A Psychological Analysis (Erlbaum, Hillsdale, New York, 1975). 
137 John Jost and Aaron Kay "Social Justice: History, Theory, and Research" in Susan Fiske, Daniel Gilbert and 
Gardner Lindzey (eds) Handbook of Social Psychology (5th ed,  Hoboken, New Jersey, 2010) 1122 at 1141-1142. 
138 Tom Tyler "Justice Theory" in Paul Van Lange, Arie Kruglanski and Tory Higgins (eds) Handbook of Theories of Social 
Psychology (Sage, Thousand Oaks, 2012) 344 at 349. 
139 Tom Tyler and Allan Lind "A Relational Model of Authority in Groups" (1992) 25 Advances in Experimental 
Social Psychology 115. 
140 Tom Tyler "Psychological Models of the Justice Motive" (1994) 67 Journal of Personality and Social Psychology 
850. 
141 Tyler, above n 138 at 350. 
142 Tom Tyler Why People Obey the Law (Princeton University Press, Princeton, 2006).  
34 
 
experience of court will be affected by their experience of procedural justice, independent of the 
outcome of their legal case.  
C. The Purpose of Civil Justice 
Our views on the purposes of civil justice are also likely to have a strong influence on our thinking 
about the role of LiPs in the court system and appropriate responses to them. Some commentators 
view civil justice primarily as a form of dispute resolution between the parties. Its aim, on this 
view, is to provide accurate determination of disputes to avoid citizens resorting to violence.143 
Assy adopts this approach, describing state involvement as a “matter of placing a service of 
adjudication at the disposal of citizens who wish to assert their legitimate interests and enforce 
their legal rights”.144 Landes and Posner also recognise that it is a function of dispute resolution to 
enforce private rights, but note that its purpose goes beyond this, because new rules are created in 
the course of the process (such as new rules of the common law). There is a public good in this 
form of “rule creation” as it specifies “standards of socially desired behavior in order to promote 
compliance with them”.145 This is important in a capitalist economy and a democracy, as civil 
justice “provides the legal structure for the economy to operate effectively and for the power of 
government to be scrutinised and limited”.146 Litigants are not, therefore, mere consumers of a 
service provided by the state. There is a public good in the enforcement and refinement of legal 
standards, and in upholding the rule of law.147 Genn makes a forceful and convincing argument 
that civil justice performs all these functions (private dispute resolution, rule creation, ordering of 
the capitalist economy, and a check on government), and that together they are a public good that 
goes beyond the interests of the individual who calls upon the system:148 
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In determining the merits in individual disputes, the judiciary are publicly stating the 
law, reinforcing norms of social and economic behaviour, identifying the limits of 
executive power and publicising the values of the society. 
Implicit in all these arguments is the necessity of access to the courts. As Bingham pithily puts it:149 
It would seem to be an obvious implication of the principle that everyone is bound by 
and entitled to the protection of the law that people should be able, in the last resort, 
to go to court to have their civil rights and claims determined. An unenforceable right 
or claim is a thing of little value to anyone. 
This provides the most convincing theoretical basis for the long-standing right to litigate in 
person.150 If litigation in person were prohibited, then the courts would be seen as a tool only for 
those who can afford to hire a lawyer or qualify for legal aid. Those left out would then have no 
means of enforcing their rights. The other main justification is that “because procedural rights are 
conferred upon persons, they … confer a right to exercise them in person, producing a right to 
litigate”.151 Assy argues that this justification is fallacious, however. Just because a right is personal, 
he says, does not mean one is entitled to exercise it in person: “Access to court can be fully (and 
often more effectively) exercised through legal representation”.152 This might be so if legal 
representation were available to all, but, in the current market for legal services and with limited 
legal aid funding available, the right to litigate in person arguably remains essential to maintaining 
the appearance of access to the courts, preserving people’s apparent entitlement to enforce their 
rights, including rights against the state. 
Access to the courts must, however, be limited. If everyone were to take up this right, the system 
would be choked under the demand. As Galanter summarises: 153 
In a world of expanding capabilities and rising expectations, where claims of injustice 
proliferate, we cannot avoid the necessity of rationing justice. Justice is not free. It uses 
up resources – money, organization, and not least, the limited supply of attention. 
One way of limiting access is, as Sarat argues, by “stress[ing] the limits of citizen competence. 
Participation is facilitated by the intervention of trained legal specialists”.154  
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The other means by which citizens’ access to the court can be limited is by rationing the amount 
of access available to any single litigant. Following the lead of the UK, New Zealand has introduced 
rules that the “just, speedy and inexpensive determination” are the overarching goals of civil 
procedure.155 These goals are the “yardstick” by which all High Court and District Court Rules are 
to be measured.156  
This “yardstick” mirrors those introduced in the UK and Australia. These aims have been set as a 
result of the Woolf Report in the UK, following a working party inquiry that was charged with 
reviewing the rules of civil procedure with a view to “ensuring and improving access to justice at 
reasonable cost and speed”.157 Prior to the Woolf reforms, as Sorabji argues, the aim of civil justice 
was to secure “substantive justice”: a correct decision, or justice on the merits.158 The Woolf 
reforms introduced a new theory of justice whereby substantive justice was just one of the goals 
of the civil justice system. The other goals are, “the pursuit of economy, efficiency, expedition, 
equality and proportionality”.159 Sorabji calls this new theory of justice “proportional justice”, and 
argues that it is a form of distributive justice, in which “a limit is now placed on the amount of 
resources individuals in the state can properly expend in securing substantive justice in any 
particular case”.160  
That proportional justice is the goal of the High Court (and now the amended District Court) 
Rules in New Zealand161 was made clear by the Court of Appeal in SM v LFBD,  where it found 
that the aim of case management is to dispose of cases “fairly, swiftly and efficiently, with regard 
to what is at stake”.162 Doing so is important not just to the parties in the dispute, but to other 
litigants (“because it affects the time their cases will take to come to trial”), and to the “public at 
large” (“because they should feel confident that the Court can try cases fairly, quickly and 
efficiently”). The Court concluded that, “From the perspective of a judge dealing with any given 
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case, all these interests are relevant; all form part of the interests of justice”.163 In other words, 
substantive justice is no longer the paramount consideration, but one consideration to be weighed 
with others.  
III. Responses 
There is a large and growing literature on appropriate responses to the rapid increase in LiPs being 
experienced in many countries, much of it very thoughtful, as well as a vast grey literature reviewing 
particular responses that have been implemented in different jurisdictions. In this section, I briefly 
survey the major categories of response, loosely based on Galanter’s taxonomy of responses to 
discontent with the adversarial justice system, published in 1980.164 My adaptation of this 
taxonomy is presented in Table 1. The discussion that follows explains and considers each 
category.  
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Table 1 - Taxonomy of Responses to increasing numbers of LiPs 













e.g. provide more legal 
advice and representation 
Diverting 
e.g. channel LiPs or disputes 
with high rates of LiPs into 
alternative dispute 
resolution mechanisms, such 
as Disputes Tribunal or 
mediation 
Displacing 
e.g. create alternative 
compensation system, such 
as ACC, or delegalize areas 
that generate high numbers 









e Expanding and reforming 
e.g. move to inquisitorial 
justice; simplify procedure; 
more information for LiPs 
Transforming 
i.e. reduce the role of law in 
ordering society 
Avoiding or Preventing 
e.g. more equal distribution 
of wealth; more social work 
services to avoid the 
breakdown of families. 
A. Responses within the Courts  
Most suggested responses to the LiP issue fall under this heading. These approaches look at ways 
of increasing the capacity of the various participants in the court system to either use it as it 
currently stands or in some modified form, while keeping the courts’ central place in the justice 
system unaltered.  
1. Strengthening 
(d) More representation 
One favoured solution to the increase in LiPs is more funding for legal aid. In 2000, the Dewar 
report on the Australian Family Court concluded:165 
Our research lends support to the argument that greater investment in legal aid funding 
will result in cost savings to the Court system, and therefore to the taxpayer. This is 
because we have shown that (a) there is an identifiable link between the unavailability 
of legal aid and self-representation; and (b) that litigants in person consume more Court 
resources than represented parties. 
The argument made is that legal aid cuts are false economy because they increase costs elsewhere 
in the system (e.g., by increasing the use of judicial time and other welfare resources), a point also 
emphasised after the recent legal aid cuts in the UK.166 The authors of this Australian Family Court 
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report argue that funding for legal aid would help to “alleviate the injustices and inconsistencies 
that currently arise”. They say that “equal access to legal services is a cornerstone of legitimacy and 
a democratic system of government”.167  
There is, however, little political will to provide more legal aid. Moreover, in addition to being 
politically unlikely, providing more legal aid does not offer a complete solution. It can simply 
generate more cases, continuing to over-burden the system:168  
[D]efinitions of legal need are not static; they are elastic and have a tendency to expand 
as potential beneficiaries see lawyers as capable of responding to their problems. As 
has been demonstrated in legal services to the poor, demand for services will increase 
to the limits of the available supply. 
There are calls for lawyers to provide more pro bono services to clients in need.169 However, even 
when describing a pro bono system in the UK that is far more organised than anything in New 
Zealand, the UK Civil Justice Council said pro bono services “cannot begin to meet the scale of 
shortfall in provision” that remains after legal aid has been reduced. They concluded that “pro 
bono work exists only as an adjunct to legal aid and privately-paid legal services. It can never 
replace legal aid”.170  
(e) More advice – limited retainer services  
Given that funding for more representation is politically problematic, and, even if provided, would 
be likely to provide only a partial solution, another focus internationally has been on the provision 
of “unbundled” or limited retainer legal advice.171 This can be provided either in the form of private 
services paid for by the litigant, or via state-funded drop-in clinics, often situated in the court 
building.172 This allows LiPs to get personalised advice for their legal problem without the cost of 
full representation. Some commentators have also suggested that court staff be trained and be 
allowed to give more advice to LiPs.173  
                                                          
department in this instance simply increases it in the courts. The expense of three judges of the Court of Appeal 
dealing with this kind of appeal is enormous”; Civil Justice Council, above n 26 at [38]; Assy, above n 144 at 110-111. 
167 Dewar, Smith and Banks, above n 61 at 80. 
168 Gary Bellow and Jeanne Kettleson "From Ethics to Politics: Confronting Scarcity and Fairness in Public Interest 
Practice" (1978) 58 Boston University Law Review 337 at 380. 
169 Winkelmann, above n 4 at 239; Deborah Rhode "Access to Justice: Again, Still" (2004) 73 Fordham Law Review 
1013 at 1025. 
170 Civil Justice Council, above n 26 at [125]. 
171 For reports recommending unbundling see for example Law Commission Dispute Resolution in the Family Court 
(NZLC R82, 2006) at 195 Civil Justice Council, above n 26 at [113] and Macfarlane, above n 2 at 123.  
172 The antipodean exemplar is in Queensland, Australia. See Tony Woodyatt, Allira Thompson and Elizabeth 
Pendlebury "Queensland's Self-Representation Services: A Model for Other Courts and Tribunals" (2011) 20 Journal 
of Judicial Administration 225. 
173 Webb, above n 143 at 178; Goldschmidt and others, above n 81 at 42. 
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Limited retainer advice does, of course, come with limitations. First is availability. Private 
practitioners are often unwilling to provide it. Second is effectiveness. Greiner and others’ 
randomised controlled trial demonstrated that full representation is significantly more effective 
than unbundled clinic-based advice.174 It may, however, be a better option than efforts to increase 
LiPs’ capacity to represent themselves without advice, to which I now turn. 
2.  Expanding and Reforming 
(f) Self-help resources for LiPs 
There are many programmes in other countries that provide self-help services for LiPs. These 
come in many forms, including online information (print and video), guidebooks, and other forms 
of information on the court process.175 For vulnerable litigants, in particular, there are still 
questions around how much self-help is possible or desirable, as it may cause litigants to feel 
abandoned rather than empowered.176 
(g) Reforming rules and roles 
One area of reforms takes as its starting point Lord Woolf’s often-quoted statement that:177 
Only too often the litigant in person is regarded as a problem for judges and for the 
court system rather than the person for whom the system of civil justice exists. The 
true problem is the court system and its procedures which are still too often inaccessible 
and incomprehensible to ordinary people.  
Many reports therefore focus on altering the roles of judges and court staff, and on changing the 
procedural rules, to make the court more accessible to LiPs.178 The argument is that, if litigants 
                                                          
174 James Greiner, Cassandra Wolos Pattanayak and Jonathan Hennessy "The Limits of Unbundled Legal Assistance: 
A Randomized Study in a Massachusetts District Court and Prospects for the Future" (2013) 126 Harvard Law Review 
901. 
175 For an example of a self-help book see Lucy Reed Family Courts without a Lawyer: A Handbook for Litigants in Person 
(2nd ed, Bath Publishing, Bath, 2013). 
176 Elizabeth McCulloch "Let Me Show You How: Pro Se Divorce Courses and Client Power" (1996) 48 Florida Law 
Review 481; Jeff Giddings and Michael Robertson "Large-Scale Map or the A-Z? The Place of Self-Help Services in 
Legal Aid" (2003) 30 Journal of Law and Society ; Mather, above n 61 at 154.  
177 Woolf, above n 157 at 17.2. 
178 Civil Justice Council, above n 26 at [32] stating “Courts and tribunals exist for the users, not the other way round”; 
Webb, above n at 178 arguing that the system should be fitted to litigants, not litigants to the system, as “litigants are 
practically and logically necessary for disputes to be settled; advocates are not”; Judicial Working Group on Litigants 
in Person Judicial Working Group on Litigants in Person: Report (Judiciary of England and Wales, 2013) at 6-7, concluding 
that “litigants in person are not in themselves a problem; the problem lies with the system which is not developed 
with a focus on unrepresented litigants. We consider it vital that, despite the enormous challenge presented, judges 
are unable to and empowered to adapt the system to the needs of litigants in person, rather than vice versa”.  
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have a right to access the courts to attain justice, then the courts must do what they can to make 
it a reality.179   
It is often suggested that Judges should be permitted to provide more assistance to LiPs concerning 
such matters as how to ask questions, or guiding witness examinations, or that judges should be 
provided with more guidelines as to the proper limits of the assistance to LiPs that they can 
provide.180 Another common suggestion is more judicial case management,181 though case 
management does not necessarily reduce costs but rather shifts costs to the front-end of the 
process, and it can increase the cost to the taxpayer, as it requires a significant increase in judicial 
resources in the early stages of the process.182 Nevertheless, it is still seen as part of the response 
required.183 But a more active role for the judiciary of this kind, even if we accept it should be part 
of the response, cannot be a complete one. This is especially because Judges’ knowledge of facts 
is limited to the evidence that is put before them. That fact gathering aspect of the process must 
still proceed outside the court. Greiner and others therefore suggest that a reason why unbundled 
advice is less effective than full representation is the role counsel play in finding and presenting 
the facts:184 
If prehearing investigation and factual development are critical, then obviously no 
amount of adjudicator explanation at a hearing can fill in the gap left by the absence of 
competent legal assistance.  
To overcome this problem, some suggest that the judiciary need to take a more active role in the 
process, leading to a more inquisitorial system, at least where one party is a LiP.185 Even 
inquisitorial systems require lawyers, however, and, as Assy and Zuckerman argue, they therefore 
offer no complete response to the challenges posed by LiPs.186 
                                                          
179 Russell Engler "And Justice for All - Including the Unrepresented Poor: Revisiting the Roles of the Judges, 
Mediators, and Clerks" (1999) 67 Fordham Law Review 1987; Jona Goldschmidt "The Pro Se Litigant's Struggle for 
Access to Justice" (2002) 40 Family Court Review 36 at 38; Family Court of Australia Self-Represented Litigants - A 
Challenge: Project Report (May 2003) at 5. Cf Assy, above n 144 at 11-15. 
180 Landsman, above n 1 at 248; Richard Zorza "A New Day for Judges and the Self-Represented: The Implications 
of Turner v Rogers" (2011) 50(4) Judges' Journal 16. 
181 Family Court of Australia, above n 179 at 37; Webb, above n 143 at 175; Goldschmidt and others, above n 81 at 
47-48 suggest that conferences would not necessarily have to be judicial, but could be run by court staff. 
182 Adrian Zuckerman "A Reform of Civil Procedure - Rationing Procedure rather than Access to Justice" (1995) 22 
Journal of Law and Society 155 at 172.  
183 Civil Justice Council, above n 26 at [100]. 
184 Greiner, Pattanayak and Hennessy, above n 174 at 945. 
185 Civil Justice Council, above n 26 at [2.10] and [5.11]; Rebecca Albrecht and others "Judicial Techniques for Cases 
Involving Self-Represented Litigants" (2003) 42 Judges Journal 16 at 45-48. In the New Zealand context, Matthew 
Smith "Self-Represented Litigants"  [2012] New Zealand Law Journal 12 at 13-14 reviews case law where Judges have 
suggested a more active role is appropriate. 
186 Adrian Zuckerman "No Justice Without Lawyers: The Myth of an Inquisitorial System" (2014) 33 Civil Justice 
Quarterly 355 at 360-361; Assy, above n 144 at 123-125 (discussing the German system).   
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The other potential area of reform is in the procedural rules, often offered as a complement to a 
more active judicial role. The procedural rules might be simplified to make them easier for LiPs to 
understand. Zuckerman argues that it would be desirable to simplify the rules, by removing 
unnecessary procedural requirements and doing away with “convoluted and opaque” language, 
rules and practice directions. But he still argues that:187 
Complexity is the inevitable result of the commitment of treating like cases alike. This 
commitment produces a continuing refinement of court practice and the build up to 
precedents to ensure that like cases are treated alike. Consequently, no matter how hard 
the rule maker and the court may try to make the procedure comprehensible to the lay 
person, unrepresented litigants are bound to remain at disadvantage. 
Zuckerman’s argument a decade ago was to apply different procedure to different kinds of cases.188 
This might lead, for instance, to simplified procedure in cases, where LiPs are particularly 
numerous.189 As an alternative suggestion, some commentators have argued that simplified 
procedural rules should be put in place, depending not on the case, but on whether one party is a 
LiP.190 There have also been calls for simplified court forms.191 The Government-led family justice 
reform introduced new forms that are intended to enable LiPs to conduct proceedings without 
legal assistance. The difficulty with these reforms for “simplification” is that they can create 
additional complexity. One (of several) criticisms levelled at the family justice reforms is the 
introduction of a “complex maze of procedures with different entry points, criteria and 
exemptions”.192 Simplified forms may also hinder clarifying the issues at stake in a dispute, which 
was why a judiciary-led rule change abandoned the simplified court forms for all District Court 
cases.193  
                                                          
187 Zuckerman, above n 186 at 373. 
188 Zuckerman, above n 182. 
189 District Court Rules 2014, r 10.1. There are three different modes of trial available: short, simplified or full. The 
complexity of the issues, the amount at stake, and “proportionality”, are all factors to be taken into account in 
determining the appropriate mode of trial. Short and simplified trials have time limits for witness examination and 
limits on discovery. Similarly, the Family Court has different “tracks” for different proceedings. 
190 Judicial Working Group on Litigants in Person, above n 178 at 8; Goldschmidt and others, above n 81 at 51-52. 
191 Macfarlane, above n 2 at 113; Civil Justice Council, above n 26 at [175]-[178]. 
192 Mark Henaghan and Meghan Nicholson "Family Law" (2014) 2 New Zealand Law Review 321 at 350 quoting 
Garry Collin, the Chair of the Law Society Family Law Section. 
193 District Court Rules 2014; Andrew Beck and others District Court Procedures: Review and Reform (New Zealand Law 
Society Continuing Legal Education, Wellington, 2014) at 1 stating that the rules were amended because “the absence 
of structured documents in the form of statements of claim and statements of defence meant that succinct and clear 
analyses of the position of the parties were often not available until the proceedings were well advanced”.  See also 
Henaghan and Nicholson, above n 192 at 351 noting that the Expert Reference Group for the family justice reforms 




B. Alternatives to the Courts 
Governments worldwide have responded by creating alternative dispute resolution (ADR) 
mechanisms. As Resnik and Curtis summarise the position:194 
With soaring demands for adjudication, governments have responded by diversifying 
the venues for adjudication. Magnificent courts welcome some rights seekers to their 
halls but send others to much less visible and impressive settings – administrative 
agencies or tribunals where lower-tier hearing officers work.  
Similarly, one of the responses to the demands of LiPs is to send them to more informal settings, 
on the basis that there they will be better able to put their case as they will not be bound by strict 
procedure and the adjudicator will not be under the restraints of the adversarial system and be 
better able to assist. 
The objections to such informalism lie both in the effect it has on disputants and on civil justice 
as a whole. Abel points out that “the danger with informalism is that it will dilute the limited 
protection against the powerful” that those who are “weaker, poorer, or of lower social status” 
derive from formal procedure.195 He argues that reformers who press the case for ADR also often 
try to reduce litigation. “Yet”, he says, “the object is not to reduce litigation in general but to rid 
the courts of certain kinds of cases so that Judges can handle more cases of other kinds, or handle 
them better.”196 Fiss’s well-known polemic, “Against Settlement”, objects to the effects of 
informalism for the civil justice system as a whole:197 
The dispute-resolution story makes settlement appear as a perfect substitute for 
judgment … by trivializing the remedial dimensions of a lawsuit, and also by reducing 
the social function of the lawsuit to one of resolving private disputes. 
Some commentators suggest that this trend towards informalism might be evidence of a more 
fundamental transformation where the role of law in ordering society is reduced. Informal dispute 
resolution is a symptom of law becoming “soft”, more flexible, discretionary and participative, 
than the coercive and enforceable “hard law” we are familiar with at present.198 Galanter says that 
evidence of this transformation is “elusive”.199 Moreover, responses that lie under the heading of 
                                                          
194 Judith Resnik and Dennis Curtis Representing Justice: From Renaissance Iconography to Twenty-First-Century Courthouses 
(2007) at 16. 
195 Richard Abel "Delegalization: A critical review of its ideology, manifestations, and social consequences" in Hubert 
Rottleuthner, Erhard Blankenburg and Ekkehard Klausa (eds) Alternative Rechtsformen und Alternativen zum Recht; Jahrbuch 
fur Rechtssoziologie und Rechtstheorie (Opladen, West-deutscher Verlag, 1980) 27 at 39 and 41. 
196 Richard Abel "Conservative Conflict and the Reporduction of Capitalism: The Role of Informal Justice" (1981) 9 
International Journal of the Sociology of Law 245 at 249. 
197 Owen Fiss "Against Settlement" (1984) 93 Yale Law Journal 1073 at 1085. 
198 Marc Galanter "A World without Trials" (2006) 2006 Journal of Dispute Resolution 7 at 31. 
199 At 30-31.  
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“transformation” are closely related to state-led responses outside the courts, where legislative 
change can reduce the demand for legal services by redefining what is a justiciable issue or displace 
demand by creating other forms of redress. 
C. State-led Responses Outside the Courts 
The most obvious example of displacement in the New Zealand setting is the Accident 
Compensation Corporation (ACC) scheme, which has been operating since 1972.200 This displaces 
from the courts huge numbers of claims for tortious liability, concerning motor accidents and 
other common injuries that could readily produce large numbers of LiPs. No-fault divorce is also 
an example of the potential for legislation to transform an adversarial process into a court-
supervised administrative event. The New Zealand Family Proceedings Act 1980 enabled married 
couples to divorce on the sole ground that their marriage had broken down irreconcilably, 
established by living apart for more than two years, rather than proving who caused the 
relationship breakdown. While the process remained under the supervision of the court system, 
this change largely abolished the adversarial element to a common category of dispute, reducing 
the number of potential LiPs via law reform. 
Focussing on wider policy initiatives emphasises that LiPs seeking access to the courts cannot 
necessarily be answered only by responses within the courts. Access to justice requires a broader 
view. As Sandefur argues:201 
New policies should include providing effective, accessible, nonlegal routes to solutions 
for common and significant civil justice problems; these routes will be a necessary 
complement to the traditional solution of more access to law.  
State-led responses that address underlying social inequality could also reduce the amount of 
conflict in society and perhaps, therefore, the amount of civil litigation. Research has shown that 
one legal problem can trigger a cascade of other legal problems, for example an unfair dismissal 
from employment can lead to debt problems and family breakdown.202 Strengthening protection 
in one area, such as employment protection, can therefore reduce the need for recourse to the 
courts for multiple issues.  
                                                          
200 Accident Compensation Act 1972.  
201 Sandefur, above n 131 at 51. 
202 Richard Moorhead, Margaret Robinson and Matrix Research and Consultancy A Trouble Shared: Legal Problems 
Clusters in Solicitors' and Advice Agencies (Department for Constitutional Affairs, 2006); Genn and Beinart, above n 67. 
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D. Conclusion  
There is limited data on New Zealand LiPs, who they are, how many, and whether the number of 
them has changed. While this data would be useful, I have argued that research that categorises 
LiPs by reference to the form of interaction they are having with the court is more useful. I argue 
that a study of LiPs must attend to not just who they are in isolation, but their interaction with the 
other participants. I have also reviewed the major findings of several studies that investigated why 
people litigate in person. Their conclusions will be considered further when I present my findings 
on this matter in Chapter 4. 
In addition, I have surveyed a number of theories that are important to understanding decisions 
to litigate in person, the experience of doing so, and the interaction of LiPs with others in the court 
system. These theories concern: the services lawyers offer; the means lawyers employ to protect 
the market for legal services; whether lawyers’ services change litigant outcomes; and, independent 
of the outcome, the importance of procedural justice. I have also considered theories of civil justice 
and the importance of allowing litigation in person to the legitimacy of the courts. These theories 
inform much of the discussion in the later chapters. 
The large and rapidly growing literature on appropriate responses to the LiP phenomenon was 
necessarily presented in broad brush-strokes. The review of the possible responses has been 
structured by reference to a taxonomy which emphasises that many possible responses lie outside 
the courts, as well as in possible changes to the behaviour of participants, or in processes followed, 
in the courts. This taxonomy is used in Chapter 10 when I discuss what my research suggests about 
the effectiveness of these different forms of response. 
In the next chapter I examine the methods I used to examine these matters, as well as the ethical 





Entering the Field: Methods, Methodology and Ethics1 
This study uses a mix of qualitative methods to investigate how LiPs experience litigating in 
person, how they are perceived by others in the process, and how court staff, lawyers and judges 
respond to them. The intention is to make a useful and novel contribution to knowledge 
concerning LiPs in New Zealand where very little previous research has been conducted on the 
issue, as well as contributing to the more developed international literature.  
This chapter begins by presenting the final form of the research design and sample, as well as 
tracing its evolution as the project unfolded. The second section of the chapter discusses the 
approach taken to data analysis. The final section considers the ethical issues that arose in 
undertaking this research.  
I Research Design 
The primary qualitative methods used were interviewing, document review and participant 
observation.2 In taking this approach, I was influenced by the work of researchers within the 
tradition often known as legal ethnography, who have explored the work of many participants 
in the legal system, including judges, barristers’ clerks, criminal law officials, and divorce lawyers, 
plus the disputing behaviour of the public.3 This study is not an ethnography in the strict sense 
in which that term is often used. Nevertheless, by employing the methods of participant-
observation, interviewing and document review, derived from that tradition, I have tried to 
understand with fresh eyes the decision to litigate in person, the experience of doing so, and the 
reaction of judges, lawyers and court staff to LiPs.4 Other researchers have noted that litigants’ 
                                                          
1 My thanks to Sharyn Anleu-Roach, John Flood, Martin Tolich, Max Travers, and Julian Webb for discussing with 
me various issues of method, methodology, and ethics. 
2 Mario Luis Small "How to Conduct a Mixed Methods Study: Recent Trends in a Rapidly Growing Literature" 
(2011) 37 Annual Review of Sociology 57 at 59-60. 
3 Penny Darbyshire Sitting in Judgment: the Working Lives of Judges (Hart Publishing, Oxford, 2011); John Flood 
"Middlemen of the Law: An Ethnographic Inquiry into the English Legal Profession" (1981)  American Bar 
Foundation Research Journal 377; David Engel "The Oven Bird's Song: Insiders, Outsiders, and Personal Injuries 
in an American Community" (1984) 18 Journal of Law and Society 551; John Conley and William O'Barr Rules 
Versus Relationships (University of Chicago Press, Chicago and London, 1990); Sally Engle Merry Getting Justice and 
Getting Even: Legal Consciousness among Working-Class Americans (University of Chicago Press, Chicago, 1990); William 
Felstiner and Austin Sarat "Law and Strategy in the Divorce Lawyer's Office" (1986) 20 Law & Society Review 93.  
4 While the case study component of the method could be called “ethnography” according to the criteria listed by 
Michael Angrosino Doing Ethnographic and Observational Research (Sage Publications Ltd, London, 2007) at 15, I have 
chosen to call this part of the method “case studies”. This is because the term “ethnography” risks misrepresenting 
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accounts of their experiences are often “fluid” and that subsequent events can colour their 
recollections as to why certain decisions were made at particular points in a case.5  Importantly, 
however, the methods I used enabled some examination of people’s experiences as they 
occurred, rather than simply retrospectively. The design included “after the fact” interviews with 
LiPs, as well as interviews with lawyers, judges and court staff who had prior experience of LiPs’ 
engagement with the court process. This ensured that a diverse range of views and experiences 
were captured to produce a rich understanding of the LiP experience and other participants’ 
responses to LiPs.  
A. Summary of Final Study Design 
This is essentially a phenomenological study, in that it attempts to see things from the 
participants’ point of view.6 The research design borrows from a number of interpretivist 
schools of qualitative inquiry, including ethnomethodology and symbolic interactionism, but 
also pays attention to structuralist concerns.7 My intention is to respect and acknowledge the 
debates about methods and knowledge that trouble qualitative researchers, but also to produce 
research that can inform policy debate and scholarly conversation about LiPs.8 Qualitative 
                                                          
the amount of time spent with the participants. While I have borrowed heavily from ethnographic methods and 
spent as much time as possible to become immersed in the experience of litigating in person, there is no 
“community” of LiPs I can spend extended time with, a key component of ethnography.  
5 William Felstiner, Richard Abel and Austin Sarat "Emergence and Transformation of Disputes: Naming, Blaming, 
Claiming ..." (1980) 15 Law & Society Review 631 at 650-651; John Conley and William O'Barr "Legal 
Anthropology Comes Home: A Brief History of the Ethnographic Study of Law" (1993-1994) 27 Loyola of Los 
Angeles Law Review 41 at 61-62. 
6 Alan Bryman Social Research Methods (4th ed, Oxford University Press, Oxford, 2012) at 28-32. 
7 As Travers explains, the interpretivist traditions are “faithful to the Weberian injunction that it is important to 
take meaning seriously. This means that their aim is unashamedly descriptive: they seek to stay close to how social 
actors understand their own activities”. Structuralists in contrast, “which all share the Durkheimian assumption 
that there are underlying structures which shape and constrain our actions, but which are hidden from ordinary 
members of society”: Max Travers Qualitative Research Through Case Studies (Online ed, SAGE Publications Ltd, 
London, England, 2001) at 16. Daniel Newman Legal Aid Lawyers and the Quest for Justice (Hart Publishing, Oxford, 
2013) at 28-29 also attempts to answer the “plea for socio-legal research to ‘bridge the gap’ between structuralism 
and interpretivism” and situates his work in the “middle ground”.  
8 As Reza Banakar and Max Travers "Law in Action" in Reza Banakar and Max Travers (eds) Law and Social Theory 
(2nd ed, Hart Publishing, Oxford, 2013) 161 at 164 observe, there are dangers in either bald empiricism, where 
theory is ignored in favour of a pretence of “neutral results”, or theoreticism where theory becomes so central that 
the connection with the empirical world is lost or it becomes “an indulgent, self-referential exercise”. They note 
“[as] Macauley and Mertz suggest, the challenge for realists based in law schools lies in conducting empirical 
research that avoids the traps of empiricism or theoreticism and remains relevant to ‘doctrinal scholarship’”, which 
dominates law schools in New Zealand as it does in other common law jurisdictions. On the position of socio-
legal research in New Zealand, see Kim Economides "Socio-legal Studies in Aotearoa/New Zealand" (2014) 41(2) 
Journal of Law and Society 257.  
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studies of any kind, but especially small-scale, single-researcher studies such as this, are often 
attacked as anecdotal, subjective, or not generalizable.9 This kind of scepticism may be 
particularly likely in New Zealand where there is a limited tradition of socio-legal research and 
a policy audience hungry for “objective facts”, especially those drawn from large data sets that 
claim to present a representative portrait of the subject.10 Smaller scale qualitative research 
studies of the kind I have conducted can, however, investigate a topic in much greater depth, 
and with more flexibility, than a large quantitative project. More subtle aspects of the 
experiences, motives, biases and reactions of participants in the process might be uncovered 
than would emerge from a large (and therefore necessarily superficial) dataset on the subject.  
I used multiple data-sources (interview transcripts, field notes, and litigation documents). These 
were collected and constructed through interviews, participant observation and document 
review. A summary of the groups who participated, the number of participants in each group, 
and the data collection methods employed, appears in Table 2.  
As shown in Table 2, LiPs participated in one of two different ways: either via a case study (that 
included interviews), or only by way of an interview that did not include the wider elements of 
a case study. I began the data collection by conducting the LiP case studies and other LiP 
interviews. Once these were complete, I moved on to interviewing court staff, lawyers, and 
judges.  
 
                                                          
9 Bryman, above n 6 at 405-407. For a specific example, see Assy who dismisses as “anecdotal” the research basis 
reviewed in the previous chapter that suggests a primary reason for litigating in person is financial: Rabeea Assy 
Injustice in Person: The Right to Self-Representation (Oxford University Press, Oxford, 2015) at 20.  
10 James Hackney Legal Intellectuals in Conversation: Reflections on the Construction of Contemporary American Legal Theory 
(New York University Press, New York, 2012) at 107, where Austin Sarat discusses positivism and the law and 
society movement and notes that “In order to pay attention to policy you have to present your work in a positivist 




Table 2 - Summary of Data Sources and Participant Sample 
Participant role Data Collection Method Number of 
participants 
LiPs 1 Case study: Individual interviews, email or text message 
conversations, review of litigation documents (court 
documents, correspondence, complaints), and, where 
possible (n = 5), participant observation 
10 
LiPs 2 Interview: Individual semi-structured interview and, where 
provided (n=11), review of litigation documents (no overlap 
with “LiPs 1”) 
24 
Court Staff Individual semi-structured interview 8 
Lawyers Individual semi-structured interview 16 
Judges Individual semi-structured interview 13 
Total Participants  71 
  
In starting data collection with the LiPs, I followed Goffman’s method of starting at the bottom 
and moving up the social order. As Goffman explains, when discussing participant observation 
as a fieldwork method:11  
… there is the affiliation issue. You can't move down a social system. You can only 
move up a social system. So, if you've got to be with a range of people, be with the 
lowest people first. The higher people will 'understand', later on, that you were 'really' 
just studying them. But you can't start at the top and move down because then the 
people at the bottom will know that all along you really were a fink - which is what 
you are.  
Macfarlane’s study, published during the course of the research, is the only other study about 
LiPs to take LiPs as a starting point.12 The expectation is that, in taking this bottom up approach, 
                                                          
11 Erving Goffman (transcribed and edited by Lyn H Lofland) "On Fieldwork" (1989) 18(2) Journal of 
Contemporary Ethnography 123 at 130. “Fink” is an informer. At 125 Goffman says he only wants to talk about 
participant observation: “observation that is done by two kinds of “finks”: the police on one hand and us 
[ethnographers] on the other”. 
12 Julie Macfarlane The National Self-Represented Litigants Project: Identifying and Meeting the Needs of Self-Represented 
Litigants, Final Report (Ontario, Canada, May 2013). This study included only interviews, not observation or 
document review. Conley and O'Barr, above n 3, had only LiP participants but their study was of legal discourse, 
rather than of LiPs as such.  
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the viewpoints of those studied – here LiPs – are less tainted by their suspicion that the 
researcher is a fink. 
Making LiPs the focus of, and the starting point for, the research was also intended to limit my 
own bias. I am trained and have practised as a lawyer, and lawyers are not usually particularly 
well-disposed towards LiPs. Lawyers love to tell stories about them, particularly those who run 
lengthy, vexatious litigation against multiple defendants.13 I wanted to try to avoid that kind of 
bias. On the other hand, in conducting this research, I was not motivated by any particular 
transformative or critical agenda, in the sense of wanting to reform the court system or improve 
the lot of LiPs.14 Nevertheless, only after attempting to understand LiPs through their own eyes 
did I turn to the perspectives of other litigation participants, inquiring into their perceptions and 
behaviour and the reasons and structural constraints that might explain them.  
B. Initial Research Design 
1. Ethics Approval 
The research design I proposed to the University of Otago Human Ethics Committee 
(UOHEC) in October 2012 had three components: case studies, semi-structured interviews with 
staff of the courts and community organisations who frequently advise LiPs, and a count of 
court files to estimate the number of LiPs active in NZ civil courts.15  
I proposed that the case studies would begin by advertising for LiP participants who were in the 
early stages of litigation. In consenting to participate, the LiP would know that at the end of my 
observation of their case I would interview the opposing litigant and their lawyer. The opposing 
party had to be represented. The LiP, opposing lawyer and their client would all need to consent 
to be included in the research. I also wanted to interview the Judge who heard the case. I was 
                                                          
13 These stories can be interpreted as what Dingwall calls “atrocity stories” and will be discussed in Chapter 8, page 
207: Robert Dingwall "'Atrocity Stories' and Professional Relationships" (1977) 4(4) Work and Occupations 371. 
14 John Creswell Qualitative Inquiry and Research Design: Choosing Among Five Approaches (3rd ed, SAGE Publications, 
Thousand Oaks, 2013) at 25-27: “the basic tenet of this transformative framework is that knowledge is not neutral 
and it reflects the power and social relationships within society, and thus the purpose of knowledge construction 
is to aid people to improve society”; Martyn Hammersley and Paul Atkinson Ethnography: Principles in Practice (3rd 
ed, Routledge, London and New York, 2007) at 97: “Some regard the role of the ethnographer as to amplify the 
voices of those on the social margins; these being treated as having epistemological or ethical privilege”. 
15 The design of the court file review to estimate numbers of LiPs was derived from Richard Moorhead and Mark 
Sefton Litigants in Person: Unrepresented Litigants in First Instance Proceedings (2/05, United Kingdom Department of 
Constitutional Affairs Research Series 2005). 
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aware, however, that New Zealand has a strictly observed rule that Judges do not make extra-
judicial comment on cases, so I sought permission to interview Judges about LiPs in general, 
not the specific case observed.16 
I chose to conduct all aspects of the research in Auckland and Waikato, areas that contain 1.8 
million people, or 43 per cent of the total population of New Zealand.17 These areas also have 
demographically diverse populations and are close to my home, which made it practical to carry 
out the observations. I refer to these regions together as the “Study Region”. The “Study 
Courts” are the District (including Family) Courts and the High Courts, conducting civil 
proceedings, within the Study Region.  
The specific ethical issues raised by the research are considered in more detail below. The ethics 
application was 15 pages long, with a further 37 pages comprising letters of support from the 
Judiciary, a template for data collection for the court file review, an advertisement for recruiting 
LiPs, and the proposed research instruments for each participant group: LiPs, the opposing 
party, the opposing counsel, Judges, and court registry staff. UOHEC granted approval on 23 
November 2012 (approval 12/315) without requiring any amendments.  
2. Māori Consultation 
In addition to UOHEC approval, I consulted the Ngāi Tahu Research Consultation Committee 
that considers potential research of interest or concern to Māori. Their feedback was that I 
include, where possible, data on ethnicity. I asked all LiP participants about ethnic identification 
and Table 3 shows the ethnic group that the LiPs said they identified with.  
                                                          
16 Grant Hammond "Judges and Free Speech in New Zealand" in HP Lee (ed) Judiciaries in Comparative Perspective 
(Cambridge University Press, Cambridge, 2011) 195. 
17 Statistics New Zealand "Estimated subnational population (RC, AU), by age and sex, at 30 June 2006-13 (2013 
boundaries)"   <http://nzdotstat.stats.govt.nz/> . 
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Table 3 - LiP Participants by Ethnicity  
Ethnic Group Number of 
participants 
NZ European/Pakeha 21 
European (immigrant) 7 
Maori 3 
Indian 1 
Pacific Island 1 
African 1 
Total Participants 34 
 
3. Judicial and Ministry of Justice Approval 
I needed permission from the MoJ to access court files and interview court staff. The MoJ has 
their own process for reviewing research conducted within the courts, including ethics review, 
and I submitted my proposal on 10 December 2012. It was approved on 21 February 2013. 
To interview Judges, I needed the permission of the Judicial Research Committee (JRC).18 I 
submitted a proposal to the JRC on 10 December 2012. It was approved on 19 February 2013, 
with one amendment: that I was able to observe proceedings involving LiP case study 
participants, but only able to interview Judges other than those I observed presiding in those 
cases.19 It is perhaps not surprising that the JRC imposed this limitation, as some LiPs are 
notorious for the amount of litigation they bring, including bringing proceedings against Judges 
personally. I therefore modified the proposal and requested interviews with all the Judges who 
had not presided over a case observed, but who sat in the Study Region. This provided the 
closest approximation to the set of interviews I had intended. 
                                                          
18 The JRC considers all requests for involvement of Judges in research and makes recommendations to the relevant 
Heads of Bench. 
19 Cf John Dewar, Barry Smith and Cate Banks Litigants in Person in the Family Court of Australia (Family Court of 
Australia, 2000) at 31, where the study involved (among other methods) researchers observing hearings and the 
presiding judge providing comments to the researcher about the case observed; and Liz Trinder and others Litigants 
in Person in Private Family Law Cases (Ministry of Justice, United Kingdom, 2014)at 156, where the researchers had 
permission to conduct informal interviews with judicial officers after observing cases over which the judicial officer 
had presided.   
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4. Initial Recruitment of LiPs 
I defined a LiP as anyone who at any point in their case had not had counsel on the record.20 
This meant I included people who had been represented at some point in the progress of their 
case, but not at other points. I chose an inclusive definition of this kind because I was interested 
in interrogating the experience of LiPs who tried to obtain help by way of formal legal 
representation or other legal assistance during the course of their case, and might have been 
successful. There were two possible methods to recruit LiPs to the study: to advertise for 
participants, or to randomly sample and invite people who had filed cases in the Study Courts 
to participate. I chose advertising for two reasons. First, I hoped to include LiPs who had not 
yet filed in court, or who had filed as represented litigants and would be recorded as represented, 
but who had subsequently become LiPs. Second, to generate a random sample of participants I 
would need access to court files, which would need to be approved by the MoJ. I was cautioned 
by other researchers that the MoJ process was likely to be lengthy and could have uncertain 
outcomes. This concern was borne out by my experience of attempting to get access to the 
court files to estimate the number of LiPs (the third component of the original design).  
Despite obtaining formal permission from the MoJ to access case files to estimate LiP numbers, 
the subsequent delays experienced in actually gaining access meant it unfortunately became 
impossible to undertake this part of the research. An initial delay, in 2013, occurred because of 
a major staffing restructure in the Family Court. This was followed by a significant delay as I 
tried to identify a MoJ staff member who could generate the case management reports. A MoJ 
employee also told me during this time that although the MoJ did not want to “put up a road 
block”, “there might be some costings associated with searching the files”, because they would 
need to have a staff member supervising my review of the files. In February 2014, I spoke to a 
MoJ employee who had detailed knowledge of the case management system. They knew how 
to generate the initial reports I needed and agreed to do so. When, in July 2014, and after further 
                                                          
20 There are a number of possible definitions for LiPs (see discussion in Chapter 2, page 14). Many of the LiPs had 
previously been represented, and several case study LiPs became represented during the course of the research 
(one moved in and out of representation several times). 
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follow-up, these reports had still not been generated, I decided to abandon the attempt to 
estimate LiP numbers.21  
I began recruiting LiPs in April 2013. I initially tried to recruit participants via “key 
informants”:22 that is, people who were acting as McKenzie friends in the Study Region. While 
they gave me useful background information and made some attempts to connect me to 
potential participants, only one case study participant was recruited in this way, and not until a 
year after I made contact with the key informant. The other initial recruitment method was via 
posters and brochures (see Appendix A) at community organisations that I expected would 
serve large numbers of LiPs, such as the Community Law Centre in Hamilton and the Citizens 
Advice Bureau. I also put up posters in the offices of the Study Courts, although this did not 
occur until later as securing permission from the MoJ to display posters took 10 weeks.   
In the interim, to increase my sample, I requested ethical approval for an amendment to my 
methods to allow recruitment via a website at www.selfrepresented.org.nz, which outlined the 
project and the opportunities to participate. It included links to information that LiPs might 
find useful, such as the Community Law Centres, Citizens Advice Bureau and the MoJ 
websites.23 I also approached both paid and free newspapers with circulation in the Study Region 
to run a story about the research. Four newspaper articles appeared in late 2013 and early 2014. 
An example of a news story about the research is included in Appendix B. 
The website proved to be an important recruitment tool. Participants volunteered after finding 
it via search engines and I was able to link the website to advertisements for participants. I 
posted a link to the website on the web forum menz.org.nz, an active website of men involved 
in Family Law proceedings. Users of this site then linked it to other online support groups for 
                                                          
21 I did explore other methods of estimating the number of LiPs including: counting the number of people listed 
as appearing in person on the daily court lists; reporting numbers of LiPs appearing in the Auckland High Court, 
which the Auckland registry office began collecting in 2013; or, searching the court judgment databases for cases 
where the party is recorded as appearing “in person”. All these methods have important limitations, particularly 
questionable accuracy and an ability only to capture representation at one moment in time (either at filing for the 
Auckland High Court figures, or at hearing for the other methods). Given many people move between represented 
and unrepresented over the course of litigation, all these methods are likely to significantly under-estimate the total 
number of LiPs. While it would be very helpful to know what New Zealand’s LiP population is, it is not a question 
that could be addressed in this research.  
22 Hammersley and Atkinson, above n 14 at 103-104. 




Family Court litigation, and through this network it was passed to diverse user groups. Fifteen 
LiPs were recruited via the website, 10 through hearing about the study in the media, five by 
word of mouth, three from posters, and one via a key informant. I had approaches from 11 
other litigants who were not eligible to participate in the study. Many of these litigants shared 
their stories about their experiences with me. I listened to these, but they are not included in the 
analysis. Others were seeking legal advice. I replied to these requests with a brief explanation of 
the study and redirected them to the Community Law Centre.24  
C. Design Amendments 
When requesting UOHEC approval to recruit via a website in June 2013, I also requested a 
number of other amendments to address issues that became apparent in the initial recruitment.  
1. Documentary Material 
I had not sought approval to study documentary material in the original ethics application, but 
it quickly became apparent that court documents and correspondence would provide valuable 
information, and was material that LiP participants wanted to provide. The written materials 
not only gave background information about the cases but also showed how the parties were 
conducting themselves in the litigation, both in and out of court. I therefore requested and was 
granted approval to study this information by the UOHEC. 
2. Consent for the case studies and recruitment of lawyers 
I had expected that it would be difficult to find LiPs who were willing to participate in the case 
studies, knowing that at the end of my observation of them I would talk to the opposing counsel 
and litigant. This was not however a difficulty, or at least, those who responded to the 
advertisement were happy for me to talk to the other party. On the other hand, securing the 
consent of the opposing party and their lawyer was much more difficult. The original design 
was predicated on all parties to the litigation giving consent, so it was also a considerable 
roadblock to the research progressing. Unsurprisingly, in many of the case studies, there was 
significant animus between the parties, but more surprising to me was the level of animus that 
had developed between the opposing lawyer and the LiP, and also the distrust with which the 
                                                          
24 The posters and newspaper articles highlighted that this was a research project and that I could not provide legal 
advice. I reiterated this when responding to them.  
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opposing lawyers treated me.25 Because of the study design, where I spent time interviewing and 
observing the LiP first, I was not regarded as neutral. Opposing lawyers were usually suspicious 
and either did not reply to my overtures or sent curt refusals.26  
The LiPs who had volunteered did not want the opposing party to stop them participating but 
without even a reply from the opposing counsel I had no way to try negotiating to secure 
consent. As Desmond discusses in his study of eviction, while there are advantages to studying 
an issue from multiple vantage points, it also requires “more effort be dedicated to gaining 
entreé and maintaining trust. ... Access to one person often complicated access to another”.27 
Without even the chance to engage with the opposing party, I had no opportunity to discuss 
the possibility of them participating. As I found later during the course of the case studies, it 
was only after opposing parties became familiar with my presence in the courtroom, where I 
could talk to them, and, by taking notes, emphasize my researcher role, that they were willing to 
participate in the study. Without personal contact in the courtroom, however, it was very 
difficult to engage the opposing party.  
I therefore decided to seek approval from the UOHEC to amend the study design so that the 
other party did not have to give consent before the LiP could participate. It would be for the 
Judge to decide whether I should be admitted to observe the hearing, and the Judge could take 
into account any objections the opposing parties might have to my presence.28 I also requested 
                                                          
25 My surprise shows my naïve belief that my academic interests would be shared by members of the practising 
profession, as Brenda Danet, Kenneth Hoffman and Nicole Kermish "Obstacles to the Study of Lawyer-Client 
Interaction: The Biography of a Failure" (1979) 14 Law & Society Review 905 83 at 908 explain: “As workers in 
the field of law and social science know, the legal profession is almost by definition unsympathetic to the needs 
and interests of social scientists. By training, practicing lawyers are pragmatic and often anti- theoretical; they are 
trained to speak decisively and apply general rules to particular cases. Social scientists, on the other hand, are more 
likely to be speculative, skeptical, and oriented toward contributing to general understanding of how things work 
in the world, rather than toward the concrete solution of specific problems. Moreover, the stance of the social 
scientist is typically one which tends to overturn received notions of how social arrangements work (cf. Berger, 
1963). Although lawyers have very little understanding of or sympathy for social science research, they recoil almost 
instinctively at any intrusion into their autonomy. In part this is the natural response of any of us who may feel 
uncomfortable at the thought of having someone look over our shoulder.”  
26 The notable exception was when dealing with a lawyer acting for an insurer who was running a defence to a LiP 
claim. Perhaps because of the distance between him and the party to the litigation (he was instructed by the insurer, 
not the defendant), he was very open to participating.  
27 Matthew Desmond "Eviction and the Reproduction of Urban Poverty" (2012) 118 American Journal of 
Sociology 88 at 97. 
28 UOHEC deferred to the JRC on the issue of consent for court observations. The JRC approved a procedure 
whereby I would submit a memorandum to the presiding Judge outlining the purpose of the research, the proposed 
date of observation, and the position of the parties regarding consent. The represented party could then raise any 
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approval to conduct semi-structured interviews with lawyers outside the case studies. This was 
to ensure that I would have a group of lawyers in the sample, even if no lawyers in the case 
studies agreed to be interviewed. The UOHEC and JRC approved all the changes and the 
research continued in this amended form.  
3. Addition of Interview-Only LiP Participants 
During the initial recruitment period I received a number of approaches from people who had 
heard about the study by word of mouth, but who were living outside the Study Region. Because 
of their physical distance from me, I could not include them in a case study. I remained unsure 
as to whether or not I would be able to recruit enough case study participants and was reluctant 
to exclude potentially useful data. I therefore considered ways to include these volunteers.  
In June 2013, along with the other amendments, I requested approval from UOHEC to add a 
second option for LiP participation. Those outside the Study Region, or those within the Study 
Region who did not want to participate in an observation, could instead take part in an hour-
long semi-structured interview by Skype or phone. Participants were eligible where their 
litigation was ongoing, or had concluded within the last 12 months. Where their litigation was 
ongoing, they could also take part in a follow up interview six months later. This amendment 
was also approved.  
4. Final Form of the Research Design 
The research, as it proceeded from June 2013, took the form set out in Table 2. In total 10 LiPs 
participated in a case study. The case studies involved multiple interviews and discussions with 
the LiPs as their case proceeded. Most of the case study LiPs forwarded court documents and 
correspondence to me on an ongoing basis. Where the LiP’s case proceeded to court and I was 
able to secure access (discussed further below), I observed them in court at case management 
or trial fixtures. A confidential summary of the case study LiP data is presented in the 
Confidential Appendix. (The reasons for confidentiality are discussed in detail below). A further 
24 LiPs participated in an interview, and 11 of those also provided litigation documents for 
                                                          
objections and the Judge could decide whether I could attend. The memorandum to the presiding Judge would 
have been required in any case, as even in hearings that are open to the public, no one can take notes in the public 
gallery without permission from the Judge.  
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review. After completing the LiP interviews, I interviewed court staff (8), lawyers (16) and 
Judges (13).  
D. Interviews, Observations and Litigation Documents 
1. LiP Participants 
When LiPs lived in the Study Region and had ongoing (rather than recently concluded) litigation, 
they had the option to participate in either a case study or solely an interview. When a LiP 
contacted me, I sent the information sheet and consent form (see Appendix C) to them to 
review. They then returned the signed consent by mail or email, and we arranged an interview 
time. As the total number of participants reached 20, I began using purposive sampling, seeking 
demographic diversity and representation across types of cases and jurisdiction.29 Table 4 shows 
the total LiP participants by age group. 
Table 4 - LiP Participants by Age Group 






Total Participants 34 
 
Table 5 shows the LiP participants by the court in which their litigation was being heard. 
Twenty-one were applicants or plaintiffs and 13 were respondents or defendants. Five of the 
LiPs I considered were “persistent”, because, at the time of entering the study, they had pursued 
more than three cases in the Study Courts; some of them many more than three. By the end of 
the study, two more met this definition of persistence by initiating further litigation.  
                                                          
29 LiPs continued to contact me volunteering to participate throughout the analysis and writing of this thesis.  
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Table 5 - LiP Participants by Court, Gender and Party 




Gender of LiPs LiP Party 
Male Female Applicant Respondent 
Family Court 21 1 12 9 10 11 
District Court 3 2 3 0 2 1 
High Court 10 3 8 2 *9 1 
Total  34 5 23 11 21 13 
*One LiP recorded as an applicant was a respondent in the original proceeding but filed a cross application. 
The cross application became the substantive area of the proceeding and therefore the LiP is recorded as an 
applicant, not a respondent. 
(a) LiP Interviews 
I conducted a similar initial interview with all LiP participants, whether or not they were in the 
case study. This was a semi-structured interview (see Appendix D for the interview schedules), 
which began with an open question about how they had come to be a LiP and then became 
more directed to specific issues, including the history of the case, decisions about legal 
representation, previous experience in court, assistance with their case, legal research, and 
interaction with opposing party and counsel. It went on to explore where the matter had been 
determined, their experience in court, issues around costs, and enforcement of judgments. With 
LiPs participating only in an interview, I also asked about suggestions they might have for 
systemic changes.  
For the LiPs in the case study, this was an “entry interview” to introduce me to their case. We 
then made arrangements for ongoing communication, which was either by mobile phone, e-
mail or post. Most participants chose to communicate via email, but some did not have internet 
access so preferred cell phone calls and texts, with documents sent by post. I had 66 
conversations with LiPs in the case studies. I had approximately 510 email exchanges with the 
case study LiPs, either reading correspondence they forwarded me (usually between the LiP and 
the opposing party), or discussing their case with them by email. 
At the conclusion of my observation of the case study (which usually but not always coincided 
with the end of the case), I conducted a semi-structured exit interview with the LiP, asking for 
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their reflections on the case, their suggestions (if any) for systemic change, and, where the 
litigation was continuing, their plans for its future. Where interview participants had continuing 
litigation, I also conducted a follow-up interview, similar to the exit-interview conducted with 
case study participants.  
Each interview with a LiP lasted, on average, one hour. I audio recorded all the interviews and 
transcribed them in the qualitative research software, NVivo.  
(b) LiP Case Study Observations 
The hearings I observed were a mixture of closed hearings (either because they were in chambers 
or in the Family Court) and open hearings. Regardless of their status, and although I had formal 
permission from UOHEC and JRC to observe court hearings, I still had to negotiate a number 
of hurdles each time I wanted to observe in court. The first was notifying the opposing counsel 
and asking for a reply as to whether or not they consented to my presence, and if not, for reasons 
so I could communicate those to the court. As with my initial attempts to get consent to their 
involvement in the research from the other party, the lawyers tended to be suspicious and curt. 
However, because I was making an application to the Judge to attend, they had to consider any 
objections to my presence that could be put to the Judge. Only one counsel objected and this 
was on the grounds that his client thought I was advising the LiP. Once it had been established 
that I was not, he withdrew the objection.  
The next step was seeking permission from the presiding Judge, by sending an email attaching 
an information sheet for the presiding judge (see Appendix E) via the court registry office. While 
I expected the registry office to merely be a conduit to correspond with the Judge, the registry 
staff sometimes acted as gatekeepers.30 For example, in one instance a Family Court registry 
staff member was reluctant to forward my request to the Judge on the basis that the Family 
Court is “private” and therefore I would not be allowed access. I sent further explanations (in 
addition to those I sent routinely) explaining my purpose and permission. In all but one instance, 
the Judge granted permission for me to attend.31  
                                                          
30 Hammersley and Atkinson, above n 14 at 50-60.  
31 One Judge refused permission for me to attend a judicial conference where my application to attend was made 
only 48 hours before the call. The Judge considered there was insufficient time to establish whether there was any 
objection, as the opposing party had not responded to my request for consent. I was, however, granted permission 
for the following judicial conference.  
61 
 
For proceedings outside the control of the court, however, I had less success gaining access. 
For example, I was unable to get the consent of one party where the dispute was heard at private 
arbitration. Unlike a Judge, the arbitrator had no power to make a decision regarding my 
presence, so I was reliant entirely on the consent of that party. With no opportunity to meet the 
other party face-to-face, I was unable to win their trust. This points to the difficulty of 
researching the increasingly private domain of dispute resolution, although this problem would 
be reduced if the researcher was presented to the parties as neutral.  
Where I was able to observe, I usually met the LiP in the court foyer or talked to them in the 
courtroom before the fixture began. I introduced myself to the court taker32 and to opposing 
counsel if we had not met previously. During hearings I took notes on a laptop computer, and 
sometimes in a notebook when the public gallery was busy and a laptop would draw too much 
attention. I took verbatim notes of discussion I thought was particularly pertinent, using my 
own shorthand, and summary notes of other conversations. I expanded these notes immediately 
after the observation, ensuring they were coherent, recording information from memory that I 
had not been able to record at the time. In taking notes, I did not have prior headings, but took 
observational notes based on Emerson, Fretz and Shaw’s discussion on strategies and tactics 
for writing field notes.33 In total, I observed 21 days or half days of court proceedings.  
(c) Documents 
The documentary data includes letters between LiPs and opposing counsel and between LiPs 
and other agencies (such as the Ombudsman, the Judicial Conduct Commissioner, or the Law 
Society), along with decisions from the complaints authorities. There is also my e-mail 
correspondence with LiPs providing updates of their case or answering my questions about 
specific aspects of their case. The other major component of the documentary material is court 
documents generated in the cases, including statements of claim or defence, affidavits or briefs 
of evidence, submissions, minutes of the court, and judgments. I reviewed 139 litigation 
documents relating to the LiP case studies. 
                                                          
32 Known as an “usher” in other jurisdictions, a court taker assists the judge in court. 
33 Robert Emerson, Rachel Fretz and Linda Shaw Writing Ethnographic Fieldnotes (2nd ed, University of Chicago 
Press, Chicago, 2011). I also audited an undergraduate class on ethnography which gave me an opportunity to 
practise and reflect on the process of writing field notes from participant observation. 
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2. Interviewing Lawyers 
The original intention was that the only lawyers that I would interview would be the opposing 
counsel in the case studies. As the study progressed, however, and after only managing to 
interview one opposing counsel, I decided to abandon this aspect of the research design for a 
number of reasons, including confidentiality and practical impossibility.34 I began recruiting 
lawyers from outside the case studies to ensure lawyers’ perspectives were included in the 
research.  
Seventeen lawyers participated, including one opposing counsel in a case study. The remaining 
16 included four lawyers I specifically invited to participate because of their high workload with 
LiPs,35 and 12 lawyers who responded to an e-mail invitation that I sent to a randomly drawn 
group.36 I had a 20 per cent response rate from this method. Table 6 shows the practice areas 
of the lawyers who participated. Ten were male and six female. All of them practised in the 
Study Region, although two were based in another part of New Zealand.  
I sent an information sheet and consent form (see Appendix F) to all prospective participants 
and they returned the signed consent by email. The semi-structured interviews with lawyers 
covered two main subjects: their experience in opposing LiPs and in providing limited retainer 
advice to them (see Appendix G). In the interview with the opposing counsel in the LiP case 
study, the questions were specifically directed at their experiences in opposing that LiP. For the 
other lawyers, the questions were about opposing LiPs generally, although I asked them to think 
about their most recent cases when answering the questions. The discussion about opposing 
LiPs included communicating with LiPs out of court, settlement discussions, appearing in court, 
                                                          
34 In five of the other case studies I decided the risks associated with interviewing the opposing counsel were too 
high, even though in two of those the opposing counsel gave consent. The particular risks varied but my main 
concern was that the LiP would become suspicious of my involvement with the opposing party (even though they 
had agreed to it) and might try to subpoena my interview record to use in the litigation. In addition, it was practically 
difficult to frame useful questions that would not violate the confidentiality I had promised the LiP. Two other 
opposing parties became LiPs during the research so had no counsel to interview, and the remaining two lawyers 
did not consent to be interviewed. 
35 This included lawyers from the Crown Law Office, lawyers who acted as lawyer for child, and lawyers whose 
practice model was specifically directed at providing limited brief advice. 
36 I used the online New Zealand Law Society roll of barristers and solicitors and generated a list of all barristers 
and solicitors practising in the Study Region. I used an online random number generator to produce a random set 
of numbers between 1 and the number of practitioners on the list. If the number generated was for example 
"number 14" I took the fourteenth name on the list, checked on their practice website (where available) their 
practice area, and if they worked in Family and/or Civil Litigation I sent them an email invitation. Where they had 
no online practice information, I called their offices to check their practice area. 
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ethical rules, perceptions of LiPs’ presentation of cases, costs, and systemic responses to LiPs. 
The question about limited retainer legal advice covered whether or not the lawyer offered this 
service, in what circumstances, and their perceptions of its merits and limitations. I also put to 
lawyers de-identified scenarios I had observed in the case studies and asked for their comment 
and interpretation. These interviews were 40-60 minutes long. 
Table 6 - Lawyers’ Practice Area  
Practice area Number of 
participants 
Family 5 
General civil 6 
Family and general civil 2 
Specialist civil 3 
Total Participants 16 
 
3. Interviewing Judges 
As I was not able to interview the Judges who presided over the cases I had observed, I did not 
invite Judges to participate until all the other observations had concluded. The High Court 
Judges were recruited via the JRC. I provided a list of ineligible High Court Judges and the JRC 
returned a list of seven Judges sitting in the Study Region who were willing to be interviewed. 
For the civil District Court and Family Court Judges, the JRC asked me to make contact with 
eligible Judges through the registry of their Court and to arrange interviews with them directly. 
I sent an information sheet and consent form (see Appendix H) via their personal assistant and 
received signed consents by email. 
While I originally intended to interview all the Judges in person this was not possible. I found 
that the Judges’ schedules changed at the last minute (particularly in the District Court) making 
it difficult to secure appointments in advance. It was also challenging to find days where I could 
interview multiple Judges in the same location on the same day given their commitments. It was 
inefficient to make repeated trips to Auckland (a three-hour return journey) to interview 
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individual Judges. I interviewed 13 Judges between March and July 2014, five in person and 
eight by telephone. Table 7 shows the number of Judges by type of court. 
Table 7 – Judges’ Jurisdiction 
Court Number of 
participants 
Family Court 4 
District Court (civil) 4 
High Court 5 
Total Participants 13 
 
These were semi-structured interviews. They covered how involvement of a LiP in a case might 
affect the judge’s preparation, conduct of pre-trial and trial fixtures, and judgment writing (see 
Appendix I). The interview also canvassed opinions of different types of LiP (as defined by the 
Judge), vexatious litigants, McKenzie friends, costs, perceived reasons for litigating in person, 
perceptions about numbers of LiPs, and systemic responses to LiPs. As the research with LiP 
participants progressed, I adapted the original semi-structured interview schedule to test ideas 
generated from other data collection, including outlining scenarios (de-identified) that I had 
observed and asking the Judges for their interpretation. These interviews were 45-60 minutes 
long.  
4. Interviewing Court Staff 
Between October 2013 and March 2014, I interviewed counter staff and other court registry 
staff working in the Study Courts who interact with LiPs regularly. I sent an information sheet 
and consent form (see Appendix J) via email to the staff member liaising with me, and received 
signed consents from the participants before beginning the interview. These were also semi-
structured interviews of 30-40 minutes duration which included questions on: the context in 
which they encountered LiPs, perceived reasons for litigating in person, perceptions about 
numbers of LiPs, and suggested systemic responses (see Appendix K). I also discussed issues 
that had arisen in the case studies or LiP interviews, putting to them various situations or 
comments that LiPs had made (on an anonymised basis) for their comment.  
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5. Limitations of Data 
The strengths of a qualitative study of this kind lie in the in-depth inquiry into participants’ 
subjective experiences, rather than in the production of findings that are generalisable to the 
whole population. However, as the study aims to illuminate the experiences of litigating in 
person and the reasons people have for doing so, I have used purposive sampling, as explained 
above, to ensure diversity. LiP self-selection for participation may however have introduced 
some bias. First, it is probable that there are more “active” rather than “inactive” LiPs in the 
sample than would be found in the general population of LiPs,37 as it seems unlikely that 
“inactive” LiPs would volunteer to join a research project. The research is, however, explicitly 
focussed on LiPs who actively engage with the court process and it is acknowledged that they 
are only part of the LiP population. Second, it is possible that the sample is skewed towards 
LiPs who had a negative experience of the court system. That is, they may have participated 
because they wanted to complain and agitate for change. This was a concern that a MoJ staff 
member expressed to me.38 This is perhaps less of an issue for the case study LiPs who were 
mostly new to the process, and whose cases were still in progress, and therefore were not in a 
position to have a concluded view, either positive or negative, about their experience.39 While 
most LiPs did have some form of complaint about the system, this was not the only reason they 
wanted to participate. They indicated a range of reasons for doing so, including a desire to 
improve the system for others, the therapeutic value of having someone listen to their story, 
and wanting to share a positive experience. To acknowledge and limit the potential for this 
“negative” bias, I have also paid particular attention in the analysis to comments made by 
lawyers, judges and court staff that commented positively on aspects of LiPs’ interactions with 
the courts.  
One of the research questions asked, what is the experience of litigating in person? This study 
was therefore designed to look at the experience of LiPs and their interaction with the judges, 
lawyers and court staff but was not designed as a comparative study, with a control group of 
                                                          
37 Moorhead and Sefton, above n 15 at 62-63 discussing “inactive” LiPs.  
38 Once the MoJ had approved display of the recruitment posters in the registry offices, a staff member was 
reluctant to put them up as he was concerned that “every time someone has a bad experience at the counter they 
will come to you”.  
39 The case study participants who were not new litigants did have views about the system, but including them 
allowed examination of persistent litigation behaviour.  
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represented litigants. For that reason I have been reluctant to make strong claims about the 
relationship between litigating in person and the emotional dimensions of the experience, when 
there is no comparison group to illuminate represented litigants’ experiences in this regard.40 
Such research would be of great value and would give further understanding to litigant 
experience of the court system, but is beyond the scope of this study.  
II Data analysis  
My method of data analysis, while not rigidly adhering to any particular tradition, is derived from 
grounded theory. It follows Strauss and Corbin’s encouragement to recognise that qualitative 
analysis is a “fluid and dynamic” process and “should be relaxed, flexible, and driven by insight 
gained through interaction with data rather than being overly structured and based only on 
procedures”.41 It requires “stepping into the shoes of the other and trying to see the world from 
their perspective”.42  
I found a number of sources useful in helping me to interrogate the data in different ways, 
particularly Becker’s Tricks of the Trade in which he sets out “tricks”, or “rules of thumb derived 
from experience”, for examining data.43 To explore the interview, observation and documentary 
material, I also combined insights from Strauss and Corbin, Silverman, Bryman, Bazeley, and 
Emerson, Fretz and Shaw, to try to “crack open” the data and develop codes and themes.44  
I transcribed all the interviews myself in NVivo. I began with line-by-line open coding of the 
first interview transcripts. I generated the initial codes from this process and from the review of 
                                                          
40 Cf Macfarlane, above n 12 at 108-112 who reports, “SRL Respondents described a wide range of impacts and 
consequences for them arising out of their decision to self-represent” and describes these under the headings 
“personal health”, “financial implications”, “social isolation”, “failing faith in the justice system”. Without a control 
group of represented litigants, it is not possible to know if all these implications are attributable to litigating in 
person, or whether they are experienced by represented litigants as well. 
41 Juliet Corbin and Anselm Strauss Basics of Qualitative Research: Techniques and Procedures for Developing Grounded Theory 
(3rd Online ed, SAGE Publications, Thousand Oaks, CA, 2008) at 12. 
42 Juliet Corbin "Taking an Analytic Journey" in Janice M Morse (ed) Developing Grounded Theory: The Second Generation 
(Left Coast Press, Walnut Creek, CA, 2009) 35 at 40-41. 
43 Howard Becker Tricks of the Trade: How to Think About Your Research While You're Doing It (University of Chicago 
Press, Chicago, Ill, 1998) at 3, for example the “null hypothesis of craziness” for behaviour commonly explained 
as “crazy” or “socially disorganized”. The null hypothesis is that the behaviour is crazy and then the researcher 
searches for explanations that disprove the hypothesis, at 24-28. 
44 Corbin and Strauss, above n 41; David Silverman A Very Short, Fairly Interesting and Reasonably Cheap Book about 
Qualitative Research (2nd ed, SAGE Publications, London, 2013); Bryman, above n 6 at 564-590; Patricia Bazeley 
Qualitative Data Analysis: Practical Strategies (SAGE Publications, London, 2013); Emerson, Fretz and Shaw, above n 
33 at 171-199. 
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the literature. After generating initial codes (or headings for the analysis) I combined these into 
higher order, or more abstract codes. I wrote short memoranda about each interview, noting 
themes or aspects that were common to other interviews, or that I found surprising. I also made 
a brief model of each LiP's path to becoming a litigant in person.  
I began to develop themes by observing commonalities in the data, that I recorded. I used the 
“see also link” function in NVivo to connect these reflections to the data and to the literature 
that I imported into the NVivo database. This was a cyclical process. As I added more transcripts 
I refined the codes and the thematic memoranda, read further literature and explored links 
between themes. The final coding structure appears in Appendix L. 
A. Observation and Interview Data 
Participant observation offers the opportunity to check what participants say in interviews 
against other sources: other participant accounts, observations, and documents, including 
documents the participants have drafted. The inferences drawn from such cross-checking are 
not necessarily “correct”, but this provides some check on the validity of the analysis: “what is 
involved in triangulation is a matter not of checking whether data are valid, but, at best, of 
discovering which inferences from those data seem more likely to be valid”.45  
I have used the participants' accounts, given in either formal interviews or informal discussion, 
in what Hammersley and Atkinson call “two legitimate and complementary ways”.46 First, I have 
used them as evidence of the phenomena they discuss: of the reasons why people litigate in 
person and of the experience of being or encountering a LiP. Second, I have used them to 
examine “interview discourse as a social activity”, where what is said in an interview is viewed 
as something generated in a particular context or for a particular purpose.47  As Atkinson and 
Coffey conclude:48 
                                                          
45 Hammersley and Atkinson, above n 14 at 184. 
46 At 97. 
47 Harry van den Berg, Margaret Wetherell and Hanneke Houtkoop-Steenstra "Introduction" in Harry van den 
Berg, Margaret Wetherell and Hanneke Houtkoop-Steenstra (eds) Analyzing Race Talk: Multidisciplinary Perpectives on 
the Research Interview (Cambridge University Press, Cambridge, 2003) 1 at 5.  
48 Paul Atkinson and Amanda Coffey "Revisiting the Relationship Between Participant Observation and 
Interviewing" in Jaber Gubrium and James Holstein (eds) Handbook of Interview Research (SAGE Publications, 
Thousand Oaks, CA, 2001) 801. 
68 
 
… we need to treat interviews as generating accounts and performances that have 
their own properties and ought to be analyzed in accordance with such 
characteristics. We need, therefore, to appreciate that interviews are occasions in 
which are enacted particular kinds of narratives and in which "informants" construct 
themselves and others as particular kinds of moral agents.  
Using this second approach not only contributes to the analysis, but, as Hammersley and 
Atkinson argue, it “can also aid our assessment of the validity of the information that is provided 
by particular informants”.49 Awareness of the context of the account and the purposes for which 
it was produced (the who, why, how, and for what audience) enables us to be aware of how it 
might be biased.  
The observational data is treated as complementary to the interview data. While there is a long-
standing tradition in social science research to privilege the researcher’s observations over a 
participant’s account,50 I accept Atkinson and Coffey's argument that even the researcher’s 
account of observed events relies “on the same culturally shared categories of memory, account, 
narrative, and experience” and cannot be regarded as an unproblematic record of “what really 
happened”.51  
This does not mean that the interview and documentary data have no utility, only that they 
should not be read as windows into the souls of the participants.52 Instead, the data should be 
read as accounts given within a specific context, whether to me as a researcher, or to the court 
as submissions, or produced in writing. The interview and observational data are not used 
crudely to determine differences between what the participants said and what they did. Conflicts 
instead invite deeper consideration about the context in which accounts were given, and what 
might be motivating the various accounts in these different contexts.53 
                                                          
49 Hammersley and Atkinson, above n 14 at 98. 
50 See Atkinson and Coffey, above n 48 for a discussion and critique of Becker and Greer's seminal 1957 article 
(republished as Howard Becker and Blanche Geer "Participant Observation and Interviewing: A Comparison" in 
William Filstead (ed) Qualitative Methodology: Firsthand Involvement with the Social World (Markham Publishing Company, 
Chicago, 1970) 133), which was highly influential in the privileging of observational data over interview data.  
51 Atkinson and Coffey, above n 48 at 813.  
52 Silverman, above n 44. 
53 Atkinson and Coffey, above n 48 at 808. 
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B. Documentary Data 
The same approach is taken to documentary data in the study. This includes correspondence 
between the parties and from a LiP to a third party, decisions of bodies to which LiPs have 
made complaints (e.g. the Ombudsman, the Law Society), and court documents (memoranda 
to the court, affidavits, submissions, minutes and decisions of Judges). These materials are 
treated as “‘social facts’, in that they are produced, shared and used in socially organised ways”.54 
The emphasis is not on determining the correctness of the information or arguments they 
contain, or contrasting the documentary data with other data, but looking at the functions these 
texts perform. The same approach is useful in examining why LiPs’ documents might be poorly 
received by institutional actors, a theme that is taken up in more detail in Chapter 6.   
C. Analysing Reactivity  
An issue that arises in any research is participant reactivity: that is, the influence of the researcher 
on participants and others in the setting. This is particularly at issue in legal disputes, which, as 
Felstiner, Abel and Sarat explain, are subjective, unstable and reactive.55 They argue (in the 
context of the formation of disputes) that the individual disputant’s subjective beliefs about the 
dispute, their attribution of blame, their goals and motives, are all malleable during a dispute 
and during interaction with institutions and advisers: 56   
… as individuals define and redefine their perceptions of experience and the nature 
of their grievances in response to the communications, behaviour, and expectations 
of a range of people, including opponents, agents, authority figures, companions, 
and intimates.  
The strategic choices they make can also be influenced. Every adviser, court official, judge, 
friend, family member, neighbour, and others using internet chatrooms or blog sites, and so on, 
with whom the LiP discusses their case, has the potential to cause some shift in their attitudes 
or position. As a researcher I am yet another person who might cause shifts in the course of the 
dispute, by interacting with them. Similarly, my being in court may change the behaviour of the 
opposing counsel, party and Judge. So too can the presence of journalists in the courtroom, or 
                                                          
54 Paul Atkinson and Amanda Coffey "Analysing Documentary Realities" in David Silverman (ed) Qualitative 
Research (3rd ed, Sage Publications, London, 2011) 77 at 79.  
55 Felstiner, Abel and Sarat, above n 5 at 637-638. 
56 At 638. 
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the presence or absence of a party (rather than just their lawyers). They could all change how 
the participants behave.  
Reactivity is often seen as a source of bias that may undermine the validity of the inferences 
drawn and researchers therefore try to minimise their effect on the data. Hammersley and 
Atkinson argue that this concern with reactivity “can be somewhat misleading …. Data in 
themselves cannot be valid or invalid; what is at issue are the inferences drawn from them”.57 
They urge ethnographers to be alive to how their presence may have shaped the data when 
deciding what inferences to draw from them. They also note that “participants’ responses to 
ethnographers may also be an important source of information”.58  
I was aware that at times my presence did have some effect and have reflected on what this 
indicates. For example, some LiP participants recognised the possibility of reactivity and stated 
that one of the reasons they wanted to participate was to have a third party in the room - a 
trained lawyer from a recognised university, which they thought would mean everyone would 
be on their “best behaviour”. Some said this was a reason for participating in the research. From 
this I can infer that some LiPs believe they will receive less favourable treatment if the 
institutional actors are not being “watched”. This is useful data. If the LiPs are correct in this 
assessment, then l will likely be under-reporting, not over-reporting the difficulties LiPs face.59 
Where I consider reactivity is possible, I therefore discuss both the effects my presence may 
have had and what this might tell us about participants’ views of what model behaviour towards 
LiPs would be. 
III Ethical Issues 
The design of the study, involving ongoing legal cases and multiple participants within those 
cases, meant that a great deal of care and attention had to be given to ethical issues, and to legal 
issues such as protection of privileged information. I anticipated and discussed these issues in 
the UOHEC application, but many of the nuances did not become apparent until the research 
                                                          
57 Hammersley and Atkinson, above n 14 at 177.  
58 At 177. 
59 I recognise that my presence may have meant the LiPs were also on “best behaviour” when I was in the 
courtroom. This seemed to be less of an issue, however, as the LiPs, perhaps with the exception of the one very 
experienced LiP in the case study, did not seem to know what “best behaviour” was.  
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was in progress. During the research I kept a journal recording and reflecting on such issues as 
they arose, referring to the literature, and the Socio-Legal Studies Association code of ethics,60 
and discussing problems and solutions with my supervisors. What follows is a discussion of the 
ethical and legal issues anticipated and encountered, and how these were approached in the field 
and in writing the thesis.  
A. Confidentiality and Anonymity in the Case Studies 
The protection of the identity of participants from the public at large, the legal community, and 
other participants was an important and difficult issue. Participation in the case studies was not 
fully anonymous, however, because the methods followed inevitably meant that everyone else 
involved in the case knew that the LiP was a research participant. The information sheets for 
LiPs said:61  
The results might include descriptions of you and your case. However, your name 
and any details that might make you identifiable to others will not be published. 
Every attempt will be made to preserve your anonymity.  
Similar undertakings were made to all other participants.  
Commonly social science researchers disguise the site of the research and assign participants 
pseudonyms to protect anonymity.62 I have not concealed the site of the research, only omitting  
the places within the Study Region where participants were based, because an attempt to conceal 
it was unlikely to be successful. When I entered a court to observe, most people knew who I 
was and why I was there.  This is of course a well-recognised problem with ethnographic 
research,63 a problem that is becoming more pronounced in a digital age where a Google search 
allows any reader to locate the author (for example from their University website) and therefore 
the likely site of the research.  Instead of trying to make the Study Region anonymous, and 
                                                          
60 Socio-Legal Studies Association "Ethics Statement" (January 2009)  <www.slsa.ac.uk>. 
61 See Appendix C. 
62 Katja Guenther "The Politics of Names: Rethinking the Methodological and Ethical Significance of Naming 
People, Organizations, and Places" (2009) 9(4) Qualitative Research 411; MaryCarol Hopkins "Is Anonymity 
Possible? Writing about Refugees in the United States" in Caroline Brettell (ed) When They Read What We Write: The 
Politics of Ethnography (Bergin & Garvey, Westport, CN, 1996) 121. 
63 See for example the essays in Caroline Brettell (ed) When They Read What We Write: The Politics of Ethnography 
(Bergin & Garvey, Westport, CN, 1993). 
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creating a false sense of security, I instead made the Study Region large.64 This makes it more 
difficult to identify any individual, within this region, who was involved.  
But even this potential means of protecting anonymity may be illusory, due to the very small 
number of cases that reach trial. For example, in 2013, three of the cases studies included High 
Court trials. In 2013, 143 civil cases went to trial in the High Court nationwide.65 Of those, we 
do not know how many involved a LiP, but if we take a rough estimate of 10-20% and estimate 
that half of those would have been conducted in Hamilton and Auckland we get to a total of 7-
14 cases. Many trials receive some media coverage, or are discussed informally among legal 
professionals. If I include in my description of a case study the cause of action (such as it being 
an action in tort or contract), some general information about the parties involved (e.g. it 
involved a company or individual, or the litigant’s approximate age, educational background, or 
previous experience of the courts), it might be possible to narrow the range to just one or two 
possible cases. So, given the small number of trials and the small, closely networked legal 
community in New Zealand, using pseudonyms to protect anonymity is unlikely to be effective. 
However, my attempt to protect participants’ anonymity does mean that I cannot use direct 
quotes from judgments in the cases studied, as it is a simple matter to enter the quote into a 
legal database and retrieve the whole judgment and therefore learn the names of the parties.  
This problem is less pronounced in the cases involving Family Court litigation as there is a much 
higher volume of cases in that court, it is estimated that there are more LiPs there, only some 
decisions are published (and names are usually redacted), and the proceedings are closed to the 
public. While this means research participants in the Family Court cases are unlikely to be readily 
identifiable to the public at large, it does not negate the ability of the various participants in the 
same case to identify each other.66 
                                                          
64 See information on size of Study Region above n 17. 
65 High Court of New Zealand Report from the High Court 2013: The Year in Review (High Court of New Zealand - Te 
Koti Maatua o Aotearoa, 2013) 
66 Martin Tolich "Internal Confidentiality: When Confidentiality Assurances Fail Relational Informants" (2004) 
27(1) Qualitative Sociology 101. 
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1. Confidentiality among participants 
Ensuring confidentiality is therefore particularly difficult in research involving small groups, as 
the data would have to be presented in such a way as to make a participant to whom the data 
relates unidentifiable to the other participants. Nevertheless, the ability of participants within 
any group to identify (or misidentify) each other – as the source, for instance, of a certain quote 
– has the potential to harm participants and the researcher.67 This takes on further implications 
where a legal case is ongoing, as there is a possibility that what a LiP discloses to me, but not to 
their opponent, is either privileged or information that is strategically useful to the other side. 
The issue of privilege, in particular, was anticipated in the UOHEC application: 
The research design means that the doctoral researcher may come into possession 
of information about an [LiP's] case that is legally privileged. The other party to a 
proceeding cannot compel the production in court of communications that are 
privileged. There is a remote possibility that the opposing party to the litigation 
might try and compel the doctoral researcher to disclose the communications and 
information she has access to in the course of her observations. The doctoral 
researcher has consulted two leading experts on the law of evidence (Donna 
Buckingham and her co-supervisor Richard Mahoney) as well as the principal 
applicant (her primary supervisor) and, in her and the experts' opinion, it is extremely 
unlikely that such an application, if made, would succeed.68  
To date, no one has made any attempt to compel disclosure of my research notes. This 
possibility does not terminate with the publication of this research, however, and in fact, 
publication may exacerbate the threat. What if a participant recognises themselves and therefore 
recognises the opposing party? If the opposing party has said something the participant thinks 
might be useful to an appeal or their ongoing case, then perhaps they will attempt to compel 
production of my notes. Protecting internal confidentiality therefore takes on an extra element 
of importance: I need to ensure that I do not write something that the other party can use as 
"ammunition". There is nothing in my notes that seems obviously useful, in a legal sense, to the 
parties of the cases studied. However, I am not intimately acquainted with all the facts and legal 
issues in the cases studied. In fact, I deliberately avoided becoming so acquainted to assist in 
                                                          
67 At 101. 
68 Danet, Hoffman and Kermish, above n 25, anticipated similar issues with their proposed study, in which there 




distinguishing the line between lawyer and researcher (discussed in more detail below). I cannot 
therefore be certain that seemingly innocuous information is not useful to another party.  
2. Methods to protect confidentiality of case study participants 
To protect internal confidentiality, I therefore need to break the link between a description of 
something I observed and a LiP or opposing party’s commentary on the relevant events. As 
discussed, the usual method of assigning participants pseudonyms, where the case is otherwise 
described in full, is insufficient to maintain confidentiality in this research. But if the cases are 
too heavily disguised then there is the different risk that I will not be able to convey the most 
coherent account possible of the events. 
One approach would be to write about all the data in very general ways, not giving any detail 
that could lead to identification, and discussing only themes. The obvious difficulty with this 
approach is that it would fail to provide the evidence upon which the themes were based and 
would therefore lack the rigour that could reasonably be expected. It would also omit all the 
detail that would make it compelling to the reader.   
An alternative is to take the writing back to participants who could be identified by a certain 
passage and ask for their informed consent to its publication. This would be difficult in practice 
as the LiP and I may not be fully aware of the implications for their case of the information 
involved. Truly informed consent may not therefore be possible without independent legal 
advice, which of course is not available for litigants appearing in person. However, even if the 
issue of informed consent could be overcome, the possibility of asking for consent is precluded 
by the terms of participation. I promised in the information sheets that I would not talk to the 
LiP again after I had talked to the opposing party. This was to reduce the appearance or actuality 
of me being a conduit of information between the parties. In the case studies, where I have had 
consent on this basis, I therefore cannot ask the LiPs to review and discuss the draft analysis 
with me.  
Instead I have used direct quotes from individual LiP participants in the text, but with no 
pseudonyms attached. This is so the quotes cannot be aggregated, by reference to such 
pseudonyms, to construct a composite picture that might be used to identify particular 
participants. I have also altered gender, where necessary, or other identifying details to protect 
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confidentiality. Some quotes simply identify the person by reference to the name of the court in 
which their case was filed, calling them for example “Family Court LiP”, unless providing even 
the name of the court would threaten confidentiality.  
In addition, I have chosen to present more detailed accounts of LiP observations and interviews 
via construction of composite cases. This is an accepted method of presenting qualitative 
research findings in the health sciences, particularly psychiatry and counselling, as well as having 
precedent in other disciplines.69 The composites are a blend of a number of cases, so that the 
person reported is fictional, but the details, and sometimes dialogue, are taken from a number 
of real cases. This avoids the difficulties associated with trying to disguise a single case: there is 
either too little disguising detail (failing to protect participant identities), or so much disguising 
detail that it distorts the case. It is therefore more “honest to develop a composite case 
instead”.70  The disadvantage of such an approach is that it departs from the basic commitments 
of social science research, with fact becoming secondary to maintaining confidentiality, though it 
is probably better than not being able to present such data at all. 
This approach was used in Piper and Sikes's research on teacher-pupil sexual relationships 
because of the considerable harm that could be caused through identification of the 
participants.71 They conclude that the “storying approach” offered the best protection for their 
participants:72  
Taking such an approach requires that readers trust writers not to have invented and 
fabricated data to fit their purpose. We would argue, however, that such trust has to 
be there regardless of the writing forms, styles, genre that researches adopt or, for 
that matter, whatever paradigm they espouse.  
An advantage of the storying approach is that it helps to make lived experience vivid for the 
reader. As an aim of the research is to investigate the experience of litigating in person, using 
fictionalised accounts can help to achieve this goal. Presenting fictionalised composites was the 
                                                          
69 Marcia Stanley Wertz and others "The Composite First Person Narrative: Texture, Structure, and Meaning in 
Writing Phenomenological Descriptions" (2011) 6(2) International Journal of Qualitative Studies on Health and 
Well-being 1; Maureen Duffy "Writing About Clients: Developing Composite Case Material and its Rationale" 
(2010) 54(2) Counseling and Values 135; Heather Piper and Pat Sikes "All Teachers Are Vulnerable but Especially 
Gay Teachers: Using Composite Fictions to Protect Research Participants in Pupil-Teacher Sex-Related Research" 
(2010) 16(7) Qualitative Inquiry 566. 
70 Duffy, above n 69 at 147. 
71 Piper and Sikes, above n 69. 
72 At 568. 
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best way to maintain both confidentiality and to fulfil one of the primary aims of the research, 
to elucidate the experience of LiPs.  
The four composite stories were created after the data analysis was completed. First, the LiP 
case study and interview participants were grouped by similar characteristics – court, gender, 
and common themes. This produced four main groups and I gave each group a “character” 
name – Lisa, Matt, Tom and Gary. I then took various details from the accounts and 
observations of the participants in the group to create a case story. Lisa and Matt’s occupations 
and family composition are fictional. Tom and Gary’s occupations and the legal disputes that 
arise out of them are also entirely fictional, and were selected because they bear no resemblance 
to any of the LiPs’ stories but provide a backdrop against which to re-present the data. I have 
used direct quotes as much as possible within the stories. Where necessary I have altered the 
direct quotes to disguise identifying details and to make the voice and story of the character 
consistent. These stories appear in Chapter 5.  
B. Confidentiality for Judges, Lawyers and Court Staff 
Having undertaken to protect the confidentiality of statements made by the Judicial and MoJ 
participants, I have also had to be mindful of how this data is discussed. Judges often have 
distinct turns of phrase that could make them readily identifiable to the profession and their 
fellow Judges. They also sometimes gave specific examples from cases they had heard, which I 
encouraged. However these examples have been disguised when I have discussed them, 
changing details that might otherwise make them identifiable. Where I remained concerned 
about whether I had sufficiently disguised the words of a Judge, I sent the passage to the Judge 
and asked for comment and confirmation. 
Some Judges and lawyers also made “off the record” comments – information they wanted to 
provide as background to me but not to be used as part of the data. I have not included these 
comments. The only exception is where I considered it would be helpful to include it on an 
anonymous basis and in those cases I have sent the draft analysis to the participant who made 
the comments and asked for permission to do so.73  
                                                          
73 Rose Wiles What are Qualitative Research Ethics? (Bloomsbury Publishing, London, 2012) at 50. 
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Given the open plan nature of the offices, the managers of the Registry Offices of the Study 
Courts, as well as other employees, knew which Court Staff participated in research interviews. 
I have therefore omitted any information that would make them readily identifiable to their 
colleagues, including their role, the location of the registry and any other distinguishing details.   
1. Privacy 
The method adopted involved some intrusion into the privacy of the litigants. Some of the 
litigation concerned sensitive issues, particularly in the Family Court where the proceedings 
related to intimate family relationships and arrangements. However, in bringing or responding 
to proceedings, the litigants are forced by court procedure to disclose information about their 
case. That information is then available to the lawyer for a represented party, the judge, and 
court staff, as well as other professionals such as mediators, counsellors and expert witnesses. 
My access to the same information was not therefore a significant further intrusion into the 
litigant's privacy.  
2. Vulnerability 
In the UOHEC application I noted that some LiPs that would be eligible for the study would 
be vulnerable people: “The most likely vulnerability is that the LiP will have mental health issues 
as it is not uncommon for mentally unwell people to repeatedly use the court system to address 
perceived wrongs”. I undertook that I would not recruit, or would abandon, study of 
participants who I thought lacked the competence or capacity to participate.  
While not specifically elicited in the interviews, three participants reported that they lived with 
a diagnosed mental health condition, including bi-polar disorder and depression, and four 
reported that they had a history of being subjected to domestic violence. Only in one instance 
did I consider that a LiP might lack capacity. He sent a completed consent form and a letter 
outlining his case to-date. Both the style of the letter and some of the assertions within it, for 
example, believing that the Judge who had heard the case was an imposter, led me to question 
his capacity. The issue was not resolved as I lost contact with him when he moved addresses, 
and I have not included the material he sent in the analysis.  
Some participants referred to feeling stressed when recounting their litigation experiences, as 
the following example illustrates: 
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LiP [recounting an interaction with the court office]: ... [I] said, “Can you help me”, 
and she said “I can't do anything to help because I have to remain ... “ [pause], I 
can't remember the word, I'm getting a bit stressed here.  
In other instances participants did not tell me they were stressed but during the course of the 
interview I noticed more rapid, pressured speech, and surmised that they were finding the 
experience stressful. In all these instances I sought to empathise with the LiP, and, where 
appropriate, offered the opportunity to discontinue the interview.  
3. Benefit to Participants 
No tangible benefits or payments were offered to any participant for their involvement. The 
LiPs did report some intangible benefits, such as finding it helpful to have me act as a sounding 
board about their case, particularly as they often said that they could not or did not want to 
trouble relatives and friends with the details. In addition, LiPs often mentioned at the end of 
the interview that they had responded to the recruitment advertisement because they wanted to 
effect change for other LiPs:  
This is the reason I came back to this [doing this interview]. If somebody else can 
get, it’s probably too late for me, but there will be other people who came back in 
the future who need the same help. I'd just like them to see them get a better run. 
A few litigants said that they wanted to tell me about their case to test their argument, to see if 
I would believe them. I explained to them that it was not my role to judge the veracity or strength 
of their case but they often continued to seek my approval for their argument. In one example, 
the LiP appealed to the fact that we had both lived in the same location (overseas) and said, 
“Well, you'll think I'm honest then if we lived in the same place”. I interpreted this as a need to 
be believed by a professional, perhaps because they had encountered or expected to encounter 
disbelief when taking their case through court.  
In other instances, study participants attempted to use their participation for their own ends, 
and in ways that were not anticipated. For example, one represented opposing party said, 
ostensibly to me, but equally, I believe, to the LiP standing with me: “I have a headline for you: 
if you need to build a house get a builder, if you are sick get a doctor”. The unstated next part 
being: “if you have a legal dispute, get a lawyer”. Another participant told me she had shown to 
a general medical practice the information sheet for the case study to “prove” that she was a 
LiP. She said they had denied her access to her children’s medical information (relevant to her 
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legal case) because the practice did not believe it was possible to go to court without a lawyer, 
but once they saw the information sheet with the University header, they allowed her access.  
4. Lawyer-Researcher – Role Conflict 
(a) Relationship to LiPs 
I recognised early that the role of former-lawyer might create ethical problems when observing 
LiPs. In the UOHEC application I noted "professional knowledge" as a potential ethical 
problem:  
Professional Knowledge: As a trained lawyer, the doctoral researcher understands 
the system the [LiP] will be attempting to negotiate. This information could be 
helpful to the [LiP]; however, the researcher will not share this information with the 
LiPs she is observing as it could undermine the purpose of the research: that is, - the 
doctoral researcher would be acting like a lawyer and therefore the litigant would no 
longer be self-represented!  
This was identified as an issue because, despite clear statements in the consent information that 
I could not give legal advice, I expected LiP participants would ask for advice. I was spending a 
lot of time with people who were attempting to navigate a complex system in which I was an 
expert and they were not, and the stakes for them were high. Sometimes LiPs did ask for advice, 
but only very rarely. When they did I was at ease restating that I could not give legal advice and 
then asking them where they thought they might go for assistance, and providing suggestions if 
they did not know.  
What I had not fully anticipated was that I would want to offer them advice. As Bell and Nutt 
note in the context of social work practitioner-researchers, "the practitioner-researcher may 
make initial decisions about separating or connecting these roles, which may then be difficult to 
achieve in practice".74 I had assumed that I was a “former” lawyer and now a researcher. I 
handed in my practising certificate to make the line clearer, and according to New Zealand law 
was therefore no longer entitled to call myself a “lawyer”. But I discovered that my role of lawyer 
was much more deeply embedded than I expected: I thought like a lawyer and felt like a lawyer. 
The role was not one I could simply hand back.  
                                                          
74 Linda Bell and Linda Nutt "Divided Loyalties, Divided Expectations: Research Ethics, Professional and 
Occupational Responsibilites" in Melanie Mauthner (ed) Ethics in Qualitative Research (Sage Publications Ltd, 
London, 2002) 70. 
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The difficulty in clear role differentiation was exacerbated by the fact that the stories LiPs told 
me as a researcher sounded very similar to what a client would have told me at an initial 
interview. In both roles I needed to listen to and question the story, but these activities are 
different in the respective roles. A lawyer listens for causes of action or defences, makes mental 
lists of evidence that might be required and further investigation to be undertaken. It is an 
exercise of taking an everyday story and turning it into a legal one. As a researcher I was listening 
both for what they were telling me about the experience of litigating in person and the 
perspectives they implied in their story. It required considerable effort, at least initially, to stay 
in the research role and not revert to “issue spotting”.  
The LiPs knew I was a lawyer so I could not take the stance of feigned ignorance or I would 
also undermine my credibility to them:75 they expected me to understand the processes and 
terminology better than they did. During interviews the LiPs and I used my knowledge of the 
system to co-construct an account of their litigation experience. The following excerpt briefly 
illustrates how common this was:  
LiP: We went to one of those things, what is it called, where you just go and talk to 
the Judge but not the trial, you know ...? 
BTC: A judicial conference? 
LiP: Yes, we went to that and ... .  
I was actively using my legal knowledge in the interviews, at least to some degree, so the 
boundary between researcher and lawyer was not the bright line I had anticipated.  
As the research progressed I came to understand that my knowledge was not just important for 
constructing an account of what had gone before, but had implications for how the LiP might 
run their case. While I was not advising them, my line of questioning and/or body language 
could nevertheless redirect (intentionally or not) their running of their case. I had to make sure 
that my questions were directed only at finding out information relevant to the research, and 
not be tempted to use leading questions to give hints and suggestions about how the LiP might 
conduct the case. To give in to this temptation would mean I might undermine the participant’s 
status as a “LiP”, but I could also open myself to professional responsibility or the animus of 
                                                          
75 Linda Nutt feigned ignorance despite being a practitioner to get more explicit information from the participant 
but she notes this had the potential to undermine credibility, at 78. 
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the LiP if they followed my “hints” and blamed me when the case was unsuccessful. Even where 
I could see the LiP’s decisions or lack of knowledge were leading to disaster for their case, I 
justified standing by on the basis that the ends of research justified inaction: if I intervened, the 
data would be of little use as I would have become an adviser. This consequentialist position is 
of course not the only one open to me and another researcher might have taken a different 
approach.76 I remain satisfied that this was an ethically justifiable position to take, although one 
that exacted a toll: it was very stressful to watch a LiP make serious errors in the trial and do 
nothing to assist.   
There were times when I did make minor interventions on the basis that failing to do so might 
undermine rapport and fail to acknowledge that some reciprocity is needed to maintain a non-
exploitative relationship.77 These included occasions when a LiP asked me a direct question 
about terminology, my redirecting LiPs wanting advice or information to other services, or when 
a LiP struggled to find their way around a court building. I justified this as a minimal intervention 
and one that showed some measure of reciprocity for participation in the study.  
The lawyer-researcher conflict would be removed if a non-lawyer had conducted this research. 
However, that would have come with a significant set of disadvantages. It was my role as lawyer 
that allowed me to understand when the LiP was violating the unwritten rules of the court: if I 
was a non-lawyer the shock might not have been quite as visceral when a LiP politely, but firmly, 
told the Judge that he would conduct his opening statement with “no further interruptions [from 
the Judge] please”. Nor would a non-lawyer, without a great deal of research and training, 
appreciate when the LiP lacked understanding of evidence, procedure and sometimes 
substantive law (although I was not necessarily always expert in the substantive law that the LiPs 
were arguing).  
                                                          
76 My ethical position was influenced by the pragmatic research paradigm I was working within. If I had been 
working within a transformative approach a more appropriate ethical stance might have been an ethic of care, 
where I could have intervened more directly to assist the LiP. Wiles, above n 73 at 4-5.  
77 See for example the discussion on observing police interviews in Jerome Skolnick Justice without Trial: Law 
Enforcement in Democratic Society (2nd ed, John Wiley & Sons, New York, 1975) at 38, where Skolnick considers his 
reaction to a direct request from an officer for his opinion: "I might have said 'no comment', but I could not divorce 
myself from the fact that I was there. The detective might try to read an opinion from my facial expressions and 
possible come to a conclusion opposite to one that I held. Moreover, I believe that although I may have a fairly 
good poker face (even when playing poker), to keep it outside that setting destroys rapport".  
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Reactivity might have been minimised if a non-lawyer had conducted this research.  However, 
if my questions and reactions to LiPs set off lines of inquiry they might not have otherwise 
pursued, then at least I can say that their outcomes are likely to be better, rather than worse for 
them, than if I had not been present. From an ethical standpoint I am not therefore causing 
them harm. From the standpoint of the research findings, the reactivity is likely to mean that 
the LiPs in the study made better, or more considered, litigation decisions, than if I had not 
been present. I am therefore, if anything, under- rather than over-reporting the difficulties that 
LiPs face in bringing litigation. While these effects must be acknowledged, I consider them 
reasonable trade-offs for access to data about LiPs’ experiences that might not otherwise have 
been attainable.  
(b) Relationship to the Profession 
My professional background assisted in obtaining interviews with the professional participants, 
particularly the judiciary. However, the process of shedding my professional identity as a lawyer 
also complicated my relationship with the professional participants. In New Zealand, the fact 
that I am currently in the legal academy rather than in legal practice does not significantly alter 
my “insider” status. There is a close relationship between the judiciary, profession, and law 
schools.78 I could therefore use my “insider” status to build rapport (discussing connections in 
the profession and past professional experience). This, however, was difficult territory. In 
reviewing literature critical of the profession and then observing as an outsider, I had reduced 
my sense of belonging to the profession. By the time I came to interview Judges and lawyers, I 
was (to borrow the words of T.S. Eliot), “no longer at ease here, in the old dispensation”.79  My 
efforts to build rapport with these interviewees therefore risked being false: reference to a 
common perspective risked misrepresenting my position.  
I was also aware that my positioning as insider or outsider might change the performative aspect 
of the interview. Positioned as an “insider”, I anticipated responses would tend to reference a 
shared understanding of “what we all know LiPs are like”. Positioned as an outsider, I 
                                                          
78 The close relationship is noted in Duncan Webb "Judicial Conduct in a Very Small Place: Some Contextual 
Questions" (2003) 6 Legal Ethics 106; Grant Hammond "Judges and Academics in New Zealand" (2013) 25(4) 
New Zealand Universities Law Review 681. 
79 T S Eliot, Journey of the Maji. This is not uncommon. As Emerson, Fretz and Shaw, above n 33 at 91 comment, 
“Over time, a fieldworker’s personal views and theoretical commitments often veer and transform”. 
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anticipated more idealised accounts of interactions with LiPs. Neither of these accounts would 
be more or less “true” and the reality is that my positioning shifted along the continuum of 
insider-outsider during interviews.80 When analysing the data I have reflected on how my 
positioning might have influenced the responses.  
The other difficulty that the lack of distance between the academy and the profession creates, 
on both a personal and structural level, is to be able to maintain critical distance. On a personal 
level this is due to being a former Judges’ Clerk and also being a former and perhaps future 
practitioner, with personal and professional relationships forged in this small community. Those 
relationships assisted in gaining access and building rapport, but could equally be an impediment 
to critical distance in analysis.  
On a more structural level, the difficulty arises from the lack of an established tradition of 
looking at legal behaviour, or law in action, rather than law on the books. This is not unique to 
New Zealand. In the United States, where there is a much longer tradition of socio-legal 
research, doctrinal studies and the construction and deconstruction of legal argument are still 
privileged in the legal academy.81 Legal doctrine is fertile and accepted ground for the academy 
to examine, but law “on the ground” is much less so. The lack of a tradition of examining law 
in context, combined with the close relationship between bench, bar and academy, means there 
                                                          
80 Miri Song and David Parker "Commonality, Difference and the Dynamics of Disclosure in In-Depth 
Interviewing" (1995) 29(2) Sociology 241, discusses the shifting and unstable nature of researcher and participant 
where they share some of the same culture, in that case Chinese-English, but in the case of this research, a common 
professional culture. They note that "interviewees may withhold or disclose certain kinds of information, depending 
upon their assumptions of the researcher". See also Sharyn Roach Anleu, Stina Bergman Blix and Kathy Mack 
"Researching Emotion in Courts and the Judiciary: A Tale of Two Projects" (2015) 7(2) Emotion Review 145 at 
147-148. 
81 Marc Galanter "In the Winter of Our Discontent: Law, Anti-Law, and Social Science" (2006) 2 Annual Review 
of Law and Social Science 1 at 11 says: “Like Holmes, the legal academy has followed the enchantments of text 
rather than the Brandeisian imperative of disciplined examination of context. Although legal academics have 
established their independence of the profession, taken in the aggregate they continue to mirror the intellectual 
styles of both judges and lawyers. Like judges, they privilege legal doctrine and justification. Like lawyers, they place 
‘more value on the inventive, the new, the clever, the winning argument,’ and critical deconstruction of opposing 
arguments than on the collaborative process of ‘describing, explaining and exploring’ the legal world (citation omitted). 
The reluctance of the law schools to be the seat of systematic cultivation of this contextual knowledge is indicated 
by the regular recurrence of calls for them to do so.” See also Deborah Rhode "Access to Justice: An Agenda for 
Legal Education and Research" (2012) 62 Journal of Legal Education 531 at 542 noting the structural reasons for 
lack of access to justice research: “Our lack of adequate research on access to justice is partly attributable to 
structural problems in the market for legal scholarship. Compared with other work, empirical research has higher 
costs and lower rewards. It is typically more expensive and time consuming than doctrinal or theoretical 
scholarship, requires greater interdisciplinary expertise and risks dismissal in some circles as ‘merely descriptive’”. 
84 
 
is little established space for critique of institutional actors’ legal behaviour. There are therefore 
both personal and cultural restraints to maintaining critical distance.  
Jaffe argues that studying a culture we are familiar with, rather than the distant village of 
traditional anthropology:82 
… can intensify the reflexive experience of the ethnographer. The experience of 
writing about people who read what we write and then talk and write back to us 
undermines our ability to construct an unproblematic Other, and hence, an 
unproblematic self.  
My ongoing proximity to the profession, judiciary, and LiPs who participated, is, I believe, a 
strength of the research. They can, and I hope, will talk back to the research. I have written this 
research expecting that I will have to defend it. This has encouraged careful consideration of 
ethical and legal issues, as well as providing considerable impetus for examining all perspectives 
on the issues discussed and the conclusions drawn.  
C. Conclusions 
My identities as lawyer and researcher have shifted continuously during the research, allowing 
me access and interpretation that would not have been possible without them. They have also 
created an ongoing balancing act between collecting useful data, maintaining rapport and 
credibility with the participants, and not crossing the line from researcher to lawyer.  
A different research design, for example simply observing litigants in court and interviewing 
them after their cases, might have minimised many of the issues discussed above. However it 
would also have meant there was no data on LiPs' expectations (untainted by how the case 
unfolded), their pre-court litigation decisions, and their sources of advice. It would also not have 
included those people who did not go to court or who appointed a lawyer at the eleventh hour.  
An important aspect of litigation is completing the procedural steps that precede one's “day in 
court”.  Negotiations and case management conferences spur cases in new directions: towards 
settlement, discontinuance, or changes in representation.  As Danet and others observed more 
than 30 years ago: "It is increasingly recognized that most of what lawyers do is not in the formal 
                                                          
82 Alexandra Jaffe "Involvement, Detachment, and Representation on Corsica" in Caroline Brettell (ed) When They 
Read What We Write: the Politics of Ethnography (Bergin & Garvey, Westport, CN, 1996) 51 at 52.  
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setting of the courtroom at all, but rather on the telephone or behind a desk, or even in a coffee 
shop - not litigating but counselling, interviewing, negotiating, manipulating, and so on”.83 
Litigation also largely occurs “on the papers”, so the inclusion of documentary material also 
allows examination of how litigants, Judges and lawyers interact and position themselves in 
written documents. The research design allowed all these aspects of litigation to be captured.  
The research does not answer all the questions the policy audience wants answered. It does not 
answer demographic questions about LiPs, nor focus its efforts on a detailed analysis of the 
possible policy responses.84 What it tries to achieve is greater understanding of the interaction 
between LiPs and the “system” (the Judges, lawyers, and court staff), their perceptions and 
misperceptions of each other and the process, and, in doing so, provides a more informed basis 
for proceeding with policy response. 
 
                                                          
83 Danet, Hoffman and Kermish, above n 25 at 906.  






Becoming a Litigant in Person 
 
Why litigate in person? The responses that tend to spring immediately to mind are that the litigant 
makes this decision due to cost – because they cannot afford a lawyer, either through legal aid or 
privately or because of personal choice. Those appearing in person by choice are easily tarred with the 
brush of the “fool for a client”, or even considered an unreasonable or obsessive litigant.   
This chapter discusses the reasons LiPs gave for deciding to litigate in person, and compares these to 
the perceptions on this matter of the bench and bar. It argues that the dichotomy between expense 
and choice is unhelpful. While financial reasons are a major factor in deciding to litigate in person, it 
was rare that the decisions were just financial or driven by only one factor. Many LiPs’ decisions were 
influenced by the perceived quality of legal services they could or did access, and their lay 
understanding of the function of lawyers and the legal system. Their experiences and perceptions on 
these matters were largely at odds with those of the bench and bar.  
The chapter begins by examining the reasons LiPs put forward for litigating in person and then moves 
to the perceptions of lawyers and Judges. I then argue that aspects of LiPs’ decisions to litigate in 
person can be seen as a response to messages communicated by the legal system about the openness 
to them of the court. Moreover, the fact that LiPs negotiate the process without a lawyer can be seen 
as a failure of lawyers to offer services that people are willing and able to purchase, though this is easily 
interpreted by the bench and bar as arrogance or unreasonableness. The chapter concludes with 
discussion of how the bench and bar’s perceptions of the reasons for litigating in person might affect 
the way they treat individual litigants. 
I. LiPs on Why they Litigate in Person 
A striking aspect of LiPs’ narratives about why they litigated in person were the multiple and 
overlapping reasons they offered. This discussion reviews the major rationales offered by all the LiPs, 
both case study and interview participants. I have attempted to identify their dominant reason for 





generally offered multiple explanations and justifications, not only one.1 This mirrors Canadian and 
UK research that found LiPs explained and rationalised their decision by drawing on multiple factors.2  
I therefore discuss the major rationales LiPs offered in turn: problems with accessing legal services, 
the quality of the services accessed, beliefs about how cases are determined and the lawyer’s role in 
that process, and institutional encouragement to litigate in person.  
A. Cost of Services and Access to Legal Aid 
Most (29 of 35) of the LiPs who participated in the study either had initially engaged a lawyer, or made 
attempts to engage one or to access legal advice to the value they felt they could afford, before taking 
any steps in the proceedings. Many cited the high cost of these services as a major reason why they 
then decided to litigate in person. A few cited it as the sole reason. Nevertheless, even in cases where 
the reason was ostensibly “all about the money”, they expressed ambivalence about whether they really 
needed or wanted a lawyer. There were many nuances, however, around what the LiPs meant by the 
cost being too high. 
1. LiPs on the cost of legal services 
Many LiPs did not qualify for legal aid and did not feel able to afford the cost of legal services. Some 
expressed their inability to pay legal fees in terms of the absolute cost. As one High Court LiP pithily 
said: “you can’t pay $500 per hour when you earn $500 per week”. A Family Court LiP explained: 
I simply couldn’t afford the legal fees. I went to a lawyer, I sat down with a lawyer for an 
hour and a half, and she did some work in the background I guess, and it cost me $1700. I 
couldn’t afford that. 
Other LiPs complained that they were given fees indications by counsel, but what they were then 
billed far outstripped the estimate:3 
                                                          
1 Following George Herbert Mead and Herbert Blumer’s caution that researchers should pay close attention to cases that 
do not fit the general pattern (see Howard Becker Tricks of the Trade: How to Think About Your Research While You're Doing It 
(University of Chicago Press, Chicago, Ill, 1998) at 195, I attempted to work back and forth between the ideas and evidence 
to achieve a fit of explanations and observations (analytic induction), which is particularly useful to find explanations for 
“deviant” behaviour; Charles Ragin Constructing Social Research: The Unity and Diversity of Method (Sage Publications, Thousand 
Oakes, CA, 1994) at 93-98.  
2 See Chapter 2, page 21.  
3 The Law Commission Delivering Justice for All: A Vision for New Zealand Courts and Tribunals (NZLC R85, 2004) at [150]-
[153] noted a trend away from hourly billing, sounding a hopeful note as “hourly billing does nothing to inform a client’s 
understanding of how much the lawyer’s services will in fact cost”, as well as tempting lawyers to work inefficiently and 





Her original quote to me was between $12,000 and $13,000, which is what I paid. But then 
she went to charge me more. Her final bill was $38,000, which was discounted from 
something like $56,000. 
It was a common pattern within the LiP participant group that they had originally engaged counsel 
with a particular budget in mind, but exhausted the budget without reaching resolution of the matter. 
Some could borrow to fund the excess but did not want to. Others had no means to keep funding the 
fees. They were then left with the choice of continuing without counsel or abandoning their case. 
A few LiPs considered it was the cost of legal fees relative to the size of the claim that made legal 
services unaffordable. This was particularly so in the District Court where claims are capped at 
$200,000, but legal fees were still hundreds of dollars per hour. It was also an issue when there was no 
monetary judgment, such as in COCA applications in the Family Court, and judicial review in the 
High Court, or where there was a question over enforcement of a monetary award.  As one District 
Court LiP explained regarding his debt recovery proceeding: 
I would say I would stand at least a 90 per cent chance of getting some money awarded.  If 
I employed a lawyer I may increase my chance marginally.  However, I would still have the 
problem of getting my money [from the probably insolvent defendant]. 
For this LiP it was a choice of either pursuing the possibility of debt recovery without a lawyer, or 
letting the defendant walk away.  
2. LiPs on access to Legal Aid  
Most of the LiPs did not qualify for legal aid. For a single person to be eligible the income threshold 
is $22,366 per year and the disposable capital is $3,500.4 In 2011 changes were also introduced to 
increase repayments of legal aid loans. This includes charging interest on legal aid debt (where 
previously it had been interest free) and using compulsory repayment orders for income related debt.5  
A few participants thought they would qualify for legal aid but were reluctant to apply because the aid 
would only be a loan, and would be secured against their home. One Family Court LiP explained, “I 
was very aware that I probably would get legal aid but would have to repay it because I own my own 
home”. Another Family Court LiP, who also advises other LiPs, said “people worry about getting 
caveats on their houses”. They see deciding whether or not to apply for legal aid as a calculation 
                                                          
4 Legal Services Regulations 2011 regs 5 and 6. The thresholds increase with the number of dependent children. The 
median personal income from all sources per person in 2013 was $28,500 Statistics New Zealand 2013 QuickStats about 
Income (2014) at 12. Family and civil legal aid recipients also pay $100, called a “contribution to the cost of their legal aid”.   





between:  “los[ing] your house to get your kids back, or … keep[ing] your house and not get[ting] your 
kids back”.  
3. Cost of returning to representation 
Once they had begun to litigate in person, some participants wanted to return to representation. This 
was often at the strong encouragement of the court staff, judge or opposing counsel, or when they 
found the case, or a particular aspect of it, more difficult than anticipated: 
[the Judge] said it was self-evident I would be struck out. Now at that point I realised - I 
realised I needed to engage a barrister. I was out of my depth. (FC LiP) 
A major barrier to finding new representation was the initial cost in having a new lawyer become 
familiar with the file. Where the matter had been running for some time, lawyers would quote 
considerable sums to familiarise themselves with the file.6 As one former-LiP and now McKenzie 
friend explained, a Family Court litigant was quoted $5,000 “just to look at the file … because the case 
was so complex and the other lawyers had a go and pulled out of it”. He said that lawyers charging to 
get acquainted with a file was justified, but the client was unable to pay $5,000 just to have the case 
reviewed. A High Court LiP who had been in and out of representation, but was three years into the 
case, said of his efforts to find a new lawyer: “Our system requires a lawyer to get it all into their head 
and it’s so expensive. They will price themselves out of a job”. For the LiP it was paying money 
without any progress in the case, only the possibility of future progress.  
B. Quality of Service Accessed 
A few LiPs who abandoned representation had nothing but praise for their lawyers, but more had 
complaints about the service they received. These complaints were not about the content of the advice, 
but the manner and competence of their counsel.  
1. Second-rate service and errors 
A number of Family Court LiPs felt the service they had been given on legal aid was very rudimentary. 
One LiP reported that her lawyer told her she was a “low value client”, because the legal aid rate he 
was receiving was a third of his usual charge-out rate. The LiP commented: 
                                                          
6 For lawyers these fees might also be an insurance against a possibly difficult client, as discussed below. This was not a 





That is the reality of the world. They do it to fill in the gaps in their business, but if a fee 
paying client comes along at the normal rate then certainly they are going to prioritise.  
While not many lawyers would countenance telling a client they are “low value”, the difference in 
service was acknowledged and explained by one senior family law practitioner. She emphasised that 
legal aid pay rates were low, and were revised down at the last review, whereas overheads are 
increasing. She said that most family law practitioners do some legal aid work but “if you are being 
paid half the rate to do something that you know you can charge double for privately, you’re going to 
do it a bit differently”. She said this “different level of service” is “just the reality of practice and it is 
human nature really”.  
There was also evidence of a more limited service being given to legal aid clients in the civil arena. 
One LiP, who was originally represented by a legal aid lawyer, was upset when his lawyer was unable 
to address questions from the Judge, who criticised the drafting of his claim and the omission of a 
cause of action. The LiP (then represented) complained to his lawyer. The lawyer responded, 
acknowledging that he had not researched the cause of action the Judge said was appropriate, “because 
with limited legal aid funding, I had to focus on what I considered the strongest argument”.7 The 
Judge took a different view about the strongest argument and the litigant was unsuccessful.  
Other LiPs who had paid lawyers also reported leaving representation because they believed their 
lawyer made errors on the file. This included LiPs believing the lawyers missed filing deadlines, made 
errors in settlement documents that made them unenforceable, or submitted documents with spelling 
and grammatical errors that demonstrated incompetence.  
2. Lack of expertise 
While there are many experienced family law practitioners who do legal aid work, some LiPs 
encountered legal aid practitioners who were junior and inexperienced, with limited expertise and life 
experience. Some family law clients who went on to become LiPs felt that they could not relate to the 
fresh graduate who advised them, with no experience of marriage or children. One Family Court LiP, 
who described her lawyer as “junior … , quite inexperienced and immature”, said she changed lawyers 
(and eventually became a LiP) when the lawyer disclosed the LiP’s unlisted phone number and other 
contact details to her allegedly violent ex-partner. Another LiP who also advises other LiPs said: 
                                                          





Often family law is a training ground for young lawyers in a practice and often with legal 
aid work that they’ve started off with. … They don’t have the experience of parenting and 
they don’t understand the emotions that are involved.  
The expertise of civil legal aid lawyers was also an issue. Two LiP participants with civil cases had legal 
aid grants but said they had been unable to find legal aid practitioners who were sufficiently expert. 
Lawyers confirmed that there was an issue with the number of civil legal aid specialists. One civil 
litigation lawyer called this a “huge problem”. He had been a legal aid provider and had done “the 
occasional case for a deserving cause”, but said he had recently removed his name from the list. He 
explained that “the rates are too parsimonious, it is just not worth doing”.  Another civil litigation 
lawyer, when asked about the number of legal aid lawyers in his specialist area, said “there are a few, 
not very good ones”. Practitioners also said legal aid cases are used to train new lawyers. One senior 
civil practitioner said he had cut his teeth on a legal aid case but the rates were so low and legal aid 
was so hard to deal with administratively that he had never done another. 
3. Negative Experiences with Counsel 
Some of the Family Court LiPs had left representation because they felt their lawyers had little time 
or interest in understanding them as individuals or even bullied them. This seemed a particular 
problem with busy practitioners, where LiPs felt “pushed through the system” or that they were “just 
another case to be processed”. In some instances, the LiP felt this reached the level of bullying. As a 
Family Court LiP said, “She scared me, she was very pushy, she frightened me … she said if I didn’t 
do what I was told … [my child] would be taken away from me”. This LiP changed legal aid lawyers, 
but the new lawyer asked her to leave her file on the doorstep of the lawyer’s home office. She did 
not meet the lawyer and said the lawyer “had no idea what we even looked like. I found that quite 
horrible really - really impersonal”. She decided to discontinue her legal aid funding and litigate in 
person instead. Another Family Court LiP with a privately funded lawyer said: 
She was a bully. She wouldn’t answer my calls for two weeks at a time and then she’d make 
it out that it was such a big deal … like she is going out of her way. 
In other instances, or compounding the perceived problem, was a lack of personal service or an 
impression that the lawyer did not believe the litigant. One LiP said her ex-partner was abusive and 





she could not see through the manipulation. She felt her lawyer’s faith in her veracity was shaken each 
time the ex-partner’s lawyer filed an affidavit.8  
4. Fragility of the lawyer-client relationship 
The fact that LiPs reported that part of their motivation for litigating in person was failings in their 
relationship with their lawyer, whether these were perceived or actual, speaks to the fragility of that 
relationship. A lawyer who had been a party to a civil (not family) proceeding himself had insight into 
this problem. He believed his lawyer made a mistake on the file, which almost ended their relationship, 
although the outcome was not affected. He commented that: “the emotions skew your perception and 
affect your judgment; one mistake by the lawyer undoes the trust”. He commented that he had been 
an “awful client”, calling his lawyer frequently and trying to micromanage the file, although he would 
advise his clients not to do that. He said the emotional involvement meant he could not follow his 
own advice: “I would never have understood how strong that was if I hadn’t had that experience 
myself”. He now realises that, with clients, “really you have to work hard at them, to explain, to win 
and then keep their trust”. 
C. Beliefs that a lawyer might bring minimal advantage 
In the background of many LiPs’ explanations as to why they were litigating in person, lay 
minimisation of the benefit a lawyer might bring to their case. This perception was based on their own 
experience of legal services, or their general understanding of such services and the operation of the 
courts.  Many LiPs minimised the role of the lawyer to that of a bureaucrat within the court system, 
rather than a person with particular expertise and the ability to be an effective force in resolving their 
case. Some LiPs also indicated that they did not see a lawyer as important because they believed the 
court would assist them and that “the truth” would come out regardless of whether they had a lawyer 
or not.  
                                                          
8 See Nan Seuffert "Lawyering for Women Survivors of Domestic Violence: Special Issue on Domestic Violence" (1996) 
4 Waikato Law Review 1 at 52 which suggests that the abusive partner's credible public persona, which may be "wildly 
divergent" from the private one, can be marshalled against the abused partner, so the abusive partner “may actually appear 





1. Experienced LiPs 
Only a few LiPs did not try to engage a lawyer at the outset of their proceedings. Three of these were 
persistent litigants,9 who had brought multiple proceedings and considered their experience matched 
that of a lawyer, and that a lawyer therefore provided little benefit.  
Some LiPs who sought advice first had previous experience of the court system, either having 
previously been involved in litigation (whether represented or not), or having experience of the court 
system from their professional life.10 The LiPs gained confidence and experience from watching their 
lawyer manage their case and felt they could do the work themselves. This was particularly common 
in COCA cases where the parties were in and out of court over many years as parenting arrangements 
changed. As one Family Court LiP said: 
I did originally have a lawyer for the first time. Because you learn the process pretty quick, 
you think I can probably do this myself. It is a fairly basic format you follow through the 
Family Court, I personally think. 
LiPs in long running civil disputes also reported drawing on the experience of observing their counsel 
managing their case, before they became a LiP.  
For individual litigants, their own contact with the legal system was important in demystifying the 
process and was a factor in their believing a lawyer was no longer necessary. A number of LiPs who 
had gained experience initially as represented litigants referred to losing their fear of court, and in 
doing so had the confidence to appear in person: 
The court is so much about bullying. I’m over the fear now … Now I’m at the stage of 
rebuilding and I know all of this is fear and it’s just artificial. (HC LiP) 
When I was able to look at it without so much fear and emotion I hadn’t been - I hadn’t 
got anything significant as a result of spending that much money [on lawyer’s fees]. (FC 
LiP) 
You know, I look back now and think that $20,000 could have been in a savings plan for 
my son’s education. What did I get out of it? I was held back by fear and emotion and lack 
of knowledge. (FC LiP) 
                                                          
9 Within the analysis I considered people persistent if they brought three or more separate proceedings. This did not 
include appeals (although all the persistent litigants also appealed) but rather they were litigants who used other procedures 
such as applications to recall a judgment, judicial review and private prosecutions, to continue to litigate around a single 
issue. 
10 LiP participants’ previous professional experience included roles as expert witnesses, police officers, a legal secretary 





Another litigant referred to not being “intimidated by the court”, as if intimidation was something the 
court intended, but failed to achieve.  
2. Encouragement from others 
A factor in some participants’ decision to litigate in person was encountering encouragement from 
former LiPs, or from professionals, to go it alone. One LiP said that the lawyer whom he had initially 
consulted told him he should proceed in person as it was a simple enough to do without a lawyer. 
Another was encouraged by an expert appointed to value the assets for distribution after a mediated 
agreement was reached, as the expert considered lawyers were no longer needed.11  
Other LiPs knew through personal contacts, or through accessing online support groups, of people 
who had previously been LiPs and were now acting as advisers and McKenzie friends. The 
encouragement of these people, and their willingness to share their experience, was a factor for some 
in deciding to litigate in person.12 As one Family Court LiP explained, he found the contact details of 
a McKenzie friend in his initial online research. He contacted the McKenzie friend who said, “I could 
get a lawyer or represent myself. He explained what I’d need to do etc”. The LiP did consult a lawyer 
“to make sure I was on track and stuff like that”, but after talking to the lawyer he realised he would 
not be able to afford full representation. With the help of the McKenzie friend, he appeared in person. 
While he said cost was the main motivation for litigating in person, the intervention of an experienced 
adviser was also instrumental in enabling this to be a viable option.  
3. Lawyers “getting nowhere” 
Some LiPs considered they were paying money to get nowhere and might as well do it themselves:  
So by this stage, of course, I had spent an awful lot on lawyers and had won zero, absolutely 
nothing. (FC LiP) 
I spent $120,000 on lawyers. After 31 years of marriage, not one, not one of them obtained 
anything other than a few months of interim spousal maintenance. It’s disgraceful! (FC LiP) 
The LiPs who thought they were not getting value for money did not necessarily blame this on their 
individual lawyer. They instead saw the problem as lawyers endlessly exchanging letters, rather than 
                                                          
11 The case continued for two more years and the LiP sought legal advice and representation a number of times. 
12 While there are no prisoners in the LiP participant group (as recruitment inside the prisons would have been very 
difficult), the court staff, judges and lawyers referred to prisoners as being among LiPs in general. The registry staff 
reported receiving applications from prisoners that repeated the same paragraphs as other prisoners’ applications. They 
surmised that the prisoners had “their bush lawyer in there” drafting the applications. The prisoners were therefore being 





“just getting on with it” and going to court, when resolution out of court seemed unlikely. From this 
perspective, lawyers were seen as ineffective, or even a barrier to resolving the case. In either case, 
they were dissatisfied with continuing to pay legal fees for what they saw as “getting nowhere”. As 
one Family Court LiP said, reflecting on her legal aid lawyer, “she was quite happy just to mosey on”, 
and process the case at the normal speed. The LiP wanted her to work more quickly but: 
When you are trying to push for something new, a new idea to go into their brain, they lash 
out at you - and make you feel like shit, like you are impatient, you’re this, you’re that, 
you’ve got all these bad qualities about you.  
Another Family Court LiP saw lawyers as a barrier, deliberately preventing the litigant’s day in court. 
He said that he now advises people who ask him how to manage their cases to “imagine there is a 
circle and in the middle the judge is making a decision”. He says they have to try and get their case 
“through the whirlpool of everybody else who is trying to stop you getting there”, being the lawyers, 
court staff, and psychologists. Some of the LiPs who criticised the speed of progress thought their 
lawyer spent too long trying to settle the case, whereas the LiP just wanted to go to court. In addition, 
some LiPs believed the lawyers were trying to drag out proceedings to make more money. 
Others considered a lawyer was poor value for money, not because of the lawyer, but because of the 
intransigence of the opposing party. This issue was emphasised by two of the four women LiP 
participants, who said their ex-partners, the opposing party, had perpetrated domestic violence against 
them. These women considered continuing to instruct a lawyer was pointless, as the lawyer would be 
unable to combat their ex-partner’s skilful manipulation of the process and flouting of court orders.13  
4. Lawyers as bureaucrats 
In discussing their decisions to litigate in person, many participants expressed views that minimised 
the lawyer’s role, reducing it to filling out paperwork, or saying lawyers were useful only because they 
knew the process. Without any faith that the lawyer might be serving more than a merely bureaucratic 
function, which organised, confident individuals felt they could do themselves, they were unprepared 
to pay (and borrow to pay) the hourly rate. They were also unlikely to believe they were getting value 
                                                          
13 The litigants’ views converge with those of William Felstiner and Austin Sarat "Enactments of Power: Negotiating 
Reality and Responsibility in Lawyer-Client Interactions" (1992) 77 Cornell Law Review 1447 at 1468: “… in the context 
of divorce, many of the judgments over which conflicts occur do not reflect technical considerations; rather, they are 
questions of timing, motive and interpretation for which the lawyer may have no comparative advantage. Indeed, insofar 






for money when they saw a lawyer as a bureaucratic functionary, rather than a person with special skill 
and expertise. A former LiP, now acting as a McKenzie friend in the Family Court, said that the people 
he assisted did not qualify for legal aid but were the “working poor” who could not afford to pay 
“$350 to $500 per hour”. He explained the impression created by lack of visible work in return for 
high fees:  
I’ve got guys who are engineers on $50/hour. When they see a lawyer getting $450/hour, 
they are just completely disgusted by it, particularly when the work is done behind the 
scenes. And they think, well, I can do that.  
Those who, as discussed above, gained experience from watching their counsel manage their case, 
tended to minimise what their counsel had done. LiPs said they had drafted the material themselves 
and the lawyer would “just put the lawyer bits in and change it”. Once the litigants had read and edited 
legal correspondence and court documents, they considered they could continue on without 
assistance. 
5. Expectations of Assistance 
Some litigants expressed beliefs that the lawyers, judges and court staff were obliged to assist them to 
litigate in person and would modify aspects of the court system to ensure they could participate. Some 
indicated they thought Judges would make special allowances for them, given they were a LiP, and 
would therefore not be at a disadvantage, and perhaps would even have an advantage, by not having 
a lawyer. Some LiPs expected that the language and procedure would be relaxed to make the process 
more accessible:  
My understanding of the normal court is that if you self-represent there is a requirement 
for the law to be fair and equal - that they must bring their terminology and all that down 
to your level. (FC LiP) 
Some LiPs went further and said that because they were not a lawyer they could not be expected to 
argue the law. They would simply bring the facts to the court and the Judge would do the rest.  
Lawyers and court staff also referred to their impression that some LiPs believed they were obliged to 
help them. A Family Court lawyer related a story of a LiP phoning for free advice about his affidavit 
and submissions: “He just wanted me to just tell him, he thought it was my duty to tell him”. Similarly, 





You get a lot … [of] people saying, “Oh, I got told I could come to the court and you’d 
help me”. And, well, help means that I’ll tell you what the filing fees are, not tell you whether 
or not you’ve got a credible claim. 
To some extent this expectation was borne out. As discussed in the following chapters, many court 
staff, lawyers and judges do go out of their way to assist LiPs access the system. 
6. The Truth Will Out 
A number of participants expressed a strong belief that the courts would deliver “justice” and 
therefore having a lawyer was unnecessary. When asked for words of advice to future LiPs one 
participant said: “Just tell the truth really, just be honest and tell the truth and you can’t go wrong”. 
Another participant in a parenting dispute explained: 
That is why I’m representing myself. I have nothing to fear. If I did, I’d go to a lawyer and 
say, hey, make me win the case. But over here I’m 90 per cent sure I’ll get what God thinks 
is right, what I want and [my child] wants.  
This LiP was successful in her (unopposed) application and reflecting on her “win” after the hearing 
she commented, “I guess if you have nothing to hide then it is fine to self-represent”.14  
Some LiPs who had succeeded in a previous case, either represented or not, believed that justice had 
prevailed and would do so again, so a lawyer was unnecessary. A LiP who had successfully defended 
a criminal charge in person pointed to that experience as both having equipped him to run the complex 
civil matter he was now involved in, but also as giving rise to a belief that presenting the “truth” will 
result in “justice”: 
So that was the first experience that I had at a reasonably young age of realising that the 
truth was out there, all I needed to do was bring the two people along that had witnessed 
the event and then I was successful.   
Similarly, a District Court LiP, reflecting on his previous experience as a LiP many years previously, 
said “I simply told the truth and justice prevailed in the end”. He believed that his current civil matter 
                                                          
14 This reflects the popular conception of lawyers that Galanter discusses in his analysis of American lawyer jokes that 
“lawyers lie incorrigibly” and “[offend] common sense by casuistry that makes black appear white and vice versa”: He 
gives, as an example of this discourse, the following joke (at 34):  
“Have you a lawyer?” asked the judge of a young man brought before him. 
“No, Sir,” was the answer. 
“Well, don't you think you had better have one?” inquired his Honor. 





required no legal research as the answer was obvious on the justice of the case as long as he told the 
truth to the court.  
The ideas about “justice” that people were drawing on were not based on what they understood the 
law to be, but what they assumed the law to be, reasoning from their morality, or a mix of legal 
principle and a sense of justice. This is consistent with Moorhead’s observation of his UK study 
participants, that: “There was some evidence of a broader, and understandable, confusion of law with 
social or moral notions of ‘justice’”.15 For example, in my study, one LiP involved in appealing her 
benefit entitlement relied primarily on an argument that the New Zealand Government must be 
intending to provide enough money for her to live on. If the benefit fell below her actual costs, then 
she believed there must be an error, as to pay someone less than necessary would be unjust. Arguing 
her case she said: “If you see that something is detrimental to somebody you don’t go ahead and do 
it, when you know that it’s detrimental”. She was unsuccessful: the Court did not overturn the decision 
on the benefit sum. It was less than she believed she needed to survive. 
D. Beliefs about the benefits of litigating in person 
Apart from the obvious financial benefits (in the form of saved fees) of litigating in person, many LiPs 
started with the belief that their knowledge of the facts, and the control they would have over the 
proceedings, would benefit them and their case. These beliefs were often challenged by the experience 
of litigating in person, as will be discussed in the following chapters. 
1. Knowing the facts 
These LiPs thought that a lawyer would not be able to hold all the detail or understand the nuances 
of their case, and so their case was best presented in person. They were also concerned about the 
lawyer’s level of motivation to know all the facts, or their level of commitment to the case: 
[A lawyer] … would have been useless to us. Because we would have had to go through 
the palaver, getting them to get to grips with our case. They weren’t motivated to the extent 
that we are motivated. 
LiPs emphasised the detail with which they knew the case: “It would cost half a million for a lawyer 
to understand the facts of the case as well as I do”. None of the litigants expressing this view suggested 
that a lawyer might not need to know the case with the same level of detail, or that all the detail may 
                                                          
15 Richard Moorhead "The Passive Arbiter: Litigants in Person and the Challenge to Neutrality" (2007) 17 Social and Legal 





not be legally salient. They instead associated detailed knowledge of facts with success, minimising the 
importance of knowledge of the law.  
2. Control – Dignity from Direct Participation 
For others, the desire to speak themselves was related to wanting control and recognition that this 
was their dispute. One LiP in the Family Court, who had previously appeared represented, described 
a Judge refusing to address him directly in the previous proceedings, speaking to him only through his 
lawyer. He said: “I really felt really degraded actually. I even talked to my lawyer about it and said ‘I 
feel like a piece of meat’”. Another Family Court LiP commented that “people can feel enormously 
out of control and not understood by their lawyer. Self-representing for me began to make me feel in 
control and become part of the system”. One Family Court LiP related the lack of control to the 
dominant mode of legal services, where the lawyer controls the case and the client takes a back seat:  
I like to assist my lawyer and not just sit back and let them do everything. … I think there 
is too much reliance on the lawyer and that the lawyer needs to let the client in to really 
assist much more.  
As this litigant could not convince her lawyer to include her more, she became a LiP, although she 
returned to representation when urged by the Judge, lawyer for child, and her family.  
3. Control – litigating without restraints 
A few LiPs referred to perceiving a benefit from being free from the rules and cultural restraints 
imposed on lawyers. As will be discussed in the next section, Judges and lawyers commonly believed 
this was because LiPs wanted to be free to run unmeritorious arguments. Two LiPs referred to running 
an argument or case that a lawyer had directly counselled against, and to becoming a LiP for that 
reason. One went on to be a persistent LiP and the other succeeded in securing court orders for access 
to his children that the lawyer had said he would be unlikely to be granted. 
Two other LiPs may have been using the legal process to oppress their opposing party. The court 
accused them of doing so but they denied this and did not cite this as a reason for litigating in person.16 
They were taking not only core proceedings against the opposing party, but were also launching 
                                                          
16 Six of the male participants had been accused of domestic violence against their opposing parties. These men were 
involved in both civil and family court litigation. Two of these men also said their female opposing party had committed 





collateral proceedings, such as judicial review and an action under the Harassment Act 1997. Both 
were men whose opposing party had accused them of domestic violence.17  
A few LiPs believed they benefited from litigating in person because they would be more forceful 
advocates than a lawyer. They felt that the style of litigation that is customary in New Zealand is too 
restrained and deferential. These, and other, LiPs also thought lawyers would rather protect their 
reputation and avoid annoying a Judge – for the sake of their later cases and their standing in the legal 
community – than strongly argue the case the LiP wanted put forward. A few criticised lawyers for 
making comments in court such as “I’m in your Honour’s hands” (surrendering the advocacy role) 
and “my client instructs” (signalling to the bench the lawyer does not agree with the instructions).18 
Some also believed that lawyers would not zealously litigate any cases that were directed against 
lawyers, judges or the Government: “they are not wanting to take on their brethren to lynch them”.  
These beliefs were most common among (but not exclusive to) persistent litigants. They saw their 
litigation as going beyond their immediate case, to exposing what they saw as corruption in the 
system.19 As lawyers are “part of the system”, the persistent LiPs did not trust them to advocate their 
case.  
II. Lawyers and Judges on Why People Litigate in Person 
Having considered the reasons LiPs gave for litigating in person, I now turn to the perceptions of the 
bench and bar as to what LiPs’ reasons were. Before doing so, I briefly summarise Judges’ and lawyers’ 
perceptions of the previous litigation experience of the LiP population.  
A. Impressions of the LiP Population’s Litigation Experience 
A High Court Judge spoke of encountering few LiPs with no previous experience of the courts: “Very 
often litigants in person are people who have as much familiarity with the court system as anybody 
else”, and another said “most” were persistent LiPs. When giving examples of how they managed 
                                                          
17 This is consistent with domestic violence research which has discussed abusive partners using the legal system to further 
the abuse; see for example Seuffert, above n 8 at 50.   
18 Lloyd Harris "The Emotional Labour of Barristers: An Exploration of Emotional Labour By Status Professionals" 
(2002) 39(4) Journal of Management Studies 553 at 569-570 found evidence of this practice in England where a barrister 
explained: “If your case is rubbish but the client insists that you put it you always obey your instructions. You just want 
the professional to know that this isn’t your idea and it is against your advice … you just put on an act saying, ‘I am 
instructed to say …’ then the entire court knows that you don’t really believe that a schoolboy spontaneously attacked a 
known mugger!”.  






LiPs, these Judges did however talk about first-time LiPs, particularly those appealing from lower 
courts.  
The District and Family Court practitioners and Judges, in contrast, were concerned that most LiPs 
they encountered were from the “most vulnerable part of New Zealand”. They were LiPs who “don’t 
know what is going on” in their case. In all the Courts, but particularly in the District Court, the Judges 
said they frequently encountered LiPs who had limited English language skills. LiPs in the District 
Court were often facing more powerful and experienced litigants such as landlords (who may 
themselves be LiPs, but who were very experienced), Government authorities such as Inland Revenue, 
or finance companies collecting debts.  
In the Family Court, Judges and lawyers were concerned about the vulnerabilities arising from the 
socio-economic status of many litigants in that Court, as well as issues such as domestic violence. The 
exception was a family law practitioner who suggested most Family Court LiPs were persistent, citing 
the example of two aggressive and physically threatening LiPs she had litigated against. She said other 
practitioners also encountered such LiPs: “So many people I have conversations with, as you do 
outside of court, have similar experiences”. She said this was probably the result of the general Family 
Court population being difficult:  “I’m sure there are nice self-represented litigants out there, but by 
gosh there are some fairly dysfunctional people who go through Family Court. They are dysfunctional 
people”. However, this practitioner also gave an example of her own vulnerable client becoming a LiP 
because the client could no longer afford her fees. 
B. Access to Legal Services 
The Judges and most lawyers cited constraints on the ability to secure legal services as the major driver 
for the perceived increase in LiPs. In particular, most believed LiPs were most often people who fell 
in “the gap” – people who were unable to afford representation but did not qualify for legal aid:   
To the average earning person the cost of private representation is outside their means, but 
they probably won’t get legal aid ,and the people who get legal aid have to pay the money 
back in general. So it is all misery in that sense. (FC Judge) 
…  people don’t have the funds and they can’t get legal aid. I think that is the primary 
reason for people appearing in person. (HC Judge) 
I think the [legal aid] threshold is pretty low. I mean there are a lot of people out there who 
are disadvantaged who are just above the threshold and don’t apply and they don’t have a 
huge amount of money and they certainly don’t have that sort of money in the budget, 





It is the people who don’t qualify for legal aid, but on the other hand can’t afford lawyers’ 
fees, who have the biggest problem. (Civil litigation lawyer) 
As discussed above, civil litigation lawyers also acknowledged there was a shortage of lawyers who 
were willing to work at legal aid rates, so even those who did not fall in “the gap” would struggle to 
find representation. In the current climate, where the legal profession feels under significant pressure 
from policy changes20 and global financial conditions, pro bono advice is also rare. As one advice 
service solicitor said: “Civil stuff is more difficult [than family cases], because lawyers nowadays don’t 
want to take it on, they don’t want to do it on legal aid, and um, pro bono, that is a no go”.  
Two family lawyers suggested that, rather than not being able to afford a lawyer, people litigated in 
person because they were unwilling to pay. One discussed flexible payment terms and reduced rates 
that many lawyers offer their poorer clients, and said that the idea that there were people who did not 
qualify for legal aid but could not afford fees was “ridiculous”. The other characterised litigants in 
person as people who “don’t want to spend the money they have”. 
Some lawyers also discussed their concern about taking on clients who had previously been litigating 
in person, particularly where they had failed relationships with previous lawyers. From the lawyer’s 
perspective, this was a dangerous client. They were perceived as being likely to be difficult to work 
with and much more likely to complain. One lawyer explained that, “You have to be mindful of the 
case … particularly if you are doing legal aid”. If the case is difficult because of the “personal dynamics 
involved around the client’s approach”, then each step may take much longer. Then the fees cannot 
necessarily be recouped from a private client who may argue about the bill, and would be very difficult 
to recoup from legal aid under the set fee regime. This may explain some of the high retainers quoted 
to take up the representation of LiPs who formerly had a lawyer. There may not only be a cost involved 
in reviewing the file, but also a desire by the lawyer to have money up front from a high-risk client.  
C. Doing a better job than a lawyer 
Other than financial reasons, all the Judges said that there was a group of LiPs who believed they 
could do “as well as” or even “better than” a lawyer: 
They would perceive they can do it better than anyone else and that it doesn’t merit a 
lawyer. (DC Judge) 
                                                          





There are others who are there because they genuinely feel they can do a better job than 
the lawyers. (HC Judge) 
Sometimes people take the view they can do as well as a lawyer. (HC Judge) 
One Judge then went on to characterise people motivated by a belief that they can do better than a 
lawyer as “obstructive and difficult”. Similarly, when a civil litigator asked if people in this study asked 
me for advice, and I said they did not generally do so, he regarded that as potentially indicating 
arrogance on their part, and perhaps even vexatiousness: 
I think there is an element - in one of the cases that I mentioned - there was an element of 
that, a sort of arrogant thinking, “I don’t really need a lawyer, I know better”, that type of 
thing. So maybe the people you are dealing with, that is what it is. Obviously there are a 
few sort of notorious self-litigants out there that maybe your study is doing, who constantly 
appear with judgments and appeals and reviews and appeals of appeals and so forth - the 
vexatious litigant type of thing - obviously they’ve got psychological complexes about 
lawyers and the legal profession and they want to sort of do things themselves and they 
know better and they obviously think that one day they will be vindicated. 
The other Judges characterised the belief that the LiP could do better than a lawyer as either common 
to many LiPs or a belief motivating a small number of LiPs.  
Lawyers suggested that some LiPs become represented during the course of their case because they 
realise they could not in fact do the job of a lawyer: 
I have had cases where part way through a case the people will suddenly get a lawyer but 
that is usually because things aren’t going their way, so they get a lawyer. (Civil litigation 
lawyer) 
They would lawyer-up immediately before a hearing because they knew they couldn’t 
manage the hearing. That is a pretty common pattern for representation, immediately 
before a hearing, “Oh I can’t manage this so I’m going to get a lawyer”. (Family lawyer) 
The lawyers are suggesting that there is no financial reason for not having a lawyer, and only once the 
LiP realises the case is too difficult, will they seek representation.  
D. Freedom to argue an unarguable case 
Lawyers and Judges said one reason people litigated in person was because that they were unwilling 
to accept advice from a lawyer. This might be because the litigant wanted to make certain submissions 
or rely on certain evidence that could not properly be put before the court. A Family Court Judge 





and admissibility, meaning that “to their mind, they don’t necessarily get to say what they’d like to 
say”. Similarly, a civil litigation lawyer speculated about a former opposing party: 
I think the client sacked the lawyer because they wouldn’t simply repeat to the Judge what 
this lady wanted to say. They were advising her, “Look, I can’t say that because of this, that, 
and the other thing, and the correct approach you should be taking is this”, and she simply 
wouldn’t accept that advice. (Civil litigation lawyer).  
In addition, judges and lawyers thought some LiPs may have been advised that they had no arguable 
case, and then pursued the case without representation:  
One suspects they’ve tried out certain lawyers who have said you don’t have a case. (HC 
Judge) 
In one situation, … they [the opposing party] weren’t liking the advice they were getting, 
because lawyers were saying “You haven’t got a case here and you should be resolving this”, 
so in the end they abandoned lawyers and acted for themselves. (Civil litigation lawyer) 
[It is] partly money, but I think it is partly some people won’t take advice. They are sure 
they are right and they can’t see sense. (Civil litigation lawyer) 
The lawyers and Judges emphasised that they did not know for sure that litigants were appearing in 
person because no lawyer thought they had an arguable case, as they had no way to know the advice 
the litigant had been given. However, they assumed, partly from their assessment of the legal argument 
the LiP was advancing, that this must have been the case.  
1. Political Stands, Hobbies and Obsessions  
In the High Court, there were examples of litigants who were aware that their case had no legal merit 
(and therefore appeared in person), but were using the court as a forum to make a political point. The 
High Court Judges referred to LiPs who argue that the court has no jurisdiction over them, usually on 
the basis of Maori sovereignty or on the basis that “they are a sovereign state and they have their own 
seal”. 21   As one High Court Judge explained, “the answer to those questions is, from a legal 
perspective, pretty obvious”, but their motivation is to make a political stand:   
                                                          
21 One District Court Judge, when asked directly about whether there were LiPs disputing the jurisdiction of the court, 
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They are there because they want ventilate their feelings about the system generally and 
they are there because they want to be. I suspect also they know they are going to lose, but 
they just want to go on and make a point.   
For other LiPs, the Judges thought there might be arguable issues to their case, but they were also 
coming to court because, for them, litigation was a pastime in itself. One District Court Judge 
described a litigant who had started in tribunals but now litigated in the courts. The Judge said: “Now 
he does nothing else. He dresses in a suit and carries a briefcase and previous decisions, and things 
like that. [It has become] his hobby”. The High Court Judges also said they had applications from 
prisoners in person, who were motivated by legitimate, or at least arguable, grievances, but also found 
court proceedings a break from prison routine. They valued “a week or two getting out the system 
and coming down to court every day to argue a case”.22 Similarly, a lawyer involved in prisoner 
litigation commented that “for some prisoners the litigation is something to do”.  
(a) The Special Category of Obsessive and Querulant Litigants 
The Judges discussing hobby or repeat litigators regarded them with caution. They were seen as either 
obsessive litigants, or on their way to becoming obsessive: “Once they decide that litigation is good 
sport then they are starting to move into the querulant category”. Lawyers and Judges noted that these 
litigants could become quite adept with court procedure, and their experience meant they had the 
confidence to continue.  
The Judges observed that obsessive litigants would not characterise themselves as obsessive, but, as a 
civil litigation lawyer described it, would see themselves as “cause driven”. One Family Court Judge 
said: 
They certainly don’t see themselves that way [as obsessive]! They are sometimes along the 
line of “I’m duty bound to do this and I’ll go to jail if my kids told me something and I 
didn’t do something”, y’know? Those sorts of things. If the standard of the reasonable 
litigant or whatever was applied (laughing) they would be found to be at the extreme end 
of that, possibly you know, and more likely unreasonable. 
Obsessive litigants were an abiding concern for the Judges, particularly High Court Judges, who 
frequently described them as belonging to a category of their own, as a small but very bothersome 
group of LiPs. 
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Some Judges supposed that the obsessive litigants were not represented because they had an 
unarguable case that lawyers would not run: 
I suppose what worries me is that we do get some obsessive people and one suspects 
they’ve tried out certain lawyers who have said ‘you don’t have a case’. (DC Judge) 
Sometimes it is because they are truly vexatious and no one will act for them. (HC Judge) 
One High Court Judge reversed this premise and said that, if the person said that they were litigating 
in person because “no one will act for me”, then the “bells are ringing for this being an obsessive 
litigant”. As discussed in the first part of the chapter, there may be a wide range of reasons why 
“nobody will take me on”. It might be because the litigant has a weak case, or because the LiP cannot 
find a lawyer with the expertise they need for what they can afford or who will work on legal aid rates, 
or it might be an uneconomic claim: i.e. the value of the claim is less than the cost of bringing it. While 
LiPs point to such reasons for their lack of representation, often to appeal to the sympathy of the 
Judge, the Judge’s perceptions indicate that these statements may still be interpreted as a sign of 
unreasonableness and obsession. 
2. The courts will deliver justice 
Some lawyers, but only one Judge, noted that a factor in people coming to court in person might be a 
belief that the courts will deliver justice, regardless of representation. They considered this belief 
stemmed both from the organisation of the courts and cultural attitudes.  
The presence of the Disputes Tribunal, where litigating in person is mandatory, can give the 
impression that all courts are accessible in person. As one civil litigation lawyer proposed: 
Many people that I’ve come across who are lay litigants have had a couple of scraps in the 
Disputes Tribunal, for example, and so in their minds it might not be much of a step up 
from going down to the Disputes Tribunal to getting involved in a District Court or High 
Court proceeding.  
Similarly, the lawyer said that the District Court Rules, which during the research were simplified and 
online, might encourage people to litigate in person.  
Cultural attitudes may also be at play. One lawyer cited the do-it-yourself attitude of Kiwi culture as a 
possible driver. In Auckland, where there are large immigrant communities, Judges said that a belief 
in the accessibility of the courts was not limited to New Zealand-born residents, but was strong (or 





I think a lot of immigrants have faith in our judicial system to deliver better than they are 
used to or could get in their own countries and therefore they don’t need to get a lawyer 
because the poor old afflicted New Zealand judge will deliver for them. (DC Judge) 
A few lawyers related this belief in the accessibility of the courts to what they saw in their own clients, 
and in opposing LiPs, as a “rose tinted” view of justice. This is the belief that their argument would 
win and “justice” would triumph, so a lawyer was unnecessary. A civil litigation lawyer saw these LiPs 
as a “manic category” who had such a “strongly held view that they are in the right” that they can’t 
“appreciate how any judge with half a brain will come to any decision other than in their favour”. 
These LiPs do not see a lawyer as necessary: “All they have to do is go through the process and get 
the information out from their perspective and the judge will come to the right answer”. Similarly, a 
family lawyer said she believed LiPs were not people who could not afford lawyers, but were those 
who believed they did not need professional assistance because “they work on the basis of what is fair 
and what is not fair”. She thought this belief was flawed: “Unfortunately there is not an ‘it’s not fair’ 
law”. 
III. Discussion 
These findings as to why people litigate in person, largely concur with previous research discussed in 
Chapter 2. What, then, do these overlapping, but significantly different, explanations for litigating in 
person mean for the legal system and the profession, and what are the implications for individual 
LiPs? 
A. Implications for the legal system and profession 
One way of framing the LiPs’ reasons for coming to court in person is that the courts are effectively 
communicating their openness to them, a posture that is necessary to maintain the courts’ legitimacy.23 
However, at the same time, there is a failure to convince people that their access needs to be mediated 
by a lawyer, when that is probably necessary for the efficiency and effectiveness of the system. 
Moreover, the failure to convince people that they need a lawyer can be seen in terms of a failure of 
the legal profession to produce a commodity (legal services) that people believe is valuable, that they 
can afford, and that they believe they cannot produce themselves.  
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1. Accessibility and Popular Understandings of Courts 
Some LiPs can be seen as accepting at face value the invitation of the state to solve their own disputes 
in the Courts. Sally Engle Merry, in her anthropological study of legal consciousness among working-
class Americans, argues that a number of reforms in the 20th century created an environment where 
working-class people felt they could bring their problems to court.24 This included the development 
of the welfare state, new legislation regulating family and neighbourhood life, subsidized legal services 
for the poor, high-profile civil rights litigation, and the activism of the 1960s and its associated 
legislation. Engle Merry concludes that: 25   
These changes [welfare reform and civil rights litigation] created a new ideology of the state 
as friendly and supportive, as the protector of the poor and weak and as the regulator of 
the strong ... During the twentieth century, the law has gradually taken on a new face as the 
protector of the weak and vulnerable, as a tool for achieving social justice, and as a weapon 
against big business and corporate power. Thus, the government has in a sense invited 
ordinary people to bring their problems to the courts.  
The New Zealand environment is, of course, different to that of the US. New Zealand does not have 
judicial review of legislation and does not have a history of civil rights litigation that mirrors cases such 
as Brown v Board of Education.26 But many of the changes that occurred in the US legal environment in 
the 20th century also occurred in New Zealand. Throughout the 20th century there was increasing 
legislation regulating aspects of the family and neighbourhood life, there were significant welfare 
reforms, there were reforms to make the courts more accessible,27 and legal aid was introduced.28 The 
New Zealand government can therefore also be seen as extending an invitation to the people to use 
the courts.  
Sarat, citing Engle Merry, argues that the US (like New Zealand), is at least theoretically committed to 
an ideology that relies both on protecting law’s autonomy and on promoting its “openness and 
availability to socially and politically disadvantaged groups, to those seeking redress for injuries 
inflicted, protection from future harm, or vindication of their membership in the community”.29 He 
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argues that if courts can maintain the appearance of both accessibility and autonomy then they can 
provide a “terrain of contestation on which the powerless can hold the powerful to account”.30  When 
citizens want to take up this right of access, however, “liberal theory stresses the limits of citizen 
competence. Participation is facilitated by the intervention of trained legal specialists”.31 LiPs can be 
seen as accepting the promise of accessibility but ignoring the limits of their competence, when they 
take the appearance of openness at face value and come to court without a lawyer.  
2. Failure to convince consumers of the value of professional services 
So why are LiPs not accepting legal services as necessary? Abel, reviewing theories of the legal 
profession (discussed in Chapter 2), argues that in order to construct a professional service as a 
valuable commodity, “[f]irst, the consumer must acknowledge the value of the producer’s services. … 
[s]econd, consumers must be convinced that they cannot produce the services themselves”.32 Success 
in achieving these goals relies on a number of factors including the affordability of the service, the 
community’s beliefs about the service, the nature of the professional expertise on offer, and the ability 
of the profession to resist challenges to its hegemony, for example by para-professionals.33   
(a) Legal Market 
The short point is that for many (or even most) people legal services are too expensive so they are 
unable or unwilling to purchase them.34 As discussed above, this was recognised by all the participants 
in the study as the primary reason for people litigating in person.35  
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The conventional reasons offered for why legal fees are high, according to Hadfield, are: “lawyers are 
an avaricious lot who will bleed you dry”; “legal training is expensive”;36 and “lawyers enjoy a state 
granted monopoly over which they control entry for the purposes of protecting the public”.37 The 
cost of legal training is not so great in New Zealand, or at least was not before the last decade, to 
justify giving much weight to that factor, but the Chief Justice has suggested that lawyers may have 
“expectations of higher income levels than may be sustainable”.38 However, Hadfield concludes that 
none of these reasons are “particularly compelling”, although hold some kernel of truth. Instead she 
argues that the forces of the legal market, which has a number of non-competitive features, cause legal 
resources to be “pulled disproportionately into the commercial sphere and individuals are largely 
priced out”.39 Many claims are simply uneconomic to litigate or the litigants cannot meet the fees. This 
is a “failure to package the commodity in units the consumer can afford”.40  
(b) Relationships between lawyers and clients 
One of the major reasons that LiPs offered for litigating in person was the perception that they had 
received a poor quality service.41 Poor services, of course, undermine demand, as the consumers 
perceive they are getting little of value. However, no lawyers or judges offered bad lawyering as an 
explanation for litigating in person. They instead talked of LiPs thinking they could that job of a lawyer, 
which to them imported a suggestion of arrogance and unwarranted confidence.42 However, in the 
context of a particular litigant’s experience with a particular lawyer, it is possible that they can do the 
job as well as that lawyer.  
It is highly likely that the quality of services that New Zealand lawyers provide is variable. The Bazley 
Report about New Zealand’s legal aid system found that “while there are very good lawyers in the 
legal aid system, there is also a small but significant proportion of very bad lawyers who are bringing 
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42 LiPs were often alert to this. As one Family Court LiP said, speaking defensively about her decision to litigate in person: 





themselves and their profession into disrepute”.43 New Zealand’s legal aid system has since been 
amended, but it remains probable that there are “bad lawyers” both inside and outside the legal aid 
system. This would be in line with international research that expresses concern about lawyer quality.44 
Swank argues that, given variability in quality, it is a mistake to conflate access to justice with access 
to a lawyer.45 He says lawyers sometimes “fail to file matters, miss deadlines, or make other mistakes”, 
rendering justice “inaccessible even for those with representation”.46 This may because they are 
inadequately funded or simply delivering an unprofessional service.47 
Problems with legal services may not be limited to technical competence, but also concern how 
lawyers interact with clients. Lawyers may use various strategies that, Newman argues, can be 
“construed as client abuse”, such as:48  
[A]cting like the boss; making the big decisions; playing mind games; using vague, 
ambiguous and ineffective language; exaggerating the harmful outcomes to the client; 
pressuring the client to accept a plea deal; and ignoring client’s instructions, decisions and 
best interests. 
There are no New Zealand studies examining lawyers’ performance, but some LiPs saw problems with 
their former lawyer’s behaviour, ranging from incompetence to abusiveness.  
Judges and most lawyers acknowledged there was a variable level of quality of service among lawyers. 
In discussing intervention to assist LiPs in court, one Judge referred to the “more common situation, 
where one side has got a very good lawyer and the other one is hopeless”. Judges and registry staff 
also commented on the poor quality of documents presented by some lawyers. When answering a 
question about the quality of documents presented by LiPs in general, one High Court Judge said, 
“They vary tremendously, just as documents filed by lawyers vary tremendously”. The Judge went on 
to say that LiP documents tended to be “wordier, but that is by no means universal because some 
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lawyers’ documents are equally wordy and unorganised”. It is possible that LiPs who are only 
marginally able to pay for lawyers are accessing lawyers at the lower end of quality. 
It is also possible that some litigants rightly perceive that their abilities, and their commitment to their 
case, will outstrip that of a lawyer, or at least a lawyer they can afford. Many Judges observed that a 
few LiPs do a good job of putting their cases:  
Well, I guess the well-endowed person who is running his or her own case is making a 
personal choice for some reason and may do a good job of it. Some people do actually. (FC 
Judge) 
Lawyers and registry staff also referred to occasionally encountering litigants who were exceptionally 
able, although they emphasised this was unusual: 
There is one guy I came across who was absolutely outstanding, including appeals to the 
High Court. In fact I think he’d been up to the Court of Appeal acting for himself on a 
couple of occasions, but leave him aside because I think he is out on his own. (Civil 
Litigation Lawyer) 
As will be discussed in the next chapters, even litigants who are capable and well-resourced encounter 
many difficulties in arguing their own case; difficulties that are inherent in being an advocate in one’s 
own cause and in the formal structure of legal proceedings. LiPs may also overestimate their abilities, 
a theme I explore in later chapters. 
(c) Popular understandings of law and lawyers 
Abel argues that whether consumers believe they need a professional service is partly determined by 
beliefs prevalent in the culture, “over which professionals only have limited control”. The LiPs’ 
reasons, as discussed above, included beliefs about what lawyers do and how the adversarial system 
works, that led them to believe they could do as well as a lawyer. This was not expressed as a belief 
the case was simple enough to do by themselves, as previous research suggests as a common reason 
for litigating in person, but rather minimising what lawyers do.49 LiPs also believed that what they 
lacked in experience or professional training could be outweighed by other benefits. In particular, 
some LiPs believed it was beneficial to be able to tell your whole story yourself, having a full command 
of the detail and controlling how it is presented to the judge. This is a seductive idea if coupled with 
the other belief that a good case only requires the facts to be put before a judge for justice (without 
reference to legal principle) to be done, and for “the truth” to come out. This finding is consistent 
                                                          





with Conley and O’Barr’s study of the discourse employed by LiPs in small claims litigation (pre-trial 
and post-trial). They found that one of the tasks LiPs often failed to perform was reframing their 
problem into a justiciable issue. They instead presented their narrative to the court and expected the 
court to extract the cause of action and theory of the case from that presentation, a task that a court 
in an adversarial system does not perform.50   
These lay beliefs about the civil justice system, and the nature of a lawyer’s function, minimise the 
value of the service that lawyers offer, making it less likely that consumers holding such beliefs will 
want to purchase those services. Judges and lawyers, however, can easily interpret such beliefs as 
arrogance, because they distrust the assumption that a job for which they have trained for many years 
can be performed by anyone.  
(d) Emotional aspects of cases 
It is also possible that some clients reject legal services because the dominant form of legal service is 
to separate the emotional aspects of the case from the legal.51 As one LiP said, “Lawyers don’t do 
emotion”. Some lawyers confirmed this impression, expressing discomfort with having to face 
emotional clients, although a few said that they accepted dealing with emotion was part of the job. 
But, as the lawyer who had previously been a client explained, the idea of separating out emotion is 
difficult, if not impossible, to achieve in practice. Attempting to do so may only alienate a client. When 
lawyers constantly return the attention to factual matters, the effect is to express “an indifference 
towards the aspects that are most salient to the person”.52 A Family Court LiP, who went on to use 
the assistance of a McKenzie friend, said that what he needed most was not the legal assistance: “It 
was more about ‘how are the kids?’, and ‘how do you feel about this?’ Almost a therapeutic relationship 
in a way”. LiPs may, of course, not have an accurate understanding of how much legal assistance they 
need. The point, however, is that when lawyers do not “do emotion”, or when well-intentioned but 
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junior lawyers fail to relate to the emotional aspect of a case, their clients do not get what they feel 
they need, and are therefore less willing to purchase the service. 
(e) Personal experience  
A further factor in minimising the value of a lawyer’s service, and in encouraging the belief of LiPs 
that they could do the job themselves, was the experience people gained through litigating – as para-
legal professionals, represented litigants, or previous LiPs. People referred to losing their fear of the 
courts and gaining the experience that enabled them to confidently represent themselves. Engle Merry 
refers to this loss of fear in repeat users of the courts, both criminal and civil:53 
With experience, the court gradually ceases to be a place for awe and fear, one which 
imposes harsh penalties with inexorable firmness, and becomes a somewhat pliant, if 
excruciatingly complex, institution which, with pressure and patience, can sometimes be 
made to yield help. 
Those with experience start to slip – in the mind of the bench and bar – into the “dangerous” category 
of obsessive litigants, but for these litigants, accumulated experience reduces their belief that only 
lawyers can provide adequate representation of their case.  
(f) Lay networks – online and in person 
The other aspect salient to LiPs gaining experience in the courts is that networks have emerged, online 
and in person, for supporting other LiPs doing this work. This was not so much the availability of 
materials online, which other research has suggested might be important in decisions to litigate in 
person, but a growing network of people.54 This development can be seen as a challenge to the 
professional hegemony of lawyers, or as the rise of an alternative representation model for lower cost, 
making the court more easily accessed in person. It has been encouraged by government reforms that 
have reduced the protected area of lawyers’ work, have made litigating in person mandatory in early 
stages of Family Court proceedings,55 and by the rise of social networks, especially online. During the 
research I learned of two Facebook groups offering assistance, both emotional and legal, for people 
taking COCA applications in the Family Court. Several of New Zealand’s most persistent LiPs have 
their own websites, share resources, and comment on each other’s material online, as well as meeting 
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each other in person. I also learned of McKenzie friends offering services, mostly unpaid, but 
sometimes for a fee,56 supporting people in drafting court documents and attending court hearings.   
B. Why it matters what judges think of people’s reasons for litigating in person 
Given there is a right to litigate in person, why does it matter what judges (or for that matter lawyers 
and court staff), think of a person’s reasons for coming to court without a lawyer? The judges almost 
uniformly said they had no way of knowing why people were litigating in person and it did not matter 
in any case:  
There are all sorts of reasons that people choose to act in person … I don’t think we can 
get into that too much really. I just can’t see how it is possible. All you try and do is act 
fairly in the circumstances. (High Court Judge) 
Despite this caution, repeated by almost all the Judges interviewed, there was evidence that the absence 
of a lawyer signals something to the bench. Primarily, this seems to signal that this litigant might be 
unreasonable. One High Court Judge referred to this explicitly:  
It is easy to start out thinking the reason they are in person is because they’ve been 
completely unreasonable and have burnt off all their lawyers.  But sometimes that is not 
the case, so I just try to keep an open mind. (High Court Judge) 
There is also evidence of such reasoning in judicial decisions. The Judge in one case referred to the 
LiP having had “a number of lawyers” and noted these lawyers’ seniority and competence. The LiP 
had had three prior lawyers, one of whom was court appointed. The opposing party, who was 
represented, had had two lawyers, but no mention was made of this. Instead the Judge used the LiP’s 
history of representation as support for the argument that she was conducting herself unreasonably 
in the case.  
Part of the reason for this belief might be found in the historical background. Litigating in person, as 
little as 20 years ago, was very rare. As one long-term court employee said about LiPs, two decades 
ago there “were none”:  
You didn’t come to court without a lawyer unless you were some kind of mad person and 
everyone here would have said “She is that mad person, she acts for herself and she’s mad”. 
It was completely outrageous [to litigate in person]. 
                                                          





While we do not have any figures for how common it is now, best estimates range between 10 and 30 
per cent of litigants, depending on the court and type of case. Nevertheless, the historically-based 
belief that being a LiP equates to “madness”, or at least being “unreasonable”, remains. This may also 
be a function of stereotyping discussed in Chapter 2, where the powerful group (the judges) use 
stereotypes modelled on “a minority of the worst” against the powerless group (LiPs). This serves 
both as a way of protecting professional identity against incursion from outsiders and as an anchoring 
point for thinking about the powerless group’s behaviour and competence.57  
Opposing lawyers, sharing the same professional understanding as judges, can play on this perception 
by mentioning to the judge that the LiP has had multiple lawyers. This signals to the judge that the 
LiP is unreasonable. One civil litigation lawyer recalled a case against a LiP who had 15 different 
lawyers and explained that he mentioned to the judge the history of representation as “something the 
judge might think is relevant … because I know full well that the judge will think that is pretty peculiar: 
there is something wrong about this person”.  
While 15 lawyers is undoubtedly extreme, I found evidence of lawyers using this signalling tactic in 
much less extreme cases. When one litigant’s case reached the High Court, she had had what appeared 
to be a string of lawyers. Her first lawyer was possibly negligent. She then had an opinion from another 
lawyer, followed by a legal aid lawyer who lacked expertise. She was then unable to find a new lawyer 
with expertise willing to work for legal aid rates, and so became a LiP. When the matter came before 
the court, the opposing counsel repeatedly referred to her having “fired her lawyers”. As the opposing 
counsel had no way of knowing the reasons behind the change in representation that had occurred, 
this claim was without evidence and also seemingly irrelevant to the case. Its only relevance was to 
encourage a shared professional understanding between counsel and judge that a litigant without a 
lawyer, and particularly a litigant with a history of previous lawyers, was likely to be an unreasonable 
litigant with a weak case.  
This is not to suggest that the fact that a judge is concerned that the person might be an obsessive 
litigant means the judge will treat that litigant unfairly. However, it does mean that the absence of a 
lawyer might burden the LiP with a presumption that they are unreasonable and their case lacks merit. 
The LiP then has to work to disprove this, rather than starting from the position of a represented 
litigant (even one with a string of lawyers behind them), that they have an arguable case. It may also 
                                                          





mean, at least in the High Court, that the judge employs the judicial management techniques reserved 
for difficult litigants, which are discussed in Chapter 8.     
C. Conclusions 
The many overlapping reasons LiPs have for litigating in person often have finance at their core, but 
these reasons are intertwined with their perceptions of the civil justice system and the value of legal 
services. LiPs can be seen as responding to the court’s projection of its openness to the public, a 
projection that is necessary to retain the court’s legitimacy, but in fact they may be proceeding without 
a lawyer because of a failure of the legal profession to offer a service they can afford and believe is 
necessary. The bench and bar view LiPs as mainly motivated by financial reasons, but there was a 
strong undercurrent that many LiPs, even those who were financially motivated, were arrogant (in that 
they believed they could do as well as a lawyer), and were unreasonable or obsessive. These beliefs on 
the part of the judiciary may lead to differential of treatment the LiP in court. 
In Chapter 6 I explore LiPs’ experience of preparing for court, their strategies for seeking advice and 
their interaction with the court staff and opposing counsel. I also look at their preparation of litigation 
documents and the issues that lawyers and judges identified with those documents. Before doing so, 




Four Litigants in Person 
 
A central purpose of the thesis is to understand the LiP experience, as this is an important aspect 
of understanding the friction between LiPs and the court system. Analysis requires the 
complexities of individual experiences to be broken into their constituent parts. For example, in 
the previous chapter examining why people litigate in person, this type of analysis was useful and 
necessary for finding commonality among a range of experiences. In doing so there is some danger 
that the full texture, or totality, of individual LiPs’ experiences are obscured, or that the complex 
motives of individuals are bleached out in the more analytical discussion. More detail on an 
individual LiP’s background and overall experience might help a reader relate to and understand 
them as a person. This is particularly so when stereotypes of LiPs abound, the most prevalent 
being the “fool for a client”.   
This chapter is therefore a sketch of four LiPs’ experience of litigating in person – Lisa, Matt, Tom 
and Gary. These people are not real LiPs. Each is a composite of several LiPs who participated in 
the research. I have taken interviews and observation material, and then created a character whom 
I hope breathes life into the experience of litigating in person, but who is sufficiently fictional in 
their totality to protect the privacy of the individuals upon whom they are based.1  
Readers who are legally trained will be familiar with hypothetical cases as they are a core tool in 
legal education. It is worth noting that these are cases of a different nature. Legal issues are not 
placed in text to be found and solved. Legally trained readers may even find it frustrating that the 
legal aspects of the cases are not clear, and the terminology is not always correct. This is intentional. 
The cases are a re-presentation of the way LiPs told me their stories, and their purpose is not to 
sift through the legal merits and strength of their case, but to relate to the experience of litigating 
in person, and the motives behind deciding to do so.  
These portraits are not exhaustive of all the experiences of LiPs and should not be considered as 
“types”, in the sense of reducing LiPs to a typology.2 They are instead intended to allow the reader 
                                                          
1 More detail about the process of creating these characters appears in Chapter 3, pages 74-76. 
2 The method employed for this study does not lend itself to the development of typologies. See Chapter 2, pages 
17-18 for a discussion of typologies developed in other research. 
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to “explore the ‘felt-sense’” of the LiPs’ experiences.3 They demonstrate the overlapping nature of 
reasons for litigating in person, examined in the previous chapter, and introduce some common 
variations and themes that will be developed in the following chapters.  
A. Lisa - Care of Children Act and Division of Relationship Property - Family Court 
When my ex left he took our youngest, Joshua, with him. The girls were teenagers and they 
stayed with me. Josh was only eight, and I was in such a panic, I didn’t know what to do. My 
ex is originally from Germany and I thought he might take him back there. I mean, I didn’t 
really think he would, but I was worried he might. It all came as such a shock I wasn’t sure 
what to think. I went to see a lawyer straight away. That was all about um, well Joshua is 11 
now, so three years ago, and we’ve been in and out of the Family Court ever since.  
At the beginning the lawyer was good because I was in such a state, and I didn’t know how 
the system worked, or what to do, but I got pretty tired of being pushed around. My lawyer 
was really a bit of a bully, she really made me feel like I had to do what I was told or all these 
terrible things would happen: I’d never get Josh back. Sometimes when my ex’s affidavits 
would come in and she’d ask me about the allegations - I mean, they were such rubbish, just 
lies and no evidence, I was so angry - and it would be like she believed them and I had to prove 
to her they weren’t true, to my own lawyer! I was so scared of losing Josh, but eventually I got 
over the fear. I mean, I was doing all this stuff, what I was told, and nothing was happening, I 
wasn’t making any progress. So how could I make it worse? The property stuff was 
complicated because of the farm and trust. There were just letters back and forth, back and 
forth. I thought, well, I can’t afford this, I can’t keep paying for nothing to happen. I mean, I 
can write letters. I’ve got a computer. I’m literate. So now I’m just representing myself.  
It was okay preparing the papers for court. I got experience of how they write them from the 
ones my lawyer did, what the Courts expect, how they are set out, so I knew what to do. I 
wrote them and then my friend, she works at Corrections and has done lots of probation 
reports, she looked at my affidavits and tidied some things up and that was it.  
                                                          
3 Marcia Stanley Wertz and others "The Composite First Person Narrative: Texture, Structure, and Meaning in 
Writing Phenomenological Descriptions" (2011) 6(2) International Journal of Qualitative Studies on Health and 
Well-being 1 at 8.  
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I took my papers into the Court Office. I was quite nervous, but they were actually really nice. 
They helped me put it all in order. But then once I got into Court I couldn't believe it. The Judge 
kept saying, “What are you actually asking for? What are you actually asking for?”. I don't 
know whether I didn't word it in the right way, but he just kept coming at me. He’d ask a 
question and then when I tried to answer he’d just look at his papers, like he didn’t even care 
what I was saying. In the end he turned to Sue, my ex’s lawyer, and told her that “it was a little 
irregular” or something like that, but he was going to order a mediation to try and get the 
property things finalised.  
The mediation never happened. Sue just hates talking to me, she always says how 
uncomfortable she is talking to me and how I need to get a lawyer. Besides, there is no way 
my ex is going to sit calmly around a table and discuss things. The last time we had a go at 
that he ended up punching the wall and walking out.  
We ended up back in court over Josh. I thought it was going to be just another of those, what 
are they called, you know the discussions with the Judge. But the next thing I knew I was in 
the stand and Sue was asking all these questions. It was so awful. So awful. I couldn’t 
understand what she meant and I just felt sick. She was just so cruel, even the Judge was telling 
her to back off. Couldn’t she see how upset I was? I couldn’t believe it. It was horrible, just 
horrible. I’m never going back to court again, never. It was the worst experience of my life.  
I think it worked against them though because the Judge he could see how aggressive they 
were. I felt like he was pretty sympathetic to me and he has ordered that Joshua is to do every 
second week with me. It is quite difficult because Josh has spent so much time with his father 
but it is such a relief to have him back. 
With the matrimonial property though, I’m basically stuck. I cut my hours back at work 
because I was just not coping with the kids and work, with this on top of it. My boss was 
noticing that I wasn’t really concentrating and I thought that if I took some time away from 
work and just gave it my all, I might be able to get it all sorted out. But it just isn’t going 
anywhere. One of my friends told me I needed to go back to court, to tell the Judge what was 
happening, but I don’t know. I don’t even know how to do that, and besides, I just don’t want 
to go back into a courtroom ever again. I don't think a lawyer would be able to do anything 
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more though. It is just too complicated with the farm side of things for a lawyer to understand 
and I just can’t afford to pay one anyway. 
B. Matt – Care of Children Application and Protection Order – Family Court 
My ex has legal aid, but I have a job so I don’t qualify. I went to a lawyer right at the start, and 
the lawyer was good, but when I realised how long it might take to sort out, at $370/hr, there 
was just no way. I mean I only bring in $600 a week. I can’t afford that. If I’d paid it out of my 
savings that would have been all the money I’d put aside for the kids’ education. I didn’t go to 
Uni myself, although plumbing has worked out well for me. I struggled a bit at school. No one 
realised I had dyslexia. I want the kids to be able to get more education than I’ve had though. 
I couldn’t justify spending that money on fighting their mother for access to them, but I’ll 
always fight hard for what is best for them. It hasn’t been easy because I don’t have much in 
the way of experience with writing all the papers you need, the affidavits and things. It takes 
me a long time to read through everything, hours in the evenings on Google trying to reply to 
things that come in.  
The first time we went to Court it was very, very brief. There didn't seem to be a lot of time 
given to cases. I went there being prepared to speak at length about what was going on but 
in the end very few things were covered. I was relieved at the time but there were a lot of 
things I would have liked to let the Court know. I guess I was a little bit disappointed about the 
depth of coverage that the Judge heard. I felt like I was stereotyped as the male, the aggro 
man, the oppressor of my ex. I think there is a real gender bias in the Family Court. I’ve 
certainly heard that from other people, like on the online forum I follow a bit. The lawyer for 
child was a real problem at first. I think she was basically biased against me to begin with. She 
and my ex’s lawyer were rubbing their hands with glee over the fact I was self-representing. 
They knew each other. It is a small town so that isn’t surprising, but they would talk with each 
other and then approach me together. And the Judge just did whatever the lawyer for child 
said - it was all over once that fat lady sung to the Judge!   
The allegations I've been under, it is just incredible. I've got no criminal convictions, but I've 
had all of these allegations: rape, attempted murder, serious assault. I was under the 
allegation of breaking into the family home and stealing things, doing all these things. It is 
unbelievable what people are allowed to put in affidavits. If rules apply then surely the number 
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one rule is that you tell the truth in court. I've been investigated by CYFS and Police. Nothing 
came of it but all these allegations have been made, they are all on my Police file and they’ve 
all been placed in the Family Court. In the end, because of the number of allegations, the Police 
did a search warrant and went right through my whole place and turned it upside down and 
saw nothing. It wasn't until we got to that point that things started to get better.  
I think they realised that this stuff was made up and that was the point where the lawyer for 
child actually started to question some of the stuff my ex was saying. I think that helped and 
also the next time we went to Court, we struck a much better Judge. She was way more active, 
asking questions that got a bit more to the heart of matters. I still felt that basically the Judge 
was doing what the lawyer for child said, and like she didn’t really want to hear from me much, 
but at least it was a bit more in my favour. I liked being able to say my piece to the Judge, 
answer the questions how I wanted to answer them.  
In the end though, for the defended hearing, I got a bit worried and I ended up getting a lawyer 
who I know to come in and just do that. That way he could get in there and ask the hard 
questions and they wouldn’t be able to rile me up and make me look like I am an aggressive 
guy. I’d just have been playing into their hands if I’d done that. He did a good job, and I think 
I did too, doing all that paperwork. It has certainly been a steep learning curve. I’ve got day-
to-day care of the kids now, none of them like their mum’s new partner. Mostly I try not to 
think about it anymore, I don’t think it helps, but there is always a bit of fear that it isn’t over. 
She can always go back to the Court again and ask for a change, even though the Judge said 
we weren’t to go back for three years.  
C. Tom – Termination of a Franchise Agreement - High Court 
January 
I’d had the shop for 15 years. 15 years! We’d had a few disputes leading up to that day, but it 
still came as a shock. They said I no longer had a right to the franchise and that was it. Game 
over. I went straight to my lawyers, but this all happened right before Christmas and it wasn’t 
my normal lawyer. Turns out the advice the new lawyer gave me wasn’t right, but I didn’t 
know that at the time. I was fighting on two fronts - trying to get the franchise back and trying 
to avoid bankruptcy.  
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After Christmas my normal lawyer came back and sat down and had a pretty serious 
discussion with me. I got an opinion from someone else, a pretty top firm in Auckland, and 
they said, look, this wasn’t done right, but the horse has bolted. Well, I couldn’t use my original 
lawyers because they said once they’d been accused of negligence they couldn’t act any more. 
They gave me the name of someone else and said they’d apply for legal aid for me. That was 
the first I ever heard of legal aid for this situation, but I’ve now been told that in actual fact 
you can’t get legal aid for businesses, so they could never put the company situation through, 
only my personal bankruptcy.  
Anyway, so I went to the lawyer. I dropped off all the documents to him and he spent ages 
and I thought it was all sorted. But then just before the court hearing I went to see him and it 
became clear it was way over his head. He didn’t really understand any of the details in the 
business and he was just not on top of it, not like I was. He agreed he couldn’t really handle it. 
I then contacted every single lawyer, or not quite, I contacted maybe 10 lawyers on the legal 
aid list from the area. I just got - some people didn’t respond or didn’t get back but - I did get 
one lawyer who was brave enough to say, “Tom”, he put this in writing, “this is a specialised 
case that requires a specialised solicitor and these lawyers or solicitors don’t work for legal aid 
rates”. So I just felt really stuck, I didn’t really see I had a choice. It was either represent myself 
or just give up and I couldn’t just walk away and let those bastards get away with it.  
July 
I’ve been working away preparing for the trial, it is going to be in December. The other side’s 
lawyer has been a bit cool towards me, but not too bad. He is a decent sort of a guy, he gave 
me a couple of pointers.  
It is a bit difficult getting everything in order. I did go and see a few lawyers to see if they could 
help me prepare for the trial, with the evidence and things. They weren’t interested though 
and I understand fully that, they are lawyers, the ones who know litigation, they don’t want 
to be someone’s tutor. They want to do it themselves. It is all in or all out and I get that. I have 
had a couple of opinions though on some of the legal points and I’ll be using those as the basis 
for closing.  
I have got myself someone to advise behind the scenes. He isn’t a lawyer, but he has run a 
very successful farm for many years, and he has a bit of an interest in the law. He is a very 
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smart guy, very clear thinker. He has helped a few people out in my sort of situation. We talk 
about the case and he looks at my documents, helps me take out all the waffle. We get them 
so I don’t sound like I’m moaning and whinging to the judge, because being emotionally 
involved you just want to say: “Oh you bastards! You can’t do this to me”. He said the danger 
is a judge just won’t read it if it is too long and not to the point. So it has been an interesting 
experiment in becoming detached and dispassionate about your own case. And I’ve got to that 
point, slowly but surely, and I’m pleased about that because it is very helpful to how I conduct 
the case. 
November 
I’ve just had the pre-trial callover and it was fine, it was all just procedural. I get the feeling 
that our Judge is a bit of a stickler for procedure but that is okay, it is all part of the process. 
The Judge said a couple of my witnesses can’t give the evidence I wanted them to give, so I’ll 
just have to do without them. What I really need to find out before it starts is to what extent I 
can use cross-examination to get across my message - that will be the key to it really. I am a 
bit hazy about the opening statement and then where the guts of the case is fitted in. I have 
all this authority and arguments and I’m not sure how that all fits together, how I tell the Judge 
about it.  
December 
The trial starts in the morning. I’m a bit nervous, few nightmares, but it will be good to get 
going now. To me a lot of it is black and white, there is no argument, just no argument at all. 
But there are always clever people. I’m just concentrating on getting the evidence out there, 
giving my case. I just hope that the Judge lets me say what I need to say. I’m not a lawyer and 
I’m not going to pretend to know the law, I’m just going to stick to the issues. 
February 
I'm feeling very battered and bruised. Obviously the experience was a lot more difficult than I 
thought but then it was a situation where I couldn't afford a lawyer. It was going to cost more 
money than I had and um, it was kind of a train wreck in slow motion and I have to face the 
consequences. I’m expecting the worst. That means if it is better, it will be better, but I'm not 
expecting to have succeeded.  The Judge was great really, gave me a lot of leeway but there 
are a lot of rules, rules I wasn’t aware of, and I didn't fit my material into them so I don’t know. 
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I’ve gone over and over it retrospectively and I couldn’t have done anything differently. I do 
wish I’d put more in my submissions but it was hard to keep on top of it all. So now I’m just 
preparing my appeal and waiting for the judgment to come out, preparing for the worst you 
know? 
D. Gary - Persistent Litigant - High Court 
I’m a self-made man really. I went to University briefly, but I never finished. It just wasn’t for 
me and when my brother-in-law suggested we go into business together I packed it in. The 
two of us built up a portfolio of properties that grew over the years. It was hard graft, a bit of 
luck, mostly hard work. In 2007, just before the Global Financial Crisis really hit, we had this 
beautiful subdivision, beachside, ready to go. We’d had problems with that Council for years, 
but 2008, that was the real beginning. The corruption, persecution really, you just wouldn’t 
believe it. People think they are living in this paradise but it has rot. My cases are really 
complex and I can’t explain all the detail, or even try to, but I have got all the documents if you 
want to know more. You can’t just read the judgments, they are full of half-truths and lies, the 
Judges protecting themselves and each other. 
The whole key has been that they've discredited me to the courts. All they need to say is, “He’s 
vexatious”, and the Court says, “Oh yes, he must be if he has gone along for seven years! Who 
in their right mind would go along for seven years?”. There is no way a lawyer will do the 
cases, they are part of the system, so I have to do it self-represented. Anyway, I couldn’t use a 
lawyer even if I could find one ready to stick his neck out because I can’t afford it. It is a system 
that rapes you financially. The only ones that get justice are the ones with the huge amounts 
of money and all mine has been taken. But if you are on the wrong side of the old boy network 
it doesn’t matter if you have money, you will soon lose it. That is my own experience. With this 
application I didn’t bother to try and get a lawyer though. I’ve done a lot of these applications, 
it is just one more of the same. I know the issues so I don’t need help with it.  
I prepare my documents entirely by myself, no help whatsoever. I do have various friends who 
are lawyers, and sometimes I’ll get them to look over something, but no, mostly entirely by 
myself. I have access to LexisNexis when I need it. I use legislation a lot. And I use anything I 
see that a lawyer has filed - across the board - my lawyers, and anyone else's lawyers. It takes 
up a great deal of time, doing all the work involved. It does consumes you. I mean, it has to 
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consume you otherwise there would be no point. I can drop everything to deal with the cases, 
and I do turn down work to do it. I also spend time helping other people who are struggling 
with similar sorts of problems. 
The lawyers on the other side, they are okay, mostly very professional. A bit like the court staff 
really, they are just cogs in the wheel, they have a job to do. It is the system that is the problem. 
The Law Schools train the lawyers to think they are operating in the fairest, most transparent 
system in the world. It is all about indoctrination, it is all this propaganda, but the system is 
corrupt. It is not like in the third world, where they are paying judges, it is much more insidious 
and perverse than that. You can take as many cases against the individuals involved as you 
like. I have, but you can’t get anywhere because they all just protect each other. They are all 
lawyers or former lawyers, there is no independence, no check. But because I’m a conservative 
person, I want the justice system fixed. I don’t want to go and blab, and tell the world, and 
embarrass the country. I’m hoping against hope that with this application, this time, they’ll 
have the balls to fix it.   
 













Having become a LiP, LiPs then face considerable preparatory work before going to court. While 
most focus on having their day in court, the majority of work in litigation involves preparation for 
that day, and in particular preparation of court documents.1 As a High Court LiP explained: 
That was one of the things we learnt as we went through the process. We found out it was 
whoever has the best paperwork at the end of the day. That is what we learnt … how you 
write your paperwork. That was a big lesson that one. We learnt a lot, we learnt a big lesson. 
This chapter begins with a discussion of the problems that the bench and bar reported with most LiPs’ 
court documents. It then turns to a discussion of the strategies LiPs used for finding support and 
advice during preparation of their cases.  
A large range of complex procedural rules govern applications in the Family and High Courts, and, at 
the time of the research, a simplified procedure was operating in the District Court (since revoked). 
The complexity of matters in which LiPs were involved varied greatly, from relatively straightforward 
COCA applications to multi-day trials in the High Court on complex areas of law. The amount of 
research and preparation that LiPs had to undertake therefore varied greatly. A straightforward COCA 
application, for example, required forms and affidavits, but little research on the law.2 A multi-day 
High Court trial, on the other hand, included drafting pleadings, making or responding to interlocutory 
applications, carrying out discovery, briefing witnesses, conducting legal research, and preparing 
opening and closing arguments. Rather than examine the different procedural rules and compliance 
with them in detail, the discussion will focus instead on major areas of difficulty and tension that arise 
in case preparation across all the Courts. 
The chapter concludes with discussion of the issues raised by these findings, including LiPs’ 
perceptions of their advice needs and the role of exhortations that LiPs seek legal advice; the effect of 
                                                          
1 This was also the finding of Richard Moorhead and Mark Sefton Litigants in Person: Unrepresented Litigants in First Instance 
Proceedings - Department of Constitutional Affairs Research Series (2005) at 255 who noted that “acts of participation concentrate 
on ‘back office’ procedure, such as dealing with documents and talking to the court staff, rather than hearings”. 
2 As one lawyer explained: “To be honest with you your average parenting case there isn’t a lot of law in it (laughing). … 
We’ve certainly learnt that it is a waste of time trying to make legal submissions to the Judges [in this particular court] 
because they know the law on parenting stuff inside out and they don’t need to be reminded about that and most of these 
cases there aren’t legal issues as such”. (Family lawyer) 
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emotional attachment to a case and the belief that emotion should be “taken out” of court documents; 
conventions of professional communication; and the risks that court staff, lawyers and judges perceive 
in their interactions with LiPs. 
I. Preparing Legal Documents  
In general, LiPs had difficulty producing court documents that met both the technical requirements 
of the procedural rules and conformed to professional conventions of style and form. Exceptions 
were some very experienced LiPs, and a few exceptionally able LiPs. Court staff, lawyers and Judges 
all mentioned encountering occasional LiPs who “do a marvellous job … better than some lawyers” 
(Family Court Judge), and know the rules and law very well. As another Family Court Judge said:   
Occasionally you get a LiP who prepares brilliantly. That is about 1/100, and they very 
carefully prepare their case and you think, well, why do we need lawyers? But they are very 
few. 
At the other end of the spectrum were LiPs who filed material that was illegible: “[the documents] 
come in as screeds of handwritten stuff and you can't actually read the writing” (FC Judge); or 
incomprehensible because the LiP had insufficient mastery of English for the purpose of stating their 
case. 
In between were the majority of LiPs about whose documents the bench and bar repeated a number 
of complaints: that they mixed content that should be placed in separate documents (claim, 
submission, evidence), contained irrelevancies, and were not focused on the legal issues before the 
court. They noted this issue was not limited to LiPs but considered it occurred more commonly with 
LiPs. As one High Court Judge said: “You'd be surprised how terrible some lawyers’ submissions are”. 
The discussion below considers, first, those LiPs who made little attempt to adhere to the conventions. 
Then it turns to issues with documents identified by lawyers and Judges.  
 
A. Conforming to procedural requirements 
Most LiPs attempted, if often unsuccessfully, to adhere to the conventions of legal documents. Their 
strategies for endeavouring to do so are discussed in detail in the next section. A few LiPs, however, 
either did not try to educate themselves about the conventions, or having learned them, rejected them.  
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These LiPs instead preferred to submit documents that made logical sense to them. For example, a 
High Court LiP, whose presentation of evidence was criticised repeatedly by the opposing party and 
Judge, said: 
I don’t care how the court is “meant” to be presented with evidentiary material. All I care 
about is getting my message across in a manner which I think works. 
Similarly, a few LiPs made decisions about whether to follow the courts’ pre-trial orders based not on 
what the order said, but their own sense of fairness or belief in what the law should be. A District 
Court LiP, for example, refused to provide discovery of a document to the opposing party because he 
considered it unfair to have to provide a document when the opposing lawyer had not explained the 
basis for a particular aspect of the evidence. This was despite the Court ordering discovery. 
 
B. Mixing content of documents 
Even where LiPs attempted to conform to the procedural rules, lawyers and Judges commented on 
the tendency to mix the contents of different legal documents. They reported LiPs having significant 
difficulty understanding the correct content of a claim, legal submissions, and evidence. A lawyer 
commented that “reasonably often instead of … a statement of claim [it] would be more like a brief 
of evidence”. A High Court LiP, who made a number of attempts to draft a statement of claim that 
complied with the rules, eventually instructed a lawyer to draft the pleading: “They were saying it broke 
all … the High Court Rules. … [T]hey were basically going to chuck my case out [because] … it didn’t 
abide by the rules”.  
The most common problem across all the Courts was that LiPs would mix opinion, fact and 
submission in affidavits.3 A Judge suggested that this was why some LiPs, at least in the Family and 
District Courts, did not file submissions, as they did not know what purpose they served having 
included all the information in the affidavit. The documents I viewed in the case studies confirmed 
this. For example, a single paragraph in an affidavit might contain a statement about an event, an 
                                                          
3 It should be noted that this problem is not necessarily unique to LiPs. One family lawyer said that she had clients coming 
from other lawyers who said that they had written the affidavits for their previous lawyer, and the lawyer had “typed it 
up”. The lawyer said: “I thought hmm, well that would explain the lousy quality of many of the affidavits we see in the 
Family Court because they aren't even being fully edited. They are not having all the submission and argument and emotion 




opinion on why that “obviously” or “clearly” did or did not happen, and an argument about the law 
relating to this event, sometimes supported by a case citation or just a statement of principle.  
Both lawyers and Judges, while expressing some frustration at this problem, took the attitude that, as 
long as the case could be understood, they would accept the documents as written. This was on the 
basis of administrative efficiency, speedy disposition of the case, and not making the process unduly 
difficult for the LiP. A High Court Judge described it as “the path of least resistance” and a civil 
litigation lawyer said that he knew the Judges would ignore submissions in affidavits, “so normally we 
let that past … it is a good example of not trying to make the issue more difficult than it needs to be”.    
As a result of mixing the different types of documents, affidavits tended to be very long. As one lawyer 
said, they will have “50 paragraphs, two of which is evidence and the rest is submission”. 
C. Determining Relevance 
Another reason that court documents (affidavits in particular) were so long was the difficulty that LiPs 
had in determining relevance. As opposing counsel submitted during a pre-trial hearing: “the idea of 
relevance confuses everyone, but a lay interpretation of relevance is not necessarily relevance in a legal 
context”.  
One Judge related the difficulty with determining relevance to LiPs’ belief, discussed in the previous 
chapter, that they were best placed to argue their own case because they knew the facts better than 
anyone else. The Judge said LiPs assumed that all this detail was necessary: 
… they can't actually identify what the real point is because they've got this mass of detail 
in their head and they think everyone has to understand that mass of detail. (HC Judge) 
The belief that all detail is relevant may be due both to a lack of understanding about legal relevance, 
and also their emotional involvement in the case:    
It will be 11pm at night and here is another email from this person [a LiP] and it is so damn 
long you can’t read it. It is incredible really. It just shows the level of commitment and 
emotional engagement that they’ve got with their issues or whatever it is they are pursuing. 
(Court Staff) 
The lawyer who had also been a party to litigation, discussed in the last chapter, said that he had filed 
overlong affidavits because he was so emotionally involved in his case. Despite having legal training, 
he could not make judgements in his own case about relevance: “There were vast amounts of stuff in 
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there [the affidavit] which was irrelevant, but it did actually tell the story”. He contrasted his affidavit 
to one that his barrister had recently prepared for one of his clients: “That was the way it should have 
been done: nice, very simple, to the point, minimalist - vastly better than all the crap that I insisted on 
having put in”. 
Many LiPs reported significant difficulty reading and responding to affidavit evidence from the 
opposing party, needing time to comprehend the affidavit, let the emotion settle, and then be able to 
respond. A number of LiPs referred to becoming “consumed” by reading the “lies” in affidavits and 
responding to them.4 As one Family Court LiP explained: 
It isn't that I haven't got the money to pay my power bills, I have. But there are three power 
bills sitting there and I haven’t paid them because my life is consumed with affidavits for 
the court, and the minute I don’t have to produce anything like that I go into complete 
shutdown mode. (FC LiP) 
For LiPs responding to affidavits, the temptation was to respond to every aspect of the opposing 
party’s affidavits, regardless of whether it was legally relevant to the case. They did not want to let any 
“lies” stand in the court.  
The large amount of content, included because of its emotional import to the litigant, rather than its 
legal relevance, sometimes meant documents contained inadmissible allegations: “[Some LiPs] 
produce documentation that will be outrageous or scandalous” (Court staff). A family lawyer 
suggested that filing material that was “voluminous, abusive, and inappropriate evidentially” increased 
costs to the opposing party and was targeted at being “nasty enough” so “they’ll go away”. This lawyer 
therefore believed it was not just emotional involvement but an abusive strategy (whether conscious 
or not), to “shut down the other side”.  
The converse difficulty was encountered in some cases, however, with LiPs not including relevant 
material: “They include all sorts of material that shouldn't be there, and forget to include material that 
should be there” (Civil litigation lawyer). Judges were concerned that LiPs were consequently 
                                                          
4 This was particularly the case in the Family Court, but also occurred in general civil cases where LiPs were similarly 
emotionally involved, and often very financially committed, in their cases. One LiP said he had developed a strategy 
whereby he only looked at correspondence and prepared documents on one day of the week. He had previously felt 
consumed by the process, and this was a strategy to manage his involvement in the proceeding.   
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disadvantaged as the judge “[doesn’t] have a crystal ball”5 and is reliant on the evidence put before the 
court:  
Litigants in person selectively eventually (sighs) write just diatribes, which you've got to go 
through. That is often one of the greatest disadvantages to them because, you know, the 
diatribe will be there and relevant stuff is not there. (FC Judge) 
Family Court registry staff were particularly concerned about this problem in the context of protection 
orders. One staff member commented that she would read an affidavit and know that the person, 
who might really need the order, would not get it:  
They’d be putting in stuff about “aunty said this and somebody else said that” … nothing 
about the violence, nothing about how long it has been going on, how long the relationship 
has been … they can write a lot, but not actually say what we are looking for.   
The Judge therefore could not grant the order: there was a basis but it had not been put before the 
Court. 
In some cases the omission of relevant material seemed to be because the LiP assumed the Judge 
would know as much about their case as they did. This interchange from a High Court LiP’s case, 
where the LiP was arguing that the opposing party’s introduction to their brief of evidence should be 
struck out, is illustrative: 
Judge: Why is this introduction any different from yours?  
LiP: Well, we know it all anyway. 
Judge: Well, I don't! 
LiP: Fair enough, I'll accept that. 
Some of the lawyers who act as lawyer for child also said that LiPs would sometimes tell them relevant 
information but then not include it in their affidavit, because having told someone they assumed the 
Court then “knew it”.  
 
D. Providing Focus 
A common complaint from the bench and bar was that the documents, in addition to misjudging 
relevance and mixing various forms, lacked focus. A civil litigation lawyer said LiP documents were 
                                                          
5 DC Judge. 
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often in the form of a “narrative story … and often not a logically coherently prepared one, in 
chronological order. It will be a bit all over the place”. While the material is in the document, it is not 
presented to “highlight and focus on [the legal] issues in a … logical and coherent way”. Judges also 
expressed this concern: 
I think what you see more is just total sort of muddlement. They write an essay. They write 
a diary of events. That doesn't focus on what you need to do. That is the difference between 
represented and not represented. The lawyer, of course, will know what will get up my nose 
- to put a certain thing, and that legal points I have to focus on are A, B, C, D and E, and 
stick to that sort of thing. (FC Judge) 
You have to read their paperwork more carefully because they will often have a point that 
they want to make. But they won’t make it in quite the way that a lawyer will although there 
is often something they want to say and they want you to understand. So you have to pay 
attention to what they are saying and be alert to it. (HC Judge) 
These difficulties do not only occur in LiP documents. As noted in this chapter and the last, sometimes 
lawyers produce documents that are similarly unfocused.6 It is also worth repeating that not all LiP-
drafted documents have these problems, but these are the common ones raised by court staff, lawyers 
and Judges.  
E. Strategising  
An issue that one lawyer raised, and was evident in my observations and interviews, was that many 
LiPs did not understand the likely course of their case, and therefore struggled to approach it 
strategically. Many LiPs simply did not understand the process, particularly in the High Court where 
the procedure is complex. As one LiP said: 
You get so far and then bang you get hit with something else. So for someone self-
representing like me, not knowing the legal process, you um - you know, you don't know 
what is coming next, and then when it happens you may not understand what and why, so 
there are lots of traps there.  
LiPs who lacked this understanding of procedure were unable to make strategic choices about when 
to defend interlocutory applications or bring them themselves. It also meant that LiPs often went to 
court blind for preliminary hearings and conferences, not knowing what was intended at the hearing. 
One Family Court LiP said that he had no idea what would have happened if his case had continued 
                                                          
6 One Family Court Judge commented that she believed lawyers sometimes tried to “impress their clients” by including 
material that was not legally relevant, but that the client wanted before the court. Other reasons for lawyers making this 
error was a lack of training, and lawyers devoting inadequate time (whether for financial or other reasons) to crafting 
documents: “It takes a lot of time to craft a really good affidavit. … The short cut is putting down anything”.  
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past the judicial conference (the opposing party withdrew the application and so the case was 
discontinued). He said: “All I know is the judicial conference – the judge heard a few things and then 
put it off for further mention”. When I asked if he knew what would have happened next he said, 
“No, but I felt like I was holding my own”. Conversely, a Family Court LiP, who had been to a number 
of judicial conferences was caught off-guard when she arrived at the defended hearing and was sworn 
in to give evidence and be cross-examined.  
Faced with the complexity of the system, some LiPs interpreted it as a deliberate ploy to shut them 
out: “Sometimes courts make it more complicated than it actually is to put people off” (FC LiP). A 
High Court LiP compared the High Court Rules to a “secret little formula” that was designed to “keep 
the whole structure in the realm of lawyers”.  
II. Strategies for Finding Support and Advice 
It is common to think of LiPs as people who have decided to “go it alone”. All the LiPs, however, 
even the very persistent, had sought some support, whether it was from a legal or non-legal source, in 
preparing their cases. This section considers the various sources of advice that LiPs turned to. These 
include online searching, using libraries, copying precedents, networking with other LiPs, as well as 
advice from friends with professional backgrounds, and McKenzie friends. The other sources of 
information and advice LiPs commonly turned to were the court registry office, or from lawyers, 
including briefing lawyers on a limited retainer. LiPs also received information and advice, sometimes 
unwelcome, from opposing counsel. 
The Trinder study divided LiPs into three categories based on their support-seeking strategies: 
proactive (searching for information without prompting from the court), reactive (searching for 
information at the suggestion of the court or other professionals), and passive (seeking no additional 
help and conducting no research).7 The LiPs in this study all sought some assistance and attempted 
some research, and would therefore be classified as either proactive or reactive. This is perhaps to be 
expected given that the LiPs volunteered to participate in this study, and are therefore unlikely to be 
passive in their approach to their case. Presumably there are litigants using passive approaches within 
the New Zealand LiP population, but they are not included in the study’s sample. The findings of this 
                                                          




section are therefore likely to under-, rather than over-estimate the difficulties LiPs encounter in 
finding support and advice. 
A. LiPs on getting information online and from non-legal sources 
1. Online – internet searching and subscription only databases 
Most LiPs referred to finding at least some information on the internet that was useful in preparing 
their case. This included accessing statutes through New Zealand legislation online, searching key 
terms relevant to their case, and looking up the court rules online. Some litigants also referred to 
accessing the MoJ websites, which (during the course of this research) included brief guides to 
litigating in person. LiPs found the two page memorandum for High Court LiPs, which focused on 
court etiquette only, to be unhelpful. As one LiP said: “It just says ‘Don't swear, don't eat your lunch’”. 
Some LiPs also found these websites confusing,8 lacking the information they were seeking, or too 
general to be useful to their situation. 
A few LiPs said they had access to subscription-only legal databases, such as LexisNexis or Brookers. 
Some paid for the service, but others were undertaking university study and had access through their 
university’s subscription. One LiP said he had enrolled for a university course primarily to have access 
to these databases to prepare his case. Those who did not have access to paid databases felt that they 
were at a disadvantage, particularly those undertaking High Court litigation or in complex family cases: 
If you’re not on LexisNexis you’re nobody. (HC LiP) 
They talk about these forms … where do I get them from? They are not on the website 
and I don't - the lay litigant as they like to call us, I know about Brookers because my 
                                                          
8 In one instance a High Court LiP was attempting to file an appeal in the Court of Appeal, located in Wellington. The 
LiP went to the MoJ website and clicked "contact us". Under the heading “High Courts, District Courts, Court of Appeal”, 
the only information is a link called “Find your local court". The link takes the reader to the address of the Court of 
Appeal. Only the Court’s address is displayed, the header “Court of Appeal” is only visible if the reader scrolls up. Beneath 
the Court’s address is the heading "Dannevirke District Court", and then all other courts in alphabetical order. The reader 
is therefore easily misled (especially given the name of the page "Find your local court") into thinking one should indeed 
find their local court from this long list of addresses. (See <www.justice.govt.nz/contact-us>). This website design, 
presumably to make the website less complicated, misled the LiP into thinking he should file his appeal in the local court. 
He took his notice of appeal to his local court at 2pm on the last day for filing. He had previously been to the local court 
office and discussed his application but the registry staff member did not mention that he could not file a Court of Appeal 
matter at the local court. The staff member he encountered on the day of filing, however, alerted him to his error. The 
staff member and his previous lawyer tried to help him by sending the notice of appeal by email to the Court of Appeal. 
The Court of Appeal did not accept filing by email. He was some eight hours travel away from Wellington so was unable 
to file it within time. The Court of Appeal ultimately granted leave to appeal out of time, but the LiP was extremely stressed 
by the incident. When attempting to recall his interaction with his local registry office on that day he said: “I said, ‘Can 
you help me?’, and she said, ‘I can’t do anything to help because I have to remain …’. I can't remember the word. I'm 
getting a bit stressed here”. 
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daughter is at law school - but the lay litigant doesn't have access to those. They are only 
available to lawyers.9 (HC LiP) 
Many found the information online overwhelming and had difficulty identifying what was relevant to 
their case. Some LiPs, however, were able to use the information they found online successfully. They 
extracted relevant principles and mounted what were, in a few cases, successful legal arguments. For 
example, a District Court Judge recalled an argument by a retired woman, with no legal training, 
litigating in person. He said her analysis of the relevant law, and her legal argument regarding the cases 
the opposing lawyer cited was: “pretty bloody good actually. She read the cases and drew out of them 
things that were highly relevant”. LiPs who did research in-depth emphasised it was time-consuming 
and required a lot of intellectual energy. A few of these LiPs reported satisfaction from having 
mastered some of these legal principles. These LiPs said that they felt they knew more than most 
lawyers about the area of law in their case: “I feel when I've done this case I'll apply to have an LLB 
in a specialised narrow [area of] law, you know!”.  
There was evidence that some, although certainly not all, of those who expressed confidence they had 
correctly sourced information online had unwittingly misinterpreted that information. For example, 
one LiP who referred to himself as “holding his own” in legal argument showed fundamental 
confusion when the laws of evidence (rather than trust law, which he had thoroughly researched) 
became relevant to his case. The Judge suggested that he had waived privilege over some evidence, 
                                                          
9 The forms the LiP is referring to appear as Schedule 1 to the High Court Rules. The High Court Rules are Schedule 2 
of the Judicature Act 1908. They are not “forms” in the sense that the word is normally used, but rather are templates and 
the litigant has to create the document using the template. They do print as “forms” (a pre-formatted Microsoft Word 
document) from within the subscription-only databases, but not from the public access legislation at 
<www.legislation.govt.nz> (although the template can be copied and pasted in to word processing software). The 
following is an example of how the forms appear in the free access legislation database:  
Form G 31 
Interlocutory application on notice 
 
To the Registrar of the High Court at [place] 
and 
To [name of party/parties to be served with this application] 
This document notifies you that— 
1 The applicant, [name], will on [date] apply to the court for an order/orders* [specify orders sought, numbering them if more 
than 1]. 
*Select one. 
2 The grounds on which each order is sought are as follows: [specify concisely the grounds on which each order is sought]. 
3 The application is made in reliance on [specify any particular provision of an enactment, principle of law, or judicial decision relied on]. 
Date: 
Signature: 




and his argument in reply was entirely based on the doctrine of qualified privilege, which relates only 
to defamation law.10  
Access to online resources obviously requires access to a computer and the internet. Most LiPs 
emphasised the importance of being able to conduct research online: “It is really only because of my 
background, and the fact I’m a [para-legal occupation], and have computer skills, otherwise I’d have 
been out of play a long time ago” (HC LiP). A few specifically purchased computers and printers to 
enable them to litigate in person: 
I had to go out and buy Microsoft Office and I had to go out and buy a printer. As soon 
as I had that I was away laughing. The set up cost was minimal compared with the cost of 
a lawyer.  
Others owned a computer but could not afford the cost of printing and therefore used work printers 
or friends to print documents for them. A McKenzie friend said that LiPs who had illegible 
handwriting and who did not have access to a computer may be unable to access the Family Court at 
all: “[They need to] get someone to do the form for [them], or it is simply not going to be filed”.  
2. Libraries 
LiPs without access to internet and printing at home said they had tried to use computers in public 
libraries. For those unable to afford home computer facilities, even the cost of accessing the local 
library was a strain:11 
You can’t even afford to go to the library to do that work. Because it costs money to use 
their computers, it costs money to park and for petrol and then not knowing what you are 
looking for because everything you are doing is at speed. I only have this much money, so 
I can only use the computer for this long and you can’t do it because you need to be able 
to relax, you know (HC LiP). 
The LiPs who had attempted to find case law or other legal information in public libraries said there 
was insufficient detailed information held in the library for it to be helpful to their case.  
Two LiPs who were university graduates felt comfortable enough to ask for assistance at their local 
campus library, but most considered University libraries were for law students only and therefore 
                                                          
10 Trinder and others, above n 7 at 64-65 discusses, as part of the typology of “working” and “not-working” hearings, 
over-confident LiPs who were extensively prepared but had gaps in understanding.  
11 At 91, Trinder and others note similar difficulties with using the public library to access the internet.  
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made no attempt to use these resources.12 A few others had tried to access case law through their local 
Law Society library. One had been given access but others, in line with policy, had been told the library 
was only for members of the profession.13  
3. Copying documents 
LiPs commonly reported using documents prepared by the opposing counsel or their previous lawyer 
as precedents to copy from: 
It is funny but we learnt a lot off [the opposing party’s] lawyer. They did a lot of paperwork 
trying to say things against us. I thought to myself, gee we should just copy what they did 
but in favour of ourselves. It was working for us. So yeah, the opposition lawyers helped 
us to do our paperwork. We learnt a lot from them - that was really helpful. (HC LiP)  
Court staff said that this strategy was successful for Family Court LiPs who had “been enmeshed in 
the court system for some time”. Their documents were generally of a better quality than the “messy 
documents” created by LiPs new to the system, as more experienced litigants have “lots of precedents 
to draw on and guide them”. 
One of the High Court Judges recognised the utility of providing LiPs with a precedent to copy. This 
Judge had modified his case management strategy to increase the chances discovery would be done 
correctly: 
I will stagger the discovery. I'll make the plaintiff do their discovery first and then I'll say 
to the defendant, “Alright there is the plaintiff's discovery. Now you can follow what they 
did and do your discovery afterwards”. 
The Judge said this had improved compliance with discovery obligations, which tended to confuse 
LiPs.14  
                                                          
12 Within the Study Region, the Auckland and Waikato Universities’ libraries are open to the public see e.g.  University 
of Auckland "Eligibility for Library Membership"   <www.library.auckland.ac.nz>: “Members of the public are welcome 
to visit University of Auckland libraries. They will normally have access [to certain resources including shelved materials, 
photocopying and the catalogue] providing their use does not prevent University of Auckland students or staff from 
accessing the same resources and services”.  
13 The New Zealand Law Society Library website says that “The Law Society library is a private library for use by members 
and associate members of the New Zealand Law Society, the Judiciary, the Ministry of Justice Court staff and Law Faculty 
members only”, New Zealand Law Society "Using the Library"   <www.lawsociety.org.nz>. This is in contrast to the 
finding in Macfarlane’s Canadian report, where Court libraries are open to the public, that a “significant group of SRL 
respondents used their local law library for research”, Julie Macfarlane The National Self-Represented Litigants Project: Identifying 
and Meeting the Needs of Self-Represented Litigants, Final Report (May 2013) at 76. 
14 In one complex High Court matter, the LiP referred to problems he had encountered with interpreting the discovery 
rules: “I misunderstood the discovery rules and I'm still misunderstanding them”. The Court in that case ruled that he had 
breached his obligations, although noted that his misunderstanding was “understandable from a lay perspective”. 
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4. Networking together 
As discussed in the previous chapter, LiPs in both the Family Court and High Court are sharing 
information among themselves. In the Family Court a number of LiPs referred to sharing information 
or finding it online, on Facebook sites, or by word of mouth: 
I belong to a website group, [who] are all going through a similar thing and it is amazing 
how many people now are turning to self-litigation. They’re all doing it themselves but 
there is no information so everyone is sort of advising everybody else. (FC LiP) 
This was sometimes assistance of a substantive nature, such as preparing the wording of documents 
or sharing case authorities. The High Court registry referred to seeing evidence in court documents 
of information sharing: 
We do have repetition. There’ll be a certain set of paragraphs with a certain type of claim 
and all of a sudden there’ll be a few people filing the same sort of thing so they are obviously 
talking to each other. Even if they are going off down the wrong track, they’ll go off the 
wrong track together.  
Similarly, filings from prisoners often repeated material from previous claims. The court staff surmised 
this was because the “bush lawyer” in the prison was preparing documents for multiple prisoners.  
5. Friends and McKenzie Friends 
Most of the LiPs said they did not rely on family and close friends for support, either because those 
people were affected by the case (financially or as members of a family dispute), or because they were 
concerned about exhausting their attention. Some LiPs drew heavily on the advice of friends who had 
professional backgrounds such as accountancy, business, and academia, although only one of these 
had legal training. LiPs also sought assistance from friends who worked in court-related jobs such as 
the probation service and Child Youth and Family (CYF). These friends provided general advice about 
the court process, or reviewed and edited documents the LiP was intending to file. 
A few LiPs used the services of a McKenzie friend, finding these assistants via word of mouth or 
sometimes through groups such as Union of Fathers. The assistance that LiPs had from McKenzie 
friends ranged from help with drafting affidavits, and discussing likely outcomes and strategy, to 
accompanying them to court. The very experienced McKenzie friends could secure some strategic 
advantage for the LiP. For example, one McKenzie Friend referred all male LiPs to a law firm that 
was known for making Protection Order applications on behalf of their female clients. The McKenzie 
friend told the LiP to instruct the firm, with no intention of continuing with representation. This 
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would mean the firm could not represent the LiP’s ex-partner, and therefore lessen the likelihood that 
a Protection Order application would be made.  
Family Court LiPs, in particular, but District and High Court LiPs as well, reported that finding an 
independent person, whether it be a McKenzie friend or a friend with a professional background, 
provided a sounding board and helpful advice on the tone and content of affidavits and other court 
documents. Many said these advisers helped them “remove the emotion” from the documents and 
make them more factual. 
B. Information (not advice) from the Registry Office  
Most LiPs sought assistance from the court registry office. For many this was their first point of 
contact with the court system, and, for some, their only source of legal information. Registry staff 
emphasised that there was a significant range of people litigating in person:  
The level of lay litigants range from people who are genuinely wanting some help, don't 
know what to do with this document, to people who all their lives is coming up with 
commencing proceedings just for the sake of it.  
Most LiPs referred to positive experiences with the registry office, saying staff members had been 
helpful and professional. LiPs who had complaints were primarily concerned about failure to return 
calls or emails, or to send out copies of documents. There were also concerns that the information 
received was sometimes later contradicted, leading them to believe the registry had given incorrect 
information. As one Family Court LiP, who was advised by the registry to “do a particular application”, 
said: “The Judge said ‘No it was the wrong thing’. I think they genuinely tried to help but they just 
simply didn’t know what to do”. (FC LiP) 
1. Advice vs Information 
In principle, when LiPs sought help, the registry staff were not allowed to give legal advice, only 
information on process. Where the line between advice and information was drawn varied between 
staff members. The line was expressed more in terms of an established personal interpretation of the 
proper position than awareness of any national or office policy that explained the difference.15 One 
                                                          
15 This mirrors the finding in Macfarlane’s Canadian study where she says that there was considerable uncertainty and 
ambiguity about the distinction between legal advice and information, resulting in court staff “constantly exercising 
personal discretion in their dealings with SRLs”: Macfarlane, above n 13 at 69-70.  
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staff member said that she kept a strict line, which did not vary from person to person, refusing to 
give information on alternative procedural pathways, as that would constitute legal advice: 
Anything that is not about process I don't go near because that would then constitute advice 
and that is not my role. I make that quite clear and I don't pick and choose with people, I 
just don't.  
Others also explained they drew the line at this point, directing people only to information in 
brochures, referring them on to lawyers, or pointing them to the procedural rules online. Other staff 
members considered the distinction “a fine line”, to be decided on a “case by case basis”.  
One staff member, who said he was clear about the distinction, gave an example of a litigant wanting 
information on how to stop an opposing party disposing of assets. The staff member spoke to his 
colleagues and then gave the litigant three possible procedural pathways. While this was “process” 
information, there were multiple pathways available. Two other registry staff members (each in 
different courts) were clear that in such a situation they would not give information about possible 
pathways, because these involved strategic choices, so this constituted giving legal advice.16  
These variable boundaries are reflected in LiPs’ perceptions that the level of assistance varied 
depending on the staff member they encountered on a given day, referring to sometimes being “in 
luck” when they encountered someone who was particularly helpful. As a Family Court LiP who 
sought help from the registry office said: 
I have to say the people at the court, some of the young girls, were really, really helpful, but 
obviously I was lucky that I was there at the right time on the right day. They took me to a 
side room and talked me through it. … [They] probably went outside of their remit, so to 
speak.  
Where LiPs found a sympathetic staff member, that person would become their preferred point of 
contact. As a Family Court LiP explained: 
[The Family Court staff member] could have been a lot more helpful. She kept saying just 
get a lawyer. When I went I saw [a Family Court counter staff member], she was 
outstanding. She said I didn’t have the right stuff and sent me off. When I came back again 
she wrote on some other sections I needed to add in. … Now if I want anything I just go 
straight to her.  
                                                          
16 Another difficulty inferred in this example, although the staff member did not elaborate on it, was that the staff member 
had also talked to the opposing party. Giving various procedural pathways to two litigants in the same case could, in some 




The need to draw the line between information and advice was often couched in terms of the potential 
hazards of stepping over the boundary.17 They explained this in terms of not being legally trained and 
therefore able to give advice, but several staff members also noted the risk of a LiP naming them as 
the source of erroneous advice: “You don't want them standing up in Court and saying ‘[name of 
court staff member] told me to do this’.”18 
The registry staff said they would therefore point out minor changes or additions that were needed. 
For example, in the Family Court, they would tell LiPs to insert the names of the children on a COCA 
application, but would not go further than this.19 The court staff said they simply accepted documents 
for filing, as long as they met the basic requirements of a court document, even if they knew it was 
the wrong application, or the contents were nonsensical.  
Court staff also noted that they would generally only serve people at the front counter, because of the 
dangers of taking them into a private room. As a staff member said, “We've got some [persistent LiPs] 
who are prone to loud and almost violent outbursts. You wouldn't take them into a room. You'd keep 
them at a public counter”. Court staff were concerned both about physical safety and being faced with 
an allegation they had said or done something contrary to the proper administration of justice.   
2. Referral to advice 
One of the difficulties court staff faced when trying to maintain the boundary between advice and 
information was the absence of a ready source of legal advice to which LiPs could be referred: “It is 
hard because you know people are missing out”. One registry staff member said she saw people who 
did not qualify for legal aid but who had “outgoings that would choke an elephant”. She said she did 
not know where they went when she told them to get legal advice. Another staff member said she 
referred people to the CLC even though she knew they would not be able to help the person until a 
volunteer evening clinic was available, as they did not have the necessary expertise: “But that is the 
                                                          
17 Some staff members noted this hazard with lawyers as well. One said that there were some lawyers who were too junior 
to be practising on their own account, or were practising outside their specialist area, who called her and asked for 
information that she considered amounted to legal advice. The staff member said that these lawyers could be swiftly dealt 
with, redirecting them to talk to a more senior practitioner or telling them to “hit the books” and figure it out themselves. 
18 One staff member said she considered this a risk if she talked to lawyers in too much detail.  
19 One LiP complained that the registry office insisted he comply with the rules but allowed the opposing counsel not to 
follow them. He said the registry would not accept his application without an affidavit: “That might be correct with that 
the other party lawyer filed a number of applications that weren’t accompanied by affidavits. So I see the court’s indulgence 
to lawyers as opposed to lay litigants. The other party files notices of opposition with paragraphs that aren’t numbered 
and I had no way to refer to the paragraphs. The registry can be very picky to lay litigants”. (HC LiP).  
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only place I have to send them to get free legal advice”. Many expressed a desire to expand the duty 
solicitor service, which currently provides summary advice only to criminal defendants, to parties in 
family or civil matters. The result of the existing system was that: 
People who come in here, unable to access a lawyer, are given a botched kind of legal 
advice. … We are talking so closely about the law and the process that it is a kind of half-
baked legal advice and we haven't been legally trained. (Court staff) 
Family Court staff also had concerns about giving vulnerable litigants a list of lawyers and telling them 
to go and find one. This was now the usual practice. Previously (before a restructure) court staff had 
sometimes rung through the list of lawyers for the LiP, as they had “tried to keep the impetus going” 
once someone had taken the “scary” step of coming into the court looking for help. Even for the 
court staff it sometimes took “eight or nine lawyers before we’d find someone” so they were reluctant 
to send someone away with a list knowing the difficulty they would face. But now people were usually 
just given a list of lawyers.  
Some LiPs expressed frustration at being told to get a lawyer: “The registry staff repeat the mantra 
‘get a lawyer’, and the most you can get out of them is ‘where’s the toilet?’” (DC LiP). 
3. Time consuming assistance 
A primary concern for registry staff was the time involved in dealing with LiPs: “They are just really 
hard to work with because they slow the process down”.20 Some registry staff also noted that they 
spent a large amount of time with LiPs on their first contact with the court, explaining the process 
and encouraging them to seek legal assistance. These staff members considered that time spent this 
way would avoid multiple visits and questions later: “It is time consuming but I take the view that if 
you take enough time … then that is possibly going to cut down on future phone calls”. In some 
instances the first contact also involved “talking [a LiP] down from the ledge”, when they had just 
been served with an unexpected court document.  
Many still needed ongoing assistance, including explanations of the terminology, the process, and how 
the LiP fitted into that process:  
                                                          
20 Note that, unlike Macfarlane’s report of the Canadian registry staff, there was no observed or articulated sense of 




They could be sitting in a conference with judge and judge will direct “Adjourned 21 days, 
Registrar’s list to monitor the filing of whatever else". They don't know what “adjourned” 
… means. “Registrar’s list” they wouldn't have a clue about, and the document they have 
no clue about either.  
This issue was evident in the observations I conducted where I was surprised at the limited 
understanding that even well-educated and motivated LiPs displayed. One District Court LiP 
understood almost none of the terms used in court documents and continually sought clarification 
from the registry office via lengthy emails. Other LiPs said they relied heavily on the registry staff for 
information about the process and for interpretation of correspondence from the court. 
I got a letter from the Court. I was unsure what it meant so I rang them up and said what 
does this mean and then I got a better information than what the letter said. (FC LiP) 
A Family Court LiP showed me the one page notice she had received from the court, notifying her of 
the time and place of a judicial conference. It said that she had to file a memorandum with the Court 
before the hearing. When I asked her what she was going to write, she told me firmly that no one at 
the registry office said she needed to do that, so she was not going to, and she did not know what it 
was anyway. 
The amount of time required with LiPs was a concern to court staff because of the pressures to meet 
their workloads, but they considered the time was necessary because LiPs had a right to the 
information: 
[LiPs] generally take up your time and when you've got pressure on your time sometimes I 
just have to draw a breath and think okay, I need to take time you know, because they need 
the time. They are entitled to the time, they are parties in the court, you know? … [But] 
sometimes if you are too kind to them, they keep ringing you, so it is a catch 22!  
One staff member also explained her desire to project a friendly and helpful image to the public, 
overcoming what she thought were LiPs’ preconceived notions that the court would be obstructive 
and difficult. Another staff member said she took the time to explain processes to people because they 
wanted one-to-one assistance: “They haven’t come all this way to get a brochure”. She therefore 
supplied the brochure only after giving personalised service.  
4. LiPs with specific needs 
The registry staff’s role becomes especially important where both parties are litigating in person. 
Where there is opposing counsel, that lawyer usually takes a significant role in guiding the LiP through 
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the process (as discussed below). Without that information, the court registry becomes a major source 
of information.  
In light of the family law reforms (that were days away from coming into force when these interviews 
were conducted, and would reduce the role of lawyers in the Family Court), this was of special concern 
to Family Court registry staff. One recounted serving a LiP who was very agitated because her ex-
partner had told her he was going to apply to have a protection order discharged. This was a false 
threat (and a breach of the protection order itself). The registry staff member advised her: “If you 
need to know anything just ring us here at the court and we will tell you”. She said she considered 
“That is why we are here”. The staff member said this was symptomatic of a general problem:  
There is heaps of that going on here at the moment, wife and husband telling each other 
what’s what. One doesn't arrive at court because the other one said not to come and then 
there is all shit because one didn't arrive.  
Family Court registry staff were particularly concerned that refugee and migrant groups, particularly 
those with limited English language skills, were unable to utilise the strategies mobilised by many of 
the LiPs discussed above (using online resources, libraries, networking together, or using the support 
of professional friends). Similarly, registry staff said that even New Zealand-born LiPs often came to 
the Family Court because their “social networks and community groups have fallen apart and can't 
take them any further”. It was therefore unrealistic to think they could use such networks to help them 
prepare court documents. The registry staff therefore became their main source of support, but staff 
were unable to meet the language or cultural needs of migrant LiPs or provide legal advice.   
C. Advice from Lawyers 
Almost all LiPs had received some advice from a lawyer. Many, as discussed in the previous chapter, 
had been represented at the beginning of their case, and therefore had documents already drafted by 
a lawyer, and accompanying advice. Those who did not have such assistance, or who needed further 
assistance after leaving representation, frequently turned to lawyers for some help. This involved either 
seeking limited retainer assistance,21 free legal help, or assistance from opposing counsel.  
                                                          
21  Limited retainer advice is often referred to as “unbundled assistance” in overseas literature. In New Zealand 
“unbundling” commonly refers to the restructure of the telecommunications industry, and its application to legal services 
is virtually unheard of. I have therefore used the more popular term “limited retainer”.  
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1. LiPs and Lawyers on limited retainer legal assistance 
LiPs reported using lawyers at strategic points in their case, to conduct specific pieces of legal research, 
to write legal submissions, draft pleadings, or review affidavits. Several High Court LiPs instructed 
lawyers to provide opinions on discrete aspects of the litigation. One used crowdfunding to pay for 
the opinion.22 A Family Court LiP went to a lawyer to get submissions drafted: “I panicked when I 
had the situation with [the Judge]. The way he treated me in that courtroom, I really panicked”. 
Another LiP said that she had instructed a lawyer as “back up”: 
Just in case things got to the point where I felt I couldn’t cope. Or I really needed, like even 
a letter from a lawyer, to make people take more notice, maybe take me more seriously 
rather than not.  
A number of Family Court LiPs referred to seeking one hour sessions with family lawyers to obtain 
guidance and reassurance regarding their management of their case. As one Family Court LiP said, “I 
explained all the stuff to the lawyer” and he said: “Yes, that’s correct, that’s correct, that’s correct, you 
are doing right, you can do this different, but in general you are doing fine”. Some of the LiPs who 
had one hour advice sessions reported that they were not charged. Lawyers said that it often was not 
worth opening a file and going through the process of sending a letter of engagement so they did not 
charge for a one hour session:  
I have to get them to sign a letter of instruction because we have to send out all the Law 
Society things. It is not unusual to see somebody as a one-off and give them some sort of 
brief advice, and I really can’t be bothered opening a file so just end up doing a bit of a 
freebie. (Family Lawyer) 
Others were not charged because of their pre-existing relationship with the lawyer, either as a former 
client, or because they knew them through a social setting. 23  A Family Court LiP, having left 
representation after spending $250,000 in legal fees without resolution of his multiple proceedings, 
said his former lawyer “was happy to give advice on a friendly basis or - he feels a bit guilty about the 
fact I’ve spent so much money on court cases”. This form of informal pro bono advice was much 
                                                          
22 “Crowdfunding” is the practice of making an appeal, usually on the internet, for the public (the “crowd”) to contribute 
to the cost of the litigation. For example, crowdfunding was used to raise funds in the successful challenge to the Electoral 
Commission’s decision that the satirical song “Planet Key” was an election advertisement: Jeremy Jones "Planet Key: 
Assist with legal challenge – support freedom of expression in New Zealand!" (29 August 2014) PledgeMe 
<www.pledgeme.co.nz>; Watson v Electoral Commission [2015] NZHC 666. 
23 A few lawyers reported being asked for advice by members of clubs or social groups they belonged to.   
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more common than LiPs being offered advice via a more formal pro bono scheme being operated by 
an individual lawyer or law firm scheme, although two LiPs did receive such a service.24  
A small number of lawyers specifically offered a limited retainer service, and a handful of these offered 
an online service. For example, a few LiPs reported using lawonline.co.nz, a document drafting and 
advice service run by a single registered New Zealand lawyer, and JustAnswer, a US-based service 
offering New Zealand legal advice.25  
Most LiPs who did obtain limited retainer advice instructed lawyers who primarily offered a traditional, 
full-representation service. Many of the lawyers interviewed said they offered this service, but were 
very wary of doing so, and selective about who they offered the service to:  
It is not something we enjoy doing … It is certainly something I wouldn’t encourage for a 
new client or for someone walking off the street. … [P]retty much all of them have been 
existing clients. (Civil litigator)  
A lawyer who was offering limited retainer services to a large number of clients saw lawyers’ reluctance 
to offer such a service as the result of “a huge tradition that the lawyer does it all and charges like a 
wounded bull for it and controls everything”. Other lawyers offered a number of reasons why they 
were uncomfortable with it. Several said not only was there was little financial incentive to engage in 
this sort of work, but also that the quality of advice was compromised by the restrictions on the time 
to complete the work: 
I think sometimes for an hour of your time, which obviously you can only bill for an hour 
of your time, you are not making too much money and you aren’t maybe giving that good 
advice, that is - just because they don’t understand what you’re doing, they don’t understand 
what the procedure is - but you are trying your best. (Civil litigation lawyer).  
Lawyers said they were sometimes asked for “just an hour of your time”, but the client would then 
attend the meeting with lengthy documents and the instruction: "Don’t incur too much time, but here 
is this 20 page document, what do you think about it?". While clients expected that this model of 
service would work for them, a senior civil litigator explained that generally it did not: “It is not like 
fixing a car or unblocking the drain. It is likely to be complex and intensely felt”. 
                                                          
24 For further discussion of pro bono in New Zealand, see Chapter 1, page 9-10. 
25 JustAnswer <www.justanswer.com/newzealand-law>. There is also a free legal question and answer service, LawSpot 
<www.lawspot.org.nz>, but no LiPs mentioned using this service. 
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The concerns about the quality of the advice that could be given in a short session, and about the basis 
on which it had been given, led to concerns about liability for incorrect advice, or at least a risk of 
being accused of having given incorrect advice.26 The lawyers said the advice had to be carefully 
hedged and recorded because of the risk that the client might in future accuse the lawyer of having 
given incorrect advice: 
Are you walking away actually knowing what I’ve told you? Has there been any benefit for 
you here? Because, of course, you are always conscious of the fact that six months later 
they might turn around and say “Look, I came to you. You gave me some advice and now 
I’ve got a judgment against me and it is all your fault”. (Civil litigation lawyer) 
Lawyers were therefore careful to record the limits of the retainer, even though as one lawyer said, “It 
is very difficult to draw the lines of the retainer”. They spent time recording the advice in writing, all 
of which was unpaid and fell outside the “hour of your time”. This led many of the lawyers to view 
limited retainer advice as “perilous and unsatisfying”, and they were therefore unwilling to undertake 
it, except where there was a pre-existing relationship with the client. This may explain why several 
LiPs had difficulty finding a lawyer to offer the service, particularly in general civil litigation.  
There was evidence to suggest that lawyers were right to be concerned that LiPs receiving limited 
retainer advice may not comprehend the advice, or its limitations. A number of LiPs did not 
understand that a lawyer was giving an “opinion” rather than “the answer”. During observations, I 
heard LiPs quoting the advice they had received and naming the lawyer.27 When the Judge or opposing 
counsel challenged the advice by raising a contrary argument, the LiP was quick to conclude that the 
lawyer who had given them the advice was “wrong”. The LiP did not raise other possibilities including: 
that the opinion had been a legal argument only, open to challenge by other argument; that the LiP 
may have misinterpreted the advice; or, that the nature of the case had changed since the opinion was 
given.  
                                                          
26 This happened to one lawyer who had given advice to a client who was appearing in person in a tribunal. The tribunal 
decision was published, naming the lawyer and saying that the lawyer had “misadvised” the party. The lawyer said he had 
not given the advice at all and recalled the judgment and had it corrected because he was worried about the reputational 
harm of having it stand.   
27 The Judges said that when they heard these comments they generally “shut them down pretty quickly” because “you 
just can’t do it when people [the lawyers] aren’t there to defend themselves” (High Court Judge). Judges said while they 
even knew or suspected a lawyer was behind advice or drafts of documents presented in court, as far as they were 
concerned, the Judge was “dealing with the person in front of me and that was that”. 
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(a) Community Law Centre and Citizens Advice Bureau 
For those LiPs with very limited or no funds to pay for advice, the only free, widely-available services 
were a CLC or Citizens Advice Bureau (CAB).28 Only a few LiPs had accessed CLC and CAB services, 
and while some had found the advice helpful, others said they did not meet their needs.  
Several LiPs found that the services offered at their local CLC did not include the expertise they 
required. A CLC solicitor confirmed that the services offered at each CLC varied depending on the 
availability of funding and the expertise of the staff employed at that CLC. Some CLCs therefore offer 
full representation, including in family law, while others offer only advice and assistance with filling 
out forms.29 The CLC solicitor said services offered are targeted at meeting unmet legal needs: “It is 
aligned so it meets the gap between legal aid and private. … Where legal aid is available the rule is we 
don’t do it, because we’re not meant to be duplicating services”.  
This meant CLCs could not assist LiPs who did qualify for legal aid, but who could not find a lawyer 
willing to work for civil legal aid rates. A CLC lawyer noted that this was not only because the LiP did 
not have what CLC defined as an “unmet legal need”:   
It is also the thing of maintaining the relationship with the private practitioners, so that we 
are not, basically stealing their bread and butter. I guess the reality of it is … [We’d have 
practitioners] saying, “Uh, what are you doing here? Shouldn't this be legal aid work?” And 
we'll say “Well, we've offered it to you but you [turned it down]”. 
CLC lawyers also attempted to find lawyers willing to take cases for those who did not qualify for legal 
aid, but who could not afford to pay a lawyer. A CLC solicitor said this was often not possible as 
lawyers, already under pressure,30 were unwilling to take pro bono cases. A CLC would therefore refer 
litigants on in the knowledge that there was probably no advice available: “[W]e’ll just refer the person, 
and I know that person has nowhere to go, technically. It is just what you have to do, otherwise you’d 
go nuts”.  
                                                          
28 I became aware during the research of at least one law firm in the Study Region was offering a free advice clinic in 
family law. I am unaware of how many other clinics may be operating: there is no centralised information about free advice 
outside the CLC and CAB system. No LiPs in the study had used a law firm clinic.  
29 Representation services are being reduced in some centres: “In 2011 Auckland Community Law Centre devoted 75 per 
cent of its resources to litigation services. In 2014, litigation services were restricted to just 15 per cent. These changes are 
a result of purchasing decisions by the Ministry of Justice”: Letter from Darryn Aitchison (Auckland Community Law 
Centre) "Access to Justice" (24 April 2015) 863 LawTalk 32. 
30 See Chapter 1, pages 8-9. 
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Given these limits and the variability of the service available in different legal and geographical areas, 
it was unsurprising that many LiPs found the CLC service, while in some ways helpful, too 
rudimentary to meet their advice needs. 
Only a few LiPs had accessed CAB services, and two of these complained that the lawyers they 
encountered at CAB were too junior and inexperienced to be able to give them useful advice. The 
registry staff at one court said they referred people to CLCs, but not the CAB because “I don't know 
how much they know”. At another Court, however, the registry staff said they regularly referred people 
to the CAB, including showing them CAB locations on a map. Like variability in the services offered 
at CLCs, this may reflect variability in services and expertise at different CAB locations. 
2. Opposing counsel – walking the line 
Lawyers said that, when they were acting for a client opposing a LiP, they usually gave the LiP some 
information about the process and the steps to take. Where the opposing party was also a LiP, this 
guidance on the process was absent, with significant effects for management of the case.31 In the 
Family Court, the lawyer for child was often an important source of information for the LiP, although 
this sometimes placed the lawyer for child in a difficult position, as they were representing the child’s 
interests, which might diverge from those of the LiP .32 
The justification for this assistance was that they were acting in their own client’s interest, as keeping 
the LiP on track reduced the likelihood of adjournments and therefore costs to their client. Lawyers 
also said they would take responsibility for pre-trial matters such as preparing consent memoranda or 
bundles of documents.33 They would therefore assist the LiP as long as it did not compromise their 
                                                          
31 For example, a District Court LiP, whose opposing party became a LiP before the trial, did not understand the direction 
to “exchange briefs of evidence relating solely to the issues that the Court will be required to determine”. He thought the 
Judge was deliberately attempting to confuse him. Rather than seek clarification about the meaning of the direction, he 
filed a 90 paragraph affidavit, annexing 70 pages of exhibits. This was in addition to the numerous affidavits that had 
already been filed in the matter, some of which had annexed the same documents. If the opposing party had been 
represented, the opposing party’s lawyer may have explained the direction to the LiP and avoided the further affidavit 
being filed. 
32 As one lawyer for child noted: “[LiPs] can’t help but see you as a helper, or they are often quite, almost manipulative 
and try and twist things, so that you are forced into a position of almost having to assist them giving them advice. They 
try and dress it up in terms of … well, it is about the child, so you are almost made to look churlish and difficult if you are 
saying ‘Actually, I can’t give you advice on that’”. Another lawyer for child said that represented parties sometimes also 
called for advice: “They often think, ‘I’ll just give lawyer for child a quick ring, because if I call my lawyer they’ll charge me 
a unit or two, so I’ll quickly ring lawyer for child directly’”. 
33 In District and High Courts, the bundle of documents is meant to be prepared cooperatively. Lawyers however said 
they that almost always offered to do the bundle themselves as it was too difficult for a LiP: “I simply offer to do that … 
Because it needs to be done and done properly for the sake of a properly conducted hearing. If I just sit back and expect 
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client’s position. Many lawyers also justified such assistance on the basis that they owed a duty to the 
court to ensure that the process was fair and just.  
Lawyers said their clients did not like their lawyer assisting the LiP, but accepted their lawyer’s 
explanation that although it would cost them in additional fees, “it is useful to spend time to save 
time”.34 Lawyers said they did not always pass these costs on to the client, so this was therefore a form 
of pro bono assistance.  
Lawyers also said they often advised LiPs to take legal advice, as is required by their professional rules 
of conduct.35 Judges also said they either checked the LiP knew they had a right to access legal advice 
or, depending on the matter and the LiPs’ ability to cope with it, encouraged the LiP to seek advice: 
“I don’t tell people to ‘get represented’, but I say sometimes, with varying degrees of emphasis, that 
they might want to consider what [being unrepresented] actually means” (FC Judge). Lawyers were 
also selective about who they gave such advice to and how strongly. For example, a family practitioner 
had opposed an experienced LiP, whom he knew from a colleague had made complaints to the Law 
Society and said he would not recommend he got a lawyer because: “He’d be insulted and probably 
complain to the Law Society, which I don’t want to run the risk of”.   
As that quote illustrates, some lawyers were alert to the possibility of LiPs perceiving opposing lawyers’ 
input as patronising. A civil litigation lawyer explained that he always tried to treat LiPs with “the 
upmost courtesy and respect and dignity”. Most lawyers guessed, though none were certain, that this 
was part of the professional obligations set out in the Client Care Rules.36 This lawyer said that treating 
the LiP with courtesy and respect was also partly for what he termed “self-serving reasons”, because 
he said LiPs “tend to be defensive and sensitive about being patronised or talked over”. Other lawyers 
                                                          
the person to do it, it will just be - it probably won't be done, or won't be done properly, to the disadvantage of everyone 
including the Court … and the parties. So that is an expense and a burden that falls on my client”. (Civil litigation lawyer). 
34 Civil litigation lawyer. 
35 Lawyers and Conveyancers Act (Lawyers: Conduct and Client Care) Rules 2008, r 12.1 says: “When a lawyer knows 
that a person is self-represented, the lawyer should normally inform that person of the right to take legal advice.” One 
lawyer, who was unaware of any such obligation, said: “I'm not going to try and give them any help or any head start by 
suggesting they need a lawyer.” (Civil litigation lawyer).  
36 Most lawyers said that they did not know the specifics of the rules (or even that there was a rule about conduct towards 
LiPs), but believed that a LiP had to be treated just like another lawyer, with “respect and courtesy”: Client Care Rules, r 
10.1. The duty towards LiPs is found in r 12 which says: “A lawyer must, when acting in a professional capacity, conduct 
dealings with others, including self-represented persons, with integrity, respect, and courtesy”. The additional requirement 
of “integrity” is not explained in the Client Care Rules. One lawyer said he assumed the requirement for “integrity” meant 
lawyers were not meant to trick LiPs, or take advantage of their lack of knowledge.  
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said they were careful in how they communicated with LiPs: “I am more careful and super-polite … 
in dealing with lay litigants”.  
Lawyers perceived there was a risk that the LiP might misinterpret what was said, or might: “start 
becoming abusive frankly” and making “all sorts of remarks about what they perceived you to be 
doing to them” either “to your face” or in court (Civil litigation lawyer). Lawyers said they therefore 
engaged in defensive practices including recording most correspondence in writing, maintaining a 
formal tone, and where there were telephone or in person conversations, carefully noting them: “to 
cover your butt in a way” (Family Lawyer). A family lawyer explained that he was litigating against a 
LiP who had a track record of complaining about the opposing counsel. He explained the precautions 
he was taking and said: “There is a degree of almost hysteria - internal hysteria, if you see what I mean. 
I'm just trying to be very careful”. Where a LiP was conducting themselves in a way the lawyer 
considered was professional, lawyers said they would be more relaxed about talking with them on the 
phone or communicating in less formal emails.  
Some LiPs said the opposing counsel was always very professional and courteous and appreciated the 
assistance from counsel, for example photocopies of rules or chapters from a textbook on advocacy. 
Other LiPs thought the opposing counsel was patronising and condescending. A Family Court LiP, 
for example, was very offended by a letter from the opposing lawyer which began:  
May I first say how uncomfortable I feel writing to you direct. You have had as your 
solicitor [Solicitor’s Name] throughout this procedure and in the strongest possible terms 
you should be seeking legal advice during this process. (sic)  
The letter closes with a similar exhortation: “I am sorry, again I wish you would take legal advice”. 
The LiP had left representation because she believed her lawyer had been negligent, and was 
determined to take the matter forward herself. She considered the letter showed (what another LiP 
termed) “sneering contempt” towards people trying to litigate in person.  
III. Discussion 
The process before court brings into sharp relief the tensions between fostering an appearance that 
the court is accessible to LiPs, while at the same time trying to encourage LiPs to seek legal advice. 
This was particularly challenging given that options for legal advice were so limited. LiPs’ preparation 
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for court also demonstrates the tensions that arise between LiPs’ lay understanding of the process, 
and the professional participants’ expectations. 
A. Fostering the Appearance of Accessibility in an Advice Desert 
In preparing for court, LiPs first experienced the gap between the formal right to access the courts in 
person and the difficulty in doing so. Court staff, focused on customer service and often believing 
that their role was to help litigants, wanted to be of assistance. As one court staff member said, she 
gave herself a talking to when she became impatient with LiPs, reminding herself that as a party to 
litigation they had a right to that time. Similarly, lawyers felt obliged to assist LiPs, often because that 
would expedite proceedings and therefore assist their own client, but also to assist the administration 
of justice, to try to make the promise of openness a reality. Judges similarly encouraged LiPs to seek 
advice where they thought it was needed. The difficulty in encouraging LiPs was that there was little 
advice available.  
1. The Advice Desert 
The material above has illustrated that, in New Zealand, there are very limited alternatives to full, 
privately paid, representation. There is access to cases and legislation online, and some limited 
guidance from the MoJ on conducting cases as a LiP. LiPs have very limited access to more readily 
searchable material which lawyers can access through paid databases. Many library resources are also 
only available to lawyers and law students, or LiPs believed they were available only to these groups. 
Few advice services are available with most lawyers reluctant to offer limited brief advice unless the 
LiP was previously a client, and CLCs and CABs having limited resources to offer litigation advice. 
Tom’s story illustrates that attempts to find advice, including limited brief advice, are often 
unsuccessful. Lawyers, court staff and judges were therefore encouraging people to go and seek advice 
but in reality, little advice was available.  
2. The Advice Mirage 
As discussed in the Chapter 4, Judges and most lawyers believed that the main reason people were 
litigating in person was financial, specifically that there were a large number of litigants who did not 
meet the criteria for legal aid but could not afford private representation. So why continue to 
recommend LiPs seek advice, when there was little free advice available?  
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A few Judges did overestimate the availability of free legal advice, suggesting to LiPs that CAB and 
CLC were in a position to assist them, or that they could get limited retainer advice, when that was 
not always the case. A lack of understanding about what advice is available might be part of the answer.  
Another interpretation of the phenomenon of urging LiPs to get legal advice is that it creates some 
moral distance from the difficult reality of system failure: that is, from the fact that the court is only 
accessible by way of a lawyer, although many people are unable to secure representation for financial 
reasons. As both CLC and registry staff noted, they were advising LiPs to get legal advice in the 
knowledge that there was probably no advice available. One lawyer said this was to avoid “going nuts”. 
Judges similarly distanced themselves. They said they could not concern themselves with why people 
were litigating in person. Recommending that people get legal advice is therefore a way to say, “I have 
done all I can, now you are bound by the requirements of the court just as anyone else is”. This was 
evident in many of the Judges’ comments, and the following is an exemplar: 
I have to respect the fact that this is an adversarial situation, that people have had the 
opportunity to consult a lawyer. I know that is sometimes not feasible in terms of cost, but 
they do have that opportunity. (DC Judge) 
This may also be related to what Engler refers to as a judicial concern that LiPs not be allowed to 
capitalise on their lack of knowledge and a fear that, if they are, numbers will increase. He argues that 
judges therefore often start from the proposition that LiPs have “chosen” to appear without counsel.37 
This fear was not strongly evident in the Judges’ comments, although some did refer to combining an 
encouragement to seek legal advice with a reminder that when representing themselves the same rules 
still applied.  
Court staff, judges and lawyers might also encourage LiPs to seek advice to protect themselves from 
overload. Court staff were concerned about the extra work that LiPs created, lawyers were worried 
about the extra costs involved in assisting the LiP, much of which they could not pass on to their 
client, and judges, under the pressure to process large numbers of cases, might be tempted to adjourn 
so the LiP could seek legal advice.38  
                                                          
37 Russell Engler "And Justice for All - Including the Unrepresented Poor: Revisiting the Roles of the Judges, Mediators, 
and Clerks" (1999) 67 Fordham Law Review 1987 at 2016. 
38 Richard Moorhead "The Passive Arbiter: Litigants in Person and the Challenge to Neutrality" (2007) 17 Social and 
Legal Studies 405 at 414, noting that it may be “a convenience for the judge” to adjourn proceedings for litigants to get 
legal advice, although “it is of questionable benefit to the litigant; where they are unrepresented out of necessity, their 
ability to get assistance is limited”. 
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Advising LiPs to seek advice also minimises the strain on the court staff, and on lawyers and judges’ 
roles within the system. The roles of the lawyers (with their duty to the client), the court staff (to give 
information only) and judges (as passive arbiters), meant assisting LiPs placed them in potential 
conflict with these roles. This is exacerbated by the problems with delineating “advice” and 
“information”. 
3. The False Divide – Advice vs Information 
As in other common law jurisdictions, New Zealand’s court staff are prohibited from giving legal 
advice and may only give legal information.39 Greacen has argued that the phrase “legal advice” has 
no inherent meaning to those who are required to decide what advice they can and cannot give.40 
Dewar, Smith and Banks, noting that the “very fine line” between information and advice is “a 
cornerstone of appellate judicial guidance in relation to litigants in person”, concluded that many 
judicial officers and court staff believe the distinction is “logically and practically unworkable”.41  
It is, therefore, not surprising that there was variation among court staff members about what they 
considered was information and what crossed the boundary into advice. Research in both the UK and 
Australia has found unevenness in the way different registries respond to requests for information 
from LiPs,42 with the confusion over advice and information sometimes leading to a “very cautious 
approach” as staff worry about exceeding boundaries.43 A very cautious approach might also be 
explained by the perception of risk involved. Court staff, limited-retainer advice lawyers, and opposing 
counsel, all referred to the danger of being cited to the court as the source of (incorrect) advice. 
Opposing counsel were concerned about the risk of appearing patronising, of creating problems in 
moving the case forward, or of increasing the likelihood the LiP would complain about them to the 
Law Society. Judges were concerned LiPs’ cases may include an injustice they should be addressing, 
but that they may miss because it is buried in legal documents that did not conform to the norms of 
                                                          
39 I have been unable to confirm whether there is a New Zealand policy to guide court staff on the distinction between 
advice and information. Court staff said there was not but a MoJ staff member told me in conversation there was. Requests 
for the policy went unanswered. 
40 John Greacen "No Legal Advice from Court Personnel" What does that Mean?" (1995) 34 Judges Journal 10. Some US 
Courts took up Greacen’s recommendations: John Greacen "Legal Information vs Legal Advice: Developments during 
the Last Five Years" (2000) 84 Judicature 198. In 2003 the NZ Law Commission cited an Australian service charter, similar 
to the type Greacen recommended, when reviewing Family Court dispute resolution: Law Commission Dispute Resolution 
in the Family Court (NZLC R82, 2006) at [935].  
41 John Dewar, Barry W Smith and Cate Banks Litigants in Person in the Family Court of Australia (Family Court of Australia, 
2000) at 2 and 79. 
42 At 53; Trinder and others, above n 7 at 36. 
43 Civil Justice Council Access to Justice for Litigants in Person (or Self-Represented Litigants) (November 2011) at [107]. 
156 
 
the court, and so are difficult to understand. A few court staff and opposing counsel also believed that 
some of the most persistent litigants posed a physical danger to them.44 With the more persistent and 
difficult litigants, it reached what one lawyer described as “a degree of almost hysteria”. These 
perceptions mean that for some LiPs, the institutional actors will treat them “very carefully”, so may 
not recommend they get advice (for fear of seeming patronising) but will also extend very limited 
assistance (for fear of it coming back to harm them).  
The other side of this is that LiPs who appear less dangerous and more worthy of help may get much 
more assistance. Some LiPs talked about identifying “sympathetic” court staff and returned to them 
repeatedly. This may be because some court staff feel being constrained to bureaucratic processing 
clashes with their conception of themselves as facilitating access to justice. As in Zimmerman’s study 
of social workers, the remarks that court staff made to me “suggest that some workers find the 
enforced features of their task incongruous with the conception of what it should consist of”.45 The 
lack of clarity about the boundary between advice and information means they can lean towards giving 
more assistance to LiPs. Opposing counsel were also exposed to this tension in finding the line 
between information and advice when LiPs sought advice from them and referred to varying the level 
of assistance given depending on how “professionally” the LiP was conducting themselves.46 
While these all provide possible explanations for the recommendation that LiPs seek advice – 
misunderstanding the extent of advice available, creating moral distance from system failure, avoiding 
overload and role conflict – if little or no advice is in fact available, then the promise of the courts’ 
accessibility is undermined. Meaningful access is revealed as illusory.  
B. Inter-group (Mis)understanding  
The “advice desert” was often filled by other sources of assistance. Tom, Matt and Lisa’s stories 
illustrate that in the absence of formal legal advice, LiPs often seek assistance from other LiPs, lay 
friends and colleagues, and by imitating legal documents from the opposing party. This is out of 
                                                          
44 See Linda Mulcahy Legal Architecture: Justice, Due Process and the Place of Law (Taylor and Francis, Hoboken, Online, 2010) 
at 95 discussing Paul Rock’s research in a UK court in which “The picture he presents is one in which staff perceived there 
to be an ever-present fear of the collapse of the social order of the court”. 
45 Don Zimmerman "Tasks and Troubles: The Practical Basis of Work Activities in Public Assistance Organisations" in 
Donald Hansen and Jessie Bernard (eds) Explorations in Sociology and Counselling (Houghton Mifflin, Boston, 1969) 237 at 
252. 
46 Judges were also exposed to this difficulty, as will be discussed in Chapter 8, pages 192-194. 
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necessity and also partly the result of LiPs misunderstanding the nature of the system and the extent 
of advice required to access it meaningfully.  
1. Belief that the courts should be able to be accessed in person 
The right to access the courts in person, unsurprisingly, creates a degree of expectation that this is 
possible. The availability of information online can also lead people to believe that, with enough hard 
work, the courts should be accessible to them as LiPs. Confusion about the amount of assistance 
required to litigate may be created by the system itself. A CLC lawyer said people who have “unmet 
legal needs” and therefore fall within the CLC’s mandate are encouraged to become “self-sufficient”: 
The Ministry [of Justice] also puts a lot of pressure on us to get people to the point where 
they are self-sufficient or are able to help themselves. So that is why we put a lot of focus 
on information and education and basic advice and the theory is they are able to assist 
themselves.  
This strategy has been criticised overseas as unfairly burdensome on the most vulnerable. McCulloch, 
for example, discussing a Florida self-help divorce project, argues that the project was:47 
[F]oisting self-representation on poor people who have more than enough demands on 
their time and energy without being told that their denial of legal service is really an 
opportunity for empowerment.  
Encouraging people to be “self-sufficient”, as well as the recent family justice reforms, are forms of 
State encouragement to litigate in person. Confusingly for LiPs, this encouragement is contradicted 
by repeated exhortations to “get legal advice” from court staff, opposing counsel and judges and also 
from the MoJ who in their “Memorandum for Unrepresented Civil Litigants” (online during the 
research) said: 
                                                          
47 Elizabeth McCulloch "Let Me Show You How: Pro Se Divorce Courses and Client Power" (1996) 48 Florida Law 
Review 481 at 491. Similarly, in Richard Moorhead, Margaret Robinson and Matrix Research and Consultancy A Trouble 
Shared: Legal Problems Clusters in Solicitors' and Advice Agencies (Department for Constitutional Affairs, 2006), the authors 
analyse how solicitors and advice agencies deal with members of the public presenting with multiple problems. They 
observed that the “ethos of empowerment” was often unhelpful to the clients. While some people were able to use 
information provided to “take control of their own lives”, often this was unsuccessful: “We saw a substantial number of 
clients who were confused by the instructions they were given and who left problems to fester or escalate as a result. 
Clients coping with years of social exclusion or dramatic worsening in their health or lifestyle and poor levels of educational 
attainment and self-esteem were often ill-equipped to deal with complex bureaucracies or hostile opponents. Whilst 
advisers indicated an awareness that ‘empowerment’ was not for everybody, too often clients who could not cope alone 
were asked to” (at 94). 
158 
 
… a knowledge of the law, of court practice, and an ability to analyse facts from a legal 
perspective, are the province of specialised court lawyers. You may be very disadvantaged 
if you are not able to call on that level of expertise.   
2. Expectation of Rapid Adjudication 
Another reason for misunderstanding the nature and extent of the advice required to conduct a court 
case may be misunderstanding about the orientation of the court process. Most LiPs demonstrated a 
tendency to think that the legal system was oriented towards prompt resolution of disputes by 
adjudication. They did not understand the case management process, the multiple procedural steps 
and formality of documents, or the orientation towards settlement.48 As one lawyer explained, new 
litigants (either LiPs or clients) expect that the first court date they are given will be the adjudication: 
[The litigants think] we’ve been served with papers, we’ve put in a statement of defence 
and now the Judge is going to make a decision. Well no. There is a huge amount of 
preliminary steps before we get that far. … [But] it is not a criticism because I think it would 
be a legitimate expectation (laughing) - if you don’t know about the District Court, or Family 
Court or High Court - look we’ve got a date in court and the judge is going to make a 
decision right there. 
LiPs, believing the case would be rapidly adjudicated, often considered they only needed brief advice 
from lawyers. Lawyers, however, as discussed above, were reluctant to give such advice, as the LiPs 
did not understand the complexity of the process ahead of them, or the amount of work that would 
be required to give the sort of advice they needed.  
Related to this was underestimating the importance of procedure. Many LiPs thought that being 
“right” in law was sufficient. Sandefur’s research suggests that lawyers might have the greatest impact 
on case outcomes where the procedure is complex.49 If this is correct, knowledge of procedure is 
important; mastering only the substantive law is not necessarily sufficient. There was evidence that 
LiPs did not understand this. 
3. Beliefs about what to include in court documents 
The findings discussed in this chapter are in line with other research suggesting LiPs have considerable 
difficulty in determining legal relevance. Moorhead points out that this is difficult for LiPs:50 
                                                          
48 As will be discussed in the Chapter 7, the system is oriented towards resolution by settlement, not adjudication.  
49 Rebecca Sandefur "Impact of Counsel: An Analysis of Empirical Evidence" (2011) 9 Seattle Journal of Social Justice 
51. 
50 Moorhead, above n 38 at 418. 
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Relevance is defined by three lenses: substantive, evidential and procedural law. Thus the 
ability of litigants to provide persuasive and relevant material on which judges can base 
their decisions is contingent on their ability to negotiate all three lenses.  
In addition, LiPs may confuse law with social or moral notions of justice.51 Instead, many LiPs believe 
that they must simply put their story before the court, including its social and moral meaning to them.52 
Part of the explanation for the inclusive nature of many documents may also lie in Ross and Ward’s 
description of disputants as “naïve realists”. Recall that this theory suggests that disputants believe 
that a third party will see things as they “really are” (the disputant’s version) as soon as they have all 
the facts before them. This belief would encourage a disputant, unrestrained by a competent lawyer,53 
to put large amounts of detail before the court. Providing a detailed narration of the events related to 
a case misapprehends the task of the litigant, which is to provide only facts that are relevant to the 
law, argue the law, and present a theory of the case.54  
The need to perform these functions as a litigant is, in terms of Galanter’s analysis, a disadvantage for 
the weaker party of the passivity of courts. Galanter explains that courts are passive in that they “must 
be mobilized by the claimant”, conferring an advantage on the “claimant with information, ability to 
surmount cost barriers, and skill to navigate restrictive procedural requirements”.55 They are also 
passive in that the burden is on the party to prove its case.56 The adversarial system treats parties “as 
if they were equally endowed with economic resources, investigative opportunities and legal skills”.57 
As this is not usually the case in fact, the system therefore advantages the “wealthier, more experienced 
and better organised party”.58 For the purpose of this discussion, that is usually the represented party.  
                                                          
51 Moorhead and Sefton, above n 1 at 256. Similarly Duncan Webb "The Right Not to Have a Lawyer" (2007) 16 Journal 
of Judicial Administration 165 at 172 wrote, “Litigants in person do not separate the legal from moral or social issues and 
have difficulty accepting that conduct which to them is clear a clear wrong causing harm is not recognised by the law. Thus 
they have difficulty in identifying the issues in dispute and getting to grips with the purpose of litigation”.  
52 John Conley and William O'Barr Rules Versus Relationships (University of Chicago Press, Chicago and London, 1990) 
characterised litigants who took this view as “relational litigants”, noting that their style of presentation was at odds with 
the court system that was “rules-based”. See discussion of this work in Chapter 2, page 18. 
53 It should be noted again that Judges emphasised that not all lawyers demonstrated an understanding of legal relevance 
or produced documents that were in line with their expectations.  
54 William O'Barr and John Conley "Lay Expectations of the Civil Justice System" (1988) 22 Law & Society Review 137. 
See also discussion of this work in Chapter 4, pages 112-113. 
55 Marc Galanter "Why the "Haves" Come out Ahead: Speculations on the Limits of Legal Change" (1974) 9(1) Law & 
Society Review 95 at 119.  
56 At 119-120.  
57 At 120. 
58 At 120-121. See also Drew Swank "In Defense of Rules and Roles: The Need to Curb Extreme Forms of Pro Se 
Assistance and Accommodation in Litigation" (2004) 54 American University Law Review 1537 at 1581 quoting Judge 
Posner’s critique of the judicial statement from a lower court that “the underlying assumption of the adversarial system is 
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Related to the difficulty in understanding what should go in litigation documents, was confusion about 
the relationship between legal relevance and emotion. LiPs commonly referred to believing, or coming 
to the realisation, that it was important to “keep emotion out of it”. As Tom’s story illustrates, LiPs 
felt they needed to reach a state of emotional detachment. A few lawyers also referred to needing “to 
keep emotion out” and removing emotional content from affidavits. For lawyers this seemed to be a 
shorthand for maintaining professional objectivity: 
Obviously you care about your client and care about the outcome but there is a limited care 
if you like. It is a dispassionate thing for you and you are trying to deal with it objectively. 
That is one aspect. So you take the emotional aspect out of it. 
Harris, in his study of the role of emotion in barristers’ work, says that barristers equate “emotional 
detachment” with “rational competence”, and as Roach Anleu and Mack state: “The suppression of 
emotion and personal feelings is a key attribute of traditional conceptions of the profession”.59 
The idea that emotion had no place in the courts led to difficulties for some LiPs. First, as discussed 
in the Chapter 4, the idea that emotion has no place in court can also express “an indifference towards 
the aspects that are most salient to the person”, alienating the LiP from the court system.60 Second, 
the idea of emotional detachment proved illusory for most. One LiP said that he thought he had 
become detached but realised after trial that detachment was not possible. He was continually tempted, 
and gave in to the temptation, to state his case when cross-examining witnesses. Tom’s story also 
illustrates that emotional detachment may not be possible to achieve. 
Third, emotion undoubtedly does have a place in court. Lawyers and judges routinely use emotional 
displays in furtherance of specific goals in court.61 What is excluded from court is inflammatory 
language, conclusory statements, or appeals to emotion that are not supported by any legally salient 
                                                          
that both parties will have roughly equal legal resources”. Judge Posner said: “This has never been an assumption of the 
adversarial system. We do not put a cap on the amount of money that a litigant can spend on lawyers; we do not inquire 
whether the litigants had roughly equal legal resources; we allow one to outspend the other by as much as he pleases. We 
count on the courts not to be overawed by the litigant with the higher priced counsel”.  
59 Lloyd Harris "The Emotional Labour of Barristers: An Exploration of Emotional Labour By Status Professionals" 
(2002) 39(4) Journal of Management Studies 553 at 571; Sharyn Roach Anleu and Kathy Mack "Magistrates' Everyday 
Work and Emotional Labour" (2005) 32(4) Journal of Law and Society 590 at 599.  
60 William Felstiner and Austin Sarat "Law and Strategy in the Divorce Lawyer's Office" (1986) 20 Law & Society Review 
93 at 132. See discussion in Chapter 4, pages 113-114.  
61 See for example Harris, above n 59 at 568-570 discussing barristers’ use of emotional displays to “impress the audience”, 
being the jury, judge or their own client; Roach Anleu and Mack, above n 59 at 600-601 discussing Harris and others on 
the various uses lawyers make of emotion; Cyrus Tata "Sentencing as Craftwork and the Binary Epistemologies of the 
Discretionary Decision Process" (2007) 16(3) Social and Legal Studies 425 at 431-432 discussing sentencing judges’ and 
lawyers’ use of emotion to achieve responses from defendants.  
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facts. Legally relevant emotion is helpful and can be persuasive. The lawyer’s role is not to “remove 
emotion”, but to unpick the litigant’s interpretation of events, and the attribution of motive, leaving 
only the “facts” before the court.62 In this sense, the lawyer serves as a screen in preparing court 
documents, deleting and rewording material that would expose the LiP’s level of contempt for the 
other party, or their unsupported conclusions as to the motives of the other party.  
While many LiPs were over-inclusive with information in affidavits, those who believed emotion was 
supposed to “stay out” of the courts were sometimes under-inclusive. 63  They were unable to 
distinguish between emotional but legally relevant content, and emotional but legally irrelevant 
content. Concerned that they would appear emotional (and therefore irrational), they instead believed 
that any information of emotional import would be considered inappropriate for the court. In family 
cases, in particular, this could obviously lead to difficulty. An application for a protection order could 
quite correctly include a statement: “I fear for my life”, as long as it is supported by salient facts. As 
the court staff member said, such applications often omitted the relevant information.  
4. Legal Style 
Part of the difficulty that LiPs encountered was in preparing documents that did not jar the 
professional reader. LiPs were naturally unaware of the “often tacit … conventions that go into their 
[legal documents] production and reception”.64 As Atkinson and Coffey argue: “Writers develop a 
working knowledge of the register(s) of their own professions”.65 New LiPs cannot possess this tacit 
understanding of the conventions of language and form, nor can it be learned from reading court rules 
and legislation. Even LiPs who rely on lay networks for advice – McKenzie friends, friends with 
professional backgrounds, and other LiPs – will not usually have access to knowledge of these 
conventions through this network.66 LiPs who have not had legal advice, and who are not themselves 
legally trained, will only possess this knowledge if they have gone to great lengths to familiarise 
                                                          
62 See also William Felstiner, Richard Abel and Austin Sarat "Emergence and Transformation of Disputes: Naming, 
Blaming, Claiming ..." (1980) 15 Law & Society Review 631 at 637 on the role of attribution of motive to the transformation 
of disputes precluding the ability to “get the facts straight”.  
63 This was not the only reason information was omitted. Information was also omitted because LiPs assumed that the 
Judge and lawyers already knew information even though it was not in the court documents, or they simply did not know 
what information to include and therefore wrote a general narrative focusing on issues that were the most important to 
them. 
64 Paul Atkinson and Amanda Coffey "Analysing Documentary Realities " in David Silverman (ed) Qualitative Research (3rd 
ed, Sage Publications, London, 2011) 77 at 84. 
65 At 84.  
66 The exception to this would be the few very experienced McKenzie friends, who, as one LiP complained, had “become 
part of the system” (FC LiP).  
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themselves with court documents, or are experienced LiPs (in which case they are likely to be 
perceived as “obsessive”).  
LiPs who did familiarise themselves with the style of court documents sometimes fared no better. As 
Lisa and Gary’s stories illustrate, copying documents was often a primary method of producing court 
documents where little other advice was available. LiPs using this source of assistance often mimicked 
the surface of the legal style but misapplied terminology or lacked the understanding to be able to 
correctly apply case authority. Hunter observed this tendency among “serial appellants” who:67 
… appropriate and mimic legal concepts and legal language, often at random and with little 
understanding, arguably as a result of their lengthy interactions with legal personnel who 
unwittingly act as legal tutors.  
I observed this tendency among all LiPs, not only persistent litigants, particularly those who were 
copying opposing counsel’s documents as their main source of guidance for conducting the litigation. 
LiPs adopt this style, just as new law students seize upon Latinisms, believing that doing so will give 
their case legitimacy.68 Both this faux-legal register, and a style that obviously does not adopt the legal 
register, will jar the professional reader and make the documents produced less comprehensible and 
persuasive than a lawyer-produced document.   
C. Conclusion 
Most LiPs (and some lawyers) struggled to produce documents that met the expectations of the court. 
Court staff and opposing lawyers attempted to keep the doors of access to justice open by providing 
help to LiPs, but simultaneously emphasised the limits of their competence, urging them to get legal 
advice. LiPs sometimes resisted this, not understanding why they needed that advice. For many LiPs, 
the advice was simply not available, or they found it limited and difficult to acquire. LiPs, in addition 
to not comprehending the complexity of the system they were facing, sometimes misunderstood that 
their role was to present legally salient facts (with or without emotion) as well as a focused legal 
argument. The LiPs’ misunderstanding of the system, as well as their lack of comprehension of tacit 
                                                          
67 Rosemary Hunter and others The Changing Face of Litigation: Unrepresented Litigants in the Family Court of Australia (2002) at 
129. 
68 Richard Abel "The Professional is Political" (2004) 11 International Journal of the Legal Profession 131 at 136 
(discussing how law students adopt Latinisms as a mark of professional distinction); Hunter and others, above n 135 
(discussing LiPs’ citation of case authority because they sense it is "the 'right' way to run a case, thus giving their matter a 
sense of legitimacy in the eyes of the Court"). 
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norms of the profession, created extra work for lawyers, as well as for court staff, who perceived risk 
in interacting with them and often adopted a defensive posture.    
In the next chapter I examine how the interaction between opposing counsel and LiPs, as well as 






Approaching the Courtroom Door – 
Negotiating, Settling and Abandoning 
 
Many new litigants, with or without a lawyer, enter the court process with the expectation of having 
their case determined by a judge. As one Family Court Judge said: “People see the court as the 
ultimate, you know, ‘I'll see you in court!’”. This expectation might stem from popular assumptions 
about the justice system. It might also be because litigants were looking to the Judge to vindicate 
their rights against a stronger opponent. It therefore came as a surprise to many LiPs that much 
litigation work occurs outside the court, and that throughout this preparatory stage, and right up 
to the door of the courtroom, there is encouragement to settle. Encouragement comes from 
several sources including overtures from the opposing party’s advisers, case management 
procedures (which include voluntary or compulsory attempts at settlement), and invitations from 
the Judge to consider settlement.  
This chapter considers the dynamics of settlement negotiations when there is a LiP party. The first 
section discusses the factors identified that assisted or inhibited settlement negotiations, including: 
LiPs’ ability to view settlement strategically, their perception of opposing counsel’s “reality 
checks”, and lawyers’ perceptions of the risk of engaging LiPs in settlement discussions. The 
chapter concludes with a discussion of how the encouragement to settle is confusing for LiPs but 
essential to the management of the scarce resource of judicial time. It builds on the existing 
literature on why LiPs are less likely to settle and more likely to proceed to adjudication. 
I. Negotiating, Settling and Abandoning 
Only two LiPs settled their cases. Two others abandoned their claims, one became represented, 
and the parties opposing two LiPs withdrew their claims, ending the litigation. All the other LiPs 
(27) proceeded to adjudication. The large group proceeding to adjudication is consistent with 
international studies suggesting that LiPs, “… if they are brave enough to remain within the court 
system, appear to be more adversarial than represented litigants”. 1 As a civil litigation lawyer said: 
“It is very, very, rare to convince self-reps that they shouldn’t have their day in court. … It happens 
occasionally but it is pretty rare”. This section reports the reasons LiPs and lawyers gave for being 
                                                          
1 Richard Moorhead and Pascoe Pleasence "Access to Justice After Universalism: Introduction" (2003) 30(1) Journal 
of Law and Society 1 at 4 (introducing Rosemary Hunter "Adversarial Mythologies: Policy Assumptions and Research 
Evidence in Family Law" (2003) 30(1) Journal of Law and Society 156). See discussion in Chapter 2, page 31. 
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unable to settle cases. It then looks at judge-initiated settlement and finally at LiPs who abandon 
their claim or defence before adjudication. 
A. Lawyer-LiP settlement negotiations 
1. Strategic overview 
The previous chapter illustrated that many LiPs had limited understanding of the procedural 
process. Without understanding where the process might lead, and what a realistic and reasonable 
outcome might be, LiPs struggled to make decisions about settlement, managing their case in a 
reactive way. For example, a Family Court LiP in a complex (socially and legally) relationship 
property division, did not have a clear idea of what settlement would be acceptable to her. 
Suspicious of the opposing counsel, she struggled to evaluate settlement offers. When I asked her 
what she planned to do in the face of an offer to compromise, and a threat of further proceedings, 
she said: 
I’m kinda just dealing with each issue as they come up. I’m just stuffed, I’m tired and 
I’m sick of it. I don’t know who to trust. I don’t understand where to go to get help. 
… I’m just kinda dealing each day with each - you know? Like it’s trying to not think 
about the whole picture, it’s too depressing, I’m just trying to - yeah it’s hard. 
A McKenzie friend emphasised the importance of explaining to Family Court LiPs the court 
process, timeframes and agreeing a strategy and acceptable outcomes at the outset as the “most 
important side of the court work” that he does:   
I try to say, “This is what you might expect” - at the beginning – “Would that be 
acceptable to you? Let’s go with that”. And if it comes up at some stage and they say, 
“Oh no, no, I want more”, I say “Well hang on, if you were prepared to accept that a 
month, six weeks, six months ago, why not accept that now?”.  
The McKenzie friend linked the lack of strategic view to the LiPs having limited financial risk. He 
said that for both LiPs and those with unsecured legal aid loans, such bottom lines were important 
because they “don’t have as much financial skin in the system” so may “continue to battle on left, 
right and centre”. While this may be true for the parenting cases the McKenzie friend was dealing 
with, it is not for other matters where the LiPs may have considerable financial risk. Relationship 
property cases, like the one where the LiP was “just dealing with each issue as they come up”, had 
many thousands of dollars at stake. This added to the stress she experienced. Not all LiPs did 
apprehend the financial risk of continuing to adjudication, or minimised it, saying they “had 
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nothing left to lose”. These were in cases where the LiP felt they had financially “lost everything” 
but did not seem to fully understand the costs regime or the implications of bankruptcy.2  
Lawyers, and also Judges, said this inability to make an objective decision about the “litigation risk” 
(whether it be financial, or a toll on relationships) was because LiPs were often “blinded by their 
emotions” (FC lawyer). A civil litigation lawyer said LiPs are “just so emotionally involved” that: 
… it is hard to detach themselves from that and look at, say, the economics, or what 
might be the final judgment position? Are they at risk at being able to meet a judgment 
if they do lose? All those things they find pretty difficult.  
The lawyer said that this was true even of “sophisticated litigants” with whom he had made some 
headway. They still found it difficult to detach themselves.  
One LiP who did settle his claim, settled for significantly less than what he had been advised by a 
lawyer he might be awarded in court. However, he thought the sum was reasonable, and the 
settlement saved him having to take the risk of litigation, particularly as he would have had to 
conduct the High Court trial himself, as he could not pay a lawyer. 
2. Bullying vs Reality Checking 
Pointing out the weaknesses of the opposing party’s case, and their risks of continuing, is often 
referred to as “reality checking”. Lawyers were accustomed to attempting to negotiate a resolution 
to cases before court. This is particularly the case in the Family Court where, as one lawyer 
described, “the underlying philosophy in family law” is the promotion of conciliation. He said the 
idea of conciliation is closely related to the belief that “there will be better buy-in in terms of an 
outcome if you agree to, as opposed to having one imposed on you”. Lawyers also promoted 
settlement in District and High Court cases, where lawyers said that threatening to file a case 
“settled about 80 per cent of cases” and most of the remainder were settled in negotiations once 
the case was filed (civil litigation lawyer). LiPs, however, often regarded the opposing lawyer’s 
assessment of the strength of their case with suspicion, and in some cases, as an attempt at bullying.  
A civil litigation lawyer said, the LiP will “just ignore what the lawyer says because they think they 
are trying to trick me or something like that”, which the lawyer said was “an understandable human 
reaction”. Another civil litigation lawyer said most LiPs regarded “a litigation risk assessment”, 
where the lawyer “tests” their case and discusses its “weaknesses”, as “a whole lot of legal bullshit 
actually and it is just lawyers playing games trying to make them drop their case (laughing)”.  
                                                          
2 This issue is taken up in more detail in Chapter 9, pages 216-218, in the discussion on costs. 
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An example of this occurred in a High Court LiP’s case. After a pre-trial hearing, when the Judge 
had left the courtroom, the lawyer turned to the LiP and they had the following exchange:  
Lawyer: I have no problem with self-represented litigants. I just finished a case against 
a self-represented litigant ... but you have to understand what you are getting yourself 
into. You could be in for a massive amount of costs if you go ahead with this. If you 
go to trial, you could be in for huge costs. Do you understand? 
LiP: Yes I know what you are saying but I’m not going to believe you. You are the 
counsel for the company. 
Lawyer: I’m just trying to help (stalking out of the court). 
LiP: I know you’ve got experience but I just don’t accept what you are saying. 
Lawyer: Right (as he continued to walk out). 
The LiP thought that anything the lawyer for the company said should be taken with a grain of 
salt. He did not entertain the possibility that this might be a genuine and well-founded assessment 
of his risk.   
For some LiPs, their mistrust in the opposing lawyer’s assessment of the case was fuelled by a 
mistrust of that lawyer generally.  Often, this was related to LiPs feeling opposing counsel was 
patronising and condescending.3 For other LiPs, it was because they believed the opposing lawyer 
must know the “truth”.4 They were therefore unwilling to engage with that lawyer when the lawyer 
continued to allow the opposing party to “lie”. A Family Court LiP, angry at the unsubstantiated 
allegations made against him in Court, referred to the need for rules that would mean people could 
not lie to the court.  Another Family Court LiP said: “As a lawyer, you are a professional, surely 
you must know that it is lies”. LiPs who believed the lawyer was letting their client lie were 
therefore angry at the lawyer and the opposing party. A few LiPs reconceived the opposing party 
as a victim of their lawyer: that the lawyer was manipulating the opposing party into continuing 
what the LiP believed to be a meritless case, for the lawyer’s financial gain. These beliefs made it 
difficult for the parties to engage in productive settlement discussions.  
With or without this level of mistrust, an opposing counsel’s “reality check” can easily be 
interpreted as, or may in fact be, bullying the LiP. Before going into the courtroom for a judicial 
conference, a Family Court LiP said she felt pressured by the opposing counsel and lawyer for 
child to amend her application:   
                                                          
3 See discussion in Chapter 6, pages 150-152, opposing counsel walking the line. 
4 These LiPs also expressed the concomitant belief that there is a single truth that they thought would emerge in court.  
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I had her lawyer and the lawyer for child both telling me to pull out … . They told me 
it would cost me, that I’d have to pay for her costs. Because they were both together, 
they said I’d have to pay for her costs. For someone who is self-representing, the whole 
reason you are self-representing is usually because of the costs, so they knew the angle 
to play.   
The LiP said she thought that her ex-partner’s lawyer and the lawyer for child “were rubbing their 
hands in glee” over the fact she was a LiP. She interpreted the lawyers’ behaviour as protection of 
the lawyers’ professional status and monopoly: “We are dealing with bullies. They are a bunch of 
bullies. They don't like the fact that we are trying to play them at their own game”.  
Some of the lawyers were very alert to the possibility of being seen as bullying, and as discussed in 
the previous chapter, said they took great care in how they communicated with LiPs.5 Some 
conducted negotiations only via written correspondence. As a civil litigation lawyer said, the 
difficulty of negotiating with a LiP comes “down to an uncomfortable feeling of inequality of 
arms”. The lawyer said that it was his job “to be persuasive, and you are ordinarily being persuasive 
to someone that you know can do the same job back”, not someone who is not able to “look 
critically” at the representations being made.  
While the lawyers I interviewed said they were careful to avoid the impression they were bullying, 
lawyers also said bullying behaviour did sometimes occur: 
In mediation you do have lawyers who take those people [LiPs] aside and bully them 
with legalities about all the things that are going to happen if they don’t put money in, 
without really being responsible about the way they deal with them like that. I’ve never 
liked that but you do see it. (Civil litigation lawyer) 
As well, a McKenzie friend said he had been involved in Family Group Conferences where lawyers 
had said “some pretty shocking things”, such as telling LiPs that “they don’t have the brains or the 
expertise to take them on in Court”.  
3. Lawyers avoiding settlement discussions  
One civil litigation lawyer said that the possibility that the LiP would consider they had been 
bullied, meant he considered that, generally, settling with a LiP was “unsafe” and he was “far more 
likely to want an adjudicated outcome”. This was not his universal approach, but he noted that a 
                                                          
5 Duncan Webb "The Duty of Rrespect and Courtesy" (2012) 802 LawTalk 19, notes that bullying is a breach of 
Lawyers and Conveyancers Act (Lawyers: Conduct and Client Care) Rules 2008, r 12 (the courtesy rule). Bullying 
includes calling the opposing party’s support person “a piece of s***” and approaching a third party in an intimidating 
way in the courthouse: JD v RU [2012] NZLRCO 27 (22 March 2012). But dealing with a third party in a “robust 
manner”, even where feelings are hurt and someone is intimidated, is not a breach of the courtesy rule: “In the middle 
there is an area where lawyers must tread carefully”.  
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LiP who is “obsessed with the cause” and “somewhat uncertain and feeling ganged up on” is likely 
to argue about the enforceability of any settlement reached:  
… it is very easy for the person to later say, “Oh, I was vulnerable, I was bullied”, even 
if you have all the right words in the agreement that says they were offered the 
opportunity to get independent advice and so on. So I regard out of court settlement 
as far less appealing in lay litigant circumstances.  
Settlement discussions could easily become heated because of the LiP’s emotional involvement in 
the case. This made settlement discussions difficult to conduct. Other lawyers were also wary of 
entering into negotiations because of the possibility that the LiP, not sharing the same 
“professional unspoken rules or guidelines in play about what should or shouldn’t be said to the 
court”, might disclose settlement discussions to the Court (civil litigation lawyer). The lawyer said 
this removed the “ordinary freedom of talking to counsel on the other side and knowing that 
certain things can be floated on a without prejudice basis”. She therefore avoided such discussions 
“to protect the process and protect yourself”. These concerns were borne out in several cases I 
observed where LiPs disclosed the contents of “without prejudice” settlement discussions to the 
Court and where two LiPs alleged duress to attempt to void alleged settlement agreements.  
4. Style of negotiation  
A few LiPs also objected to the style of negotiation, and identified this as the reason for not settling. 
These LiPs said they were not willing to entertain offers made on a “take it or leave it” basis:  
We've never not wanted to settle but we didn't want to be told “here is an amount”. 
Negotiation is about negotiation, not “here is a figure, and like it or lump it”. (HC LiP) 
A few LiPs were also unwilling to consider last minute settlement offers because they felt they had 
done all the work by that point, and thought they might as well proceed to trial. As one LiP said, 
“If they genuinely wanted to settle they would have approached us a year ago”. Lawyers on the 
other hand were accustomed to reaching settlements at the door of the court, once all the evidence 
was in and the reality and expense of a trial was imminent, and would still consider last minute 
settlement desirable.6  
                                                          
6 Andrew Beck Principles of Civil Procedure (3rd ed, Thomson Reuters, Wellington, New Zealand, 2011) at 1-2: “Although 
most disputes never reach the stage of having to be formally decided by a court, in many instances serious negotiation 
towards settlement does not begin until the matter is firmly placed on the road towards trial”.  
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B. Judicial encouragement to settle 
The encouragement for last minute settlement often comes from the Judge. As a civil litigation 
lawyer said, “[LiPs] usually needed some intervention from the judge, in terms of really almost 
insisting that they talk to a lawyer, or bash their head a bit into getting things to settle”.  
Judges, particularly in the Family and District Court, spoke of a strong preference for parties 
reaching settlements. In both these Courts, Judges emphasised this was in the parties’ interests as 
it would mean a quicker resolution, avoid irreparably damaging relationships (for example between 
parents or neighbours), and as being more durable because it was an agreement they had reached 
themselves. Judges referred to “inviting the parties to have a conversation” (FC Judge) or 
encouraging litigants who come in for case management conferences to discuss settlement. As a 
District Court Judge said, he told parties that while he had the documents “surely at this stage it is 
not necessary to go through all the detail” and asked them if they could reach an agreement where 
there won’t be “any winners or losers” but “a settlement at least you can live with”. He emphasised 
the benefits of “moving on”: 
No more hassle, no more expense, get on with life, put it behind you. If you don't, it 
will go on and on and on and we all know it causes anxiety and sleepless nights. 
It seemed to be a matter of individual judicial practice as to how strongly the Judge worded these 
invitations. I observed, and a lawyer also reported, that some Family Court judges went as far as 
giving a preliminary view of the outcome, both before and during a defended hearing, and asked 
the parties to consider settlement again in light of the expressed views. The lawyer said this 
presented difficulty for anyone who was inexperienced:   
I’ve seen [a] Judge … halfway through a … fixture saying, “This is where I'm thinking 
I'm going to decide it”.  And then, at the end of the day, he comes to a totally different 
view. So you have to be really careful around that sort of stuff. And that traps junior 
lawyers in particular, who might say to their clients, “Oh shit, this is what the Judge is 
saying. Maybe we better give in or reach an agreement on that basis”.  
The Family Court Judges also referred to the role of lawyer for child in helping broker agreements, 
and this was a role that I observed them fulfilling. As one Family Court Judge said, lawyer for child 
have a “problem solving” approach, and the Judge said that most lawyers for child would not take 
a “forceful approach” to such discussions but would still see whether an agreement was possible.7 
In one case I observed, where the LiP did settle, this was a very successful strategy. The LiP, a 
                                                          
7 Family Court Judges and court staff referred to an informal system whereby the Judges would ask court staff not to 




mother in a parenting dispute, had a high level of trust in the lawyer for child, having met with 
him during a previous dispute over care. She said the lawyer for child was the “in between person” 
who asked each parent what they wanted and “then he said what he thought was best for [the 
child]”. She described the lawyer for child as a “sort of mediator” who “drafted it, depending on 
what we wanted, but what he thought was best for [the child]”. The LiP was very happy with the 
outcome and the process, saying: “I was really pleased that I didn’t go to a lawyer, because 
everything just got done so quickly”. 
While the Family Court Judges emphasised the importance of settlement for the benefits they 
believed it brought litigants, a Family Court Judge said that settlement should not be forced on 
people: “You are mindful of it, but it is not for the court to push them through as if they were 
sausages in a factory”. The Judge said it was “unfortunate” if a determination had to be made but 
that is what would happen if “that is where things lie”.   
The High Court Judges regarded settlement as desirable but put somewhat more weight on their 
adjudicative role. A High Court Judge, while noting that it was not possible to generalise across 
the range of cases the Court hears, said that while mediated outcomes were good for some people, 
“It seems to me a lot of litigants just want someone to say, ‘You are right, and you are wrong, and 
this is what the law says’”.  Another High Court Judge said he asked all litigants whether they 
“really wanted to spend the money” on having their dispute adjudicated. He said he was “all for 
mediated settlement” but “ultimately they do have a right to come to court”. 
When a Judge initiates the conference between the opposing counsel and the LiP, this can further 
the LiP’s sense that they are being forced into a settlement against their interests. The LiP who 
already believed that the opposing counsel and lawyer for child were ganging up on her saw a 
judicial encouragement to negotiate as the bench and bar closing ranks against the outsider. 
Another LiP regarded the Judge’s effort to encourage settlement as “pretty stupid” and “not 
productive” given it was “pretty obvious” that “the reason we were at the Court, believe it or not, 
was because we couldn’t agree”. That LiP also interpreted the encouragement to settle as a time 
management strategy: 
The Judge seemed to have her own agenda. She seemed to want to move on and get 
through it as quick as possible. It felt like we were holding her up – that was how it felt: 
“Come on I've got something to do. You guys sort it out”.   
When they did not agree, the LiP felt the Judge did not listen to the points raised but imposed the 
“quickest thing she could come to”. A District Court LiP similarly thought that he was put under 
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unfair pressure to settle at a judge-led settlement conference, musing that judges “… probably get 
brownie points if they can talk people into reaching an agreement”. 
 
C. Lumping it 
A 2006 survey of unmet legal needs in New Zealand demonstrates that many more people do not 
even get as far as filing or defending a claim.8 For those who do persist, settlement negotiations 
may cause LiPs to abandon, or lump, their claim or defence. If the claim or defence was without 
merit, this may be a just outcome. However, there is also potential for this to result in injustice, 
and for there to be serious consequences flowing from walking away.9 One LiP, with an apparently 
strong case for the division of relationship property (given the presumption is for 50/50 division), 
abandoned her claim during a mediation. The LiP believed that, based on her experience appearing 
in the Family Court in a judicial conference where she thought the Judge did not listen to her, she 
would not be taken seriously without a lawyer. She says the mediator took a passive role and 
believing that returning to Court would be futile, accepted one chattel of minimal sentimental value 
in full settlement, when her ex-partner (who she said was violent towards her during the 
relationship) took a strong position in the mediation.   
Surveys of legal needs, both in New Zealand and overseas, suggest that potential litigants abandon 
their claims, not just at the point of settlement discussions, but at all stages of the process. A High 
Court LiP said he knew another litigant trying to take the same proceedings against the same 
corporate defendant, but the other litigant “experienced the same problem as us” and after trying 
to initiate proceedings in the High Court, also without legal assistance, “they gave up”. He said the 
other litigant told him, “You can’t beat them [the corporate defendant]. They are too powerful. 
                                                          
8 Legal Services Agency Report on the 2006 National Survey of Unmet Legal Needs and Access to Services (Legal Services 
Agency, 2006) at 68-69 found that more than half the people surveyed who had experienced a problem in the last 12 
months had not, and did not intend, to seek any advice, information or assistance to help them. For 31 percent of 
these people their reason for not seeking help was related to problems accessing services, including: not knowing 
where to get help; believing it would be too expensive or too stressful to resolve; being unsure of rights; being 
mistrustful, intimated or confused by the system. District Court Judges expressed concern about vulnerable litigants, 
often those with limited education and English language skills, who were facing debt collection action from large, 
repeat litigants such as finance companies. Under the rules that were in force in the District Court at the time of this 
research, debt collectors would file proceedings and the debtor “would look at it with such confusion they didn’t know 
what to do” (DC Judge). The Judge said, “Lawyers didn’t want to touch them”, so no defence was filed and a default 
judgment would be entered against the debtor. The Judges had no choice but to enter judgment but were concerned 
about what was happening behind the scenes. As one District Court Judge said: “Some people, particularly non-
English speaking people, wouldn't have a clue what it all means and would just bugger off and find themselves in debt, 
often up to 10 times what they thought, because of interest and penalty”. 
9 See discussion on “lumping it”, Chapter 2, pages 30-31. 
173 
 
They are an international company”.  The LiP’s own lawyer, when he was still represented, had 
also emphasised how powerful the corporate defendant was: 
My own lawyer was by now saying, “Well, you’ll never win over the might of the 
company. It’s a waste of time. You are pushing good money after bad - he who has the 
money wins”. 
The LiP resisted the suggestion that he could not win and continued his case in person. Another 
LiP sought a legal opinion in preparation for trial and that lawyer warned him off continuing his 
case, emphasising that litigation was a lottery:  
Some [lawyers] are quite cynical, that it is a lottery. What mood is the judge going to be 
in when they got out of bed that morning is going to affect how their case goes. … 
There seems to be a cynicism towards the judiciary on the part of lawyers. … Maybe 
you get used to it but because I’m not used to it I find it quite inappropriate … 
[although] it might be entirely appropriate relative to their experience. 
While some, like these two LiPs, were defiant in the face of encouragement to settle or walk away, 
others did abandon their claims. McKenzie friends working with men in Family Court cases 
(including COCA and CYF cases) said they often encountered men who stopped litigating after 
initially bringing or defending proceedings. This was often in the context of a Protection Order 
being issued against a father who wanted care of his children: 
So … you have a guy having to fight a Protection Order and fighting to parent and do 
it on his own. It can all get too much. I’ve had people just walk and say I don’t care 
about the Protection Order, I’m just not going to see the kid.  
Most of the LiPs did not abandon their claim or defence, and continued to push to adjudicate in 
the face of encouragement to settle.  
II. Discussion 
A. Projecting Accessibility while Protecting Scarce Resources 
The emphasis on settlement was difficult for LiPs to understand or engage with. This was not just 
because they wanted their “day in court”, taking up the invitation to come to court to vindicate 
their rights. Many were looking for the protection of the Judge, for the neutrality brought by a 
high authority to determine their rights. This is central to the promise of the courts, that the weak 
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will be able to enforce their legal rights even against, or particularly against, the powerful. The push 
towards settlement, when seen in this context, is confusing and threatening.10  
The lawyers and Judges were, to differing degrees, uniform in the belief that settlement was 
preferable to adjudication, which they regarded as a vital “last resort”.11 The views expressed by 
lawyers and Judges accord with the body of evidence internationally that suggests family lawyers, 
in particular, take a conciliatory approach, steering clients towards compromise and settlement 
rather than an adjudicated outcome.12 Cases are filed in court so that lawyers can then “bargain in 
the shadow of the law”, but with the expectation that all but the most difficult will be settled before 
adjudication.13 The Family Court rules contain a number of mechanisms to encourage negotiated 
outcomes, as do the High Court and District Court Rules.14 Rules of this nature can be seen as 
encouraging what Resnik calls “managerial judges”, where judges “become mediators, negotiators 
and planners – as well as adjudicators”.15 While the High Court Judges discussed their adjudicative 
function as important, they were also very conscious of these additional functions of their office. 
Judges emphasised the benefits of settlement in terms of benefits to litigants: party “buy-in”, and 
therefore durability of solutions; conciliation between parties; and cost savings for the parties. 
While the Judges discussed time pressures created by managing LiP trials, they did not discuss the 
benefits of settlement in terms of managing court time. As Galanter points out, the “chronic 
overload which typically characterize” courts means, “… there are more commitments in the 
formal system than there are resources to honor them – more rights and rules ‘on the books’ than 
can be vindicated or enforced”.16 This overload creates pressure on claimants to settle rather than 
                                                          
10 Liz Trinder and others Litigants in Person in Private Family Law Cases (Ministry of Justice, United Kingdom, 2014) 1 at 
37 concludes that LiPs who did not have access to legal advice had “no understanding of the modus operandi of the 
family justice system – the expectation of settlement”.  
11 This echoes the view of the rule of law stated by Bingham who argues that the “obvious implication” of being 
bound by law is that you can go to court and have your rights determined: "An unenforceable right or claim is a thing 
of little value to anyone". He also calls recourse to court a “last resort” and discusses the merits of “additional dispute 
resolution” (mediation, conciliation and arbitration) as a first line of dispute resolution: Tom Bingham The Rule of Law 
(Penguin, London, 2011) at 85-86. 
12 Hunter, above n 1; see also a discussion of this research in the NZ Family Law context in Mark Henaghan "Changing 
Politics of Family Law in New Zealand" (2012)  International Survey of Family Law 253 at 259. 
13 Robert Mnookin and Lewis Kornhauser "Bargaining in the Shadow of the Law: The Case of Divorce Dispute 
Resolution" (1978) 88 Yale Law Journal 950; see also Hunter, above n 1 at 163. 
14 In the High Court, the Rules encourage parties to negotiate, giving the Judge the power, before the hearing of a 
proceeding, to “convene a conference of the parties in chambers for the purpose of negotiating for a settlement of 
the proceeding or of any issue, and may assist in those negotiations” HCR 7.79(1). The High Court Rules also give 
Judges the power to call case management conferences at any time, and at those conferences the Judge can “Give 
directions to secure the just, speedy, and inexpensive determination of the proceedings” HCR 1.2.  
15 Judith Resnik "Managerial Judges" (1982) 96 Harvard Law Review 374 at 379.  
16 Marc Galanter "Why the 'Haves' Come out Ahead: Speculations on the Limits of Legal Change" (1974) 9(1) Law & 
Society Review 95 at 122. 
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adjudicate, including by “inducing institutional incumbents to place a high value on clearing 
dockets, discouraging full-dress adjudication in favor of bargaining, stereotyping and routine 
processing”. 17  Galanter’s analysis suggests that, whether stated or not, a motivation for 
encouraging settlement is protecting the scarce resource of court time.18 Some Family Court LiPs 
interpreted “docket control” as a reason for the judicial encouragement to settle.  
This is not to suggest that settlement or the use of ADR methods is a bad thing, only that there 
are reasons for it that go beyond the predicted benefits to the parties. 19  From the court’s 
perspective, LiP resistance to settlement is not just a problem in terms of LiPs missing out on the 
expected benefits of settlement, but in creating pressure on the scarce resource of judicial time.20  
B. Barriers to LiP settlements 
Lower rates of settlement among LiPs therefore creates a tension between projecting accessibility 
of the court to the citizenry, while protecting the resource of hearing time. What then are the 
barriers to settlement? The findings of this study support the reasons identified in previous 
research: that LiPs’ lack of strategic overview means they do not know where a reasonable 
settlement lies, that LiPs can be difficult to communicate with, and that LiPs expect resolution by 
way of adjudication.21 The LiPs’ experiences also suggest some nuances to these finding, and 
expands on other reasons why settlement might be less likely with a LiP party than with a 
represented party. These include, different financial incentives, absence of the party’s own lawyer 
to persuade the party to settle,22 lawyers using lawyer-lawyer negotiation techniques that were 
                                                          
17 At 121. 
18 Russell Engler "And Justice for All - Including the Unrepresented Poor: Revisiting the Roles of the Judges, 
Mediators, and Clerks" (1999) 67 Fordham Law Review 1987 at 2020 also makes this point: “Far from playing a 
minimal role in settlement, however, judges routinely encourage and pressure litigants to settle. Court rules encourage 
judges to clear their dockets”. 
19 ADR has been promoted for a number of different reasons. As Judith Resnik and Dennis Curtis Representing Justice: 
From Renaissance Iconography to Twenty-First-Century Courthouses (2007) at 307 argue, “… some pressure for diversion [to 
alternative dispute resolution] comes not from criticism of adjudication but from regret that governments have not 
allocated adequate funds – either for judges or court-house or for subsidies to litigants unable to afford court and 
lawyer fees”. This differs, they explain, from the promotion of alternative dispute resolution focussing “… not on 
lack of resources for adjudication but instead on adjudication’s failings – that it is too expensive, too cumbersome, 
and too aggressive” at 308.  
20 Australian and United Kingdom research notes that the low settlement rates among LiPs creates difficulties for 
court staff scheduling cases. Court staff often double book court time in the expectation that some of the cases will 
settle, but as settlement is not as frequent with LiP cases then, this creates additional pressure. This issue was not 
mentioned by the court staff interviewed in my research. See John Dewar "The Impact of Legal Aid Changes on 
Family Law Practice" (1999) 13 Australian Journal of Family Law 33 at 48 and Trinder and others, above n 10 at 37.  
21 See Chapter 2, page 31. 
22 This factor is mentioned in Richard Moorhead and Mark Sefton Litigants in Person: Unrepresented Litigants in First 
Instance Proceedings - Department of Constitutional Affairs Research Series (2005) at 173 citing William Felstiner and Austin 




counterproductive with LiPs and lawyers avoiding negotiating with LiPs to avoid the perceived 
risk of doing so.  
1. Financial 
Financial incentives for settlement operate differently for LiPs. As the McKenzie friend suggested, 
LiPs do not have as much “skin” in the system as a litigant paying for legal services. Zuckerman 
argues that economic inequality between parties creates procedural advantage for the wealthier 
party.23 He says that people have a “natural aversion” to “fighting with weapons considered to be 
inferior to those in the hands of the opponent”.24 This puts pressure on the poorer litigant to try 
and “match the opponent’s facilities”.25 If they are unable to do so, the poorer litigant “may well 
feel obliged to settle on terms that he or she regards as unfair”. 26 LiPs however are at least 
somewhat freed from this inequality. While they might still need to meet costs in terms of expert 
evidence, they do not need to match the wealthier party’s capacity to pay legal fees.  
The financial incentives operate not just regarding the cost of legal services, however, but also 
regarding the costs regime if the litigant wins. New Zealand operates the rule that, in general, the 
losing party pays the winning party’s costs. These costs are not usually the actual costs incurred 
(indemnity costs), but are assessed on a scale.27 For a represented litigant, a win in this regime is 
still a partial loss, because they are not reimbursed for their legal fees in full. This creates an 
incentive for represented litigants to settle. However, as a LiP, there is the possibility of a complete 
win. It is high risk, but higher return, creating less incentive to settle.  
2. No lawyer to “cool out” the LiP 
One of the methods for achieving settlement is for lawyers to persuade their own clients to settle. 
Felstiner and Sarat demonstrate in their study of divorce lawyers that lawyers will attempt to 
persuade clients to adopt a “realistic” goal (as defined by the lawyer), “orienting and reconciling 
clients to the world of the legally possible”.28 Lawyers challenge client’s beliefs about what the legal 
                                                          
23 Adrian Zuckerman "A Reform of Civil Procedure - Rationing Procedure rather than Access to Justice" (1995) 22 
Journal of Law and Society 155 at 170.  
24 At 170. 
25 At 170. 
26 At 170. 
27 In certain circumstances indemnity costs are awarded, but this is the exception, not the rule. The costs regime and 
its implications are discussed in more detail in Chapter 9. 
28 William Felstiner and Austin Sarat "Enactments of Power: Negotiating Reality and Responsibility in Lawyer-Client 
Interactions" (1992) 77 Cornell Law Review 1447 at 1459. Note that it is also possible that lawyers are in some courts 
are locked into the type of exchange relationship described in Abraham Blumberg "The Practice of Law as Confidence 
Game: Organizational Cooptation of a Profession" (1967) 1(2) Law & Society Review 15, where lawyers act as 
“double-agents”, convincing their criminal defendant clients to plea bargain. He describes the role of the defence 
lawyer “double-agent” as part of a “rather tenuous resolution” to the “almost irreconcilable conflict” between “intense 
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system might be able to deliver, what it might cost, how hard it might be to enforce a judgment, 
and encourage clients to put aside the emotional aspect of the dispute.29 Lawyers in my study 
described this as a “reality check”.  
To achieve their goal, Felstiner and Sarat found that lawyers used their “knowledge and experience 
in a manipulative way” most commonly by using what they call “law talk”: “… a form of cynical 
realism through which the legal system and its actors are trashed on various accounts, frequently 
in an exaggerated fashion”.30 Through this “rhetorical style”, lawyers define and identify “realistic” 
goals for the client, convincing the client to settle to avoid the cost, risk and uncertainty of the 
courts.31 In addition to “law talk”, Felstiner and Sarat found lawyers also used:32  
… rhetorical flourishes, technical language and role manipulation. Perhaps proceeding 
from experience in the law school classroom, some lawyers conjure up a ‘parade of 
horribles.’ In this scenario, clients are informed that if they continue to seek one goal 
or another, they will suffer a series of negative consequences of continuing and 
mounting severity.  
The LiP who briefed counsel for an opinion before trial was exposed to “law talk” and perceived 
the talk as “inappropriate” and “cynical”. From the perspective of Felstiner and Sarat’s analysis, 
however, this talk is a (manipulative) device by which lawyers steer their clients away from their 
day in court and towards settlement. The achievement of the lawyer’s goal may or may not be in 
the litigant’s interests.33 For the purpose of this analysis, it is sufficient merely to point out that 
                                                          
pressure to process large numbers of cases on the one hand, and the stringent ideological and legal requirements of 
‘due process of law’, on the other hand” at 22. The context that Blumberg describes is specific, but it is possible that 
elements of such an exchange are also occurring in the Family Court where there are high volumes of cases and many 
of the lawyers have an ongoing relationship with the court.  
29 See discussion in Chapter 4, pages 113-114 on separating out emotional aspects of a case. 
30 Felstiner and Sarat, above n 28 at 1463. 
31 At 1463. 
32 At 1464. Note that it may have been this type of talk that clients identified as “bullying” and was offered as a reason 
for becoming a LiP as discussed at Chapter 4, pages 91-92. Conversely Julie Macfarlane The National Self-Represented 
Litigants Project: Identifying and Meeting the Needs of Self-Represented Litigants, Final Report (May 2013) at 45 found that LiPs 
“bemoaned the general lack of settlement orientation among the lawyers they encountered”. My research found no 
evidence of this problem, although as discussed at Chapter 4, pages 94-95, some felt lawyers were pointlessly trying 
to write letters back and forth with no prospect of a negotiated outcome.  
33 Whether the lawyer will be successful in persuading the client and whether that is in the client’s interests will depend 
on factors such as the relationship between the lawyer and client and the lawyer’s understanding of the client’s goals 
and social world. Felstiner and Sarat argue that power relations between divorce lawyers and clients are dynamic with 
both lawyer and client feeling powerless at different points (Felstiner and Sarat, above n1454-1457) and that during 
negotiations between lawyer and client the lawyer may fail to understand the client’s goals and social reality (at 1461-
1462). See also Nan Seuffert "Locating Lawyering - Power, Dialogue and Narrative" (1996) 18 Sydney Law Review 
523, discussing knowledge production between lawyer and client and emphasising the need to examine the context of 
the lawyer-client relationship, and the enactments of power in those relationships.  Power relations will look very 
different between clients and lawyers of large firms (some of whom are very dependent on a small number of wealthy 
clients) to relationships between a legal aid lawyer and client. See for example Christine Parker and Tanina Rostain 
"Law Firms, Global Capital, and the Sociological Imagination" (2011-2012) 80 Fordham Law Review 2347 discussing 
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LiPs are insulated from the pressure that Felstiner and Sarat describe, and therefore avoid a 
potentially powerful influence to settle.  
3. Popular understanding of opposing counsel’s role 
LiPs are exposed to the opposing lawyer’s “reality check”, but this is likely to be less effective than 
a litigant’s own counsel’s efforts,34 and in the LiP context, comes with its own set of problems. 
Chief among them is the perception that the opposing lawyer is talking “legal bullshit”, or worse, 
“bullying”. The decision not to heed the warnings of the opposing counsel can also be seen as 
evidence of the LiP’s (mis)perception that lawyers are completely partisan and will not be realistic 
in their assessment of the case. The LiP who was warned off by opposing counsel after a pre-trial 
hearing dismissed these attempts and did not perceive that the lawyer might be genuinely trying to 
protect him from the consequences of continuing with the litigation. Some of this perception may 
relate to popular beliefs of lawyers as overzealous advocates. It may also relate to a belief that 
lawyers are attempting to reach a negotiated settlement because, as one of the Family Court LiPs 
thought, they do not like LiPs “playing their game”. 
There was also some limited evidence to suggest that “take it or leave it” negotiation tactics that 
may be effective in achieving a favourable settlement with a represented litigant, inhibited 
settlement discussions with LiPs.35 Conversely, the opposing counsel’s “reality check” and “take it 
or leave it” negotiation tactic may occasionally be effective in making LiPs abandon their claims 
altogether. One of the LiPs who had braved the system all the way to the courtroom door, and as 
far as a judicial conference, abandoned their claim in the face of an intransigent represented 
opposing party. This is a risk of encouraging settlement. While it protects court time, there are real 
                                                          
client-lawyer relationships in large firms, and for a review of the literature regarding lawyer control of clients, 
particularly in the criminal legal aid context, see Daniel Newman Legal Aid Lawyers and the Quest for Justice (Hart 
Publishing, Oxford, 2013) at 122-125.  
34 Note that in the criminal court context that Blumberg, above n 28 at 36-37 examines, while not directly applicable, 
may still be analogous. It is the defence counsel who is the most effective in securing a plea of guilty from a defendant, 
not the police, or district attorney, as popularly assumed: “The defense counsel becomes the ideal agent-mediator 
since, as “officer of the court” and confidant of the accused and his kin, he lives astride both worlds and can serve 
the ends of the two as well as his own”: at 37.  
35 The efficacy of hard ball negotiation is also questionable in the settlement of any dispute: Roger Fisher, William Ury 
and Bruce Patton Getting to Yes: Negotiating an Agreement Without Giving In (2nd ed, Random House Business, London, 
2003). However, lawyers may be more accustomed to receiving this type of offer, and given the emphasis on 
settlement, would not be inclined to reject all further negotiation attempts on the basis that the offer was on a “take 
it or leave it” basis. See also Tom Tyler "Justice Theory" in Paul Van Lange, Arie Kruglanski and Tory Higgins (eds) 
Handbook of Theories of Social Psychology (Sage, Thousand Oaks, 2012) 344 at 351 reporting psychological experiments 
that show people given an ultimatum “will decline small gains rather than accept ‘unfairly’ low divisions illustrating 
that people are willing to incur losses to defend principles”.  
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risks that the less powerful party will be cowered into taking a settlement against their interests.36 
This is particularly so where judges, who may not be aware of the relationship between the parties, 
or between the parties and the legal representatives, strongly encourage settlement. Where the LiP 
party believes the judge will not protect their interests and that arguing the case in court is futile, 
they may be more likely to take a settlement against their interests or abandon the case.  
4. Dangerousness  
There is also evidence to suggest that LiP litigation might not settle, not because the LiP is more 
adversarial, but because the opposing counsel feels constrained and does not initiate or pursue 
settlement discussions. The Trinder study noted that different counsel had different styles of 
interaction with LiPs, with some more willing to negotiate than others.37 Lisa’s story illustrates that 
even a court initiated mediation might be unsuccessful if the opposing counsel is uncomfortable 
talking directly to the LiP. As in the pre-trial matters discussed in the previous chapter, some 
lawyers perceived LiPs were dangerous to interact with in settlement discussions. This was because 
of the LiP’s emotional involvement, the power-knowledge imbalance between the LiP and lawyer, 
and, therefore, the likelihood of being seen as bullying and having the settlement attacked on that 
basis. There is also the risk that the LiP will report the contents of “without prejudice” discussions 
to the judge.  
C. Conclusion 
While settlement is promoted as being in the best interests of the parties, it is vital because it serves 
to protect the expensive and scarce resource of judicial time. When LiPs resist settlement and insist 
on their day in court, it therefore creates a tension between bench and litigant. In this context the 
perceived benefits to parties of “buy-in” and durability of settlement are questionable, while the 
risks of the LiP being or perceiving bullying are high. The settlements that were successful had 
important differences. One involved a very commercially oriented litigant who was focused on the 
economics of the outcome rather than on a “just” outcome or the “maximum”. In the other, a 
critical role was played by a third party (lawyer for child) in whom the LiP had a great deal of 
confidence. Without these factors, and without their own lawyer to educate them about the 
orientation of the system and persuade them to settle, LiPs regarded the push towards settlement 
as threatening and confusing.  
                                                          
36 Hunter, above n 12 at 171-175, calling into question “the notion that out-of-court solutions to family disputes, 
arrived at via a mediation or other consensual processes, are always preferable to litigated solutions”. Hunter discusses 
research that demonstrates that, particularly where there is a background of domestic violence, negotiated settlements 
will favour the abusive party. 
37 Trinder and others, above n 1 at 50. 
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In the following chapter I develop these themes of openness and protecting resources, examining 
interaction between opposing counsel, judges and LiPs, as LiPs enter the courtroom, the “dramatic 
and symbolic location where law and society interact”.38  
                                                          
38 Sharyn Roach Anleu and Kathy Mack "Magistrates' Everyday Work and Emotional Labour" (2005) 32(4) Journal 






Appearing in court before a judge is central not only to the LiPs’ conception of litigation but also 
to the professional identity of the bar. This chapter considers the interaction of LiPs with judges 
and opposing counsel when their case reaches court, either for pre-trial case management matters 
or for a defended hearing.  
Starting from entry to the courtroom, the chapter considers interaction between LiPs, judges and 
opposing counsel as the case proceeds: through introduction, legal argument, and evidence. The 
chapter closes with a discussion of how access is promised to LiPs and how judges try to give 
substance to this right. They are restrained and discouraged from doing so by a number of factors: 
balancing the need for an inexpensive and speedy disposition of cases against a just disposition; 
the restraints of their role as a passive arbiter; and the protection of the legal profession. I then 
discuss how reframing LiPs as visitors to a foreign land can shed light on the tensions that arise 
when they enter the courtroom. 
I. Getting Underway 
For most LiPs, particularly inexperienced litigants, going to court induced nervousness and stress. 
Many LiPs worried about finding the correct courtroom and understanding the protocols in court. 
For some the nervousness was exacerbated because they did not know what the appearance would 
involve, and expected that the Judge might resolve the matter at any time.1 Inexperienced LiPs 
also had to orient themselves to the tone of the court, their previous experience of courts being 
solely through popular culture: 
My intention is to go to trial as factual and as objective as possible. I sat in the High 
Court briefly and I became aware of how ponderous the proceedings are, and obviously 
how serious the proceedings are, that there is no room for pretending it is LA Law. 
(HC LiP) 
A. Calling Cases and Seating in the Courtroom 
For many litigants the first interaction with the court in their case is a judicial mention in a list. 
Lists are often very busy with anywhere between three and 20 cases being called depending on the 
                                                          
1 For example one LiP said she did not know what would happen at an upcoming judicial conference but thought the 
Judge would tell them what to do next, “or there is a possibility that he might let my kids come home”. Conversely, 




court. The judge sits in court with the lawyers for the first case, and often many other lawyers for 
parties on the remainder of the list. 2 The court taker calls each case on the list, the lawyers 
announce their appearances, and then a discussion about the case begins, led by the judge.  
In the District Court it was the practice of some Judges to call cases involving LiPs last, as the 
Judges expected they would take more time than cases where lawyers were involved: “otherwise 
everyone has to sit through while I try and make some sense of it” (DC Judge). The Judge also 
expressed the hope that by listening to other cases being called, the LiPs would be educated as to 
how to present their matters. This created additional cost for the opposing represented party 
paying their counsel in six minute increments.3  
High Court lists can be similarly busy, although none of the High Court Judges mentioned 
rearranging the order. A High Court LiP said that in a busy list of this kind, he chose to appear 
without counsel because he was concerned about having to pay “a barrister to sit around for 2-4 
hours”. Although he had been in the Family Court previously he found he was “… thrown off 
guard by this High Court thing, cos they’ve got all the gowns”. He was unsure where to sit and 
someone (he thought a lawyer) said, “Just sit here, just sit here”, ushering him to a seat in the 
public gallery. When the case was called the LiP remained in the public gallery. The LiP said the 
Judge “… [didn’t] even speak to me, he just [spoke] to the lawyer and I’m the applicant”. The 
respondent’s lawyer made the submissions and the High Court found that the security had lapsed 
so the LiP became an unsecured creditor. 
The issue of seating arrangements did not only arise in lists but, in the High Court, occurred at the 
beginning of defended hearings. On an interlocutory application a LiP encountered some 
confusion about where to sit:  
I sort of went into the courtroom and put my stuff on the table and [the opposing 
party’s lawyer] said, ‘You can't stay here you know, that’s the bar there. That is, you 
have to belong to the bar before you can’. I said, ‘That is fine, that's fine’, so I went 
back and sat in the public gallery. And [the Judge] said, ‘Come on up’. 
The LiP was amused, feeling he had one up on the lawyer. On the first morning of the LiP’s trial, 
he set up his many books and papers at counsel’s table. Court begins at 10am. I was surprised 
when at 9:53am he came to sit in the public gallery. He said the court taker had told him to sit 
there until the Judge gave leave for him to sit at counsel’s benches.4 At 9:58am the court taker 
                                                          
2 Lawyers will often have multiple clients on the same list.  
3 In one list where I was observing, the LiP was gleeful that his opponent was being forced to pay for his lawyer while 
we waited several hours for the case to be called. The case had been moved to the end of the list because he was a 
LiP. 
4 The court taker assists the Judge in court and is often referred to in other common law jurisdictions as the “usher”. 
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came and told him the Judge said he could sit at counsel’s table. Another High Court LiP said he 
had encountered the same issue and also noted, offended, that the court taker had offered water 
to counsel, but not to him.  
The High Court Judges expressed various positions on the issue of seating. Some thought that 
LiPs were sitting in the Public Gallery because they were unsure of where to sit, it being human 
nature to hang back in unfamiliar situations. Another said:  
Our court takers always ensure they sit at the back and I invite them to come and sit 
up at the front, at counsel's table … . It is just courtesy. They are not entitled to be 
seated on counsel’s benches because they are not counsel, but because they are 
appearing for themselves, they are being heard, we allow them in. 
Another Judge said that the court takers probably told them to sit in the public gallery because 
they do not have a right of audience without leave, but was unsure if that was the case or not.  
The Family Court is not public, so LiPs are not allowed to sit in the court while the list is called, 
but lawyers are.5 A Family Court Judge said a LiP had recently objected to this practice:  
One litigant came in and said “I don't like this. I feel you're all sitting here like a club”, 
which would be a reasonable, fair assumption and that is bad for business for people 
to feel like that. We shouldn't allow that to occur.  
The Judge said this “might need to be engineered out of the process” by excluding all lawyers and 
parties from the courtroom, and then parties and lawyers would come in as their case was called. 
The difficulty was efficiency. If each case was called individually and the litigants had to come in 
and sit down with lawyers that would “halve your throughput” because there would always be the 
“human factor” of being unable to find one of the parties.  
B. Introductions 
The cases I observed often began awkwardly: 
The Judge enters. LiP and opposing counsel stand. The Judge sits. LiP and opposing 
counsel sit. The Judge looks at LiP meaningfully. There is silence. 
Opposing counsel to LiP: You are supposed to introduce yourself. 
LiP: (rising to his feet) I'm Mr [Name], the plaintiff. 
Most of the Judges, particularly in the District and Family Courts, said they spent time at the 
beginning of a case explaining the process to the LiP. Some Judges described their patter, which 
included information such as the order of speaking, the timing of breaks, the purpose of the 
                                                          




appearance, and even checking whether the LiP had pen and paper. In the High Court many Judges 
would give a brief overview of procedure to LiPs new to the Court, but as one High Court Judge 
said: “There are some who are very frequent litigants in person and we just launch into it because 
they know what they are doing”. Where the Judge was new to the Court, the registrar would give 
them “a thumbnail sketch” of the litigant because “usually they’ve been bugging the registrar first, 
… so you’ve got an idea of what you are going into” (HC Judge).  
Inexperienced LiPs reported feeling nervous about how to address the judge,6 and in what order 
they were permitted to speak, and whether they could interrupt.7 Some LiPs attempted to imitate 
lawyers, referring to themselves in the third person, and addressing witnesses (whom they often 
knew well, or had even been married to) using titles (e.g. “Ms Smith, the plaintiff says …”), but 
then reverted to using first person and first names and pronouns (e.g. “But Alice you told me that 
…”). 
Opposing counsel also often fell into calling the LiP “my learned friend”, the term used for 
opposing counsel, although one counsel who made this slip corrected himself: “My friend – he’s 
not my friend at all”.  
C. Language in Court 
Most LiPs struggled to understand and pronounce legal terminology. This caused anxiety. As one 
Family Court LiP commented about his nerves leading up to his first appearance in court: “I was 
hoping like hell they wouldn’t start speaking in Latin”. Many LiPs felt they were encountering a 
foreign language and often needed help “translating” documents: “It is almost like they are 
speaking another language. You hear the words but you think, well you know, what are they saying? 
Where is this going?” (FC LiP). A few LiPs expressed satisfaction in having mastered legalese, but 
found the process of doing so demanding and stressful.  
Several LiPs interpreted the complexity of the language as a deliberate ploy “to keep the ordinary 
plebs out” (HC LiP). Lawyers and Judges were alert to this possibility. As one High Court Judge 
said: 
I think that it is quite important with a litigant in person that there not be any semblance 
of secret clubiness between the judge and the lawyer. Certainly nothing that looks like 
                                                          
6 One Family Court LiP said he was unsure what to call a female judge. He heard the opposing counsel call the Judge 
“Maam or Ma’am, or something like that”. Nor was he sure whether he was permitted to say “Your Honour”. Despite 
having been through a defended hearing, he said “I think I still don’t know what to call her”. 
7 I observed one LiP in the High Court, raise a hand to request an opportunity to interrupt the opposing counsel’s 
submissions. This attempt was studiously ignored by all others in the courtroom.  
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a wink and a nudge or, as I say, using arcane language and having a conversation that 
excludes the litigant in person. I think that is probably quite important. 
The terms that LiPs did not understand or struggled to pronounce were not just Latin, but any 
technical term such as “adjournment”, “unless order”, and “brief of evidence”.  Lawyers and 
Judges commented that they strived to speak plain English when speaking to any litigant, but 
several said they took extra care with LiPs, particularly vulnerable or new LiPs: “I try to speak their 
language” (DC Judge). Some Judges, lawyers and also court staff were concerned though that LiPs 
might feel patronised if they explained too much.  
Where it was evident that the LiP did not understand the terminology, lawyers and Judges often 
gave explanations. A civil litigation lawyer gave what he called a “slightly comical example” of a 
LiP who filed an interlocutory application titled “Inter-lock-a-tree Application”. The lawyer sent 
the LiP “a template for the application he was trying to make so he could fill in the blanks and file 
it”.  
LiPs sometimes felt embarrassed, even when talking with me about their case, when they had 
misused terms or did not understand them. A McKenzie friend said he warned LiPs against using 
terminology they did not understand or could not pronounce: 
Because one of the most off-putting and embarrassing things I've seen is where people 
try to use the phrases in the court, to try to prove they are on the level of the Judge and 
lawyers, and then stuff it up. And then [the LiPs] go into shut down mode because they 
are so embarrassed.  
A High Court LiP asked for leave to “sit at the bench”, instead of “at the bar”. The Judge smiled 
and gently corrected his error. I thought the LiP might be embarrassed by his error, but he was 
unabashed and said to me: “I did get a smile out of him [the Judge]”.  
In addition to specifically legal terms, some of the litigants, particularly in the Family Court, 
appreciated it when the Judge used more colloquial English. For example, a Family Court LiP said 
“This Judge speaks English!”, after the Judge used a conversational tone with parties. 
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II. Presenting the Case 
A. Assistance Presenting the Case 
1. Problems with using advice in court 
Many LiPs sought advice from lawyers, often at the urging of the Judge or opposing counsel, but 
its use in court caused difficulty.8 When LiPs named the lawyer and explained the advice they had 
received, they were confused when the Judge told them not to name the lawyer or discuss the 
advice. The advice was only of limited use when the case took an unexpected turn and the LiP was 
unable to respond to the new point: 
They [the Judge and opposing counsel] started talking sections back and forward and I 
was getting a bit lost. And in the end, because I didn’t understand, I kept going back 
to, "Well Your Honour, I stand by [the section of the Act] where I'm looking for a 
distribution. (FC LiP) 
This situation was likely frustrating not only for the LiP, but also for the opposing counsel and 
Judge. 
  
2. McKenzie Friends and support people coming to court 
McKenzie friends have a support role only in the New Zealand courts.9 The Judges described 
them as a “mixed bag” and said they were useful when they were able to keep the LiP calm and 
focussed, or could provide “a sounding board” for the LiP (FC and HC Judge). There were some 
experienced McKenzie friends who were said by Judges and lawyers to perform the role well. LiPs 
said they found having a McKenzie friend useful as an independent person with whom to test 
ideas, although one Family Court LiP said that his experienced McKenzie friend was “part of the 
system” and “tried to placate the Judge and the other party”, by suggesting compromises that the 
LiP felt gave too much away.   
The Judges found McKenzie friends less useful when they had their own agenda to push, which 
did not necessarily align with the interests of the LiP. One Judge gave an example of a LiP 
abandoning an argument that had some merit, and instead pursuing a much weaker argument that 
aligned with the McKenzie friend’s agenda on land rights. In the Family Court, lawyers and Judges 
noted that previously McKenzie friends had often been associated with fathers’ rights groups and 
                                                          
8 For further discussion of limited retainer advice see Chapter 6, pages 146-148. 
9 There is some discretion for McKenzie friends to take a speaking role (see Chapter 1, page 6. Judges and McKenzie 
friends spoke of occasions where this discretion was exercised. This included situations where the LiP’s English was 
limited, or an example in the Family Court where in a case, heard immediately before Christmas, the LiP was struggling 
so much with cross-examination that the McKenzie friend was permitted to feed the LiP questions, phrase by phrase.  
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had taken a combative approach, but as Family Court lawyers said, “They are less rabid now” and 
“have mellowed”.   
3. Court appointed lawyers and amicus curiae 
Some Family Court LiPs had lawyers to assist appointed in their cases. They were sometimes 
appointed when the Judge felt the LiP was unable to put their case, or there was a conflict of 
interest.10 Where these lawyers were appointed, LiPs showed confusion about whether they were 
to assist them or the court.  
The role of amicus curiae caused similar confusion.11 One LiP, in a case where an amicus was 
appointed, was concerned that the amicus was biased and asked the Judge a series of questions 
about the role. After correcting the LiP’s pronunciation of “amicus”, the Judge explained that the 
amicus was appointed because “You aren’t represented and I want to make sure I’m aware of all 
the issues”. In interviews the High Court Judges said an amicus is appointed where there is 
“complexity” or “high stakes” or a “far reaching point”. Judges said they were generally reluctant 
to appoint them: “I wouldn’t appoint an amicus unless I thought there was a pressing need for 
one. I don't see amicus as a way to avoid the legal aid structures” (High Court Judge).   
B. Judicial Management of LiPs 
Many of the Judges, particularly in the High Court, said that they considered the right to litigate in 
person was a fundamental right that should not be taken away, but that they would prefer litigants 
to have lawyers:12 
You know there is a right to self-represent and the courts are there for anyone but I’d 
generally rather they had lawyers, (laughing lightly) but you know. (HC Judge) 
Researcher: what about those who just don’t want a lawyer? 
HC Judge: Ummm, should they be denied? Should there be a rule? … On the one hand 
it would be lovely quite frankly (laughing), but I’d certainly have to think long and hard 
about it first. 
                                                          
10  A Family Court practitioner said that counsel to assist in COCA applications was “more of an Auckland 
phenomena”: “The Auckland lawyers got all very precious about having to be very clear that these were their 
instructions and that the welfare and so on was quite distinct. So whenever there was a sniff (laughing) of a conflict 
between welfare and best interests and the child's views, then they'd seek to have a separate lawyer appointed so that 
one was covering welfare and best interests and the other was solely advocating on views. Quite frankly the rest of 
the country were a bit more pragmatic about it (laughing). You know (laughing), just an Auckland thing”. The 2014 
family justice reforms were partly directed at addressing the increase in public spending this caused. A Family Court 
Judge said that a lawyer to assist might be helpful in cases where there was an abusive relationship between the LiP 
and other party. A Family Court Judge said that a lawyer to assist might be helpful in cases where there was an abusive 
relationship between the LiP and other party. 
11 The role of amicus is discussed in Chapter 1, page 7. 
12 This preference is also expressed in Re G J Mannix [1984] 1 NZLR 309 (CA), which requires bodies corporate to be 
represented in the High Court and above, discussed in Chapter 1.  
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Much as we would prefer them to be represented I don’t think you can take that right 
away from them. Even though, from a Judge’s point of view, you'd much rather they 
have a lawyer because lawyers will bring better presentation of the case to you. But you 
can’t deny them that right as far as I see it. (HC Judge) 
Most said that the right had to be defended on the basis of ensuring access to justice, given many 
people could not afford a lawyer.13  
The Judges that I observed, and those I interviewed, demonstrated a commitment to trying to give 
LiPs a fair hearing, and be patient with them. A McKenzie friend who had been practising in the 
Family Court for a long time commented that there has been a “softening among the judges” 
towards LiPs in recent years. A High Court judge said the “era of the truly grumpy judge is gone” 
and other judges are less likely to think grumpiness is acceptable.14 The Judge however did say that 
“I still think you’ll find judges who are less accommodating and less tolerant of LiPs than others”. 
This was also reflected in LiPs’ comments. They said they found Judges generally polite and 
courteous, but a couple were repeatedly named as having behaved in a manner that the LiPs 
considered “rude and condescending”.  Lawyers also said Judges were generally “courteous and 
accommodating”, even in the face of LiP behaviour that was occasionally “absolutely atrocious”. 
A few lawyers noted that Judges were particularly “careful” around persistent litigants who might 
complain about them to the JCC:  
If [a Judge] get[s] on the wrong side of a lay litigant … they [the LiP] go to the JCC and 
that is the last thing you need as a Judge I imagine. Just like the last thing I need is 
complaints to the NZLS about me. (Civil litigation lawyer) 
Judges spoke of some limited training they had received on the issue of managing LiPs in court 
and on being mentored by more senior judges about how to handle LiPs, particularly persistent 
LiPs. They emphasised that this was a matter of individual judgecraft rather than any formal 
ongoing discussion, although particularly difficult, persistent litigants were discussed informally: 
Usually it is a matter after the fact you tell everyone at morning tea … about how 
security had to be called and all that sort of thing … and there is always someone down 
the corridor to ask questions of I suppose. (HC Judge) 
                                                          
13 Some thought the right may be more fundamental than this but they had not given it detailed consideration and did 
not have a settled view.  
14 A civil litigator who had been in practice for many years said that even the very formidable Judges in years past were 
more polite and careful with LiPs than they were with counsel: “I remember when I was quite young there used to be 
a formidable judge called [Judge’s name] who sat on the High Court, who was absolutely a nightmare for young 
counsel to appear in front of. And I once had a case where there was a lay litigant, and I couldn’t believe the complete 
change in demeanour from the Judge when he gave the lay litigant such a lovely run by comparison with what a lawyer 
would have been prepared to suffer”.  
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I have already discussed two judicial management techniques: encouraging LiPs to seek legal 
advice15 and encouraging LiPs to settle.16 I now turn to techniques used when the LiP does appear 
before the judge to present a case. 
1. Letting them talk 
Judges said they often managed LiPs by “letting them talk”. Judges gave several justifications for 
this technique. It took a lot of court time, but if the judge engaged with them via questions this 
could be “red rag to the bull”. It was more efficient “just to sit there and say nothing, so you give 
them nothing to feed off” and they will finish their case more quickly. In the High Court the Judges 
said that this technique was used particularly with persistent litigants: “My feeling is the best thing 
is to shut up and let them run out of steam”.  
Judges also said allowing LiPs to state their case without interruption was important in ensuring 
they perceived they had a fair hearing: “I think your job is to make sure that the parties believe 
they really have had a fair hearing however disastrous their case might be” (District Court Judge). 
It also serves the interests of substantive justice. A High Court Judge said she allowed LiPs to talk 
both so they “feel that they had said all that they can say” and because “I need all the information 
that I can get before I go away to write my decision”.  
A High Court Judge explained that the sense of procedural justice was particularly important 
because the Judges were concerned that they might otherwise create a vexatious litigant: 
The lore, L-O-R-E, or the mythology, is this: with many vexatious litigants they were 
people who in their first encounters in the legal system were treated unfairly and they 
then went away with a sense of unfairness. It may be that they didn't have any merit in 
their case anyway. But the fact that when they went away feeling they have been treated 
unfairly or felt that the judge had got the matter wrong and that triggered something in 
them that brought them back again and again. It might be a minor matter, but you have 
be conscious that you have to be fair and be seen to be fair as well. It’s not enough just 
to get the answer right but give the answer in a way that shows that you have listened 
to what the unrepresented person said and you've taken into account what they've said. 
All the Judges who discussed this technique also said it was time consuming (but sometimes less 
so than asking questions) and that letting LiPs talk had to be balanced with concerns about time: 
“You can’t waste the court’s time either” (DC Judge). A Family Court Judge also expressed this 
conflict between allowing LiPs enough time to have a sense of procedural justice and protecting 
court time. The Judge had recently allowed a LiP hours of additional time to put his case and was 
very unhappy that the LiP had used the opportunity to try and conduct a trial by ambush, raising 
                                                          
15 See Chapter 6. 
16 See Chapter 7. 
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material that never appeared in the affidavits. The Judge said: “The more I do it, the more I think, 
why shouldn’t they have to play within the rules [remaining within the allocated hearing time]?”. 
This conflict was sometimes observable: I saw Judges telling LiPs to take their time but also 
communicating through body language such as impatient sighing, that they felt the LiP was taking 
too long. LiPs were aware of this, for example, a High Court LiP said he thought the Judge had 
“cut the trial short”. When I challenged him, reminding him the Judge had said repeatedly that he 
should take as long as he needed, he said the Judge “didn’t really mean it”.  
2. Asking questions 
The judges noted however that not all LiPs were willing or able to talk at length and that they 
sometimes encountered the opposite problem: 
In other cases they speak very briefly and right to the point and then say nothing more 
at all. You often feel a bit frustrated they haven't said more in their favour than they 
actually have. (HC Judge) 
In those cases the Judges said they sometimes had to spend time drawing out the case, which could 
take a long time. One Judge said that, in deciding how to manage LiPs, such as whether they 
needed encouragement or calming, “It is almost more psychology than law at that point”.  
One of the reasons that LiPs may be brief in court, other than lacking public speaking confidence, 
is that they often expected the judge to be as familiar with the file as they were. As one Family 
Court LiP said the day before a hearing: “I'll let the judge lead. I’m not going to blow my mouth 
off and go blah blah blah. I’m sure the Judge has already gone over my defence”. Judges, 
particularly in the Family and District Court, said that while they tried to read files before court, 
this was not always possible because of the large number of cases to be called through.  
The LiPs were surprised when the Judge was not as knowledgeable about their case as they were, 
or asked questions that showed they had not read the material before court. A few LiPs thought 
that the Judge was not “sharp” or “clever” because they asked questions of the LiP they should 
know. Some LiPs interpreted this as being obtuse or inadequate as a judge, and while positive 
about judges in general, considered certain judges they had encountered “weak” or “rogue”. One 
LiP whose closing submissions were interrupted by questions from the Judge, said afterwards that 
he thought the Judge was “… trying to sort of sabotage the submissions. Or, if not sabotaged, to 
put me off my mission”.17  
                                                          
17 Raynor Asher and Kieran Rafterty "Closing Address" in Bruce Robertson (ed) Introduction to Advocacy (New Zealand 
Law Society Continuing Legal Education Ltd, Wellington, 2000) 355 at 387-388: “New Zealand judges do not hesitate 
to ask questions if they do not understand a submission, or believe that there is a point not fully dealt with. Sometimes 
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3. Deferring to opposing counsel 
Where the Judge could not understand what the LiP wanted, or wanted further legal submissions, 
they said they sometimes relied on opposing counsel. As one High Court Judge explained, this was 
no different from the situation where both parties were represented and one counsel was much 
better than the other: 
If you are just questioning a lawyer and it is clear all you are doing is punching right 
through them and they aren’t feeling it, then it is like hitting a brick wall. You may as 
well not bother so then you tend to rely on the good counsel. 
The Judge said that, having encountered this in practice, she knew it could make counsel feel they 
were compromising their “ability to represent [their] client and win the case”, but it was necessary 
to give the Judge the information they needed to make the right decision: 
At the end of the day you’ve got to try and get the result right. … You've got to try and 
at least understand what their [the LiP’s] point is and see if there is anything in it.  
Judges in the Family Court said that they did sometimes allow the opposing counsel or, more 
often, the Lawyer for the Child, to define the issues during judicial conferences. Most Judges said 
that they were wary of doing this but it was a “tool of the trade”.18 This was, however, in the 
context of judicial conferences or other pre-trial matters. In defended hearings or trials the judges 
were adamant that the formal procedure needed to be followed, although, as one Family Court 
Judge said about a case where both parties were LiPs: “You can find yourself running ragged trying 
to ensure some semblance of procedure is followed”.  
The Judges’ wariness at changing the speaking order was due to the risk that the LiP would see it 
as unfair. As one civil litigation lawyer said, reflecting on the practice, LiPs “will perceive that they 
are being kept out of the process, and that this is a lawyer's sort of process; they'll feel 
condescended to”. The LiPs who said this had happened to them, and was striking enough for 
them to report it to me, felt that changes in turn-taking was patronising and put them at a 
disadvantage. Even those who initially felt relief at not having to do as much talking as they 
expected sometimes felt, on reflection, that their chance to put their case had been hijacked. The 
civil litigation lawyer who recognised that LiPs may feel condescended to by changes in speaking 
order, as did the High Court Judge, saw it as reasonable “in the interests of getting the right 
outcome for the case”. The lawyer said “If people feel miffed about that then that is probably 
                                                          
they will take direct issue with the thrust of a particular submission. It is imperative that you deal with the substance 
of any such judicial question or interruption, and do so in a pleasant and courteous but forthright manner”.  
18 One Family Court Judge said that she preferred to maintain the normal order as this educated the LiP about how 
the court ran, although laughing she said she was “being optimistic” that it would have this effect. 
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tough luck”. He said that this was a minor matter and that “on the whole” Judges did a good job 
of hearing LiPs and of “making them feel entitled to be there”.  
Many LiPs were sensitive to any variation from the rules. A Family Court Judge gave the example 
of a problem with service of a document. The Judge said the LiP: 
… made a snide comment that “I’ve been told all day that I have to play by the rules” 
and then they don’t have to play by the rules. It was a mistake by the bailiff. It wasn’t 
anyone’s fault. (FC Judge) 
A High Court LiP said he “was shocked” when he received a 29 page synopsis when the rules, that 
he had carefully followed, limited the synopsis to 10 pages. Some LiPs also complained of counsel 
being allowed to give evidence from the bar when the LiP would not be allowed to get away with 
that:  
… even if I say, “Hey, that is evidence without getting any affidavits filed”, the court 
doesn’t blink an eyelid. There is a real, you know, the court doesn’t treat lay litigants as 
being equal and that is in a nutshell where the real problem is. (HC LiP) 
4. Bending over backwards 
The lawyers were unanimous in their opinion that Judges often “bent over backwards”19 to help 
LiPs and were sometimes “overly fair” or “gave a lot of leeway”, but said this was understandable 
and reasonable in the circumstances. When discussing judicial leniency towards LiPs, lawyers were 
very positive, although these comments must be read in the context of lawyers talking about the 
judiciary to a researcher, where intra-professional solidarity and hierarchy may mean criticism is 
restrained: “I take my hat off to them”, they are “very competent”, “I can understand why they 
give the lay litigant a bit of rope that they wouldn't give a lawyer”, “The court process is stressful 
and foreign to [LiPs] so I can understand why the court wants them to feel like they’ve actually 
had a fair hearing the first time around” (civil litigation and family lawyers). 
Judges justified giving LiPs multiple chances when they made procedural errors or guiding them 
through the procedure on the basis that it was important to their sense that they had a fair hearing 
and also in the interests of securing a substantively fair result. As a District Court Judge explained: 
You know if you go that extra step it may mean they might see justice was delivered 
even though they don't like the result. It may stave off unnecessary appeals or 
rehearings. It may just give the community indirectly a sense that you know, in a 
modern democracy like we have, there are judges who will take the pain, and try and 
                                                          
19 This phrase was used commonly by lawyers and Judges in interviews, and has a history of use in LiP-judicial 
relationships, appearing for example in John Dewar "The Impact of Legal Aid Changes on Family Law Practice" 
(1999) 13 Australian Journal of Family Law 33 at 48. 
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deliver justice in good faith. I mean it all sounds very lofty. But it is basically what we 
are doing - without fear or favour we are basically trying to help them. 
Judges often expressed concern about how the opposing represented party would perceive the 
process if they gave too much assistance to the LiP. As a Family Court Judge said, she was “acutely 
aware” of not “bending over to such an extent” that the other party “who is paying for a lawyer, 
thinks: ‘Crickey! Is this Judge acting for him?’”. Lawyers, however, said that though clients are 
sometimes unhappy about the assistance given to the LiP, the lawyers generally managed this 
aspect by forewarning their client that the Judge would “try and make the person [LiP] feel that 
they have got a fair hearing” and “that is part of the process they [the client] are going to have to 
accept” (civil litigation lawyer). Judges and lawyers were unanimous in their opinion that facing a 
LiP would increase the costs for the opposing litigating party. As one opposing counsel submitted 
to the Court, “Litigants in person cause a tyranny for the [opposing party]. There is a tendency of 
the judiciary to be lenient that is misplaced. It places an onus – no – an impossible onus on the 
[opposing party]”.20 
LiPs who recognised that the Judge was assisting them by giving them procedural leeway 
appreciated the Judge’s role in protecting their substantive claim, by preventing it being undone 
by procedural mistakes.21 The LiPs often wanted legal information and advice from the Judge, 
seeing them as a neutral source of reliable information. For example, during a case management 
conference, a Judge told a LiP that she needed to amend a key document. The Judge asked the 
opposing counsel to tell the LiP what she needed to do. After the conference, however, the LiP 
said: “I need to ask the Judge what I need to do”. When I asked if the opposing counsel had given 
that guidance, as the Judge directed, the LiP said: “That is Mr [Name]. I need to get it from the 
Judge”.   
Judges were unhappy at being asked to fulfil the role of adviser and neutral arbiter: 
I think basically you know the LiPs are a nuisance and sometimes a supreme irritation, 
just because they are so demanding, and they expect the Judge to be their lawyer and 
their assistant, and they want what they want when they want it. (DC Judge)  
                                                          
20 This counsel had said to me before the beginning of the matter that she was concerned my presence would lead the 
Judge to be “fairer than fair”. One interpretation of this statement is therefore that it was an attempt to neutralise 
what she considered the effect of my presence might be.  
21 LiPs did not always recognise when they were being given such assistance. For example one High Court LiP, not 
understanding the procedural steps being taken, thought that the Judge was harming his claim when in fact the Judge 
was protecting his rights. It was only by good fortune that the LiP’s former counsel happened to be in court with 
another client. The LiP’s former lawyer explained to the LiP that what the Judge was trying to do was to the LiP’s 
benefit. The LiP stopped arguing with the Judge.  
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Most Judges were more measured in their comments, but the difficulty they explained was the 
same. They were caught between wanting to ensure the proceeding was fair, not appearing biased 
towards the LiP by giving them too much assistance, and fulfilling their role as adjudicator: 
The real problem that I perceive here is that self-represented people are not the only 
people who miss legal points. So if you start saying, “I'm going to tell that person over 
there that they might want to do that or that or that”, why aren't you telling the other 
side that they might do that or that? … You don't do it for them [represented litigants], 
so should you do it for people on the other side [LiPs]? Because it is very easy in these 
circumstances to allow a perception to emerge that you are looking after them [LiPs]. 
Maybe you are looking after them and maybe – not maybe – probably, you shouldn't 
… . (Family Court Judge) 
Judges did feel there were situations where substantive justice demanded some intervention. I 
observed a Judge giving a LiP the advice “to keep your powder dry” when the LiP began discussing 
in open court various strategic decisions he was making and the advice he had received on them. 
One Judge gave the example of stopping a LiP making self-incriminating comments on the basis 
the statements were irrelevant, but also that they might have “created further difficulties for [the 
LiP] in another arena”. The Judge characterised that kind of intervention as potentially giving “legal 
advice”, and therefore creating a tension between his role as a passive arbiter, and protecting the 




Managing evidence in the courtroom, unsurprisingly given its highly technical nature, caused most 
LiPs considerable difficulty. Not all cases involved witness examination, although most involved 
at least affidavit evidence. I considered the difficulties encountered in producing written evidence 
in Chapter 6. In this section I consider the particular challenges LiPs faced in preparing and 
conducting witness examinations, arising both from their own inexperience, and because of the 
conflicting nature of the roles they had to play as witness and advocate. 
1. Witnesses 
LiPs encountered particular difficulties in selecting and briefing witnesses. A few LiPs needed 
experts to support their cases. Briefing experts can be extremely expensive, however, and only one 
of the three LiPs in the case studies who needed experts could afford this. The two LiPs who did 
not brief experts also misunderstood to some extent the need for, and nature of, expert evidence. 
They believed their own professional backgrounds, which included some subject matter expertise, 
along with cross-examining the opposing party’s expert witnesses, would be sufficient. As one LiP 
said: “Not that I can be an expert witness because I'm partial, but my expertise would still count”. 
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The Judges in both cases however emphasised the need for independent experts. The LiPs had no 
resources to pay for these experts and did not call any.22 
This difficulty continued once the LiP was in court with judges excluding material because it 
breached the rules of evidence. For example, in one case, key evidence was excluded because it 
was presented only by hearsay; the LiP did not call the witness who could give the evidence 
firsthand. The LiP accepted the ruling without argument but made no effort to call evidence 
another way to prove this fact because he believed the court already “knew it”, it having been 
raised in a brief of evidence that was filed, and that he could then cover the issue off in his final 
submissions. It was not until after the trial that he understood the problem he faced: “There are a 
lot of rules I wasn’t aware of, that I didn't fit my material into and that [material] was lost 
consequently”.  
2. Access to Records and Expert Reports 
Due to their close relationship to the case, some LiPs also encountered difficulties accessing 
reports and records or getting agreement for witnesses to appear in support of their case. One LiP, 
in a case regarding access to her children, said that while the social services who had been involved 
with her and her children were happy to tell her they supported her, they were reluctant to swear 
affidavits in support of her parenting of the children. She believed this was because they were 
“very unsure and uncomfortable” about dealing with her as a LiP. She speculated: “If it was a 
lawyer who wrote to them and asked for what I’m asking for, then they’d get themselves and their 
supervisor to write a note”.  
The same LiP had difficulty accessing her children’s medical records to include in her evidence. 
The general practitioner was reluctant to provide notes to her, and wanted the name of her lawyer. 
A Family Court Judge also commented that it was difficult for any litigants “to get the hospital to 
disgorge your psychiatric notes”. The Judge wondered about the further challenge this may present 
for a LiP: “It is your case. But you might struggle to do that”.  
A significant issue for LiPs in COCA cases was accessing reports ordered under COCA sections 
132 and 133.23 These reports are provided to lawyers as of right, but practice varied between courts 
                                                          
22 Sir James Munby P in Q v Q; Re B; Re C [2014] EWFC 31 at [43] noted that “the absence of public funding for those 
too impoverished to pay for their own representation potentially creates three major problem”, including “the denial 
of the ability to bring to court a professional witness whose fees for attending are beyond the ability of the litigant to 
pay”. (The other two problems he identified were the inability to draft documents and appear with an advocate in 
court).  
23 These are reports prepared by professionals including social workers, psychologists, and psychiatrists in regard to 
applications for parenting orders or guardianship.  
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as to LiP access to the reports.24 In some courts the Judges routinely ordered that the LiP attend 
the registry office and read the report. This occurred under the supervision of the registry office 
staff. A registry staff member, who frequently supervised LiPs reading these reports, said, “They 
can take notes from the report but they can't … write it verbatim. That is one of the reasons we 
sit there too, to make sure they aren't”. The LiPs have to “cross examine the other party without 
having the report in front of them” so they allowed them to return and read the report again if 
they needed to. A McKenzie friend acting in a location where these reports were rarely released to 
LiPs, said that lack of access to the reports, and most LiPs’ lack of comprehension of the contents, 
was very prejudicial to their case. For this reason, he advised people not to attempt litigation in 
person where these reports were ordered.  
3. Cross-Examination 
It was not only in COCA cases that LiPs encountered difficulty preparing cross-examination. As 
a Family Court LiP, who spent considerable time preparing her cross-examination said, “I didn’t 
know if the questions were appropriate or adequate”. Even those LiPs who were confident in their 
preparation found the reality of cross-examining more challenging. A LiP, who was confident in 
his preparation, having read some previous trial transcripts and a book on advocacy said: “Cross 
examination was harder and less effective than I thought it would be. I thought I'd get the witness 
to concede.” The LiP had abandoned the cross examination when it seemed ineffective. He 
thought the Judge would regard the shortened cross-examination favourably because he would be 
saving the court time, having been continually told that as a LiP he was slowing the case down. He 
did not have any awareness of the obligation in New Zealand to put your case to the relevant 
witnesses for the opposing party 25  and thought he could cover further material by way of 
submission. His error only became apparent to him when the opposing counsel vigorously alerted 
the court to his omission in closing.  
                                                          
24 Section 134 - Distribution, etc, of reports under sections 132 and 133 
(1) The Registrar of the court must copy a report under section 132 or section 133 (the report)— 
(a) to the lawyer acting for each party to the proceedings or, subject to subsection (3), if a party has no lawyer acting 
for that party, to that party; and 
(b) to a lawyer appointed to act for a child who is the subject of the proceedings. 
(2) If the court orders a lawyer referred to in subsection (1)(a) not to give or show the report to the person for whom 
the lawyer is acting, the lawyer must comply with the order. 
(3) If a party has no lawyer acting for that party and the court is satisfied that information in the report would, if 
provided directly to that party, place the child concerned or another person at risk of physical abuse, sexual abuse, or 
psychological abuse, the court may— 
(a) order that the report not be copied to that party under subsection (1)(a); and 
(b) appoint counsel to assist the court under section 130(1) for the purpose of explaining the contents of the report 
to that party. 




Judges and lawyers said that most LiPs struggled to do effective cross-examinations, which, as a 
District Court Judge said, is not surprising: “… it is an advocate’s skill, and often lawyers are not 
very good at it”.26 Some Judges noted they had been caught by surprise on occasion by LiPs who 
“have been artists at it” (FC Judge) or did a job that was “as good as any lawyer would have done” 
(DC Judge). Similarly a McKenzie friend said that the occasional person can manage to cross-
examine but most people make a “pig’s ear out of it” and the “whole courtroom is kinda going 
‘groan’”.  Judges described two problematic styles of cross-examination: very brief cross-
examinations or very lengthy ones. 
Judges said LiPs often did very brief cross-examinations, either asking “a few inane questions just 
to go through the motions” (DC Judge) or getting “very frustrated and angry” when the judge 
explains what can and cannot be asked and “giving up” (FC Judge). LiPs who “just go on and on” 
(FC Judge) asking repetitive or poorly directed questions were also considered problematic. As 
one Family Court Judge said, the cross-examinations tend to be “pre-scripted” and the LiP will 
stick to the script and fail to pursue useful answers and avenues: “They ask a question and the herd 
goes thundering away”.  
Frustration often arose when LiPs had difficulty determining relevance and not including opinion 
and submissions. Judges said they sometimes tried to help formulate questions for the LiP when 
they were struggling, although most said they preferred not to do this.27 Some LiPs regarded such 
interventions negatively, believing the Judge was trying to inhibit their ability to put their case: 
Judge: You cannot ask - 
LiP: [holds up an open palm, signalling the Judge to stop talking, and talks over the 
Judge] You will just have to wait until I go through my questions. 
Judge: She is an expert witness. You can only ask questions that are germane to her 
expertise. 
LiP: So you say. Now would you like to wait? 
                                                          
26 Tatiana Tkačuková "Cross-Examination Questioning: Lay People as Cross-Examiners" in Malcolm Coulthard and 
Alison Johnson (eds) The Routledge Handbook of Forensic Linguistics (Taylor & Francis, Hoboken, 2010) 333 at 346 
suggests that LiPs do not have mastery of some of the more linguistically subtle aspects of cross-examination, skills 
which are “… difficult to acquire without a solid understanding of the basic principles of the adversarial system and 
without professional practice”. 
27 In one case for example, the opposing counsel objected to the LiP’s question to a witness. The Judge attempted to 
guide the LiP to reformulate the question. On the LiP’s fifth unsuccessful attempt, the Judge stopped the cross-
examination: 
Judge: No, no, no, Ms [Name] – no. Your question is this - I’ll put it to the witness for you, shall I?  
LiP: Okay, Your Honour. 
Judge: [Asks the witness the question]. 
Witness: No. 
Judge: Right. Now you take it from there. Take it wherever you want to take it, but that’s your foundation.   
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Judge: You are allowed to ask questions, but you are not allowed to waste the Court’s 
time with irrelevancy.  
LiP: It is not irrelevant. 
Judge: Very well, go ahead. 
Where LiPs, or for that matter counsel, did not ask relevant questions, some Judges said they 
would sometimes ask questions themselves at the end of the cross-examination, as they were 
entitled to do. Most (but not all) preferred not to do this as a “good rule in terms of judge’s 
intervention” was to “sit back” as “we all know about Judges who intervene too much. They get 
into trouble down the track [on appeal]” (HC Judge). In the Family Court, lawyers said that when 
acting as lawyer for child they would ask questions that, if the LiP “had been properly represented, 
should have been [asked]”, to ensure the court had all the information “to make the right decision”.  
4. Role Conflict – Witness-Advocate 
In the time pressured environment of a trial, the conflict between the roles of advocate and witness 
became apparent: keeping documents in order, appearing as a witness, keeping track of re-
examination questions, all under the further strain of close emotional involvement in the case.  
One LiP encountered significant difficulty when being cross-examined by the opposing counsel, 
which he described afterwards as “dreadful, sick making”. In addition to the stress of answering 
questions that pointed to deficiencies in his case, he was attempting to fulfil the role of advocate, 
struggling to keep track of the implications of his cross-examination for the direction of the case 
and of questions he needed to ask in re-examination: 
Opposing counsel: I want to ask about the document on page 22 of volume 3. On 17 
August did you meet with Mr [witness] and discuss [topic]? 
LiP: [long pause]. Sorry, I can’t find that document. What was the question? I’m sorry 
I’m thinking of other things as well. 
Judge: Well keep your mind on the job. 
Opposing counsel: [continues with questions about the document and then begins to move on to 
another document] 
LiP: Before we do that I’d like to come back to a few other points if I can. 
Judge: After the cross-examination is finished, you can do a re-examination, essentially 
of yourself.  
Opposing counsel: You can put that volume away now. 
LiP: Can someone put a tag on page 22? 
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Judge: Sorry? [Confers with the court taker]. [To LiP]: You make a note. Have you got pen 
and paper there? Well you make a note of anything you want to come back to. It is your 
case. 
For a Family Court LiP, the strain of trying to run her own case and being cross-examined by the 
opposing party’s lawyer proved too much. She broke down during the cross-examination, 
requiring several adjournments. She was then unable to close the case and the Judge decided to 
accept her closing submissions in writing instead:  
My head was pounding, I thought I was going to pass out - I couldn't even see properly. 
I don't even get migraines, but my vision had gone and I was sitting there so stressed. 
The Judge said I had until next week to write down my points that I needed to get 
down. I had no idea how to do that, but I put some points down and took it to the 
court the next week. 
Other litigants, particularly men in the Family Court, noted that they had to be careful to maintain 
a calm and cool demeanour so the judge did not draw adverse inferences about them. A Family 
Court Judge said that it was “not a matter of plain law to what extent a judge should be allowing 
her impression of people who are not witnesses at the time to be part of the material” but said “I 
have to be honest, it can be an advantage” to see the interaction between the LiP and the witness.  
LiPs found the pace of trial generally very challenging. Performing the tiring roles of both witness 
and advocate left them with little energy for preparation at night. Another LiP complained that the 
time pressures were unreasonable, leaving him too little time to absorb the material from the other 
party and respond to it. LiPs also complained about lawyers being late with filing documentation, 
particularly briefs of evidence in the weeks immediately before trial. This presented particular 
problems for some LiPs, who found that with additional other commitments (such as a fulltime 
job) they had little time to prepare, and lateness furthered the difficulties. Lawyers, however, were 
accustomed to some slippage in the timetable, and rarely pulled each other up about this in case 
they needed the indulgence of the same counsel in another case in the future.28  
The strain of the courtroom also meant LiPs had not always heard what the Judge said. For 
example, I asked a LiP what he thought about the fact his ex-partner was changing lawyers. It had 
been discussed in the LiP’s presence, in an exchange between the opposing counsel and Judge 
during the judicial conference. The LiP, however, was surprised. He had not heard that discussion 
                                                          
28 Andrew Beck "Introduction" in Bruce Robertson (ed) Introduction to Advocacy (New Zealand Law Society Continuing 
Legal Education Ltd, Wellington, 2000) xxi at xxvi: “A lawyer who is known to be reasonable, co-operative, and 
understanding is likely to be well-treated by other members of the profession. This may well result in benefits for 
clients particularly where small indulgences are involved”. One LiP involved in a lengthy case, noted that the lawyers 
being late with briefs of evidence meant he could then require the same leniency.  
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at all. A Family Court Judge noted that he tried to keep explanations in Court brief as he was aware 
that “no matter how smart they are”, LiPs “only absorb so much”.  
D. Opposing counsel 
In preparation and negotiation before trial, lawyers said they generally tried to be “super-polite” 
when dealing with LiPs.29 Some counsel were polite and even friendly to LiPs, which the LiPs 
appreciated.  Many LiPs said that, once in court, they considered the opposing counsel’s behaviour 
ranged from distant to patronising. A few of the LiPs speculated that the opposing counsel might 
use LiPs’ lack of emotional distance from the case to strategic advantage. A High Court LiP said: 
I almost feel like the opposing counsel totally ignoring me and being rude to me was 
almost a deliberate tactic to get me riled up. I imagine if you get someone speaking 
really emotively in court then it is a really bad look. So I'm a bit suspicious that it was a 
deliberate tactic to rile up the lay litigant.  
A few of the civil litigation lawyers offered a different explanation as to why they might be cool 
towards an opposing LiP. One lawyer said she did “not talk to them [LiPs] at all” during a hearing. 
She said her concern was that “idle talk or chatter” can lead to the LiP telling the Judge that she 
had said “such and such, and it is really unhelpful. It is better to not say anything at all”.   
While lawyers said they tried to be polite, or explained their distance as wariness at where 
interactions might lead, there was also evidence this “best practice” was not always followed. A 
High Court Judge said that occasionally when litigation had been going on for a long time there 
was animus not only between the parties, but between the parties and the opposing lawyers. The 
Judge said this, “… does perhaps give rise to behaviour [like] … eye rolling and all that sort of 
thing”. The Judge noted that that sometimes happened “when you have two lawyers in front of 
you as well” but said that “by in large I think they [lawyers] are pretty good”.  
During observations I noted counsel behaving in ways that varied from the professional ideal. In 
one there were remarks to the Judge which could easily be interpreted as snide or condescending 
(“Well it depends on how long it takes [the LiP] to conduct his interesting cross-examination”); 
putting undue pressure on the LiP (making comments to the LiP during the LiP’s cross-
examination, such as “you can’t say that” and “when are you going to be finished?”);30 counsel 
signalling higher social status (“I’m sorry I haven’t been here to help Your Honour, but I’ve been 
                                                          
29 See Chapter 6, pages 150-152 and Chapter 7, page 168. 
30 These were not audible to me as an observer, but were confirmed by both parties.  
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in Europe for the last three months”); or signalling the sort of “clubiness” that the Judges perceive 
as a risk to LiPs’ perceptions of fairness:31 
Court taker: [asks the opposing counsel about the whereabouts of some documents] 
Opposing counsel: The Judge knows how I lose paper, he has seen it before. 
Court taker: I don’t know about that. 
Opposing counsel: How is the Judge today, is he in a good mood? 32 
Court taker: I’m not taking court, I’m just sorting it out for [the other court taker]. 
Where opposing counsel did try to be of assistance to the LiP (in the interests of their client and 
the court), as in the process before court, LiPs sometimes interpreted this as “playing games”. In 
one instance a comment that, I believe, was intended to be helpful, or at least not harmful to the 
LiP, had an unintended consequence. The opposing counsel commented during a break that you 
“can’t win a case on cross-examination”. The LiP took this comment to mean that cross-
examination was pointless and cut the cross-examination short, a decision he later regretted. It is 
likely the opposing counsel meant the LiP needed to elicit evidence-in-chief to support his case, 
as well as cross-examine, not that he should abandon the cross-examination. 
III. Discussion 
Once LiPs’ cases came to court, the Judges generally tried to give some substance to the right of 
access by assisting the LiP. This included spending time introducing the court process to the LiP, 
speaking in plain English, letting them speak without interruption, asking questions of them or on 
their behalf, bending procedural rules, and trying to put them at ease.  
These attempts to assist LiPs and ensure a fair hearing were, however, also coupled with various 
forms of limiting access or providing only formal access. Letting LiPs talk in some cases was a 
form of simply allowing formal access, the right to talk until they ran out of steam. Impatient 
sighing and asking for time estimates indicated LiPs had outstayed their welcome. Altering turn-
taking and moving LiPs to the end of the list may have been for efficiency but also signalled the 
LiPs’ outsider status, privileging lawyers’ place in the court. Other acts communicated to LiPs 
                                                          
31 Nigel Fielding "Lay People in Court: The Experience of Defendants, Eyewitnesses and Victims" (2013) 64(2) British 
Journal of Sociology 287 at 296 for a discussion of the lay witness, defendant and victims experience of opposing 
counsel in criminal trials.  
32 This talk is similar to that described in the preceding chapter, where lawyers encourage litigants to avoid the 
capricious courts and settle their claims: see Chapter 7, pages 176-178. 
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more directly, although still subtly, that they were outsiders: requiring leave to sit at counsel’s 
benches and not offering them water. So what interests are served by these mixed messages?  
A. Accessibility and Proportionate Justice 
One explanation is the tension between enabling LiPs access to justice and the aim of efficient 
disposition of cases. This tension is discussed in international research that record judicial concern 
over LiPs taking much longer than represented cases to process because LiPs need assistance in 
understanding the procedural and substantive law.33 Judges consider they therefore have to devote 
a disproportionate amount of time to cases with LiPs, which Zuckerman calls the “efficiency 
deficit”.34  
The “just” determination of a case includes both substantive justice and procedural fairness.35 
Judges said they let LiPs talk in pursuit of both these goals. They also spent time explaining ground 
rules, procedure, and gave guidance to LiPs with the aim of ensuring both substantive and 
procedural justice. These techniques however have a price: they reduce speed, and increase costs 
to both the court and the opposing party. Techniques that assisted with speed and efficiency, such 
as moving LiPs to the end of the list and altering turn-taking (allowing opposing counsel or lawyer 
for child to speak first), risked compromising the LiPs’ sense of procedural justice.36 Judges were 
particularly concerned about procedural justice both because of awareness that this was important 
aspect of justice, but also because of the “lore” that one Judge described: that failing to give LiPs 
procedural justice might create persistent litigants.  
The importance of speed and efficiency arises both from Judges’ personal workloads and also 
because the procedural rules require not the pursuit of only substantive justice but also the 
potentially conflicting goal of a “speedy and inexpensive determination” of the case.37 Recall that 
the “just, speedy and inexpensive determination” of disputes is an expression of proportionate 
                                                          
33 John Dewar, Barry W Smith and Cate Banks Litigants in Person in the Family Court of Australia (Family Court of 
Australia, 2000) at 48; Richard Moorhead and Mark Sefton Litigants in Person: Unrepresented Litigants in First Instance 
Proceedings - Department of Constitutional Affairs Research Series (2005) at 257 reporting a perception that LiP cases take 
longer but finding that there is “at best only modest evidence that cases involving unrepresented litigants took longer”; 
Liz Trinder and others Litigants in Person in Private Family Law Cases (Ministry of Justice, United Kingdom, 2014) at 57. 
34 Adrian Zuckerman "No Justice Without Lawyers: The Myth of an Inquisitorial System" (2014) 33 Civil Justice 
Quarterly 355 at 355. 
35 See discussion of procedural justice in Chapter 2, pages 32-34.  
36 Kathy Mack and Sharyn Roach Anleu "`Getting Through the List': Judgecraft and Legitimacy in the Lower Courts" 
(2007) 16(3) Social & Legal Studies 341 argue that in certain contexts standing down cases to the end of the list can 
be successfully used to create a sense of procedural fairness and meet the court’s efficiency goals. Richard Moorhead 
"The Passive Arbiter: Litigants in Person and the Challenge to Neutrality" (2007) 17 Social and Legal Studies 405 
explains that altering turn-taking is one of a number of techniques that Judges use with LiPs to maintain the appearance 
of being a passive arbiter, while acknowledging that, if some accommodations are not made for the LiP, substantive 
injustice may be done. 
37 High Court Rule, r 1.2; District Court Rule, r 1.3. 
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justice, in which “a limit is now placed on the amount of resources individuals in the state can 
properly expend in securing substantive justice in any particular case”.38 This has replaced the 
previous paramount goal of substantive justice, a correct decision, or justice on the merits.39 
Substantive justice, as the Court of Appeal confirmed in SM v LFDB, remains a goal, but its pursuit 
is to be weighed with the pursuit of speed and efficiency.40 Judges showed some conflict about 
whether or not substantive justice should still be the paramount consideration. As one Judge who 
had come to the bench pre-Woolf reforms said: 
Justice should never be overridden by administrative expediency. That is the rule … . 
Even though we are now more resource-based, … surely that rule still applies.  
Judges made statements in court to indicate that substantive justice was the paramount 
consideration: “Take as long as you need”.41 However, they gave conflicting signals, such as asking 
clarifying questions, policing relevance, asking for time estimates, and using body language such as 
impatient sighing, that indicated speed and efficiency were also important goals. These mixed 
messages can be seen as a result of judges attempting to satisfy conflicting goals. 
B. Accessibility and the Passive Arbiter 
Judges were subjected not only to the tension between the competing goals of justice, speed, and 
efficiency, but also tension due to the restrictions of their role as a neutral arbiter. Judges wanted 
to ensure a substantively fair hearing but felt restrained from giving too much assistance as it 
potentially conflicted with their role as a neutral arbiter (both in substance and appearance). This 
tension is well documented in other studies of LiPs.42  
Judges were often exposed to this tension because in many cases LiPs were not able to conduct 
the court proceedings effectively themselves. This was not universally true and there were some 
cases where the LiP was involved in what Trinder labels a “working” hearing.43 There were many 
cases, however, which were “non-working”, where the LiP took an active role but was unable to 
conduct the case effectively. As the discussion above demonstrates, this was for a range of reasons 
but included that being unable to: effectively use limited retainer advice in court; access evidence 
                                                          
38 John Sorabji English Civil Justice after the Woolf and Jackson Reforms: A Critical Analysis (Cambridge University Press, 
Cambridge, 2014) at 3. 
39 At 2. 
40 SM v LFDB [2014] 3 NZLR 494 (CA). See discussion in Chapter 2, page 36-37. 
41 It was of particular interest that in one case where such a statement was made, the LiP felt the statement had been 
made because of my presence in the courtroom. If the LiP was correct, then this would suggest the Judge also thought 
that my expectation would be that the LiP should be given as much time as needed. That is, the Judge believed that 
substantive justice should be the guiding principle.  
42 Dewar, Smith and Banks, above n 33 at 47-48; Moorhead, above n 36; Kim Williams Litigants in Person: A Literature 
Review (Ministry of Justice, United Kingdom, 2011) at 7.  
43 See Chapter 2, pages 17-18. 
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to support their case; cross-examine effectively; perform multiple roles in the proceeding (as 
advocate and witness); understand procedure and the laws of evidence; and present a legal 
argument, even when they had received some advice. There were also other issues such as the pace 
of trial being too fast. Tom’s story demonstrates many of these issues that LiPs did not usually 
anticipate.   
This tension for judges between assisting LiPs in court and remaining neutral is exacerbated by the 
lack of a bright line between what constitutes information that a judge can give a litigant, and what 
amounts to advice. This was discussed in Chapter 6 in relation to court staff and opposing counsel 
assisting LiPs, and Judges encountered the same difficulty.44 As one Judge said, he considered he 
did sometimes give what amounted to legal advice. Other Judges also noted that depending on the 
situation, they might give more or less assistance.45 As with court staff, this discretion may mean 
that LiPs who are perceived as “sympathetic” are more likely to receive greater assistance. Engler 
argues, based on a review of US case law, that LiPs will be treated differentially, depending on the 
court’s level of sympathy towards them:46   
The more annoyed the court is with an unrepresented litigant, the more likely the 
invocation of precedent requiring impartiality, the application of similar rules, and a 
prohibition of playing advocate for the litigant. The more sympathetic the litigant, and 
the more the absence of counsel seems beyond the litigant's control, the more likely 
the court will be to articulate a need to provide additional assistance to avoid a 
miscarriage of justice. 
Those who are perceived as having “chosen” to appear in person can be seen as the authors of 
their own misfortune, relieving the court of the burden of giving them assistance. For this reason 
LiPs were very wary of the risk of being labelled as “persistent” because they considered they 
would be treated unsympathetically and their cases dealt with perfunctorily if this label was applied. 
As one High Court LiP said: 
It was just like, either the Judge wasn’t familiar with that part of the legislation or he 
decided, well, the lawyers must be right, why is this man [litigating in person]? The 
whole key has been that they’ve discredited me to the courts. All they [opposing 
counsel] need to say is, “He is vexatious”. And the court says, “Oh yes, he must be if 
he has gone along [litigating] for seven years. Who in their right mind would go along 
for seven years?”. 
As the Judges said, LiPs who are perceived as persistent are likely to be given formal access only.  
                                                          
44 See Chapter 6, pages 140-142 and 155-156. 
45 Moorhead and Sefton, above n 33 at 184 noted similar variability in their UK study. See also Moorhead, above n 36 
at 410. 
46 Russell Engler "And Justice for All - Including the Unrepresented Poor: Revisiting the Roles of the Judges, 
Mediators, and Clerks" (1999) 67 Fordham Law Review 1987 at 2015. See also Moorhead, above n 36 at 410. 
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C. Accessibility and Protection of the Profession 
Some of the judicial management techniques that have the effect of communicating to LiPs that 
they are outsiders, such as deferring to the opposing counsel or moving LiP cases to the end of 
the list, can be justified on the basis that they are needed for efficiency and to ensure substantive 
justice. Other practices, by lawyers, judges and court staff, that communicated to LiPs that they 
were unwelcome have no efficiency justification. These include not offering water to a LiP, and 
not allowing LiPs to sit at “counsel’s tables” without leave, at least in the High Court.47  
Not offering water echoes MacFarlane’s finding there was “an embedded ‘apartheid’ that 
privileged legal counsel” in Canadian courthouses.48 The idea that LiPs need leave to sit before the 
bar does not hold up to historical examination. It appears that what began as the lawyers’ push to 
take more room in the court, seems to have now evolved to the point that LiPs are equated with 
the “public”, and excluded from the central area of the court unless they are granted leave.49 I have 
found no contemporary rule that requires it.50 Mulcahy argues that, while lawyers look on the space 
within the court “as a depoliticized surface”, the allocation of space to different roles, the lines of 
sight, and various levels and divisions, is an exercise of power, creating an “inside and outside; an 
‘opposition’ or other which can serve to signal segregation, place or inequality”.51 The practice of 
                                                          
47 A Family Court Judge justified the exclusion of LiPs from the courtroom, but not counsel, on the basis of efficiency. 
Counsel sat in court during lists, including when it was not their client’s case, so that when their client’s case was called 
they were ready to proceed. LiPs could not remain in court because the Family Court is not public. The Judge 
suggested everyone except the parties and their counsel could be excluded but this would slow down the progress of 
the list as there would be delays as they moved in and out of court.  
48 Julie Macfarlane The National Self-Represented Litigants Project: Identifying and Meeting the Needs of Self-Represented Litigants, 
Final Report (May 2013) at 102: “The examples they gave included: a registry counter system with lines for lawyers – 
shorter and faster – and lines for SRLs; different security lines to enter the courthouse (again, the longer lines are the 
public lines); and even access to a water cooler at the front of one courtroom deemed ‘lawyers only’”. The new “justice 
precinct” being constructed in Christchurch to replace buildings destroyed during the earthquakes was described in 
"Onwards and Upwards" (26 September 2014) 851 LawTalk 4 as constructing lawyer-only zones: “There will be a law 
library on the ground level”, (which will be exclusive to lawyers, as all Law Society libraries are, see Chapter 6, pages 
137-138), and “a ‘lawyers’ room’ on level 3 … . Lawyers will be able to use one card for accreditation (to allow them 
to pass easily through security checkpoints) as well as access to the level 3 lawyers’ room and the law library”. 
49 See Chapter 1, page 4.  
50 In New Zealand I have found no written rule that LiPs are not allowed to sit at counsels’ table. The only written 
guidance I have found on the subject of where LiPs can sit in the courtroom is the Ministry of Justice "Memorandum 
for Unrepresented Civil Litigants" (undated, no longer available, on file with the author)  <www.justice.govt.nz>, a 
two page document which was at the time the Ministry’s only official advice to self-represented litigants. It was 
unhelpfully drafted in the passive voice and says only, “You will be shown where to sit when the case is called”. The 
new guide that has since been introduced, and is much more comprehensive, is silent on the topic of where to sit: 
Ministry of Justice "Representing Yourself in the High Court of New Zealand" (undated)  <www.justice.govt.nz>. 
The Guide for Self-Represented Litigants in the Victorian County Court is more specific and advises LiPs to sit “in 
the body of the Court in the front row nearest the bar”, and goes on to advise that once the case is called then: “The 
Judge will ask your name and confirm you are representing yourself. You may be allowed to sit at the bar table with 
the other representatives, however, you should not sit there until the Judge has said that you may”. County Court 
Victoria "A Guide for Self-Represented Litigants in the Civil Jurisdiction of the County Court" (2011)  
<https://www.countycourt.vic.gov.au/files/SRL_w_24Oct2011.pdf>. 




requiring LiPs to remain in the public gallery, or to seek leave to sit at counsel’s table, can be seen 
as a political act that signals in a very direct, physical sense the LiP’s “outsider” status. Even the 
name “counsel’s table” signals it is exclusively for the use of counsel. All of these practices 
communicate to LiPs that they are not welcome.  
One explanation is simply that, as discussed, LiPs are perceived to create an “efficiency deficit”. 
Ensuring a just outcome, at least in both the substantive and procedural sense, is time-consuming 
and therefore expensive (for the court and opposing party). Reinforcing outsider status discourages 
LiPs so they are less likely to come to court unmediated by a lawyer and the goals of the “just, 
speedy and efficient” resolution of disputes are easier to achieve. Discouraging LiPs also means 
that opposing counsel and judges are not exposed to strain on their roles as advocate for the 
opposing party and neutral arbiter. 
The encouragement not to “by-pass” lawyers might also be a form of protecting the system itself. 
If, as Sarat argues, too many people take up the invitation to access the courts, the gap between 
law on the books and law in action is exposed.52  Lawyers filter out claims (as we saw in the 
previous chapter), encouraging settlement or dissuading people from pursuing their claims. 
Practices that remind LiPs that they are outsiders discourage them from coming to court without 
a lawyer and therefore protect the institution from overload.  
Another explanation is that the bench and bar are protecting their patch, in the sense of 
maintaining social closure.53 Moorhead observes that the Judge’s interaction with a LiP depends 
in part on the “professional economy”:54 
Judges wanted to protect themselves against encouraging non-representation and doing 
lawyers out of work which was deservedly theirs. Under this view, the court’s primary 
goal seems to be to deter litigants from “by-passing” lawyers.  
I found no convincing evidence to suggest that financial interests were a significant factor, possibly 
because the numbers of LiPs (while unknown) are not perceived as great enough to pose a genuine 
financial threat and because of a belief that many cannot afford to pay a lawyer in any case. LiPs 
may, however, be a perceived as a threat to the profession’s identity. The courtroom is what Abbott 
calls the “charismatic heartland” of the profession, the most publicly and professionally recognised 
                                                          
52 See Chapter 4, pages 108-109. 
53 Social closure involves constructing a closed group with its own identity to monopolise a resource, in this case, the 
provision of legal services. See Chapter 2, pages 129-130.  
54 Moorhead, above n 36 at 410. See also Jona Goldschmidt "The Pro Se Litigant's Struggle for Access to Justice" 
(2002) 40 Family Court Review 36 at 44. 
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aspect of being a lawyer.55  The protection of the space is therefore particularly important to the 
protection of the legal profession’s territory. Lawyers “tend to jealously guard the right to provide 
representation”.56 We might expect that Judges, as former lawyers, share these values.  
Persistent litigants may pose a particular threat to social closure. They are have often become so 
adept at mimicking (at least the surface) of lawyers’ dress and language, that they may become 
indistinguishable from lawyers, making lawyers’ claim to a special status precarious. This may be 
akin to Dr Seuss’ tale of The Sneetches, where the plain-belly sneetches have stars put on their bellies 
so they are indistinguishable from the higher status star-belly sneetches, until “neither the Plain 
nor the Star-Bellies knew whether this one was that one … or which one was … who”.57 One 
Judge hinted at this in a description of a “serial offender”, who brought appeals from a lower 
jurisdiction, always over the same issue: “Now he does nothing else. He dresses in a suit and carries 
briefcases and previous decisions and things like that”. This is, of course, not the whole story about 
persistent litigants, a topic that is taken up in the next chapter, but it may go some way to explaining 
judicial and lawyer resistance to LiPs.  
Somewhat paradoxically, persistent litigants can also serve as means of maintaining social closure. 
There were hints in the interviews of both judges and lawyers that stories about persistent LiPs 
serve a function as “atrocity stories”, dramatic renditions that bind a group together through the 
exchange of common problems.58 This function was not obvious in interviews. As one might 
expect, a research interview is no place to share such stories. They were only mentioned in passing 
as discussions in the tearoom or the corridors of the courts, where they also might serve the 
function of releasing tension after an encounter that was perceived as potentially dangerous or 
volatile.59 They were much more apparent on occasions that seemed more suitable, for example at 
a conference on LiPs attended mainly by judges and court staff, and in casual conversation when 
lawyers discussed my research topic with me and jokingly offered to put me in touch with their 
                                                          
55 Andrew Abbott "Status and Status Strain in the Professions" (1981) 86(4) American Journal of Sociology 819 at 831 
for example calls the “anachronistic rituals of moot court” which law students participate in, despite few going on to 
have careers as advocates, a way in which the profession increases its status by “[forcing] all careers to start in the 
charismatic heartland”.  
56 Duncan Webb "The Right Not to Have a Lawyer" (2007) 16 Journal of Judicial Administration 165 at 173. 
57 Dr Seuss The Sneetches and Other Stories (HaperCollins Children's Books, London, 1998). 
58 Robert Dingwall "'Atrocity Stories' and Professional Relationships" (1977) 4(4) Work and Occupations 371 
59 As discussed, persistent LiPs were sometimes regarded as dangerous and security was posted in the registry office 
or courts. This concern about volatility might be more pervasive. Mulcahy, discussing Rock’s study of a UK court, 
says Rock presents a picture in which “staff perceived there to be an ever-present fear of the collapse of the social 
order of the court”: Linda Mulcahy Legal Architecture: Justice, Due Process and the Place of Law (Taylor and Francis, 
Hoboken, Online, 2010) at 95. 
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nemesis-LiP. These stories both bind the professional group together and serve the function of 
reinforcing stereotypical views about LiPs and therefore justify their outsider status.60  
D. Intergroup Friction  
The conflicting goals of projecting the accessibility of the courts, while still protecting roles and 
resources and the identity of the profession, are one aspect of the tensions between LiPs and the 
professional actors in the courtroom. Another source of explanation is in the different 
expectations the groups have about the court process and their level of familiarity with it.   
1. Conflicting beliefs about the purpose of courts 
Most LiPs found the courtroom environment imposing and, while sometimes not succeeding, tried 
their best to follow its norms. The message that speed and efficiency was important was received 
by some LiPs. Recall the LiP who thought he was “doing a good thing” by shortening his cross-
examination because it would save time, and another High Court LiP who thought the Judge did 
not really mean he should take as long as he needed. While LiPs did their best to meet expectations, 
they felt disappointed after court, believing that they had not put their case across as well as they 
could have if they had more time.   
Other LiPs regarded the courtroom as their space, a service for them as citizens to argue their case. 
Examples are, the LiP who stopped the Judge from policing the relevance of his cross-
examination, and the LiPs in Chapter 4 who said one of the reasons they were litigating in person 
was because they did not like the culture of deference towards judges. These LiPs believed that 
their right to litigate in person must include granting them the time needed to put their case to the 
court in a style that suited them, availing themselves of a service on offer. They did not see any 
purpose in deference towards judges. As one LiP explained:  
I think it becomes a bit of a club. They are trained as lawyers and then the lawyers 
become judges and it is all a bit incestuous in terms of what happens. The thought that 
struck me …, you know when the judge comes into the room and they say “all rise”, I 
almost think it should be the other way around because at the end of the day the judges 
are the servants of the people, not the other way round. A big healthy helping of 
humility wouldn’t go amiss in the judiciary to realise that they are there to serve the 
people. 
This conception puts the justice system at the service of the people, based on the idea of litigants 
as consumers. That image is at odds with legal professionals’ image of law, promoted through legal 
                                                          
60 See Chapter 2, pages 129-130. 
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education, as doctrine focused and a public good going beyond the litigants in a particular case.61 
Where little deference is displayed, it causes tension between the bench and LiPs. As a District 
Court judge said, while LiPs “are often better than lawyers” they are also “annoying”: 
They don’t necessarily shut up - to put it bluntly. It is nothing personal. They’re not 
used to how the court operates and rules of court and the fact that it is the judge that 
is in charge.  
Policy changes, both in New Zealand and abroad, may be in part responsible for LiPs conceiving 
themselves as consumers.62 For example, the requirement to pay filing and hearing fees,63 and the 
introduction of an annual survey measuring “court-user satisfaction”, designating court users as 
“customers”. 64  The Chief High Court Judge criticised this development, which she noted also 
included calling judges and lawyers “stakeholders” and District Court centres “franchises”: “We 
are now to understand that we are part of a market for justice services and our product is being 
‘marketised’”.65 A participant told a story that illustrated market ideology becoming embedded in 
the court system: a bailiff was warned not to enforce an order against a vulnerable, one-shot 
litigant, because the litigant’s right to a stay had not yet expired. The party seeking to enforce the 
order was a large, well-resourced, repeat litigant. The bailiff enforced the order regardless, without 
waiting for the right to stay to expire, on the basis that the repeat litigant enforcing the order “had 
a right to customer service”.   
Judges, particularly in the High Court, saw their role as developing precedent, rather than simply 
adjudicating private disputes. As Genn argues, “civil justice has important and extensive social 
functions that go beyond settling disputes” between individuals, including “functions in relation 
to social justice, economic stability and social order”. 66  Promoting the idea of litigants as 
                                                          
61 See for example Julie Macfarlane The New Lawyer: How Settlement is Transforming the Practice of Law (UBC Press, 
Vancover, 2008) at 33 for legal education as doctrine focussed. See Chapter 2, pages 34-35 for discussion of litigation 
as a public good.  
62 Macfarlane, above n 48 at 51 noted evidence in Canada of LiPs viewing the “… justice system as a ‘service’ facility, 
no different from other government offices” and that going to court would include the same complexity and 
involvement for the LiP as “… applying for a passport or a vehicle licence”. Sharyn Roach Anleu and Kathy Mack 
"Magistrates' Everyday Work and Emotional Labour" (2005) 32(4) Journal of Law and Society 590 at 596 suggest that 
the concept of “emotional labour” used in their analysis may have “become more applicable due to management 
reforms and a concern with measuring client/customer satisfaction” (citing Richard Moorhead, Avrom Sherr and 
Alan Paterson "What Clients Know: Client Perspectives and Legal Competence" (2003) 10(1) International Journal 
of the Legal Profession 5). 
63 High Court Fees Regulations 2013; District Court Fees Regulations 2009; Family Court Fees Regulations 2009. The 
family justice reforms also introduced a mandatory fee for Family Dispute Resolution. 
64 Ministry of Justice "Court User Survey 2014" (October 2014)  <www.justice.govt.nz> (The survey respondents 
include litigants, criminal defendants, and people attending court to support a friend or relative).  
65 Helen Winkelmann "Access to Justice – Who Needs Lawyers?" (2014) 13(2) Otago Law Review 229 at 232. This 
trend was evident from interviews with court staff who said that people holding long term institutional 
knowledge had been shifted out of their roles and people from other areas moved in, emphasizing their role 
as bureaucrats rather than experts. 
66 Hazel Genn Judging Civil Justice (Cambridge University Press, Cambridge, UK; New York, 2010) at 17.  
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“customers” creates expectations that are at odds with the idea of litigation as a public good and 
the dominant ideas of the bench and bar. This suggests a mismatch between some LiPs’ 
expectations about how long they should have to argue their case and the goals of speed and 
efficiency being pursued in the court.  
2. Strangers in the Halls of Justice 
A metaphor that LiPs, the bench and bar all used is that of the court as a “foreign land”.67 The 
idea that LiPs are visitors to this foreign land of justice is useful for reframing the problems that 
arise in these interactions. The features of this foreign land include specific rules about turn-taking, 
forms of address, physical proximity (specific seating positions in the courtroom with no 
movement around the court), eye contact (litigants should look at the Judge rather than addressing 
their adversary when making an argument), language (both vocabulary and register),68 and dress 
(gowns with a dark suit in the High Court, muted colours and formal clothing in the District and 
Family Court). The fact that many LiPs belong to the same national culture and speak the same 
English language as members of the bench and bar may worsen the problem, because where 
groups speak the same language (e.g. New Zealanders visiting the US), this may “obscure any 
differences” and the visitor “may not realise they are sending unintended messages [to the host] 
and distorting incoming information”.69 The problems are not due to LiPs’ “failures”, but, in this 
light, an unsurprising consequence of a cross-cultural interaction.  
Judges recognised that subtle forms of cross-cultural communication were important in the court: 
When everyone is represented I suppose it is like you are all in a secret club really, in 
the sense that everyone is talking off the same page and the idea is that everyone knows 
                                                          
67 See discussion above including the following quotes: “It is almost like they are speaking another language” (LiP); 
“The court process is stressful and foreign to [LiPs]” (lawyer); “I try to speak their language” (Judge). See also 
Winkelmann, above n 65 at 239: “The court system is for many a foreign land and the notion of bringing proceedings 
without legal representation can be compared to the fearful prospect of being stranded in a foreign land unable to 
speak the language, and without the money needed to find your way home.”; William Felstiner and Austin Sarat 
"Enactments of Power: Negotiating Reality and Responsibility in Lawyer-Client Interactions" (1992) 77 Cornell Law 
Review 1447 at 1455 referring to client-lawyer interactions as that of two cultures “[m]aking a landfall in the 
treacherous waters of each other’s world”. 
68 Janet Holmes An Introduction to Sociolinguistics (4th ed, Taylor and Francis, Hoboken, 2013) at 266 explains that a 
register is developed “initially from the desire for quick, efficient and precise communication” but over time it develops 
“… more and more characteristics – lexical, syntactic and even phonological – which distinguish their communications 
from those of other groups. Eventually these specialised registers may be very difficult for outsiders to penetrate”. 
Sharyn Roach Anleu, Kathy Mack and Jordan Tutton "Judicial Humor in the Australian Courtroom" (2014) 38(2) 
Melbourne University Law Review 621 identify the specific uses of humour in the courtroom. This varies from the 
forms and appropriateness of humour in other settings. Tatiana Tkačuková "Language and Law" (2015)  
<www.linglaw.org> is a linguist researching the communication needs of litigants in person. The results of her study 
are due to be published in July 2015. 
69 Colleen Ward, Stephen Bochner and Adrian Furnham The Psychology of Culture Shock (2nd ed, Routledge, Hove, 
England, 2001) at 53. 
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what the law is and you can use certain words and phrases that everyone knows what 
it means. (HC Judge) 
It is a funny thing courtroom dynamics. It is just little things, isn't it? (DC Judge) 
Procedural justice theory, discussed in Chapter 2, suggests that the Judge is correct to think that it 
is the little things that matter. Procedural justice theory points to LiPs being attentive to whether 
they are being treated with dignity and respect, are given an opportunity to participate and to 
whether the forum is neutral.70  Misunderstanding the roles and reasons for conduct in this foreign 
land negatively affected some LiPs’ sense of procedural justice. Some expected assistance from the 
Judge and thought the judge would know their case well. When the Judge disappointed these 
expectations, the LiPs attributed this to the Judge being lazy or inadequate or prejudiced against 
them. Where opposing counsel were cool towards them they believed the counsel were trying to 
“rile” them, whereas it is possible the counsel were protecting themselves and their clients 
(although there was some evidence that the motives were not always so pure). When Judges made 
changes in procedure because they wanted information to help them reach a substantively correct 
decision, such as deferring to opposing counsel, this negatively affected LiPs’ sense of procedural 
justice. 
When Judges tried to make the court less foreign, by way of using a familiar style of interaction, 
LiPs felt more comfortable. One felt like the Judge was “speaking English” when the Judge 
abandoned the legal register and instead adopted an informal tone to address the parties. Another 
was pleased to get a smile from the Judge, even though it was at the LiP’s expense (having misused 
the term “bench”). While these judicial efforts made LiPs more comfortable they could also result 
in “cross-cultural” communication breaking down. For example, one LiP was buoyant after a 
judicial conference, both because he misapprehended the difficulty of the task before him but also 
believing the Judge was “warming up”, having smiled while in court. I, however, perceived the 
conference to be legally-disastrous and held grave concerns for his case (later realised). Staying 
within the formal register, however, can lead not only to puzzlement but also to “upset and 
anger”.71 Discussing examination of lay witnesses in criminal trials, Fielding concludes that the 
“unfamiliar, mannered and challenging questioning styles may feed a sense of unfairness” among 
lay participants. 72  This suggests that the foreignness of the court environment may create 
miscommunication and alienation regardless of the best intentions of all involved. Whether there 
                                                          
70 See Chapter 2, pages 32-34 for discussion of procedural justice. 
71 Fielding, above n 31 at 292. 
72 At 292. 
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is a need for the court environment to be foreign, and to what extent, is debatable.73 For present 
purposes it is sufficient to note the seemingly intractable tensions it creates.  
3. Excising Emotion 
A feature of this foreign land is a different role for emotion. In this world, emotion is considered 
“irrational, disorderly, impulsive and personal”, and at odds with the dispassion and impartiality 
that are core judicial values.74 Roach Anleu and Mack argue that Judges must manage their own 
emotions and that of the court users to maintain the “impartiality, fairness and decorum” of the 
court and the appearance of “rational application of law”.75  
Lawyers serve this function as they “filter out or manage many emotions”, so that what is presented 
to the court is a legal argument, “… relatively independent of external forces, including the 
concerns and demands of lay participants”.76 Where litigants appear in person there is no lawyer 
to perform this filtering. The Judge is left to manage the “raw emotions” of the LiP,77  and may 
have to perform extra work managing their own emotions, for example in displaying patience and 
courtesy.78 This work is “an essential component of enabling court users to experience the legal 
process as fair, impartial, and legitimate”.79 However, while the dispassionate atmosphere of the 
court may enhance procedural fairness, it may also produce a sense that the judge has not 
understood or heard all aspects of their case that they think are relevant.80 
In the lower courts judges have more contact with lay people, either as LiPs or witnesses, and a 
higher volume of cases, so do more work managing emotion (their own and others).81 The higher 
court judges usually need to do this work less, so the presence of LiPs requires them to perform 
additional work to which they are not so accustomed. For example, a High Court Judge described 
a competent family law appellant in person and struggled to articulate what made the case difficult 
to hear: 
                                                          
73 The reasons for the foreignness of the court is debatable. The robes, language and “odd etiquette” can remind both 
judges and litigants that court is unlike a normal social interaction, and involves the rational application of law to fact: 
Judith Resnik "Managerial Judges" (1982) 96 Harvard Law Review 374 at 383. Alternatively, it can be conceived as a 
means of maintaining social closure, making it difficult for lay people to break the monopoly over legal services: see 
Chapter 2, pages 29-30.  
74 Sharyn Roach Anleu and Kathy Mack "Judicial Authority and Emotion Work" (2013) 11 The Judicial Review 329 
at 329-330. 
75 Roach Anleu and Mack, above n 62 at 603; Roach Anleu and Mack, above n 74 at 330. 
76 Roach Anleu and Mack, above n 62 at 591. 
77 At 607-611 describe techniques developed by magistrates who often hear cases involving LiPs to manage emotion 
in the court including acting like a mediator, taping proceedings and taking adjournments. 
78 Roach Anleu and Mack, above n 74 at 335.  
79 Roach Anleu and Mack, above n 62 at 593. 
80 See discussion of the role of emotion in Chapter 4, pages 113-114 and Chapter 6, 158-161. 
81 Roach Anleu and Mack, above n 74 at 339.  
213 
 
She had prepared excellent submissions … . She knew her way around the Act … . It 
was just that she had been so closely involved in it. It was about children and 
maintenance and things. She herself was getting you know, very - quite emotionally 
involved in it. It just made the hearing - well maybe that is what they get all the time in 
the Family Court, but it is just not quite what we are used to here. 
While not articulated, it may be the additional “emotion work” that the Judge was required to do 
that was troubling.  
LiPs’ raw emotions also present a challenge to the “purity” of the judges’ work. Abbott argues that 
status within the legal profession is a “function of professional purity … the ability to exclude 
nonprofessional issues or irrelevant professional issues from practice”.82 Corporate law operates 
in an exclusively legal world and is therefore much “cleaner” and therefore of higher status than 
criminal prosecution or tenancy evictions where the “drama in real human lives, [mocks] the 
pristine abstraction of the law”.83 The presence of LiPs therefore challenges the purity of the work, 
particularly in the higher courts, bringing emotion into a place where cases are usually stripped to 
legal principles. The role of emotion is therefore another explanation for tension between the 
professional participants and LiPs in the courtroom.  
E. Conclusion 
The court is the legal profession’s heartland and the symbolic meeting place of law and society. 
When LiPs enter this domain they enter a foreign land designed its usual inhabitants, the legal 
profession and the judiciary, in mind. LiPs bring their own interpretations and expectations to the 
courtroom that often differ from those of opposing counsel and judges, generating tensions which 
are not easily resolvable, even when all try to overcome them. Judges are however committed to 
giving some substance to the bare right to access the courts in person and employ various 
techniques to try and accommodate the LiPs.  The judges and lawyers also have an interest in 
protecting the domain of the courtroom from LiPs, both because it places their roles under strain 
and makes additional demands on time, and because the courtroom is an important centre of the 
legal profession’s identity.  
In the next chapter I continue exploring these themes, examining the final stages of litigation: 
judgment, costs, enforcement, and appeals, as well as LiPs’ complaints against opposing counsel 
and judges.  
 
                                                          
82 Abbott, above n 55 at 823. 






Once the process of appearing in court was over, LiPs waited for judgment. Sometimes this was a 
brief wait, with oral judgment given immediately, or a written judgment handed down shortly after 
the proceeding. For others, there was a period of several months before the outcome was known. 
For many LiPs, judgment did not mean the end of proceedings but the beginning of further 
arguments over costs, enforcements and appeals. After judgment, and sometimes during litigation, 
some became involved with complaints.  
This chapter considers this process after court and returns to the question addressed in the chapter 
about becoming a LiP, to examine what LiPs thought in retrospect would have been the value of 
having a lawyer. The final part of the chapter looks at the end of proceedings in the context of the 
themes of projecting accessibility, lay expectations, and dangerousness. As persistent litigants 
usually express their persistence in terms of multiple appeals, this chapter also has an extended 
discussion about the vexing issue of persistent litigants.  
 
I. Finalising Proceedings 
A. Writing Judgments 
The Judges, particularly in the High Court, said they tended to hear all argument and then reserve 
their decision. This option was not always available in the higher volume, lower courts. Where 
Judges could reserve judgment, it had two advantages: courtroom management and accuracy.  
From a courtroom management perspective, Judges said they preferred not to give oral rulings 
because of the possibility that it would cause disruption and argument in court. This was 
particularly in relation to “vexatious litigants”, whom Judges thought might get upset in court: 
My mentor’s advice was – and what I advise others – you know, sit there, hear what 
they are saying, don’t interrupt, keep quiet, do the best you can to not say anything. 
Take a full note of what they are saying and reserve your judgment. (HC Judge) 
The concern was borne out, for example, by one LiP’s description of an oral judgment handed 
down to him in Court some years ago: 
Judges never say what they are going to rule on anymore. [One Judge] is the worst of 
any Judge. [That Judge] is just disgusting. I had a stand up argument with [that Judge], 
who said “I’m the Judge and I will rule”. We had a stand up argument and [the Judge] 
just kept ignoring the facts.  
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Court staff said that on occasion a security guard was posted in the back of the court or in the 
registry office, particularly when someone whom they believed was “prone to loud and almost 
violent outbursts” was in the courthouse. A family law practitioner also pointed to the risk of 
outbursts in that court, particularly in the post-reform courts when more litigants are expected to 
appear in person: “There could well be violence because these people aren’t rational who come 
before the Family Court”.  
Recall that Judges identified a number of issues with LiP documents (in general) and also style of 
presentation in court, for example long and unfocused submissions. Judges said that where these 
issues occurred, judgment writing took longer because of the time it took to ensure they accurately 
understood the LiP’s case and accurately applied the relevant law.  High Court Judges said that 
extra time required to write judgments in LiP cases was a reason they “not always, but in a fair 
number of cases”, took more judicial time:1 “Sometimes it does take a bit of extra thinking”; “You 
have to do a lot of foot work yourself”. Judges said that this extra time was also needed for 
persistent litigants who often brought cases that were “absolutely clear cut”, in the sense of lacking 
any merit. The Judge said that even if ultimately there “was nothing to the point” you still “have 
to go to a lot of trouble” because sometimes they “have a good point. The trouble is finding it”.  
One Judge, and a few lawyers, considered that having a LiP as a party negatively affected the quality 
of judgments: “It is just impossible to do a job that also involves development of the law or some 
issues that might involve that, without legal assistance” (HC Judge). Other lawyers however 
thought that judgments were better when LiPs were involved. A Family Court lawyer said that 
judges, like lawyers, probably, “… take a little more care in their paperwork because you want to 
feel like you've dotted your ‘i’s and crossed your ‘t’s”. So:   
The decisions are usually very well crafted so that, if it went to the High Court or 
something, that a High Court judge would be in no doubt about what decision was 
reached and why. I'm not saying they don't give quality decisions in other cases, but if 
you've got lawyers representing and they are pretty clear about what the result is going 
to be then they are going to be perhaps not quite as careful as they'd be with litigants 
in person. 
Judgments, either oral or written, sometimes contained statements about the LiP’s conduct of the 
case being typical of LiPs in general.2 Sometimes these were phrased as being “understandable” 
given the complexity of the procedure, and at other times were given as examples of problematic 
LiP behaviour, such as using inflammatory language and making claims (sometimes scandalous) 
                                                          
1 The other major reason cited for LiP cases usually taking longer was longer hearing times, see Chapter 8, page 202. 
2 I am unable to quote examples of statements from judgments because the quote could be entered into a legal database 
and would match a case, thereby disclosing the identity of the participant. 
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without evidentiary support. In judicial minutes or judgments on interlocutory applications, the 
comments on LiP conduct formed part of an encouragement to seek advice or representation. At 
other times the statements were made in support of costs awards against the LiP.  
B. Costs 
1. Costs against LiPs 
In the District and High Courts the general rule is that the unsuccessful party pays the successful 
party’s costs.3 Costs are, however, discretionary. In the Family Court, costs are also discretionary, 
although at the time of the research costs orders in the Family Court were relatively uncommon 
in cases involving children.4  
A court staff member said that LiPs were aware of the fees, as they had to pay them to initiate 
proceedings, but many LiPs did not understand the fact that, just because “you by-pass the legal 
advice step … and avoided legal fees yourself”, you don’t avoid “your liability for costs orders 
against you”.5 A few LiPs told me they “had nothing left to lose” by taking or defending 
proceedings, which suggests a lack of understanding that a costs order can be made and enforced, 
including by way of bankruptcy proceedings. 
Opposing counsel and Judges made reference to the costs of litigation, alluding to the costs for 
which  the LiP might be liable if unsuccessful. This exchange in a High Court case is an example:  
LiP: (Hands over a large box of discovery documents and talks about the cost of 
printing them). 
Opposing counsel: The cost of litigation, eh? I had a case recently where the discovery 
folders and dividers cost $1000. Not cheap is it, nor the hearing fees either. That is why 
I want five days. Poor [first name of opposing party] has to pay $3,500 per day.  
The meaning of this exchange, which I interpreted partly as a warning, may have gone unnoticed 
by the LiP who demonstrated a very rudimentary understanding of the costs regime. Some lawyers 
suggested there was an arguable case for saying costs awards against LiPs should be higher because 
litigating against LiPs created additional expense. 
                                                          
3 High Court Rules, r 14.1 and District Court Rules 2009, r 4.2 (now 14.2 of District Court Rules 2014). 
4 Family Court Rules 2002, r 207, but note there is debate about the operation of costs in the Family Court (see Simon 
Jefferson (ed) Brookers Family Law: Family Procedure (online, looseleaf ed, Brookers) at [CD1]. 
5 There are fees for all applications, but the fees for High Court applications are particularly high. As the Chief High 
Court Judge calculated, the fee payable for a straightforward one day hearing in the High Court, is $6,700: (Helen 
Winkelmann "Access to Justice – Who Needs Lawyers?" (2014) 13(2) Otago Law Review 229. The same calculation 
using the District Court Fees Regulations 2009 is $2,300 for a one day hearing in the District Court (or $1,400 for a 
half day). This fee can be waived by the Registrar if the litigant is a beneficiary or "would otherwise suffer undue 
financial hardship": High Court Fees Regulations, reg 19 and District Court Fees Regulations 2009, reg 5.  
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Judges, lawyers and court staff encouraged LiPs to seek representation, sometimes bluntly, at other 
times by way of more gentle encouragement.6 When this advice was not heeded it was sometimes 
invoked in justifying costs awards. As a High Court Judge said: 
Sometimes you get litigants who have been repeatedly advised to instruct, or at least to 
get legal advice, and then lose horribly, so submissions [by opposing counsel] are made 
about that. [The submissions are about] the recommendations to do that [get advice or 
representation] and the [LiP] bearing the consequences, I suppose.  
Oceanic Palms Ltd v Disputes Tribunal at Auckland,7 and Belling v Belling,8 are both examples of cases 
where the Judge accepted submissions that the LiP took unnecessary steps and put the opposing 
party to expense in the face of judicial warnings about costs and the need to seek representation. 
In Belling, Hammond J approved Fisher J’s holding:9 
While an unrepresented party should not be penalised on that account alone, if the 
result has been to throw an extra burden of legal costs upon the represented party, 
there is no reason why some recognition should not be given to that.  
In Oceanic, Courtney J held, “… the reality is that litigants in person must be taken to accept the 
dangers of managing the court process without legal assistance”.10  
Where a LiP is successful there is generally no right to recover costs, only out of pocket expenses.11 
In the leading case, In Re Collier (a bankrupt),12 Temm J said that whether LiPs should be paid for 
their “time and trouble raises many important considerations of both policy and practice, and … 
is not really a matter that can be solved by a Court”.13 One of the “policy” reasons, hinted at but 
not explained, is that awarding costs to LiPs might encourage them. As a High Court Judge in this 
research said, “I would have thought if [LiPs] became entitled to costs that would act as an 
incentive to self-representation and, as I say, I don’t think it should be encouraged”. One Judge 
also suggested that, while LiP numbers were currently manageable, if they “become a real concern” 
there are a number of measures that could be taken, including better education about how to 
conduct themselves, and “costs orders can be made against lay litigants; the Court can take a firmer 
line with them in the conduct of litigation”. Other Judges and lawyers also said costs awards in 
                                                          
6 See Chapter 6 for discussion on encouraging LiPs to seek representation. 
7 Oceanic Palms Ltd v Disputes Tribunal at Auckland 13 May 2005, HC Auckland CIV-2005-404-39913. 
8 Belling v Belling (1996) 9 PRNZ 296 (HC).  
9 At 576.  
10 Oceanic Palms Ltd v Disputes Tribunal at Auckland, above n at [12].  
11 Out of pocket expenses, referred to as disbursements, includes legal fees for limited retainer advice: Official Assignee 
v Cavell Leitch Pringle & Boyle HC Christchurch CP131/88; B28/91, 18 August 1995.  
12 Re Collier (A Bankrupt) [1996] 2 NZLR 438 (CA).  
13 At 12 at 441 per Temm J.  
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favour of LiPs would encourage more litigants, as well as saying that costs should not be awarded 
because the LiP had not incurred costs, only time and effort, which all litigants put into litigation.  
Many LiPs said that the amount of work they put into preparing a legal case exceeded what a 
represented litigant would ordinarily expend, particularly if the LiP carried out the research 
necessary to present the case thoroughly and in keeping with the rules. LiPs said that they put in 
“hours and hours” of time and cited loss of income from other activities and distraction from 
work: “Your productivity goes down” (HC LiP). A LiP who was receiving a Government benefit 
said: 
The whole court thing would be impossible if I was working full-time. All the time I’d 
need to take out to go to meetings, court, assessments, and being able to do research 
and prepare all the paperwork. I mean if I’d been working full-time that would never 
have happened, or else I’d be censured for spending too much time doing my private 
stuff. (FC LiP) 
Some lawyers and Judges recognised this, particularly District Court Judges, and said that LiPs 
should get, if not costs, then “compensation or restitution” for the “time out of work, … lost 
wages, … travel, and that sort of thing” (DC Judge).  
One LiP who was successful in his High Court case noted that the presumption against costs in 
favour of LiPs was not just unfair in terms of compensating him for the time he spent. He also 
believed the presumption encouraged his opposing represented party to appeal against him, 
because even if they lost the appeal they would be exposed only for the amount of their own costs, 
not his costs. Similarly, a High Court LiP believed that the presumption against recovering costs 
encouraged the opposing party’s counsel to take unnecessary interlocutory steps, as it would create 
more work for her, but little risk of having to pay costs. 
C. Enforcement 
Several LiPs were frustrated and disappointed when they realised the court orders and negotiated 
agreements were not self-executing.14 As one LiP said, “Well, you imagine you go to Harvey 
Norman and buy a washing machine, but the delivery man doesn't deliver it. That is how I'm 
feeling”. She was one of three LiPs who entered into agreements to divide relationship property 
with their former partner but struggled to enforce the agreement.15 
                                                          
14 William Felstiner and Austin Sarat "Enactments of Power: Negotiating Reality and Responsibility in Lawyer-Client 
Interactions" (1992) 77 Cornell Law Review 1447 at 1461 identify that in the context of divorce proceedings many 
“clients are slow to realize that many legal entitlements are not self-executing”.  
15 These agreements were made under the Property (Relationships) Act 1976, s 21. Their difficulties may not be 
surprising given there remains a question over whether a s21 agreement can be enforced as part of a proceeding, 
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Most litigants obey court decisions “whether or not they agree with it, because it issues from an 
institution with such authority”.16 In these cases there is no need for parties to enforce decisions. 
Crantson notes that in family law non-compliance is high and parties often have to approach the 
court afresh to bring enforcement proceedings.17 A Family Court LiP who initially instructed a 
lawyer did not comprehend the difficulties with enforcing court orders until after a defended 
hearing. At that point he had spent three years and thousands of dollars in legal fees:  
It took me about two weeks to realise, after we'd been to court, that I’d been done like 
a dog’s dinner. It didn't mean the end of things, all the rest of it. I still had contact 
issues and various other things. 
He decided to start litigating in person after this point, dissatisfied and feeling cheated at having 
no certainty after spending so much of his savings. Another LiP became frustrated when Family 
Court staff were unable to tell her what process to use to enforce the division of trust assets:  
I’m back to square one: how do I get these sealed orders implemented? I don't think 
there is a process, or if there is a process, no one on the court counter knows how to 
do it. Everyone assumes that because you've got orders they'll comply with them. 
For those who recognised the difficulties with enforcement in advance, it was a factor in deciding 
to litigate in person, believing a lawyer would add little when the litigant expected the opposing 
party would be intransigent or impecunious.18  
D. Appealing 
The research was focused on first instance determinations of disputes, but some LiPs did discuss 
appeals or were involved in appeals as appellant or respondent. Most LiPs said they were too 
intimidated by the formality of the appeal courts (the Court of Appeal, Supreme Court, and in 
some cases the High Court), to appeal their cases. When I asked a High Court LiP if she was going 
to appeal the decision she said: “Hell no! I left school at 15, man. I was a solo mum at 16”, and 
said she did not have “the courage or the will to appeal”. A few LiPs (mostly High Court LiPs) 
considered appealing was the natural next step. As one LiP said, “I am currently preparing for 
what I know is my inevitable appeal”. The LiP did not yet have the judgment and there was nothing 
in the conduct of the trial that he had raised as a possible ground for appeal. This comment 
                                                          
although it can be enforced via normal civil remedies. See Bill Atkin and others Fisher on Matrimonial and Relationship 
Property (online, looseleaf ed, LexisNexis, Wellington) at [5.14].  
16 Ross Cranston "What Do Courts Do?" (1986) 5 Civil Justice Quarterly 123 at 139. See also Tom Tyler Why People 
Obey the Law (Princeton University Press, Princeton, 2006) at 172, concluding that people will comply with legal 
authorities where they believe the authority has followed fair procedure.  
17 Cranston, above n 16 at 140. 
18 See Chapter 4, page 95. A LiP who recognised potential difficulties enforcing a judgment weighed this in his decision 
to litigate in person. He assessed his likelihood of success on the legal claim as “90 per cent” and thought employing 
a lawyer might improve that chance “marginally”: “However, I would still have the problem of getting my money”. 
220 
 
therefore indicated a fundamental misunderstanding about the nature of an appeal: there must be 
an error of fact or law to appeal against. An appeal is not a second-chance to argue the case.19 
A small number of very persistent litigants made multiple collateral attacks on the original 
judgment, sometimes launching multiple proceedings:  
Unfortunately [the LiP] came across the ability to recall. I think at one stage [he] was 
applying for recall of a decision, refusing to recall a decision, refusing to recall a 
decision, refusing to recall a strike out of a decision - so he was asking to recall the third 
lot of … refusals of recall. So, you know, that was just a nightmare. (Civil Litigation 
Lawyer) 
The collateral attacks were not just against the decision but sometimes against the decision-maker 
as well. Persistent LiPs made complaints to the Judicial Conduct Commissioner (JCC)(discussed 
below) and launched private prosecutions or other proceedings against the Judges, attacking the 
Judges’ professionalism: 
[A persistent litigant] said I was bribed by the defendants. I’m not quite sure what 
happened because I was supposed to have been on a [tropical] holiday and I didn’t get 
it. And with everyone else he alleged corruption and judicial bias and all these sorts of 
thing, to keep the [case] going. (DC Judge) 
This pattern of appeals and collateral attack (often by way of judicial review, which originates in 
the High Court), is probably responsible for the much higher percentage of persistent litigants in 
the higher courts. As a District Court judge commented: 
I think the higher up the food chain in the law you go the worse the self-reps, because 
the Supreme Court, that is their regular diet - so I mean it is not - it is a problem shared 
across the benches. 
II. In Retrospect - Reflections on the value of having a lawyer 
A. The value of lawyers – in retrospect  
I asked LiPs whether, with funds and their time again, they would instruct a lawyer. Few gave a 
definitive answer, qualifying statements that they would choose a lawyer with conditions such as 
needing the “right” lawyer. This would be someone with both the necessary specialisation and 
commitment to the detail of their case, and they doubted such a person existed. LiPs who said 
they probably would instruct a lawyer emphasised, not the benefits of the lawyer’s professional 
knowledge, but their belief that their case would be taken more seriously if they had a lawyer.  
                                                          
19 Part II of Rosemary Hunter and others The Changing Face of Litigation: Unrepresented Litigants in the Family Court of 
Australia (2002) is a detailed consideration of the problems LiPs faced in appealing Family Court decisions, including 
discussion of the fact that many LiPs misunderstood “the function of the appellate court, viewing an appeal as a right 
to a complete hearing de novo” (at 123).   
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A number of Family Court LiPs felt they simply were not listened to by the Judge, opposing lawyer, 
court staff, and lawyer for child, because they were a LiP. As one said:  
It is almost like you are not being believed because you are not a lawyer. [The opposing 
counsel] can stand up and say … things which aren’t true and it is okay.  
Another Family Court LiP said that there “was no practical advantage whatsoever” in being a LiP: 
“You get totally ignored [by the Judge and lawyer for child] on ridiculous points”.  
Family Court LiPs suggested this was due to a very strong presumption that litigants would be 
represented. For example, a LiP was surprised at how difficult it was to have his lawyer removed 
from the record when the lawyer failed to file a withdrawal of representation when he instructed 
the lawyer to do so. He said the court staff would not deal with him until they had received the 
withdrawal. He said:  
If the lawyer is non-contactable, it is ridiculous that it should stop a court process. You 
should be able to register the fact that a respondent is saying they don't want a lawyer 
present. They could have just recorded it on the file, say “We've had a notification in-
person from [name] that he doesn't want to have a lawyer”. It should be made easier. 
The default seems to be that you need to have a lawyer for something to work. 
Another Family Court LiP thought it was a widespread and strongly held belief that all litigants 
need a lawyer:20 
So every professional freaks when [they hear] I am self-represented. I got that you need 
a lawyer from just about every one of the professionals. There is a morbid fear, parallel 
to the fear held by humans in the days when [they thought] the earth was flat, and that 
if you travelled so far you would fall off the end of the world. It is worse than the Santa 
[Claus] myth, because at least when you get to 10 years [old] you realise it’s a myth.  
This LiP eventually instructed a lawyer after both the Judge and lawyer for child strongly urged 
her to find counsel, but she did not do so willingly: “I've had massive resistance; they want to find 
some excuse to keep me out. I'm sad about the lack of choice; it is like I don't have a choice”.  
In addition to believing a lawyer would make the judges and lawyers take them more seriously, 
LiPs also considered that a lawyer would have been helpful for screening them from the opposing 
party’s attack:  
[My lawyer] was in some ways like a bodyguard, like a [pop star] bodyguard. He stops 
the person who is a little bit delinquent, or a little bit impassioned, from getting into 
trouble, if that makes sense. It is really stupid, it shouldn't be like that. I have an 
immaculate police record, I'm a fully registered [professional] and I - I get all those 
                                                          
20 This quote is an unabbreviated version of the original text message: “So evry professional freks wen i am self rep. I 
got da u ned a lawyer frm jst bwt ev1 ov da proffesionals. Dea is a morbid fear paralell 2 da fear held by humans in 
da days wen da earth was flat n dat if u traveld so far u wud fall off da end ov da world. Its worse dan da santa myth 
cos at least wen u get 2 10 yrs u realise its a myth”. 
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things - all my integrity and stuff is called into question by [the opposing party's] lawyer. 
... When I employed [my former lawyer] it is like I dropped behind the barrier and he, 
ah, diverts attention from me to the issue - keeps the focus on the issue. 
Another LiP identified similar benefits in having a lawyer, and instructed a lawyer for the final 
hearing:  
I took a lawyer in for that just to finish it off, just to speak a bit more aggressively in 
court, because in court, when you are self-represented, you can't speak aggressively. 
Alright? You can't thump your fist on the bench and start saying "These allegations are 
ridiculous and false, and no, I don't have anger issues". You can't do that, but your 
lawyer can.  
These LiPs recognised, in retrospect at least, the screening function a lawyer could serve. Rather 
than presenting themselves in the “raw”, a lawyer could limit their contact with the opposing party 
and present their legal case while shielding them. Matt’s story illustrates the decision that some of 
the LiPs came to, that it was preferable to employ a lawyer for at least part of the proceeding, so 
that they would have the benefit of the lawyer as a screen.  
B. Complaining 
Some LiPs were satisfied with their experience and praised or at least had some positive comments 
about the court staff, Judges and lawyers involved in their case. Many had criticisms and made 
complaints seeking redress for perceived failings. Most commonly these complaints were made to 
the MoJ (about legal aid) or the Law Society, sometimes about their previous counsel but also 
about the opposing party’s counsel, or to the JCC, about their presiding Judge. The other avenues 
of complaint were the Courts’ Manager, the Heads of Bench, the Minister of Justice, the Minister 
for Courts, Members of Parliament, the Ombudsman, Human Rights Commissioner, Privacy 
Commissioner, Police, newspapers, web forums and talkback radio.  
Complaining is often associated with persistent litigants,21 but novice and one-shot LiPs also made 
complaints, sometimes several. The Law Society does not record the proportion of complaints 
that come from LiPs, but I was surprised by the large number of complaints that the LiPs in my 
study made to the Law Society. The complaints covered a range of issues. Over-charging was a 
common source of complaint, either where the lawyer had previously been acting for the LiP, or 
was acting on a limited retainer. Where the lawyer complained about was the opposing counsel, 
complaints concerned failing to answer correspondence, rudeness, and bullying. Lawyers were 
generally defensive when the subject was raised; several said they had received complaints but 
                                                          
21 See discussion of persistent litigants, Chapter 2, pages 18-21. 
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emphasised they had successfully defended them. One lawyer also suggested that a LiP complaint 
might have been made to manipulate the conduct of the litigation: 
She made some sort of complaint [to the Law Society] that was intended to demonstrate 
unprofessional conduct. But, of course, there was no substance to it. She might have 
thought that by making that complaint I might be intimidated into backing down on 
some particular step. (Civil litigation lawyer) 
The complaints that I reviewed were generally long and detailed. Lawyers who were subject to 
complaints mentioned the amount of time and effort spent defending them. Some instructed 
lawyers to reply on their behalf.  
The JCC also kept no statistics on whether complainants were LiPs, but estimated that at least 95 
per cent of complaints were from LiPs.22 The Judges did not mention the risk of JCC complaints, 
but some LiPs did complain to the JCC during the course of the research. One complained about 
a Judge’s conduct during a settlement conference. When I spoke to him immediately after the 
conference he was upbeat, saying he thought it had gone well. The following morning he was 
deflated and said that, on reflection, he was disappointed with the conference, feeling the Judge 
had not leaned heavily enough on the opposing party and was more concerned about getting a 
settlement than the rights and wrongs of the dispute. By the end of the week he had made a 
complaint about the Judge’s conduct in the conference to the JCC.  
Another LiP complained to the JCC because she felt the Judge had criticised her case so much in 
Court that the opposing counsel had been emboldened to pressure her into a settlement against 
her interests. She considered that the Judge, rather than treating her fairly and protecting her, had 
worked together with the opposing counsel to shut down her case. Neither of these LiPs were 
persistent but most of the persistent LiPs that I studied also made complaints, sometimes several.  
LiPs demonstrated little faith in the independence of the avenues of complaint: 
The Law Society isn’t an independent body. The Judicial Conduct Commissioner is a 
lawyer, the Minister of Justice is a lawyer. … It is the old boys club. Sir David [the 
Judicial Conduct Commissioner] would say “I’m not here on any legal basis, just on 
conduct”. So unless you can videotape them [the judge] having a meltdown in the court 
he could pretty much do what he likes. (FC LiP) 
The Law Society, they didn’t uphold one thing. I find that so bizarre. It feels like the 
lawyers are just covering themselves. … I’m not a lawyer and the [lawyer I complained 
about] did - I don’t know how many hundreds of pages, three quarters of a ream - to 
answer my complaint, something for everything. How can you argue against lawyers? 
                                                          
22 Email from Judicial Conduct Commissioner, 16 April 2015, on file with author. 
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[The lawyer’s partner] is on one of the committees so he’d know them all. … The 
lawyers are managing to get away with blue murder. (FC LiP) 
A High Court LiP observed that the Law Society’s response to his complaint relied on 
generalisations about how LiPs conduct themselves, listing the difficulties lawyers commonly 
experience when litigating against LiPs, rather than engaging in analysis of his particular case. He 
interpreted this as evidence of bias against LiPs and of lawyers protecting their own.  
Few of the complaints were successful. None of the LiPs who complained to the Law Society and 
JCC, whose complaints had been finalised at the time of writing, had their complaints upheld. A 
Family Court LiP was successful in having his ex-partner’s Legal Aid-funded lawyer reviewed and 
removed from the case. He said his ex-partner’s lawyer sent “totally aggressive letters and emails 
[that were] very accusing and very degrading”. The LiP’s friend, who was a lawyer, advised him 
that he did not need to respond to the letters, and that he could complain to Legal Aid:  
Legal Aid investigated it and they sent me a letter saying they've been removed from 
Legal Aid. That helped my case a lot because I then wasn't being harassed by her lawyer.  
A complaint to a Minister was also successful, although no remedy was offered. The LiP was not 
notified of a case management conference and it proceeded in the LiP’s absence. The Minister she 
complained to found there had been a failure of notification and expressed concern at this being 
an example of “less than satisfactory customer service”. 
III. Discussion 
A. Accessibility 
The process after court left some LiPs feeling excluded. Some LiPs took this exclusion to indicate 
institutional bias against them, and they believed they needed a lawyer to overcome this bias. It 
was for this reason they thought a lawyer would be of benefit, rather than for any professional skill 
and knowledge the lawyer might bring.  
The presumption against LiPs being awarded costs was one factor which led to LiPs feeling 
excluded.  This may be somewhat intentional, as the underlying purpose of the rule is discouraging 
litigation in person. The reasoning is that allowing costs recovery only for counsel encourages 
litigants to seek representation, rather than using their own time for which they will not be 
reimbursed. Judges, particularly in the High Court, said they would prefer it if all litigants were 
represented.23 That the purpose of the rule is to encourage representation has more force when 
we consider the exception to the rule: lawyers holding a current practising certificate who appear 
                                                          
23 See Chapter 8, pages 187-188. 
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in person in their own case are allowed costs, although they may not have costs for instructing, 
consulting or attending upon themselves.24  
That the rule is based on a fear of encouraging LiPs is perhaps unsurprising given the context of 
the leading case on the issue. The Court, in that case, In re Collier (a bankrupt),25 would have been 
very reluctant to do anything to encourage Mr Collier. He was a persistent litigant and four years 
later became part of the small group of litigants to be declared vexatious.26 While emphasising that 
costs were discretionary, Temm J gave examples of when LiPs recovering costs might be 
justifiable:27 
… it could happen that a litigant might involve himself in an action without hope of 
any personal gain or advantage, but purely out of the concern for the welfare of the 
general public.  
This is a high bar to set. There are other reasons to litigate that will not surmount this threshold, 
but may give rise to a sense of injustice if the LiP is not awarded costs. For example, in the Ontario 
Supreme Court case of Bergen v Sharpe, the represented defendant, who was the plaintiff’s ex-
husband, made false allegations that the LiP-plaintiff was a “dangerous criminal involved in the 
sex industry”, thereby obtaining temporary custody of the couple’s son.28 The LiP-plaintiff 
disproved the allegations and the Judge said she “presented her case efficiently and as well as most 
lawyers would have done. She did not engage in misconduct or add unnecessarily to the time 
required for the hearing”.29 The Judge awarded costs of $12,019.85 plus disbursements, 
benchmarking the award against the represented defendant’s solicitor-client costs. The Judge in 
this case was directly rebutting the stereotype that LiPs increase costs in cases or bring 
unmeritorious litigation. 
Bergen v Sharpe is part of a line of Canadian authority moving away from the presumption and 
allowing costs in favour of LiPs.30 The UK introduced legislation in 1975 allowing LiPs to recover 
                                                          
24 Hanna v Ranger (1912) 31 NZLR 159 (SC); Brownie Wills v Shrimpton [1998] 2 NZLR 320 (CA); Family Court Rules 
2002 r 86(1): “A lawyer who is a party to proceedings and acts in person is entitled to lawyers’ costs”. In Brownie Wills 
at 327, Blanchard J said, “The High Court of Australia has cast some doubt on this exception (Cachia v Haynes (1994) 
179 CLR 403 at p 412) but, not having been asked to reconsider the question, we do not depart from the practice of 
allowing costs to a solicitor/litigant”. 
25 Re Collier (A Bankrupt), above n 12.  
26 Attorney-General v Collier [2001] NZAR 137 (CA). See Chapter 2, page 21 on history of vexatious litigants in New 
Zealand. 
27 Re Collier (A Bankrupt), above n 12. 
28 Bergen v Sharpe 2013 CanLII 74188 (ON SC) at [1]. 
29 At [5]. 
30 Canadian common law provinces have also moved away from the disbursements-only presumption. The latest in 
the line of authority is Hope v Pylypow (2015 SKCA 26). My thanks to Julie Macfarlane for drawing my attention to this 
case: Julie Macfarlane "Not De Cruz - But the SRL case you should have been paying attention to this week" (27 
March 2015)  <www.representingyourselfcanada.com>. 
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costs.31 In Canada, the courts have concluded that allowing LiPs to recover costs attains the 
broader purpose of costs awards, facilitating access to justice.32 There has been judicial 
acknowledgment in New Zealand that the presumption against LiPs recovering costs may be a 
“… significant deterrent to the exercise of his right to come to court in person”,33 but this concern 
has not led to any modification of the rule. Another factor identified in Canada for abandoning 
the presumption against LiP cost recovery was that it created bargaining inequality in favour of the 
represented litigant.34 As the Saskatchewan Supreme Court recently noted, the presumption “… 
effectively inoculates a litigant facing a self-represented party against any risk of an unfavourable 
costs award”, so the represented litigant does not have the same incentive to settle.35 It is not 
difficult to see how such handling of costs could lead LiPs to conclude that lawyers hold a 
privileged place and LiPs they are not welcome. 
Similarly, judicial statements of stereotypes about the typical problems LiPs present in litigation 
also fuelled a sense of exclusion. Some of these statements may of course be entirely justified. 
They also serve as a warning to LiPs of the need to seek advice or representation (when these 
statements appear in judgments on interlocutory issues, or judicial minutes). They may also be 
used to justify costs orders against the LiP (if they appear in a final judgment or separate costs 
decision). They also communicate the fact that there are restrictions on access to the courts. Recall 
Sarat’s argument that while the courts are formally open, by stressing the limits of citizen’s 
competence to access them without a lawyer, direct access is discouraged. Judicial statements in 
judgments and minutes serve the function of stressing limited competence to any future reader. 
Future readers are unlikely to include the general public, but may include prospective LiPs 
researching their case. These statements are therefore a means of discouraging LiPs. The other 
                                                          
31 The UK has legislation governing the issue: The Litigants in Person (Costs and Expenses) Act 1975, which allows 
LiPs recovery of “… sums in respect of any work done, and any expenses and losses incurred, by the litigant in or in 
connection with the proceeding to which the order relates”. Richard Moorhead "The Passive Arbiter: Litigants in 
Person and the Challenge to Neutrality" (2007) 17 Social and Legal Studies 405 at 413 notes that in practice there is 
unequal treatment of LiPs as Judges “… tended to ask litigants in person whether they wanted to apply for costs at 
hearings and would not, for instance, specifically encourage them to respond to a suggestion that they would make 
the normal order for costs (as they would do with lawyers). In effect this means they were offering lawyers costs orders 
but not offering them to litigants in person (partly because they were difficult to quantify)”. 
32 Cf Adrian Zuckerman "A Reform of Civil Procedure - Rationing Procedure rather than Access to Justice" (1995) 
22 Journal of Law and Society 155 at 166 who argues, “[T]he indemnity rule aggravates the already existing 
disadvantage under which the poor labour” because the poorer the litigant the greater the risk of not being able to 
meet the costs award. In this sense the indemnity rule does not operate to secure access to justice in any case where 
there is financial inequity between the parties. See also Rabeea Assy Injustice in Person: The Right to Self-Representation 
(Oxford University Press, Oxford, 2015) at 203 who suggests removing the presumption of cost-shifting, so that the 
right to access the court includes “a right to go to court and lose”, without being saddled with costs.  
33 Re Collier (A Bankrupt), above n 12 at 441 quoting the High Court of Australia decision in Cachia v Hanes (1994) 179 
CLR 403 at 415-416. 
34 Hope v Pylypow, above n 30 at [57].  
35 At 30 at [56].  
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most likely readers are members of the legal profession and, if the LiP appeals, the appellate court. 
The statements reinforce beliefs about problematic LiP behaviour in the courts, and may also serve 
the purpose of telling the appellate court that this LiP was “difficult”, making it more sympathetic 
to the trial judge.   
The increasing formality, and the number of judges as a case progresses through the hierarchy of 
courts was intimidating for some LiPs who contemplated appealing.36 This of course may in part 
be intentional: a form of communicating to all litigants that appeals are not to be taken lightly, with 
the further message that this is an arena requiring specialist skill.37 However, the persistent litigants 
and some LiPs did not regard this formality as a barrier. For some, it was further evidence of the 
unfairness of the system, and all the more reason to take the appeal, or to take further proceedings 
re-litigating the original issue or collaterally attacking the original decision.  
B. Lay expectations of the courts 
Some LiPs’ frustration at the process after court can be explained in terms of a gap between their 
expectation and the reality of the judicial process. This gap may be responsible, along with other 
reasons, for the high number of complaints brought by LiPs to the JCC, and possibly also to the 
NZLS. The LiPs whom I discussed above as having complained to the JCC complained about 
judicial conduct (encouraging settlement in a settlement conference, and pointing out weaknesses 
in the LiPs’ case) that the bench and bar would both consider routine, or normal processing, and 
therefore unlikely to give rise to a complaint. In the UK, the Civil Justice Council notes that the 
misunderstanding and mistrust between LiPs and the courts may result in “increased appeals and 
complaints about Judges and lawyers, borne of misunderstanding rather than merit”.38  
Psychological theory might also go some way to explaining the high number of complaints. 
Remember the discussion of “naïve realism”, a belief that one’s own position is more correct and 
reasonable than one’s opponent’s.39 Ross and Ward explain that where a third party does not 
concur with the person’s belief, one of the responses is to attribute the third party’s “failure” to 
                                                          
36 Gowns are worn in the High Court and Court of Appeal and the Supreme Court. The Court of Appeal and Supreme 
Court buildings are much more physically imposing than the lower courts. Three to five judges sit on appeals to the 
Court of Appeal, and five judges sit on Supreme Court appeals.  
37 See Judith Resnik and Dennis Curtis Representing Justice: From Renaissance Iconography to Twenty-First-Century Courthouses 
(2007) at 338 for discussion of courthouse architecture designed to promote the dignity of the law and “excite and 
preserve the reverence of the population” quoting Clare Graham, Ordering Law: The Architectural and Social History of the 
English Law Court to 1914 (Aldershot, Ashgate, 2003) at 267-307. 
38 Civil Justice Council Access to Justice for Litigants in Person (or Self-Represented Litigants) (November 2011) at [51]. 
39 See Chapter 2, pages 26-27. 
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bias, arising from “ideology, self-interest, or some other distorting personal influence”.40 This may 
go some way to explaining why LiPs frequently referred to suspicion that the “old boy network” 
influenced the process. Of course, in New Zealand the small profession and its close connections 
to the small bench easily fuel this perception. LiPs referred to evidence of the network: marriages 
between lawyers and judges, judges’ lawyer-siblings, judges’ connections to their previous law 
firms, and events where lawyers and judges socialised together.   
Frustration also arose for LiPs when they found enforcement more difficult than expected. This 
led to one litigant feeling he had been “done like a dog’s dinner”, having paid legal fees but unable 
to enforce the orders. This gap between expectation and what the system is capable of delivering 
unsurprisingly led to LiPs seeing little benefit in instructing a lawyer, and also losing some faith in 
the system as a whole. Similarly, the litigant who referred to feeling like she had bought an 
appliance that was not delivered had her faith shaken in the protection the law would afford her. 
Her analogy also invokes the consumer perspective, the idea that the courts are a service like any 
other, discussed in the previous chapter.41 Similarly, the Minister suggesting that the failure to 
notify a LiP of a case management conference was a problem with “customer service” encourages 
viewing the courts as such a service. It may therefore be unsurprising that LiPs’ views of what a 
court should deliver are at odds with those of the bench and bar, who do not generally share a 
consumerist view of the courts’ function.  
C. Overconsumption of court resources 
A point of tension between LiPs and the bench in this final stage of the process was the additional 
time that LiP cases took, particularly in the High Court. The need to undertake more research and 
analysis in many LiP cases creates an additional demand on judges who have performance targets 
to meet, including meeting waiting times for judgments. The time taken is publically available for 
High Court decisions.42 This additional time is not, of course, required in every LiP case, nor is it 
solely the province of LiP cases, as Judges referred to poor case presentation by lawyers as well. 
However, as Judges expected this additional time would usually be necessary, it is not hard to see 
why LiP cases, particularly in the High Court, might invoke a sense of frustration.  
                                                          
40 Lee Ross and Andrew Ward "Naive Realism in Everyday Life: Implications for Social Conflict and 
Misunderstanding" in Edward Reed, Elliot Turiel and Terrance Brown (eds) Values and Knowledge (Online ed, Taylor 
and Francis, Hoboken, 2013) 103 at 111. 
41 See Chapter 8, pages 208-209 for discussion on consumer ideology.  
42 Courts of New Zealand "High Court Judgment Delivery Expectations, Inquiry Process and Recent Judgment 
Timeliness"   <www.courtsofnz.govt.nz>. 
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Similarly, responding to complaints created additional demands on lawyers’ and Judges’ time. 
Judges did not mention this issue, but as the JCC estimated that more than 95 per cent of 
complaints they receive are from LiPs, it is a small step to infer that the bench might see LiPs as 
generally carrying a higher risk of complaints. For both lawyers and Judges, responding to claims 
is more work without additional remuneration, as well as carrying potential reputational harm if 
there is publicity or an adverse finding.  
D. Persistent Litigants – Nuisance and Danger 
Overconsumption of judicial time also explains, in part, the level of concern about persistent 
litigants. If LiPs are generally over-consumers of resources, then persistent litigants are super-
consumers. They launch, by definition, a large number of cases and appeals. So too, however, do 
some other litigants who would not be characterised as persistent: finance companies, 
Government agencies, landlords with large portfolios.  
Persistent LiPs are not super-consumers of court time in terms of hearing length for each case. 
Unlike cases involving inexperienced LiPs, there are no introductions or special explanations: these 
LiPs know the rules already. The Judges dare not alter turn-taking or procedures to accommodate 
them lest they be accused of favouring the other party. They only take time in the sense that the 
Judges will let them talk until they “run out of steam”, as the most efficient way to deal with their 
cases. It is not just, therefore, the number of cases or appeals or the length of hearings that makes 
persistent LiPs the target of judicial ire.  
What is different about persistent litigants is the refusal to accept the finality of decisions handed 
down, and the accusations against the integrity of the court staff and judges personally. These are 
attacks on the integrity and legitimacy of the system itself. Gary’s story illustrates the belief of many 
persistent litigants, that there is systemic corruption that needs to be exposed and that bringing 
cases and complaints can help achieve this. 
Persistent litigants present a danger in the sense of calling the system itself into disrepute, as well 
as a number of smaller but troubling problems. As Judges noted, persistent LiPs are sometimes 
right. Failing to see a genuine point gives genuine grounds for appeal. For the Judge who misses 
the point, there lies the ignominy of being overturned on appeal in a case involving one of these 
infamous litigants. This is time consuming and frustrating work.  
The danger lies not just in creating an appealable judgment but also in the threat of physical attacks 
or harassment of the judge. Occasionally there is a risk of a physical threat such as harassment in 
a public or private space. The incidents of a decade ago, in which a fathers’ rights group picketed 
230 
 
Judges’ homes,43 were referred to by a number of lawyers and Judges. One Judge wondered, if the 
threat of such incidents grew, “who would want to be a judge?”. More often there is a threat that 
the persistent LiP will call the Judge’s professionalism into question, making allegations of fraud, 
bias and corruption, via proceedings, media, and complaints to the JCC. There may be nothing of 
substance to the allegations, but time and energy is expended on defending them.  
The concern about persistent litigants becomes more acute in the higher reaches of the court 
hierarchy. This is in part because there are proportionally more persistent litigants in the higher 
courts: appeals by definition have to be made in the appellate courts.  Persistent litigants also cause 
particular concern because they distract from what Judges, particularly in the higher courts, see as 
their central function. The District Court and Family Court Judges were more accustomed to 
higher volume work, with a great deal of energy being spent on courtroom management. As a 
District Court Judge explained:44 
You know, in our court, we are here to do the business and you've just got to get on 
with it. I mean, if we worried everyday about procedural things you'd never get anything 
done. You've got to be robust. You know, that is why the higher courts are there. If 
you are wrong, they'll just reverse you. They've got much more time and more people 
to research things. We are here, not to do illegal things, but to do things in a generally 
principled way but nevertheless without getting bogged down in the detail.  I'll tell you 
what, there is no rocket science involved in what we do. 
Further up the hierarchy, from the High Court upwards, Judges see their role as increasingly 
“pure”, in the sense of applying law and building precedent. High Court Judges referred to their 
constitutional role and two of the High Court Judges differentiated what they did from lower 
courts and tribunals on the basis that it involved “real law”, as opposed to the “robust” approach 
the District Court Judge referred to, although one apologised that this distinction sounded 
“snobby”. As discussed in the previous chapter, the highest status within the profession is 
accorded to those who do work that is the most “professionally pure”, law in the abstract or “real 
law”.45 Robert Fisher QC, a former High Court Judge, also makes this point: “Sitting judges usually 
prefer major trials of social, commercial or legal significance; few relish case management, 
                                                          
43 See for example Derek Cheng and Anne Beston "Fathers' Vendetta Angers Top Judge"  New Zealand Herald  (online 
ed, Auckland,  9 May 2006) reporting action by Union of Fathers in the mid-2000s. There have been more recent 
incidents of picketing, where the picketers have recorded and uploaded the footage on YouTube. These incidents 
have not been reported in the media and no participants referred to them. 
44 This comment is similar to Penny Darbyshire Sitting in Judgment: the Working Lives of Judges (Hart Publishing, Oxford, 
2011) at 412. The United Kingdom Judges who are equivalent to New Zealand’s District Court Judges told Darbyshire 
that they believed High Court Judges needed “a much more acute intellect” and were responsible for deciding 
important and finely balanced cases. 
45 Andrew Abbott "Status and Status Strain in the Professions" (1981) 86(4) American Journal of Sociology 819; 
Rebecca Sandefur "Work and Honor in the Law: Prestige and the Division of Lawyers' Labor" (2001) 66(3) American 
Sociological Review 382. See also discussion on “purity” in Chapter 8, page 203.  
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interlocutory applications, and high volume trivia".46 Persistent litigants are seen as creating “high 
volume trivia” and distract the Judges from precedent building: where there is no legal puzzle to 
solve, there is no law to make.  
The number of cases, accompanied by high numbers of appeals and collateral attacks, take up a 
great deal of time, present danger (of appeal, complaint, or accusation), and give little opportunity 
to make precedent.  
E. Conclusion 
The origin of many of the tensions between LiPs and the courts can be found in the process that 
comes after court. The time it takes to write judgments, and the threat of complaints and appeals, 
pose particular problems in terms of consumption of court resources. Persistent litigants amplify 
these challenges, presenting a particularly high risk of launching complaints and appeals, distracting 
Judges from what they consider to be their core function. While still formally open to LiPs, the 
court emphasises the limits of LiPs’ competence to access the courts through judgments and costs 
awards, and discourage LiPs through a presumption against awarding costs when they are 
successful. Some LiPs take these messages as evidence of institutional bias against them. Along 
with disappointed expectations in what the court might deliver by the way of finality and 
enforcement, the process after court left some LiPs frustrated and disillusioned.  
In the next chapter I draw together and discuss the findings from the different stages of the court 
process about the experience of LiPs and the court staff, lawyers, and judges’ perceptions of them. 
I then turn to evaluating possible responses.   
 
 
                                                          
46 Robert Fisher "Whether the Adversarial Process is Past its Use-By Date: A New Zealand Perspective" (Paper 
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But there is one way in this country in which all men are created equal – there is one 
human institution that makes a pauper the equal of a Rockefeller, the stupid man the 
equal of an Einstein and the ignorant man the equal of any college president. That 
institution, gentlemen, is a court.1 
I. Contradictions in the Accessibility of Courts 
The contradictions underlying LiP access to the courts are inherent in the contradictions of liberal 
society:2  
The ideology of liberal society values social equality, individual autonomy, and 
fraternity, yet the social system creates and strengthens stratification, permits 
domination, and dissolves the ties of community.  
The courts offer the “possibility of an escape from this contradiction”.3 The courts are a forum 
for people to vindicate their rights, where the powerful can be held accountable to the powerless 
under the rule of law. The number of rights promised on paper is expanding, via greater regulation 
and by reconceiving problems once considered simply private matters or misfortune as justiciable 
issues.4 Yet legal advice is expensive and the economic value of vindicating these expanding rights 
is often small. The State is unwilling or unable to pay for everyone to have legal advice. Citizens 
must, therefore, be able to go to court in person. If they cannot, the court will be seen as an 
institution open only to the “resourced elites and the outliers”,5 breaking the promise of the courts 
as a place to hold the powerful to account.  
In reality, however, the courts cannot be open to everyone, or they would be flooded with claims 
and choked by the demand. Moreover, their process is too difficult in many – even most – cases 
                                                          
1 Atticus Finch addresses the jury in Harper Lee To Kill a Mockingbird (Arrow Books, Online, 2010) at 274. 
2 David Trubek "Complexity and Contradiction in the Legal Order: Balbus and the Challenge of Critical Social 
Thought" (1977) 11 Law & Society Review 529 at 541. 
3 At 541. See also Austin Sarat "Going to Court: Access, Autonomy, and the Contradictions of Liberal Legality" in 
David Kairys (ed) The Politics of Law: A Progressive Critique (3rd ed, Basic Books, New York, 1998) 97; Judith Resnik and 
Dennis Curtis Representing Justice: From Renaissance Iconography to Twenty-First-Century Courthouses (2007) at 17.  
4 Marc Galanter Lowering the Bar: Lawyer Jokes and Legal Culture (University of Wisconsin Press, Madison, Wisconsin, 
2005) at 259. Statutes such as the Property Law Act and the Harassment Act were identified by the District Court 
Judges as popular forms of litigation for LiPs. 
5 Resnik and Curtis, above n 3 at 16. 
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for litigants to access in person. The main sources of this difficulty, discussed in the previous 
chapters, can be summarised as follows:6 
First, even if people can access information about substantive law and procedure (which is 
generally not the case in New Zealand at present), having this information is only half the battle. 
To use the system effectively, LiPs need to understand further complex matters, including legal 
relevance and the laws of evidence. A detailed understanding of court procedure is also required 
to be able to litigate strategically. Lisa’s case illustrates how a LiP can become “stuck”, unable to 
advance their own case. If a matter proceeds to trial, LiPs need to be able to examine and cross-
examine witnesses, which few can do successfully. They need to be adept at the legal register, 
correctly using forms of address and proper legal language, so they appear competent to lawyers 
and judges. Some very experienced LiPs acquire these skills, but if they become too experienced, 
as Gary’s case illustrates, they risk being considered “vexatious”, which undermines their credibility 
in another way.  
Second, there are many difficulties in practice in the LiP role. Role conflicts in being both a party 
and an advocate mean that LiPs cannot access the courts as well as lawyers can. The fact that they 
come to court without a lawyer often signals to the bench and bar that their case is weak. They 
may confront the largely incorrect belief that a clear division exists, between LiPs who litigate in 
person because they cannot afford to do otherwise, and LiPs who “choose” to represent 
themselves. Problems like these present LiPs with a disadvantage from the start. Matt’s case 
illustrates how this lack of credibility before the court can be hard to overcome and might only be 
remedied by instructing a lawyer. Moreover, like most litigants, LiPs find litigation emotionally 
stressful. When preparing for court, their lack of emotional distance makes it hard for them to 
address the need to exchange documents: receiving affidavits that contain “lies” (the other person’s 
“truth”) can be painful. Furthermore, even when emotions do not run so high, the tight trial 
timetable (especially in multi-day trials) may mean that LiPs struggle to prepare the necessary 
material, particularly if they have work commitments. Reaching a negotiated outcome is often 
difficult because both the lawyer and the LiP may be suspicious of one another and reluctant to 
negotiate. Accessing evidence may also be difficult, either due to cost (of experts) or due to fears 
others have about providing sensitive information directly to the LiP. At trial, performing the role 
of witness and advocate causes further role-conflict. All these conflicts are inherent in being an 
                                                          
6 Not all LiPs experienced all these difficulties. The evidence in this study suggests most LiPs encounter them to some 
degree and it should be kept in mind that the LiPs in this study were sufficiently proactive to have volunteered for the 
study and were therefore those who had a greater level of interaction with the system and encountered the difficulties 
more acutely. Less active LiPs may encounter fewer difficulties but may not secure more “justice”. 
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advocate in one’s own cause and arise regardless of the technical or intellectual capacity of the 
individual.  
A third matter is that lawyers do not provide only expert legal assistance. They perform many other 
roles, such as that of broker, translator and negotiator. Most disputants labour under a kind of 
naïve realism, believing “their side is ‘right’, that the other side is ‘wrong’”.7  Without a lawyer to 
help them test their case against the kind of evidence that a court will accept, they may be unable 
to see its weaknesses. Lawyers, of course, can abuse their power of negotiation with the client and 
subjugate them, which has its own problems. Where lawyers do their job well, however, they can 
test their client’s case, showing the client how the court might view it. Without the lawyer playing 
the role of translator and negotiator (with the client), a LiP may provide too much detail to the 
court, believing that if the court simply has the “facts”, then they will see the LiP is “right”. 
Providing this level of detail will often irk professional readers, like the opposing lawyer and the 
judge. At trial, LiPs may also give in to the temptation to argue the case at every point, in every 
cross-examination, re-examination, and submission with the Judge. As Tom’s case illustrates, it 
might not be until after the trial is over that the LiP realises that their case is not as open and shut 
as they had conceived it to be. All these difficulties confront successful conduct of the LiP’s case. 
The judges, lawyers, and court staff are well aware of these problems and try to assist LiPs in many 
ways including giving them advice and substantial assistance in court. In this way they help to 
maintain the appearance of accessibility, legitimating the authority of the court as a venue for 
vindicating rights. In doing so, some may also be driven by an ideological commitment to 
substantive justice. 
Their attempts to assist LiPs and therefore sustain the legitimacy of the courts are subject to 
significant cross-cutting pressures. The integrity of the courts relies on the institutional players 
protecting and economising its scarce resources, and in the process, protecting themselves from 
overload. Institutional integrity also relies on the players remaining within their defined roles and 
the presence of LiPs, as we have seen, puts these roles under strain.8 A further pressure comes 
from the professional project, to maintain the professional heartland of the court as a space for 
the profession.  
                                                          
7 Lee Ross, Mark Lepper and Andrew Ward "History of Social Psychology: Insights, Challenges, and Contributions 
to Theory and Application" in Susan Fiske, Daniel Gilbert and Gardner Lindzey (eds) Handbook of Social Psychology 
(John Wiley and Sons, Hoboken, 2010) 3 at 23. 
8 Role conflicts are: for judges, between passive arbiter and overseer of a justice process; for lawyers, between the duty 
to the client and enabling efficient and fair processing of disputes, for the benefit of their client and the court; and for 
court staff, between an administrative, information only function and as part of a justice system. 
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These pressures encourage judges, lawyers, and court staff to steer LiPs away from accessing the 
courts in person. They do not do so in all cases. There were some cases where it was quicker and 
less likely to increase conflict to simply process them rapidly through the system. In most cases, 
however, where the lawyers, court staff and judges were faced with a LiP who was trying to actively 
access the courts, they tried to steer them away but to do so without undermining the appearance 
of accessibility. The main tactic is to emphasise repeatedly their need for a lawyer. This message is 
conveyed by court staff, lawyers, and judges, and in MoJ advice to LiPs. A lawyer, if engaged, 
would screen the claims brought before the court, and encourage settlement, protecting the courts 
from overload. Cases eventually brought to court would (usually) be presented  in clear and concise 
terms, according to pre-determined rules, and consistently with the norms of a legal culture into 
which all the participants are initiated.  
Not all litigants respond to this encouragement to get a lawyer. The reasons, as discussed in 
Chapter 4, vary from legal market failure, to misunderstanding the purpose of the courts, to a 
growing network of current and former LiPs for support. Some Government conduct, driven by 
a desire to limit public spending, may also directly encourage people to litigate in person, such as 
measures that emphasise the value of self-help, user-pays court fees, and the 2014 family justice 
reforms, which prohibit legal representation in some contexts. Some of these measures suggest 
that the courts are a public service for consumers like any other that can be directly accessed by 
citizens.  
When direct encouragements to seek legal advice and representation fail, sometimes more subtle 
means of discouraging access are deployed, such as restricting access to counsels’ benches in the 
court and not allowing costs awards in favour of LiPs. Procedural justice theory suggests that 
messages of exclusion, even subtle ones, affect people’s perceptions of justice, even if the outcome 
of the process is favourable for the litigant. Discouraging access in some senses protects the 
legitimacy of the courts by preventing rising demand, but also risks their legitimacy by suggesting 
to LiPs that they are excluded because they are not part of “the club”. If people perceive they have 
been treated unfairly they will be less willing to defer to the courts’ authority.9 The promise that 
all citizens will be able to hold the powerful to account (including the government itself), and that 
all will be equal before the courts, is revealed as illusory.  
Yet this was never a promise that could come close to being satisfied in full. The gap between 
what is promised and the reality cannot “be easily eliminated by social engineering, but [is] a 
                                                          




pervasive if not constitutive feature of legal life in liberal societies”.10 A rising number of LiPs will, 
however, if this theory is correct, reveal the gap more often and therefore call the legitimacy of the 
courts into question. The system must respond to rising demand, but this analysis suggests that no 
complete resolution is available.  
II. Rationing Access to Justice 
If there is no complete resolution available to the tension between projecting and delivering on 
access to the courts, what responses are available? The taxonomy introduced in Chapter 2, and 
reproduced below for convenience, draws attention to the fact that responses do not all lie within 
the court system.  
Table 1 - Taxonomy of Responses to increasing numbers of LiPs 













e.g. provide more legal 
advice and representation 
Diverting 
e.g. channel LiPs or disputes 
with high rates of LiPs into 
alternative dispute 
resolution mechanisms, such 
as Disputes Tribunal or 
mediation 
Displacing 
e.g. create alternative 
compensation system, such 
as ACC, or delegalize areas 
that generate high numbers 










Expanding and reforming 
e.g. move to inquisitorial 
justice; simplify procedure; 
more information for LiPs 
Transforming 
i.e. reduce the role of law in 
ordering society 
Avoiding or Preventing 
e.g. more equal distribution 
of wealth; more social work 
services to avoid the 
breakdown of families. 
 
 
By avoiding, preventing, displacing, and transforming issues that would otherwise become disputes 
within the courts’ jurisdiction, demand for their resources can be reduced. There will always be a 
gap between what the system promises and what it can deliver: that is the fundamental 
contradiction just discussed. Trying to resolve this conflict by offering people more access to 
courts, does not create access to justice. Abel writes:11   
                                                          
10 Trubek, above n 2 at 540.  
11 Richard Abel "Socializing the Legal Profession: Can Redistributing Lawyers' Services Achieve Social Justice" (1979) 
1 Law and Policy Quarterly 5 at 41. See also Sarat, above n 3. 
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Emphasis on redistributing lawyers' services as the means of promoting social justice 
perpetuates the liberal myth … that formal justice can be attained within a capitalist 
legal system and, once attained, will produce substantive justice …. They define the 
problem as a “gap” – this time the gap between the ideal of an adversary system and 
the reality – between the promise of redistributing lawyers' services and the 
performance. The proximate goal of closing that gap is thereby substituted for the 
ultimate goal of justice. In place of questions about the capacity of legal reform to effect 
fundamental change in political, economic, and social institutions, we are directed back 
to the legal system conceived as an autonomous entity, to be evaluated by the unique 
standards of formal justice. 
Seeking more representation or a more accessible system become the goals for access to justice 
instead of more fundamental political and economic change.12 Attempts to address inequalities in 
society are not likely to provide a quick fix to the “problem” of LiPs, but they are part of a wider 
set of available policies. Attention to these emphasises the structure of the distribution of resources 
in New Zealand, including resources needed to access the courts, rather than merely searching for 
answers in reforms to the court system.  
However, responses within the court system also involve distributive choices:13   
[I]n a world of expanding capabilities and rising expectations, where claims of injustice 
proliferate, we cannot avoid the necessity of rationing justice. Justice is not free. It uses 
up resources – money, organization, and not least, the limited supply of attention. 
Every expenditure of these involves corresponding opportunity costs. And justice is 
not the only thing we want. 
The difficulty with discussing rationing explicitly is that it poses “an overt challenge to universal 
equality before the law”.14 It is admitting that the promise of accessibility cannot be met in full.15 
But given that not everyone can have access, I argue that principled decisions should be made 
about how that access is rationed. The tension between promising access and what the system can 
deliver will still exist, but maybe rationing decisions can be made with more confidence and 
consistency.  
Rationing essentially involves political decisions that depend on views about the value of justice, 
“based in philosophical and social theory”.16 Deciding on the value of justice, and the role we want 
                                                          
12 Gary Bellow and Jeanne Kettleson "From Ethics to Politics: Confronting Scarcity and Fairness in Public Interest 
Practice" (1978) 58 Boston University Law Review 337 at 384: “Unless increased access to legal services is also 
accompanied by a lessening of the inequalities that stand in the way of a more harmonious, accommodative society, 
the amount of conflict that results will either press present adjudicatory institutions beyond their capacities, or intensify 
the already powerful pressures against adversary behavior that operate so much to the disadvantage of the poor, the 
unorganized, the inexperienced, and the vulnerable.” See also discussion in Chapter 2, pages 43-44.  
13 Marc Galanter "Access to Justice in a World of Expanding Social Capability" (2010) 37(1) Fordham Urban Law 
Journal 115 at 128. 
14 Richard Moorhead and Pascoe Pleasence "Access to Justice After Universalism: Introduction" (2003) 30(1) Journal 
of Law and Society 1 at 2. 
15 At 2. 
16 At 10. 
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the courts to perform, drives decisions about who gets access to the formal justice system, and 
who is diverted elsewhere. Uzelac poses the problem, in introducing a discussion on civil justice 
generally:17  
Do all civil disputes deserve equal attention and thorough deliberation of all factual and 
legal aspects, or should they be awarded only that level of attention that is proportionate 
to their social importance? 
This in turn begs the definition of social importance: is this just a question of the sum of money 
involved or are other more important interests at issue? And important to whom, society or the 
parties? At present, in many civil disputes it is the sum in question that determines which court 
has jurisdiction, rather than the importance of the principle involved. Poor people are less likely 
to be litigating over large sums and therefore less likely to have access to full dress adjudication, 
regardless of the legal importance of the issue at stake, either to them, or society, or to the 
development of the law. Hodder has suggested that in New Zealand even commercial clients with 
large, complex cases are turning away from the “mainstream civil justice system” towards ADR.18 
There is therefore room for a discussion about what types of disputes we want to have in the trial 
courts and what mechanisms would achieve access for these cases, for example provision of 
counsel where necessary.19 
Explicitly rationing court resources by paying attention to the distributive choices involved is not 
novel. One very popular form of rationing is diverting cases away from the courts. This is 
commonly in the form of encouraging or requiring ADR, such as mediated and negotiated 
outcomes. As Winkelmann J has said, the benefits of ADR have “… been so widely spoken of, 
and so seldom, if ever questioned, as to become accepted wisdom”.20 The perceived benefits can 
hide the fact that this approach is also a form of rationing that is now fully integrated into New 
Zealand’s dispute resolution landscape.21 The family justice reforms implemented in 2014 further 
entrench this form of rationing, removing the right for parties to proceed to court unless they have 
first been through the Family Dispute Resolution system. 
                                                          
17 Alan Uzelac "Global Developments - Towards Harmonisation (and Back)" in Alan Uzelac (ed) Goals of Civil Justice 
and Civil Procedure in Contemporary Judicial Systems (Springer, Switzerland, 2014) at 4. 
18 Jack Hodder "Civil Procedure: 'Case Management' - Architectural or Deckchair Reforms?" (Paper presented at the 
Civil Litigation in Crisis - What Crisis?, Auckland, New Zealand, 22 February 2008) at 4. 
19 Russell Engler "Connecting Self-Representation to Civil Gideon: What Existing Data Reveal about When Counsel 
Is Most Needed" (2010) 37 Fordham Urban Law Journal 37 at 81. 
20 Chief High Court Judge Justice Helen Winkelmann "ADR and the Civil Justice System" (Paper presented at the 
AMINZ Conference, Auckland, New Zealand, 6 August 2011) at 21. 
21 For example through Judicial Settlement Conferences, the Family Dispute Resolution process and the Disputes 




Rationing is also occurring within the courts with adoption of rules that require attention to the 
just, speedy and efficient processing of disputes. As discussed, the Court of Appeal has recognised 
that this is a distributive approach, affecting not just the parties to the dispute but also other waiting 
cases and the public at large.22 There is also procedural reform, for example in the District Court, 
which rations the amount of procedure and time available in different cases.23  
The evidence in this study suggests that there is tension and discomfort with rationing resources 
within the courts. This tension is exacerbated if the starting point is that people “have a right of 
access to the courts and that courts should help them obtain that access”, an expectation that 
Goldschmidt argues is “reasonably justified both constitutionally and morally”.24 This approach 
does not recognise that the resources are not available to do this. It also creates more room for 
discretion where individual judges, court staff and lawyers have to make decisions in each case 
about how much resources to give a LiP. For example, Judges have to weigh up whether to give a 
LiP as much time as they seem to need, only as much as they consider “reasonable”, or only as 
much as a lawyer would need. Some LiPs were of the view that they should have as much time as 
they needed, regarding the courts as a service for their benefit.  
Access to justice does not necessarily mean giving everyone as much justice as they think they 
need, however. But rationing could at least involve making principled, distributive choices about 
which cases should come to the courts (informed by a theory of the value of the courts and justice 
in various situations) and how much procedure or time they should be given, once there.25 
III. Responding to LiPs Accessing the Courts 
A more fundamental political discussion about the distribution of justice resources is therefore 
required, but that is a longer-term goal. In the meantime, I make several recommendations below 
that this study suggests would be effective, without promoting a promise of accessibility that 
cannot be fulfilled. I also address why some commonly encouraged reforms may be ineffective.  
                                                          
22 See discussion of SM v LFBD [2014] 3 NZLR 494 (CA) in Chapter 2, page 36. 
23 District Court Rules 2014, r 10.1. There are three different modes of trial available: short, simplified or full. The 
complexity of the issues, the amount at stake, and “proportionality”, are all factors to be taken into account in 
determining the appropriate mode of trial. Short and simplified trials have time limits for witness examination and 
limits on discovery. Similarly, the Family Court has different “tracks” for different proceedings.  
24 Jona Goldschmidt and others Meeting the Challenge of Pro Se Litigation: A Report and Guidebook for Judges and Court 
Managers (American Judicature Society, 1998) at 38. See also Chapter 2, pages 39-42. 
25 Civil Justice Council Access to Justice for Litigants in Person (or Self-Represented Litigants) (Civil Justice Council Working 
Group, November 2011) at [103] concluded, in line with the idea of proportionate justice, that “Access to justice does 
not mean allowing a litigant, self-represented litigant or not, to consume disproportionate resources”; Adrian 
Zuckerman "A Reform of Civil Procedure - Rationing Procedure rather than Access to Justice" (1995) 22 Journal of 
Law and Society 155. 
240 
 
A. Policy Reform 
1. Advice and Representation 
Expanding access to resources for LiPs so they can help themselves may seem an obvious solution, 
particularly for those in the “advice desert” who do not qualify for legal aid but cannot afford 
private representation. When I asked LiPs for suggestions about systemic reforms, most suggested 
self-help information of some kind. In particular, they wanted flowcharts showing the process so 
they understood what came next, and more comprehensive written advice on how to run a 
proceeding.  
Along similar lines, Macfarlane made preliminary recommendations, based on her LiP participants’ 
suggestions, of services that might assist LiPs.26 First, better access to legal information, which she 
says would “[fit] with the aspiration of many [LiPs] to continue working on their case themselves 
once they have determined that they cannot afford to pay (or continue to pay) a private lawyer”.27  
Second, a range of “non-legal” services might be provided for LiPs, including skills-based 
workshops, coaching (in communication, negotiation, and presentation skills), office services, a 
buddy or mentoring system to support the LiP “in their emotional as well as their substantive and 
procedural journey”. The courts might also extend their opening hours so LiPs need not take time 
away from employment to file documents and appear.28  
As discussed, there are many reasons why accessing the courts meaningfully is difficult for LiPs, 
many of which are outside their control or require so much learning and practice that, while the 
occasional person may master it, most will not and should not be expected to. Furthermore, no 
amount of self-help can overcome the absence of a lawyer as broker, screener, translator and 
negotiator. Thus, recommendations of this kind, while well intentioned, can perpetuate the idea 
that most LiPs can access the courts meaningfully, and, if they struggle to do so, this is due to 
personal failings rather than systemic barriers. Even if LiPs could overcome the difficulties 
identified, without greater resources, court staff and judges will continue to discourage LiPs, to 
protect themselves from overload.  
The research findings suggest that, for litigants to realise meaningful access to the courts, one-to-
one advice, assistance in drafting documents, and sometimes full representation, is necessary. This 
suggests that the answer lies in distributing more legal services: that is, more legal aid that would 
                                                          
26 Macfarlane also made recommendations on improving the provision of advice services to LiPs and improving 
judicial management of LiPs: Julie Macfarlane The National Self-Represented Litigants Project: Identifying and Meeting the Needs 
of Self-Represented Litigants, Final Report (Ontario, Canada, May 2013) at 121-126. 
27 At 116. 
28 At 118-121. 
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mean more advice and representation. Providing more state funded access to justice is unlikely in 
the current political climate, however, and will not necessarily mean fewer LiPs. This is because 
their reasons for litigating in person are not purely financial, and because the concept of injustice 
is elastic, so “demand for services will increase to the limits of the available supply”.29Alternatively, 
the State could provide a clinic-based service for LiPs, like that operating in Queensland.30 Many 
Judges, while wary of straying into the “political” arena and not having given the matter deep 
consideration, suggested that some form of advice clinic or duty solicitor would be helpful. Court 
staff similarly thought a clinic-based model would have a place.  
The discussion and research about access to justice for “personal plight clients” 31 is,  it has been 
said, “almost uniformly focused on the delivery of legal services to the poor as a form of charity 
[pro bono] or welfare [legal aid]”.32 There is ample room for New Zealand to improve coordination 
of pro bono services to provide full representation for cases that require it but fall within the gap 
between legal aid and affordability. The private market could also serve these clients, however, 
particularly those who want meaningful access but cannot afford full representation. Many have 
the means to pay for some advice, however, and are willing to do so. 
While reliable data are in short supply, what is available suggests that there is a steady stream of 
law graduates, many of whom are unable to find work in law.33  If that is correct, it is hard to avoid 
the conclusion that the market for legal services is distorted, skewed towards commercial interests 
and away from personal plight clients.34 Susskind has argued that “The legal market is in an 
unprecedented state of flux” and that the delivery of legal services is changing, and will continue 
to change, radically in the coming decades.35 Some commentators believe that, while this “unsettled 
                                                          
29 Bellow and Kettleson, above n 12 at 380. 
30 Tony Woodyatt, Allira Thompson and Elizabeth Pendlebury "Queensland's Self-Representation Services: A Model 
for Other Courts and Tribunals" (2011) 20 Journal of Judicial Administration 225; Civil Justice Council, above n 25 
at [110] discussing Californian models. 
31  John Heinz and Edward Laumann "The Legal Profession: Client Interests, Professional Roles, and Social 
Hierarchies" (1978) 76 Michigan Law Review 1111 at 1126. Heinz and Laumann defined “personal plight” clients as 
those with legal matters such as divorce, criminal defence, and personal injury. I adopt Semple’s broader definition of 
personal plight clients as including “Work for small corporate clients embroiled in legal disputes”, although these 
matters would fall outside Heinz and Laumann’s original definition: Noel Semple "Personal Plight Legal Practice and 
Tomorrow's Lawyers" (2014) 39 Journal of the Legal Profession 25 at 32. 
32 Gillian Hadfield "Higher Demand, Lower Supply - A Comparative Assessment of the Legal Resource Landscape 
for Ordinary Americans ABA Symposium on Access to Justice" (2010) 37 Fordham Urban Law Journal 129 at 131.  
33 Geoff Adlam "Young Law Graduates: What they Earn and Employment Rates" (20 June 2014) 844 LawTalk 21 
reporting Ministry of Education information, what this “appears to indicate is that around 80% of young law graduates 
who have completed professionals will be in employment after two years” though not necessarily in law jobs; Sasha 
Borissenko "Too Many Lawyers?" (7 November 2014) 854 LawTalk 5 at 9 noting the lack of willingness of law 
graduates to work in the provinces.  
34 Helen Winkelmann "Access to Justice – Who Needs Lawyers?" (2014) 13(2) Otago Law Review 229 at 241 who 
concluded that there must be market failure in New Zealand given the large number of lawyers but unmet legal needs 
of many. See also discussion of market in Chapter 4, pages 109-110.  
35 Richard Susskind Tomorrow's Lawyers (Oxford University Press, Oxford, 2013) at 8.  
242 
 
landscape” is producing resistance in the legal profession, there is room for innovation and for 
lawyers to carve out new roles that would address the justice gap.36 Maclean provides a diverse list 
of innovative services, reporting on her review of websites marketing legal services for divorce in 
the UK:37 
Advocacy, forensic accountancy and tax planning, collaborative law (light or not light), 
early neutral evaluation, arbitration, med-arb, as well as mediation and counselling. 
Unbundling of services is accompanied by clear pricing for specific packages of service, 
with fixed price deals ranging from DIY through lawyer-supported or managed divorce 
to the traditional hourly charged full legal service.   
As Maclean notes, diversification of this sort is “by no means risk-free”, with live questions about 
the boundaries of protected areas of work, responsibility for error, and whether such services meet 
the needs of vulnerable litigants.38  
Nevertheless, even if we do not go as far as offering services in this manner, there is room to grow 
face-to-face legal advice for personal plight litigants. This area is poorly serviced by lawyers who 
are drawn both by market forces and prestige to other areas of the law.39 But Semple argues that, 
in the face of current disruptions to the legal market, personal plight work is a relatively safe haven, 
which may make it more attractive.40  
The New Zealand Law Commission recommended investigating the provision of limited legal 
advice, on certain aspects only of the litigation, in response to the perceived increase in LiPs, as 
long ago as 2003.41 There are currently barriers to the availability of this kind of advice, particularly 
lawyers’ perception of the risks such a service entails, discussed in Chapter 6.42 The introduction 
of guidelines, such as those recently published in the UK, would assist New Zealand lawyers to 
think about limited retainer services.43 Judges consistently said in interviews that they had no 
                                                          
36 Marsha Mansfield and Louise Trubek "New Roles to Solve Old Problems: Lawyering for Ordinary People in 
Today's Context" (2011) 56 New York Law School Law Review 367.  
37 Mavis Maclean "The Changing Professional Landscape" (2014) 44 Family Law 177 at 179. 
38 At 182.  
39 The US research shows the legal profession, in that country, is bifurcated, with lawyers either serving organisational 
clients (corporates or government), or individuals and their small businesses. Few lawyers serve both organisational 
and personal plight clients: John Heinz and Edward Laumann Chicago Lawyers: The Social Structure of the Bar (Russell 
Sage Foundation and American Bar Foundation, New York, 1994) at 97; John Heinz and others Urban Lawyers: The 
New Social Structure of the Bar (University of Chicago Press, Chicago, 2005); Rebecca Sandefur "Work and Honor in the 
Law: Prestige and the Division of Lawyers' Labor" (2001) 66(3) American Sociological Review 382. These studies 
found that regardless of what type of client the lawyers studied served, lawyers regarded working for organisational 
clients as more prestigious, due to the higher prestige of working for organisational clients (and obtaining the greater 
income as a result), and because working for these clients called for more use of pure professional knowledge. See 
also Andrew Abbott "Status and Status Strain in the Professions" (1981) 86(4) American Journal of Sociology 819. 
40 Semple, above n 31. 
41 Law Commission Dispute Resolution in the Family Court (NZLC R82, 2006) at 195. 
42 See discussion of limited retainer advice, Chapter 6, pages 146-148. 




objection to this form of legal advice. Coordinating with the bench, so that lawyers knew this was 
an acceptable form of advice, and developing protocols around the limits of responsibilities for 
lawyers undertaking this type of work, would be helpful. 
Leadership for this type of innovation needs to come from the senior bar, as new graduates do 
not have the resources or experience to be effective innovators without such support.44 A District 
Court Judge in my study recalled encountering a retiring civil litigator who felt he could repay the 
community for his successful career and offered to provide pro bono services for people trying to 
defend claims against more powerful litigants, such as finance companies. The Judge commented 
that this man was “exceptionally, exceptionally able”, and that it would be “very hard to replicate 
something like that”, but said “it would be nice if there was some sort of super-duper civil lawyer 
who wanted to do something about” assisting people who would otherwise have to litigate in 
person.45 Converting pro bono programmes such as that into self-sustaining innovative advice 
services is a possibility. Law schools can assist by encouraging experimentation and “inspire 
students … [to] begin legal careers that are very different from the traditional legal practice”.46 
Some of this may require attitudinal adjustments concerning the prestige of personal plight work 
within law schools. As Kennedy argues, legal educators participate in the reproduction of hierarchy 
and in the declining interest of students in public service work during law school.47 Instead of 
viewing poor litigants as a training ground for inexperienced lawyers, Macfarlane argues “it is 
critical for this type of work to be seen as specialized, difficult and attracting additional educational 
and mentoring support”.48 Rhode encourages curriculum review that makes access to justice and 
the distribution of legal services fully integrated and important topics of discussion.49  
                                                          
44 For examples of models of “incubator” programmes supported by the senior bar see City University of New York 
Community Legal Resources Network <www.law.cuny.edu> and the Chicago Bar Foundation’s Justice Entrepreneurs 
Project <www.jepchicago.org>. 
45 See also Frances Joychild QC "Continuing the Conversation ... the Fading Star of the Rule of Law" (5 February 
2015) 1 Law News (Auckland District Law Society) 3 at 10 discussing a retired judge offering pro bono assistance for 
complex civil claims. 
46 Mansfield and Trubek, above n 36 at 390.  
47 Duncan Kennedy "Legal Education as Training for Hierarchy" in David Kairys (ed) The Politics of Law: A Progressive 
Critique (3rd ed, Basic Books, New York, 1998) at 64: "As for any form of work outside the established system - for 
example, legal services for the poor and neighbourhood law practice - they convey to students that, although morally 
exalted, the work is hopelessly dull and unchallenging, and that the possibilities of reaching a standard of living 
appropriate to a lawyer are slim or non-existent"; Robert Stover "Making it and Breaking It: The Fate of Public Interest 
Commitment in Law School" in Richard Abel (ed) Lawyers: A Critical Reader (New Press, New York, 1997) 75. 
48 Macfarlane, above n 26 at 88. 




Related to this is the question of providing not just more advice, but better advice. In looking at 
why litigants become LiPs, it was apparent that the legal profession is, in some instances, generating 
LiPs. As Tyler and Zimerman say:50 
By retaining counsel, people lose their opportunity to directly represent themselves. 
Therefore, the quality of their experience will depend upon the quality of their legal 
representation, relative to what the litigant might have been able, or at least imagines 
he might have been able, to accomplish himself.  
If we want the litigant’s calculation to come out in favour of representation, and want them to 
better understand what legal services entail, they have to experience a service they believe is 
valuable. Poor quality representation might be partly a structural problem: legal aid is so 
constrained and private fees so high that this may encourage lawyers to engage in routine 
processing of cases. It may also be attitudinal and the result of poor training and poor monitoring.51 
Training lawyers as good translators who listen to their clients and empower them, rather than 
subjugating them, would potentially decrease the number of LiPs.  
2. Information for Litigants 
Education about legal rights is no substitute for good legal advice and representation. It raises 
awareness of rights (expanding expectations of a remedy), but this study and other research 
suggests this is not easily translated into the knowledge needed to vindicate them. 52  Legal 
information and education that would be of assistance to the public (and therefore potential LiPs) 
would be about the role of the courts in society, their function, and what they can deliver (e.g. that 
they only vindicate legal rights, while presenting further issues of enforcement). Information about 
the basic functioning of the courts would be helpful. For example, courts do not begin their 
sessions until 10am, which led some LiPs to conclude that Judges live a privileged existence with 
short working hours. One LiP said that explaining that judges have responsibilities outside the 
courtroom, such as telephone conferences and judgment writing, would help litigants understand 
why the judge might not be as familiar with their file as they are. Part of the purpose of this 
                                                          
50 Nourit Zimerman and Tom Tyler "Between Access to Counsel and Access to Justice: A Psychological Perspective 
ABA Symposium on Access to Justice" (2010) 37 Fordham Urban Law Journal 473 at 506. 
51 The call for improved lawyer training is not new. See for example Nan Seuffert "Lawyering for Women Survivors 
of Domestic Violence: Special Issue on Domestic Violence" (1996) 4 Waikato Law Review 1 at 53-55 who suggested 
(now twenty years ago) that lawyer training be improved in dealing with survivors of domestic violence. There has 
undoubtedly been a huge growth of awareness about domestic violence but the LiP experiences recounted here suggest 
there are some practitioners working in the area who do not have a firm grasp of the dynamics of representing a 
woman who has survived domestic violence.  
52 John Eekelaar and Mavis Maclean Family Justice: The Work of Family Judges in Uncertain Times (Hart Publishing, Oxford, 
2013) at 186-207. 
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information would be to reorient expectations away from the customer service model of justice 
towards an understanding of the courts’ constitutional role. 
At a very specific level, playing a video to LiPs at the courthouse, for example in the waiting room 
before appearing before the judge, would be helpful. This video might involve nothing more 
complex than a brief introduction to the layout of the courtroom, the sitting times, the seating 
arrangements, and how to address the judge and other participants in the litigation.53 This would 
at least save judicial time, particularly in the District Court, where Judges say they spend a lot of 
time repeating this information to every LiP who comes before them.  
If written guidance is to be provided to LiPs, as has been done through the MoJ’s website,54 LiPs 
say this should contain warnings about how difficult the process is without a lawyer. However, 
one LiP said this advice should be in the form of stories from LiPs, so that prospective LiPs take 
it seriously rather than assuming it is a way of lawyers protecting their territory. This kind of advice 
needs to be paired, not with a bare injunction to “seek legal advice”, but with an explanation of 
the focus of the court system and the role of a lawyer within it. Many LiPs expect prompt 
adjudication, so explaining there is a long procedural process designed to refine the dispute and 
ensure all information is put before the judge, that settlement is the norm, and that lawyers can 
help litigants to use this process strategically and discuss reasonable settlement levels, would be 
very helpful. Otherwise LiPs are likely to disregard the suggestion to “get more advice”, thinking, 
“I don’t need it, I’ve researched the law”. Choosing a hub, preferably a non-governmental website 
such as New Zealand Legal Information Institute, would be useful for avoiding duplication of 
resources and providing a starting point for LiPs searching for resources.55  
3. The Role of Court Staff 
Some commentators have proposed that, to assist LiPs, court staff could be trained to give more 
detailed process advice, even if it may amount to strategic legal advice.56 I do not agree. At a 
                                                          
53 New Zealand Law Foundation "Appearing in the Family Court - Without a Lawyer Part I and II" (31 March 2015)  
<www.youtube.com> are videos outlining the New Zealand Family Court process for LiPs. These videos are directed 
at assisting LiPs who have to go to court without a lawyer in accordance with the family justice reforms. They do not 
therefore suffer from the difficulty of other self-help videos, which are caught between trying to give a simplified 
explanation to promote accessibility while simultaneously discouraging people from coming to court without a lawyer. 
See for example: County Court of Victoria "Self Represented Litigants - County Court of Victoria" (18 July 2013)  
<www.youtube.com>). The videos I suggest would be more basic than these examples however, to be played 
immediately before going into court.  
54 Ministry of Justice "Representing Yourself in the High Court of New Zealand" (undated)  <www.justice.govt.nz>. 
55 New Zealand Legal Information <www.nzlii.org> is a joint project between three New Zealand universities, AustLii 
and the New Zealand Law Foundation. It provides a hub for case law and legislation and would be sufficiently neutral 
to be viewed as reliable by LiPs.  
56 Duncan Webb "The Right Not to Have a Lawyer" (2007) 16 Journal of Judicial Administration 165 at 178; 
Goldschmidt and others, above n 24 at 46. 
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practical level, it does not seem feasible, given the rate of staff turnover and how movement 
between positions within the public service makes it difficult for staff to accumulate the specialised 
knowledge they would need. There also seems little need to train another workforce to do the job 
of lawyers, when there are many qualified lawyers, some of whom cannot find work. If the MoJ 
had to train and pay court staff to do lawyers’ jobs, why not just pay lawyers? At a more principled 
level, there is real potential for conflicts of interest as court staff would potentially be advising both 
parties in a dispute.57 
Other reforms overseas involve court staff acting as gatekeepers rather than seeking to improve 
access. The Supreme Court of Victoria’s “self-represented litigant coordinator’s” role is to speak 
to new LiPs and “hit them hard and early with the reality check”, emphasising that litigating in the 
Supreme Court, unlike litigation in the lower courts, is “complicated and tough”, and that they 
need legal advice. At the same time, the coordinator is striving to keep “the access to justice doors 
firmly open”. 58 The message is: you are welcome, but only with a lawyer. This undermines the 
appearance of access and, I suggest, is an inappropriate role for court staff.  
What would be useful would be guidelines for court staff on the information they can give to 
litigants, particularly if the content of those guidelines was made known to litigants.59 The UK 
Civil Justice Council drafted a suggested guideline based on a US’ self-help centre document called 
“What court staff can and cannot do”.60 A similar guideline would be of much more practical 
assistance than the injunction to give only information, not advice. For such guidelines to be 
effective in practice, however, there must be more advice services available for court staff to refer 
LiPs to. Otherwise court staff will continue to be tempted into going beyond their role (even if it 
is more clearly defined) where they see a “deserving” case.  
4. The Role of Judges 
Pressing judges to extend further assistance to LiPs is unlikely to succeed if workload pressures 
and role conflicts (as between passive arbiter and overseer of substantive justice) remain 
unchanged. The risk is that judges will continue to send mixed messages to LiPs, exercising 
discretion as to how much help to extend them (a discretion that can count against LiPs perceived 
as being there “by choice”), while simultaneously communicating to LiPs that they are not 
                                                          
57 See Chapter 6, footnote 16. 
58 Nerida Wallace and Shane Draper "Managing the constant tension which exists between trying to persuade self-
represented litigants to seek and retain legal advice (in the higher court setting) whilst always being cautious to keep 
the 'access to justice doors open'" (Paper presented at the Australasian Institute of Judical Administration, Sydney, 
Australia, April 2014) . 
59 See Chapter 6, page 155.  
60 Civil Justice Council, above n 25 at Appendix 1.  
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welcome. Resourcing judges to provide more assistance to LiPs is possible but is a very expensive 
form of assistance.61 However, even a well-resourced judge cannot fill the role of a lawyer as 
screener, translator, and negotiator, and as we have seen, a LiP is still responsible for making 
choices about procedure and about what factual material to put before the court.62  
It is also questionable how far the “foreignness” of the courts should be removed so that judges 
could engage with litigants in a way the latter might prefer. While causing LiPs discomfort, some 
level of foreignness serves a purpose in reminding everyone that this is not a normal social 
interaction: “Judges must decide the facts and apply the law regardless of the displeasure they 
incur”.63 The appearance of law’s autonomy and rationality might be compromised by too much 
movement in this direction.  
The research project of the Family Court of Australia suggested that the uneven way in which 
Judges respond to the needs of LiPs indicates a need to develop consistent policies.64 In interviews, 
however, New Zealand Judges uniformly rejected the suggestion of developing a code of practice 
for managing LiPs, stating it was a matter of individual “judgecraft”. New Zealand’s judiciary take 
part in the Institute of Judicial Studies’ programmes, which include some guidance on managing 
LiPs. Some High Court Judges commented that this guidance was not targeted at judges of their 
court. Developing a more nuanced training programme, as well as creating better opportunities 
for dialogue between judges about LiP management, could develop a more consistent practice and 
lead change.65  
5. Procedural Simplification, Inquisitorial Justice and Informalism 
New Zealand has already experimented with this type of reform and continues to do so. The 
Tenancy Tribunal and the Disputes Tribunal, which have very high caseloads relative to the Courts, 
use a simplified procedure and parties almost always appear in person.66 Tribunal referees also 
                                                          
61 See also Wright v Wright [2013] EWCA Civ 234, Chapter 2, footnote 166. 
62 Rabeea Assy Injustice in Person: The Right to Self-Representation (Oxford University Press, Oxford, 2015)111-118 for an 
extended discussion of why an active judge is no substitute for the role of a partisan advocate.  
63 Judith Resnik "Managerial Judges" (1982) 96 Harvard Law Review 374 at 383. 
64 John Dewar, Barry Smith and Cate Banks Litigants in Person in the Family Court of Australia (Family Court of Australia, 
2000) at [2]. 
65 In the UK, the Civil Justice Council, above n 25 at [90] stated: “[T]he judiciary … have a particularly significant part 
to play, especially in current circumstances. In particular, … [t]hrough commitment, formal training and collegiate 
judicial discussion, they can develop practice and help drive change”. Similarly, see Richard Moorhead "The Passive 
Arbiter: Litigants in Person and the Challenge to Neutrality" (2007) 17 Social and Legal Studies 405 at 422 suggesting 
that it is worth debating “improved training, monitoring of, and feedback for, judges on their handling of the difficult 
balancing act presented by litigants in person”.  
66 The Tenancy Tribunal, which disposed of 20,299 cases in the 2014 calendar year, allows representation but it is rare 
in practice. The Disputes Tribunal, which disposed of 14,757 in the 2014 calendar year, requires parties to appear in 
person. By way of comparison the High Court disposed of 2,473 civil cases plus 302 civil appeals, and the District 
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have a more inquisitorial role than judges. The question, then, is whether to make similar changes 
to the court system. I suggest that this is neither desirable nor possible. The courts’ function as a 
public good is potentially undermined by a shift in the direction of informality and it is questionable 
whether procedural simplification (beyond improving clarity of language, which is desirable in any 
case) is possible.67 In the District Court procedural simplification was attempted, with simplified 
forms intended for LiP use.68 That reform has now been abandoned because: 69 
[T]he absence of structured documents in the form of statements of claim and 
statements of defence meant that succinct and clear analyses of the position of the 
parties were often not available until the proceedings were well advanced. 
There have been suggestions New Zealand should consider an inquisitorial approach for its 
criminal justice system, at least in cases of sexual offending,70 and this could lead to calls for a more 
inquisitorial civil justice system as well. That discussion is beyond the scope of this thesis, but it is 
important to note, in relation to LiPs, that the major European inquisitorial systems require 
litigants to be represented, rather than welcoming them.71 This is not therefore a response that 
increases LiP access to the courts, as it excludes them altogether. Instead, it puts the focus back 
on the provision of more advice and representation. 
The evidence in this study, concurring with and building on that of other studies,72 suggests that 
negotiation and mediation do not necessarily promote access to justice for LiPs. The involvement 
of a LiP can make a negotiated or mediated outcome more difficult to achieve and less likely to 
stick should an agreement be reached. As discussed in Chapter 7, this is because lawyers lack 
willingness to engage with LiPs in settlement discussions, and because the power imbalances 
between the parties when one in unrepresented can easily create an impression that the lawyer 
involved is bullying and make the LiP feel they have “been had”. While this study does not consider 
disputes between two LiPs, there is also evidence that ADR will be similarly ineffective in these 
cases because any power imbalance between the parties will simply be replicated in the 
                                                          
Court disposed of 590 defended civil cases, in the 2014 calendar year: Courts of New Zealand "Annual Statistics for 
Court and Tribunal Cases" (December 2014)  <www.courtsofnz.govt.nz>. 
67 See discussion of simplification in Chapter 2, page 40-42. 
68 See Chapter 2, page 42. 
69 Andrew Beck and others District Court Procedures: Review and Reform (New Zealand Law Society Continuing Legal 
Education, Wellington, 2014) at 1. The family justice reforms of 2014 introduced simplified forms for COCA 
applications for use by LiPs. No evaluation is available regarding whether this reform has made the court more 
accessible to litigants. 
70 New Zealand Ministry of Justice, Government Response to the Report of the Taskforce for Action on Sexual 
Violence, September 2010 www.justice.govt.nz at [23]. 
71 Adrian Zuckerman "No Justice Without Lawyers: The Myth of an Inquisitorial System" (2014) 33 Civil Justice 
Quarterly 355 at ft 16: “Legal representation is mandatory in: Austria, Belgium France, Germany, Greece, Italy, 
Luxembourg, the Netherlands, Portugal, and Spain”; Rabeea Assy "Can the Law Speak Directly to its Subjects? The 
Limitation of Plain Language" (2011) 38(3) Journal of Law and Society 376. 
72 See Chapter 7, page 175.  
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negotiations.73 This suggests that Judges should be more willing to adjudicate in cases involving 
LiPs, not less.  
6. Rules and Guidelines 
There are other rules and guidelines that could be helpfully introduced in New Zealand. The 
Victorian Civil Procedure Act 2010 places “overarching obligations” in the conduct of litigation, 
not only on lawyers, but also on the parties (LiPs or otherwise).74 These include obligations to act 
honestly, to take steps to resolve the dispute, to not mislead or deceive the court, and to minimise 
delay.75 This amendment was brought in with the support of the Victorian Supreme Court, which 
submitted to the Commission reviewing the rules that, “Because [the parties] make many of the 
important decisions about the initiation and conduct of litigation, it is appropriate to consider 
bringing them into a system of broader obligations”.76 This is worth considering as a way to not 
only assist LiPs’ understanding of the system but also that of private clients.  
The current rules of professional conduct state that when opposing a LiP “the lawyer should 
normally inform that person of the right to take legal advice” and imposes a duty on lawyers to 
conduct dealings with LiPs with “integrity, respect, and courtesy”.77 As discussed, these rules were 
not well known among lawyers and of little practical guidance in the complex reality of interacting 
with LiPs. In the UK and New South Wales, guidelines have been adopted that set out in more 
detail the duties and responsibilities of counsel opposing LiPs.78 It would be helpful for the Law 
Society and Bar Association to consider developing similar guidelines. As Macfarlane said, “[the] 
uncertainties and tensions where a [LiP] faces off against legal counsel will not be dealt with simply 
by developing more ‘rules’ – but that would be a good place to start”.79 
Discussion is also needed about whether to follow UK and Canadian practice of allowing LiPs to 
recover costs in the event they are successful. Even if the rule preventing LiPs from recovering 
costs is retained, the rule that lawyers who represent themselves in their own cases are entitled to 
costs needs to be amended. 80 It is unprincipled. It demonstrates a kind of “clubiness” that 
                                                          
73 Mark Henaghan "Changing Politics of Family Law in New Zealand" (2012)  International Survey of Family Law 
253 at 258-260; Mark Henaghan and Meghan Nicholson "Family Law" (2014) 2 New Zealand Law Review 321 at 351. 
74 Civil Procedure Act 2010 (Victoria, Australia), s 10. 
75 At ss 17-27. 
76 Victorian Law Reform Commission Civil Justice Review (Victorian Law Reform Commission, Report 14, 2008) at 166.  
77 Client Care Rules Lawyers and Conveyancers Act (Lawyers: Conduct and Client Care) Rules 2008, r 12. 
78 New South Wales Bar Association "Guidelines for Barristers on Dealing with Self-Represented Litigants" (2012)  
<www.nswbar.asn.au>; Law Society (UK) "Litigants in Person: Guidelines for Lawyers" (4 June 2015)  
<www.lawsociety.org.uk>. 
79 Macfarlane, above n 26 at 124. 
80 See Chapter 9, footnote 24.  
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undermines the claim that lawyers have no special privileges, and it fuels LiPs’ suspicions of the 
institutional incumbents. 
7. Spaces 
Attention needs to be given to physical space within courthouses and courtrooms. At present, the 
seating and spaces in courtrooms are oriented towards lawyers. In some courts only lawyers are 
able to access interview rooms and appear without leave before the bar. Changes to the 
management of space should concentrate not on LiPs, however, but on recognising the role of the 
parties in the proceedings. Assigned space could be given at the bar tables for parties, whether 
represented or not. This reform could be paired with changes in the rules to put obligations on 
the parties, as discussed above.   
B. Moving on from a stereotype “modelled on a minority of the worst” 
Macfarlane calls, properly in my view, for a cultural change in attitudes to LiPs.81 The very few 
very persistent litigants currently overwhelm the discourse about LiPs within the legal community. 
I hope this research brings to light the many different experiences and many different kinds of 
LiPs, including the mix of motives they demonstrate for becoming one. Awareness of their varied 
experiences, the reasons for their actions, and the systematic barriers they face, may help other 
litigation participants to interact with them in a more nuanced fashion, without easy resort to 
stereotypes or the assumption that litigating in person involves some kind of personal failure. 
Very persistent litigants are the source of many of these stereotypes. I have argued that the 
difficulty they cause lies not only in their overconsumption of resources, but, more importantly, in 
their attack on the legitimacy of the courts. Instead of seeking change through the political process, 
very persistent litigants tend to challenge the finality of decisions through multiple appeals and 
collateral attacks, and by calling into question the ethics of the participants in the court system. 
They try to use the court process against itself. Their efforts, by necessity, are concentrated in the 
highest courts and therefore against the members of the profession with the highest prestige.  
Persistent litigants have been a feature of the legal landscape for many years82 and few mechanisms 
seem to be available to address this that would not involve an unconstitutional denial of access to 
the courts. The Law Commission has recommended a sliding scale approach for controlling 
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vexatious litigation that offers more flexibility than the blunt tools currently available.83 Further 
controls might, however, reduce their access to the courts to unacceptable levels. 
C. Areas for further exploration 
There is almost no research on the New Zealand legal profession, its internal structure, the client 
experience, or New Zealand judges. Hammond notes there are several structural reasons in New 
Zealand that cause “the alienation of many legal academics from any form of study of legal 
practice, including judging.” 84 Hammond suggests that the academy is well placed to:85 
[S]uggest creative solutions to problems thrown up by social, economic and 
technological change. They can, for instance, consult more widely with colleagues, 
within the academy at large and, for that matter, the community, in making suggestions.  
Further, I would suggest that the wider community, rather than being the last to be consulted, 
should be given a primary role. The fact that LiPs express limited confidence in the fairness of the 
process they experience suggests, as Sandefur says, that more research should be conducted on 
public opinion, including public perceptions of the fairness of the courts and their confidence in 
the process.86 This would not be “user satisfaction” research of the kind the MoJ conducts, but 
research on the general public’s views about the justice system. One study of this kind has recently 
been conducted, but much more could be done.87 That research could provide an empirical 
foundation for debate about the distribution of justice resources, broaden that discussion beyond 
the question of more access to lawyers to the more fundamental question of access to justice.  
There is also the question whether lawyers are needed to provide a representation service in all 
settings, or whether lay advocates would suffice and might bring the advantage of competition to 
a monopolised market. Some studies have concluded that within certain constraints (such as within 
particular specialisations), lay advocates perform either better than lawyers or, if not as well, at least 
better than LiPs.88 New Zealand has already gone some way down this path in that the area of 
                                                          
83 See Chapter 2, footnote 57. 
84 Grant Hammond "Judges and Academics in New Zealand" (2013) 25(4) New Zealand Universities Law Review 
681 at 699-700.  
85 At 687. 
86 Rebecca  Sandefur "Access to Civil Justice and Race, Class, and Gender Inequality" (2008)  Annual Review of 
Sociology 339. 
87  Saskia Righarts and Mark Henaghan "Public Perceptions of the New Zealand Court System: An Empirical 
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88 Rebecca Sandefur "Impact of Counsel: An Analysis of Empirical Evidence" (2011) 9 Seattle Journal of Social Justice 
51 at 79 citing Rebecca Sandefur "Elements of Expertise: Lawyers' Impact on Civil Trial and Hearing Outcomes" 
(2011) unpublished (currently under review) ; Herbert Kritzer Legal Advocacy: Lawyers and Non-Lawyers at Work 
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protected work for lawyers is small and lay advocates have an audience in several jurisdictions.89 
The Employment Court, where both lay advocates and lawyers represent litigants, could provide 
an ideal forum for research that examines the costs and outcomes, and risks and benefits, in a 
comparison of lay advocates and lawyers as representatives.  
IV. Conclusion 
This thesis has examined litigants’ decisions to litigate in person and their experiences of doing so. 
It has also examined how they are perceived by and interact with the regular inhabitants of the 
court system: the judges, lawyers, and court staff. I have argued that LiPs struggle to access the 
courts in a meaningful way, not necessarily because of any particular personal deficits, but because 
there are many complexities and conflicts that cannot be easily overcome by a litigant advocating 
their own cause. Further, I have argued that there is a contradiction underlying the promise of LiP 
access to the courts. The courts promise a forum to vindicate rights. Without this forum, the rights 
are empty, merely occurring on the books and not in reality. Yet the courts cannot hear all the 
claims that citizens have. They would collapse under the demand. Even expansion of their 
resources would not satisfy all claims, as demand is elastic. So, to appear to provide justice and to 
control their process, the courts must both promise and limit access simultaneously. Normally 
lawyers play a central role in mediating access, screening and translating claims, and negotiating 
clients towards settlement. LiPs come straight to the courts, however, demanding vindication for 
their raw sense of injustice. 
This contradiction in the courts’ approach is not unique within the legal system. It has been said: 
“[L]aw is required to perform inconsistent and incompatible jobs … it does not have the option 
of purifying itself by eliminating some of those jobs”.90 What looks like a defect – a gap between 
promise and reality – is a fundamental part of the judicial system that must mediate between the 
claims and values of competing and diverse social groups.91 Frequent revelation of the gap between 
promise and reality, however, may undermine the courts’ legitimacy. A response is therefore 
required. Barriers erected to dissuade LiPs from continuing to approach the courts risk 
undermining the courts’ legitimacy by revealing to LiPs the illusion of their accessibility. Judges, 
lawyers, and court staff providing assistance risk undermining long established conventions of the 
                                                          
Alan Paterson and Avrom Sherr "Contesting Professionalism: Legal Aid and Nonlawyers in England and Wales" 
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adversarial system and encouraging further litigation in person that would place further pressure 
on the system. Faced with demand for access that the courts cannot accommodate, the 
professionals are tempted to personalise LiPs’ failures. In this manner, the illusion that the courts 
are accessible is maintained, while the failure is blamed on the individual, not on systemic factors 
that few LiPs, if any, can overcome. This focus on individuals’ failings easily elides into thinking 
of LiPs as persistent and vexatious litigants. 
I have argued that the focus on the “problem of persistent litigants” can be explained by several 
factors: their overconsumption of court resources, their function as “atrocity stories”, and the 
danger they are perceived to create. Even more crucially, perhaps it is because they often attack 
the integrity of the court system and are therefore a risk to its legitimacy. The particular problem 
that persistent litigants present, however, often contaminates broader dialogue about LiPs. 
Discussion about these very persistent litigants needs to be cleaved from the discussion about LiPs 
because all LiPs are not very persistent and all very persistent litigants are not LiPs.  
This thesis was directed at studying cases in which LiPs came up against represented litigants, 
where the pressure on LiPs would be expected to be greatest. My findings do speak to cases 
involving only LiPs as well, as I have discussed a number of limitations inherent in not having a 
lawyer, regardless of whether the opposing party was represented. In particular, even the most 
competent LiP cannot fulfil the role lawyers perform as screener, broker, translator, and 
negotiator. Nor can a judge fill those roles, even if they were given considerably more time to deal 
with each case (an expensive form of assistance). These findings are important in light of the 2014 
family justice reforms, which made litigation in person mandatory in many Family Court cases. 
Despite this legislative change, New Zealand’s response to LiPs has so far been muted, although 
there is growing interest in the topic.92 I suggest that the policy response, to be effective, needs to 
address the question of the distribution of justice resources on a principled basis. As Rhode has 
asked: “Our ideal world is surely not one in which all disputes are fully adjudicated, but can we 
develop more equitable limiting principles than ability to pay?”.93 I have argued that adjudication 
is a public good. It has an important role to play in our society and there is room for a discussion 
about determining access based on the importance of the claim to the person, or to society, or to 
the development and refinement of the law.  
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93 Deborah Rhode Access to Justice (Oxford University Press, Oxford; New York, 2004) at 6. 
254 
 
I have also made a number of specific policy recommendations. In doing so I have been mindful 
of the limitations of a small-scale qualitative study as a basis for policy reform but also aware of a 
policy audience in need of insight from empirical inquiry. These more concrete proposals respond 
to the need to protect the courts’ legitimacy without creating a false impression that they are easily 
accessible to LiPs. They are a means by which the delicate balance between projecting accessibility 
and maintaining closure might be somewhat restored. 
While responding to New Zealand’s need for empirical data, this research also contributes to the 
international body of work on LiPs, answering the call for further qualitative research on the issue. 
The case studies, which formed part of the investigation, are an innovation in method. They 
demonstrate both the difficulties of studying live court disputes, particularly in an environment 
where many aspects of litigation are private, as well as the benefits conferred in that they present 
a detailed and nuanced picture of LiPs’ strategies and perspectives in navigating the court system. 
In presenting the experience of LiPs as I witnessed them, and examining their perspectives and 
approaches to litigation, I hope judges, lawyers, and court staff can approach interactions with 
LiPs with greater understanding. Lisa, Matt, Tom and Gary were offered as portraits to assist. As 
Atticus Finch advised: “You never really understand a person until you consider things from his 
point of view – until you climb into his skin and walk around in it”.94 Equally, I hope that in 
presenting the perspectives of judges, lawyers, and court staff, LiPs will better understand the 
pressures and constraints they are subject to and come to court with more knowledge of this 
institution’s orientation and practice. By helping to close the gulf between the participants, a more 
informed and thoughtful debate can occur about how to best respond to those seeking access to 
the courts. 
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Appendix A – Poster 
 
 
Going to Court without a Lawyer? 
 
Research Study on Self-Represented Litigants 
 
Most people who go to Court in New Zealand are represented by a lawyer. There are some people who are 
self-represented - they take or defend cases without the help of a lawyer. This research study explores why 
people become self-represented, their experience of the court system, and the outcomes of their cases. It also 
looks at the experience of other people who are involved in cases where there is a self-represented party 
(judges, court staff and opposing parties and their lawyers). 
 
If you are considering representing yourself in the Family Court or in the District or High Court in Hamilton or 
Auckland in a civil case (i.e. not a criminal case) and you are over 18 years of age you may be eligible to 
participate in this study. 
 
If you take part in the study the researcher will talk to you about your case, including why you do not or cannot 
have a lawyer, and she will come with you to court and meetings with the party on the other side of your case. 
The researcher will not be able to give you any legal advice but will discuss your case with you and be with 
you on your journey through the court system. 
 
The time commitment that is required is an interview at the beginning and end of the observation of your 
case, time to contact the researcher before you go to court or meetings for your case so she can come with 
you and time to discuss your case (several conversations during the observation of your case). 
 
Bridgette Toy-Cronin, University of Otago, Faculty of Law 
Call or text: 0223155972; E-mail: law.selfrepresented@otago.ac.nz 
 
This project has been reviewed and approved by the University of Otago Human Ethics 
Committee. Reference: 12/315. 
 
This project is being undertaken as part of the requirements for a PhD (Doctor of Philosophy in Law). The 








Appendix B – Example of News Story 
 
Harry Pearl, “More people representing themselves” Waikato Times (2 September 2013) 
Te Kawa dairy farmer Hamish Burdon took a slightly unconventional route into legal 
representation, but it's a path one researcher says is becoming increasingly common among 
New Zealanders. 
In 2003, Burdon was forced to represent himself in a custody dispute for the shared parenting 
rights of his two children. 
"I couldn't afford a lawyer so I chose to represent myself," said Burdon, 42. 
He had no legal training and no familiarity with the court system. He won his case. 
It was a galvanising experience and one that ultimately lead him to study post-graduate law 
at the University of Waikato. 
"I'm a farmer by trade and I now also represent people in employment law," he said. 
Burdon is among what is said to be a growing number of people representing themselves in 
New Zealand's civil courts. 
Although there are no official figures available, Hamilton doctoral student Bridgette Toy-Cronin 
told the Times anecdotal evidence suggests numbers are rising. 
"It's widely thought within the system - the judges and the court staff - that the numbers are 
rising. 
"That would make sense because legal aid has been cut back and there was a recession on, 
so people were less able to have an income to pay for a lawyer." 
And when the Government's Family Court Proceedings Reform Bill becomes law, she said, 
almost everyone will be required to be self-represented in the early stages of Family Court 
proceedings. 
Toy-Cronin, who is researching self-represented litigants in New Zealand's civil courts for her 
doctoral degree, hopes her research will provide better outcomes not just for individuals 
representing themselves, but the court system in general. 
"There's a gaping hole there as far as New Zealand research on the topic goes," she said. 
While working as a litigator she had come across several people representing themselves. 
"It's quite hard to litigate against someone who doesn't really know the rules of engagement." 
Some of the challenges facing people representing themselves were difficulty understanding 
court procedures, how to advance their cases and the details of the law. 
But for Burdon, the hardest part was keeping emotion out of proceedings. 
"The old saying is: a good lawyer is one that can keep the emotion out of it. Well, when you're 
representing yourself, you can't." 
Toy-Cronin has been in touch with about 35 self-represented litigants from throughout the 
country for her research, but said she was looking for others. 
"I'm really looking for Hamilton people to be part of that so I can get to know them a bit more 









Reference no 12/315 
23 November 2012 
 
 
GOING TO LAW WITHOUT A LAWYER: SELF-REPRESENTED LITIGANTS IN NEW ZEALAND’S CIVIL 
COURTS 
 
INFORMATION SHEET FOR SELF-REPRESENTED LITIGANTS – OBSERVATIONAL STUDY 
 
Thank you for showing an interest in this project.  Please read this information sheet carefully before 
deciding whether or not to participate.  If you decide to participate we thank you.  If you decide not 
to take part there will be no disadvantage to you and we thank you for considering our request.   
 
What is the Aim of the Project? 
Most people who go to court in New Zealand are represented by a lawyer and in general the court 
system is designed is a way that assumes people will be represented by a lawyer. There are a number 
of people who either take or defend cases as “self-represented litigants”, appearing in court without 
a lawyer representing them. The aim of the project is to find who self-represented litigants are, why 
they are self-represented and to understand their experience of being self-represented. It also aims to 
understand the effect self-representation has on other people in the court system including judges, 
court staff and opposing parties and their lawyers. By participating in this project you will be able to 
give your opinion on how to improve the court system to better serve self-represented litigants. This 
project is being undertaken as part of the requirements for a PhD (Doctor of Philosophy in Law). 
 
Who can take part in the study? 
We are inviting research participants through community organisations and by word of mouth to 
consider participating in the study. We are looking for people who are a party (plaintiff, defendant, 
applicant or respondent) in a case that is or will be: 
• in the Family Court, District Court or High Court; 
• is not a criminal prosecution (i.e. the other party is not the Police); 
• is ongoing, preferably in its early stages. 
If you are a party to this type of case and you are representing yourself, or thinking about 
representing yourself, you may be eligible to take part in the study.  
If you take part in the study the researcher will talk to you about your case, why you do not or 
cannot have a lawyer and how you plan to represent yourself. The researcher will observe you as you 
prepare and argue your case including coming with you to court and meetings with the party on the 
other side of your case. This may be for part of your case or all of your case. The researcher will not 
be able to give you any legal advice, but will discuss your case with you and ask you questions which 
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might help you clarify your strategy and goals. The researcher can also point you in the direction of 
people who might be able to help you. . 
 
What will you be asked to do? 
If you agree to take part in this project, you will be asked to talk to the researcher about your case, 
why you want or need to be self-represented, and the successes or difficulties you are having in 
taking or defending your case without a lawyer’s help. You will be asked to contact the researcher 
before taking major steps in your case (like going to Court or meeting with the other party and their 
lawyer). If possible, the researcher will come with you to court and meetings and observe you 
running your case. If you wish to, you can provide the researcher with court documents related to 
your case.  
 
The time commitment which it will involve is the time to: 
• discuss your case with the researcher; 
• call or email the researcher before you take steps in the case, for example before going to 
court or meeting with the lawyer and the other person involved in the case. 
 
The researcher will arrange to have a final interview with you at the end of your case or at some 
earlier point in your case. During this interview you will be asked to reflect on your experience of 
being an SRL, give any advice for other people thinking about becoming SRLs and your thoughts on 
changes needed in the system. 
 
If the person your case is against and their lawyer have consented to taking part, the researcher will 
then interview them. She will not share any information with them about your case, your opinions or 
your discussions with her. The questions she will ask them will only be about their experience of 
litigating against you, a self-represented litigant. They may provide court documents related to the 
case to explain their experience of litigating against you. This is so there is research information 
about everyone’s perspectives. 
 
If the person your case is against and their lawyer do not consent to being part of this research, you 
can still take part. However the researcher will only be able to observe the parts of your case where 
the Judge gives the researcher permission to be there. You can still call or email the researcher with 
your own updates of how your case is progressing. 
 
Please be aware that you may decide not to take part in the project without any disadvantage to 
yourself of any kind. 
 
What information will we collect and what use will be made of it? 
The researcher will make notes of her discussions with you and during or after watching you take 
steps in your case (for example, when you are meeting the other party’s lawyer or in court). The 
notes will be of answers to the researcher’s questions and the researcher’s observations. She will 
also (with your permission) make a recording of the interview when you first join the study and your 
final interview so that she can ensure her notes of what you said are accurate. You can provide 
copies of court documents to the researcher to explain your case and your experience of being self-
represented if you would like to. You can also e-mail the researcher with updates of your case. This 
information will be used to write her PhD thesis as well as reports and articles on the experience of 
self-represented litigants in New Zealand.  
 
The only people who will have access to the information collected will be the researcher and the 
supervisor. It will be stored securely so that only the researcher and the supervisor can access it. The 
information collected will be retained for at least 5 years in secure storage. Any personal 
278 
 
information held about you, such as your contact details and any recordings of the interviews, will 
be destroyed at the completion of the research even though the data derived from the research will, 
in most cases, be kept for much longer or possibly indefinitely. 
 
The only exceptions, where information collected during the research might be disclosed to a wider 
range of people, would be where disclosure was immediately required to protect the safety of any 
person or where the researcher was ordered to disclose by a court. 
 
The results of the project may be published and will be available in the University of Otago Library 
(Dunedin, New Zealand). The results might include descriptions of you and your case. However, your 
name and any details that might make you identifiable to others will not be published. Every attempt 
will be made to preserve your anonymity. 
 
You can request a copy of your first interview and final interview summary and you can correct or 
withdraw any information you provide at any time following the interview and before the writing up 
of the research results. 
 
Can you change your mind and withdraw from the project? 
 
Yes. You may withdraw from participation in the project at any time and without any disadvantage to 
yourself of any kind. 
 
What if you have any questions? 
If you have any questions about our project, either now or in the future, please feel free to contact 
either:- 
Bridgette Toy-Cronin (Researcher) and/or  Professor John Dawson (Supervisor) 
Faculty of Law, University of Otago   Faculty of Law, University of Otago 
022 315 5972      03 479 8909 
 
Email: law.selfrepresented@otago.ac.nz   Email: john.dawson@otago.ac.nz 
 
This study has been approved by the University of Otago Human Ethics Committee. If you have any 
concerns about the ethical conduct of the research you may contact the Committee through the 
Human Ethics Committee Administrator (ph 03 479 8256). Any issues you raise will be treated in 




Reference no 12/315 
23 November 2012 
 
 
GOING TO LAW WITHOUT A LAWYER: SELF-REPRESENTED LITIGANTS IN NEW ZEALAND’S CIVIL 
COURTS 
 
CONSENT FORM FOR SELF-REPRESENTED LITIGANTS – OBSERVATIONAL STUDY 
 
I have read the Information Sheet concerning this project and understand what it is about.  All my 
questions have been answered to my satisfaction.  I understand that I am free to request further 
information at any stage. 
I know that:- 
1. My participation in the project is entirely voluntary; 
 
2. I am free to withdraw from the project at any time without any disadvantage; 
 
3. Personal identifying information (field work notes that have my name and contact details, any 
recordings of interviews, and any documents provided) will be destroyed at the conclusion of the 
project but any raw data on which the results of the project depend will be retained in secure 
storage for at least five years; 
 
4. The results of the project may be published and will be available in the University of Otago Library 
(Dunedin, New Zealand) but every attempt will be made to preserve my anonymity.  
 
5. At the end of the observation of my case the researcher will interview the opposing party and 
their lawyer. She will not share any information with them about my case, my opinions or my 
discussions with her. The questions she will ask them will only be about their experience of 
litigating against me, a self-represented litigant. 
     
 
 









.............................................................................    ............................... 
       (Signature of participant)      (Date) 
 
This study has been approved by the University of Otago Human Ethics Committee. If you have any 
concerns about the ethical conduct of the research you may contact the Committee through the 
Human Ethics Committee Administrator (ph 03 479 8256). Any issues you raise will be treated in 







Reference no 12/315 
Date 23 November 2012 
 
 
GOING TO LAW WITHOUT A LAWYER: SELF-REPRESENTED LITIGANTS IN NEW ZEALAND’S CIVIL 
COURTS 
 
INFORMATION SHEET FOR SELF-REPRESENTED LITIGANTS – INTERVIEW(S) 
 
Thank you for showing an interest in this project.  Please read this information sheet carefully before 
deciding whether or not to participate.  If you decide to participate we thank you.  If you decide not 
to take part there will be no disadvantage to you and we thank you for considering our request.   
 
What is the Aim of the Project? 
Most people who go to court in New Zealand are represented by a lawyer and in general the court 
system is designed is a way that assumes people will be represented by a lawyer. There are a number 
of people who either take or defend cases as “self-represented litigants”, appearing in court without 
a lawyer representing them. The aim of the project is to find who self-represented litigants are, why 
they are self-represented and to understand their experience of being self-represented. It also aims to 
understand the effect self-representation has on other people in the court system including judges, 
court staff and opposing parties and their lawyers. By participating in this project you will be able to 
give your opinion on how to improve the court system to better serve self-represented litigants. This 
project is being undertaken as part of the requirements for a PhD (Doctor of Philosophy in Law). 
 
Who can take part in the study? 
We are inviting research participants through community organisations and by word of mouth to 
consider participating in the study. We are looking for people who are a party (plaintiff, defendant, 
applicant or respondent) in a case that is: 
• in the Family Court, District Court or High Court; 
• is not a criminal prosecution (i.e. the other party is not the Police). 
• is ongoing or concluded in the last year. 
If you are or were a party to this type of case and you represented yourself, or are representing 
yourself, you may be eligible to take part in the study.  
If you take part in the study the researcher will talk to you about your case, why you do not or 
cannot have a lawyer and your experience of representing yourself. The researcher will not be able 
to give you any legal advice, but you will be able to share your experience and your ideas for 
improving the system to better serve the needs of self-represented litigants. 
 
What will you be asked to do? 
If you agree to take part in this project, you will be asked to talk to the researcher about your case, 
why you want or need to be self-represented, and the successes or difficulties you are having in 
taking or defending your case without a lawyer’s help. If your case has already concluded or has 
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been in progress for several months, you will also be asked to reflect on your experience of being an 
SRL, give any advice for other people thinking about becoming SRLs and your thoughts on changes 
needed in the system. 
 
The time commitment which it will involve is the time to discuss your case with the researcher 
(approximately one hour). If your case is ongoing the researcher may ask you to participate in a 
second interview to discuss your progress and any changes in your further experience of being an 
SRL (approximately one hour, 6-12 months after the original interview). You can provide copies of 
court documents to the researcher to further explain your case and experience of self-representing, 
if you wish to.  
 
Please be aware that you may decide not to take part in the project without any disadvantage to 
yourself of any kind. 
 
What information will we collect and what use will be made of it? 
The researcher will make notes of her discussions with you. She will also (with your permission) 
make a recording of the interview(s) so that she can ensure her notes of what you said are accurate. 
This information will be used to write her PhD thesis as well as reports and articles on the experience 
of self-represented litigants in New Zealand.  
 
The only people who will have access to the information collected will be the researcher and the 
supervisor. It will be stored securely so that only the researcher and the supervisor can access it. The 
information collected will be retained for at least 5 years in secure storage. Any personal 
information held about you, such as your contact details and any recordings of the interviews, will 
be destroyed at the completion of the research even though the data derived from the research will, 
in most cases, be kept for much longer or possibly indefinitely. 
 
The only exceptions, where information collected during the research might be disclosed to a wider 
range of people, would be where disclosure was immediately required to protect the safety of any 
person or where the researcher was ordered to disclose by a court. 
 
The results of the project may be published and will be available in the University of Otago Library 
(Dunedin, New Zealand). The results might include descriptions of you and your case. However, your 
name and any details that might make you identifiable to others will not be published. Every attempt 
will be made to preserve your anonymity. 
 
You can request a copy of your first interview and final interview summary and you can correct or 
withdraw any information you provide at any time following the interview and before the writing up 
of the research results. 
 
Can you change your mind and withdraw from the project? 
 
Yes. You may withdraw from participation in the project at any time and without any disadvantage to 
yourself of any kind. 
 
What if you have any questions? 
If you have any questions about our project, either now or in the future, please feel free to contact 
either:- 
Bridgette Toy-Cronin (Researcher) and/or  Professor John Dawson (Supervisor) 
Faculty of Law, University of Otago   Faculty of Law, University of Otago 




Email: law.selfrepresented@otago.ac.nz   Email: john.dawson@otago.ac.nz 
 
This study has been approved by the University of Otago Human Ethics Committee. If you have any 
concerns about the ethical conduct of the research you may contact the Committee through the 
Human Ethics Committee Administrator (ph 03 479 8256). Any issues you raise will be treated in 




Reference Number 12/315 
23 November 2012 
 
 
GOING TO LAW WITHOUT A LAWYER: SELF-REPRESENTED LITIGANTS IN NEW ZEALAND’S CIVIL 
COURTS 
 
CONSENT FORM FOR SELF-REPRESENTED LITIGANTS – INTERVIEW(S) 
 
I have read the Information Sheet concerning this project and understand what it is about.  All my 
questions have been answered to my satisfaction.  I understand that I am free to request further 
information at any stage. 
I know that:- 
1. My participation in the project is entirely voluntary; 
 
2. I am free to withdraw from the project at any time without any disadvantage; 
 
3. Personal identifying information (notes that have my name and contact details, any recordings of 
interviews, and any documents provided) will be destroyed at the conclusion of the project but 
any raw data on which the results of the project depend will be retained in secure storage for at 
least five years; 
 
4. The results of the project may be published and will be available in the University of Otago Library 
(Dunedin, New Zealand) but every attempt will be made to preserve my anonymity.  
 
    
 
 









.............................................................................    ............................... 
  (Signature of participant)       (Date) 
 
This study has been approved by the University of Otago Human Ethics Committee. If you have any 
concerns about the ethical conduct of the research you may contact the Committee through the 
Human Ethics Committee Administrator (ph 03 479 8256). Any issues you raise will be treated in 








Appendix D – Interview Schedule for LiPs  
 
GOING TO LAW WITHOUT A LAWYER: SELF-REPRESENTED LITIGANTS IN NEW ZEALAND’S CIVIL 
COURTS 
 
INTERVIEW QUESTIONS FOR SELF-REPRESENTED LITIGANTS  
 
This is a semi-structured interview schedule. One interview will be undertaken when the SRL enters 




Representation Decision and Assistance with Case 
• Why are you going to be self-represented? Have you made any attempts to find a lawyer? Do 
you know if you are eligible for legal aid? Have you applied for legal aid?  
• Have you got any previous experience of the court system? As a litigant? As a witness? Jury 
member? Have you self-represented before? 
• Do you have anyone with legal experience helping you? If so, how are they helping? What is 
their experience? Do they have formal qualifications? 
• Have you looked for help with your case anywhere else? Online? At an organisation? At the 
court? Are you planning to get help anywhere else? 
 
Nature of the case 
• What is your case about? Have you brought the case or are you the respondent/defendant? 
• Who is the other party to the case? What is their relationship to you? Who is their lawyer? 
• Have you tried to resolve the case without going to court? Why or why not? If yes, what have 
you done?  
• Which court will your case be in?  
• What do you hope to achieve by taking the case to court? Are you hoping you’ll find a resolution 
before getting to a court hearing or would you rather a judge solve it? 
• How long do you think the case will take to resolve if a judge makes the final decision? 
 
Steps taken 
• What have you done so far in your case, if anything? 




Reflections on representation 
• Do you think there were any advantages or disadvantages by being self-represented? If so, what 
were the advantages and disadvantages?  
• The other party had a lawyer, what were the advantages to them in having a lawyer? What were 
the disadvantages? 
• Looking back at your case, do you think it would have been better to have represented yourself 
or to have a lawyer? Why? Do you think the outcome would have been the same or different? 
 
Reflections on the process 
• If you had your time again, from the beginning of the case, what would you do differently? What 
would you do the same? 






Reflections on the outcome of the case 
• [If the case went to a hearing] Did you think the Judge was fair to you at the hearing? Do you 
think the Judge was fair to the SRL? Do you think the Judge favoured you or the SRL or treated 
you equally?  
• [If SRL is a plaintiff/respondent] What were you hoping to achieve by taking this case to court? 
Did you achieve that [or if case is not yet resolved, do you still think you will achieve that]? Do 
you feel satisfied with the outcome of your case? Do you think it was a fair outcome? 
• [If the interviewee is the respondent/defendant] Do you think that the other party needed to 
bring this case to court to solve the dispute between you? Why or why not? If not, how could 
the dispute have otherwise been resolved? 
 
SRLs and the Courts 
• What do you see as the main purpose or purposes of the [Family/District/High] Court? 
• If you were advising someone who was thinking about being an SRL in the [Family/District/High] 
Court, what advice would you give them? Should they go self-represented or get a lawyer? 
• Should people have the option to be self-represented in the [Family/District/High] Court? 
• What should be done for people who want a lawyer but can’t afford one?  
• Thinking about preparing your case, what changes could be made to the system to better help 
SRLs? What help do you think you would have benefited from? (e.g. online information, SRL self-
help centre, clearer forms, easier procedure). What about the Court registry office? 
• [If the case went to a hearing] Thinking about arguing your case in court, what could judges do 
differently to better help SRLs? What about the rules in the court [like the rules for examining 
witnesses] do they need to be changed at all?  
• [If the case is ongoing] What are you planning to do next in your case? [or] what is going to 






Appendix E – Information Sheet for Presiding Judge 
 
Reference no 12/315 
23 November 2012 
 
 
GOING TO LAW WITHOUT A LAWYER: SELF-REPRESENTED LITIGANTS IN NEW ZEALAND’S CIVIL 
COURTS 
 
INFORMATION SHEET FOR JUDGES PRESIDING OVER FIXTURES 
WHERE PERMISSION TO OBSERVE IS SOUGHT 
 
Aim of the Project 
 
Self-represented litigants (SRLs) present unique challenges to the courts. Anecdotal evidence suggests 
the number of SRLs is increasing but there is little reliable data on how many SRLs there are in the civil 
courts, why they are self-represented and the experience of being an SRL, to litigate against them or 
to hear cases in which they appear. It is hoped this research will answer these questions and that the 
results of the research will help guide future policy and procedural reforms in the courts. This project 
is being undertaken as part of the requirements for a PhD (Doctor of Philosophy in Law). 
 
Funding and Approval 
 
The research is funded by a New Zealand Law Foundation Doctoral Scholarship and has been approved 
by the University of Otago Human Ethics Committee, the Ministry of Justice and the Judicial Research 
Committee.  
 
In Court Observation 
 
Part of the research involves observations of SRLs who have cases in the Family Court, District Court 
and High Court in Auckland and Hamilton. The researcher will observe the SRLs as they attempt to 
negotiate the court process including court appearances. One of the SRLs participating in this study is 
appearing in your court and I am seeking permission to observe the fixture. The SRL has signed a 
consent form and agreed to being observed. I have also contacted the opposing party’s solicitor and 
asked the solicitor and opposing party to participate in an interview and to consent to observing 
fixtures. Their response will be noted in the e-mail accompanying this information sheet.   
 
Publication and Protection of Anonymity  
The research findings will be published as part of the researcher’s PhD thesis and will also be used for 
conference presentations and journal publications in New Zealand. Every attempt will be made to 
preserve participants’ anonymity. The names of, and any identifying details about, the people 
observed (including the Judge) will not be published, nor any other information would easily lead to 




I am admitted as a Barrister and Solicitor and have practiced as a litigation solicitor in the New Zealand 
Courts. I will of course abide by any orders of the Court.  
 
Questions 
If you have any questions about the Judicial Research Committee’s approval please contact Kieron 
McCarron (kieron.mccarron@courts.govt.nz). 
If you have any questions about the project please contact either:- 
Bridgette Toy-Cronin (Researcher) and/or  Professor John Dawson (Supervisor) 
Faculty of Law, University of Otago   Faculty of Law, University of Otago 
022 315 5972      03 479 8909 
 
Email: law.selfrepresented@otago.ac.nz   Email: john.dawson@otago.ac.nz 
 
This study has been approved by the University of Otago Human Ethics Committee. If you have any 
concerns about the ethical conduct of the research you may contact the Committee through the 
Human Ethics Committee Administrator (ph 03 479 8256). Any issues you raise will be treated in 






Appendix F – Information Sheet and Consent for Lawyers 
 
Reference no 12/315 
23 November 2012 
 
 
GOING TO LAW WITHOUT A LAWYER: SELF-REPRESENTED LITIGANTS IN NEW ZEALAND’S CIVIL 
COURTS 
 
INFORMATION SHEET FOR LAWYERS 
 
Please read this information sheet carefully before deciding whether or not to participate.  If you 
decide to participate we thank you.  If you decide not to take part there will be no disadvantage to 
you and we thank you for considering our request.   
 
What is the Aim of the Project? 
 
Self-represented litigants (SRLs) present unique challenges to the courts and those who litigate against 
them. Anecdotal evidence suggests the number of SRLs is increasing but there is little reliable data on 
how many SRLs there are in the civil courts, why they are self-represented and what it is like to be a 
SRL or to litigate against them. It is hoped this research will answer these questions and that the results 
of the research will help guide future policy and procedural reforms in the courts. This project is being 
undertaken as part of the requirements for a PhD (Doctor of Philosophy in Law). 
 
The research is funded by the New Zealand Law Foundation and has been approved by the Ministry of 
Justice and the Judicial Research Committee.  
 
Who can take part in the study? 
 
Self-represented litigants who are parties to civil cases in the Family Court, District Court or High 
Court in Hamilton or Auckland have agreed to participate in our research. We are contacting you 
because your client is the opposing party to an SRL who has agreed to be part of this study.  
The researcher will observe the SRL as they prepare their case and will discuss their experiences with 
them throughout the court process (such as understanding the substantive or procedural law). We 
also want to understand your experience of litigating against an SRL, so we are asking for opposing 
parties and their lawyers to participate in the study as well. 
The researcher is trained as a lawyer, but she will not provide any legal advice to the SRL or your 
client.  
What will you be asked to do? 
 
As part of the observation of the SRL, the researcher would like to attend meetings between the SRL 
and you and your client and any attempts at dispute resolution, as well as any court appearances. 
When the researcher has finished observing the SRL, she would like to interview you and your client 
separately about your experiences of litigating against the SRL and any issues you encountered that 
were due to the SRL not having a lawyer (the Interview). The researcher will not share any 
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information with you about the SRL’s case, opinions or her discussions with the SRL. The Interview 
will only be to discuss issues related to the SRL’s lack of representation. The Interview will only take 
place after her observation of the SRL has ended and she has no ongoing contact with the SRL. 
Everything discussed in the Interview is confidential and will not be shared with the SRL or the court. 
The time commitment which it will involve is: 
• presenting the information sheet and consent form to your client and asking if they will talk 
to the researcher; and 
• up to one hour of your time for the Interview.  
 
Before any court fixtures the researcher will make an application to the Judge to ask for permission 
to attend. This application may be made whether or not you and your client agree to participate in 
the research. A copy of the application will be sent to you so that you have the opportunity to raise 
any objections to the researcher observing the fixture.  
 
Please be aware that you may decide not to take part in the project without any disadvantage to 
yourself of any kind. 
 
What information will we collect and what use will be made of it? 
The researcher will make notes of her observation of any interactions between you and the SRL. The 
researcher will also make notes of your responses to the questions in the Interview. With your 
agreement the Interview will be recorded so that key themes can be identified, and relevant quotes 
and examples can be retrieved for the research report. If you wish to, you can provide copies of court 
documents to illustrate your answers. 
The information is being collected for the purpose of better understanding the experience of SRLs 
negotiating the New Zealand civil court system and the effect they have on all the other actors 
involved in the system. The research findings will be published as part of the researcher’s PhD thesis 
but will also be used for conference presentations and journal publications in New Zealand and 
internationally.  
 
The only people who will have access to the information collected will be the researcher and the 
supervisor. It will be stored securely so that only the researcher and the supervisor can access it. The 
information collected will be retained for at least 5 years in secure storage. Any personal 
information held about you, such as your contact details and any audio tape of the Interview, will be 
destroyed at the completion of the research even though the data derived from the research will, in 
most cases, be kept for much longer or possibly indefinitely. 
 
The only exceptions, where information collected during the research might be disclosed to a wider 
range of people, would be where disclosure was immediately required to protect the safety of any 
person or where the researcher was ordered to disclose by a court. 
 
The research report will provide an overview of the key themes emerging across all the interviews 
with lawyers. Anonymous quotes and examples of practice will also be included to illustrate these 
themes. No individual lawyer or their location will be identified.  
 
The results of the project may be published and will be available in the University of Otago Library 
(Dunedin, New Zealand) but every attempt will be made to preserve your anonymity. 
 
You can request a copy of the Interview summary and you can correct or withdraw any information 
you provide at any time following the Interview and before the writing up of the research results. 
 




Yes. You may withdraw from participation in the project at any time and without any disadvantage to 
yourself of any kind. 
 
What if you have any questions? 
If you have any questions about our project, either now or in the future, please feel free to contact 
either:- 
Bridgette Toy-Cronin (Researcher) and/or  Professor John Dawson (Supervisor) 
Faculty of Law, University of Otago   Faculty of Law, University of Otago 
022 315 5972      03 479 8909 
 
Email: law.selfrepresented@otago.ac.nz   Email: john.dawson@otago.ac.nz 
 
This study has been approved by the University of Otago Human Ethics Committee. If you have any 
concerns about the ethical conduct of the research you may contact the Committee through the 
Human Ethics Committee Administrator (ph 03 479 8256). Any issues you raise will be treated in 




Reference no 12/315 
23 November 2012 
 
 
GOING TO LAW WITHOUT A LAWYER: SELF-REPRESENTED LITIGANTS IN NEW ZEALAND’S CIVIL 
COURTS 
 
CONSENT FORM FOR LAWYERS 
 
I have read the Information Sheet concerning this project and understand what it is about.  All my 
questions have been answered to my satisfaction.  I understand that I am free to request further 
information at any stage. 
I know that:- 
1. My participation in the project is entirely voluntary; 
 
2. I am free to withdraw from the project at any time without any disadvantage; 
 
3. Personal identifying information (field work notes that have my name and contact details, any 
audio file, and documents provided) will be destroyed at the conclusion of the project but any 
raw data on which the results of the project depend will be retained in secure storage for at least 
five years; 
 
4. The results of the project may be published and will be available in the University of Otago Library 
(Dunedin, New Zealand) but every attempt will be made to preserve my anonymity. 
 
   
  









.............................................................................    ............................... 
       (Signature of participant)      (Date) 
 
This study has been approved by the University of Otago Human Ethics Committee. If you have any 
concerns about the ethical conduct of the research you may contact the Committee through the 
Human Ethics Committee Administrator (ph 03 479 8256). Any issues you raise will be treated in 





Appendix G – Interview Schedules for Lawyers 
 
GOING TO LAW WITHOUT A LAWYER: SELF-REPRESENTED LITIGANTS IN NEW ZEALAND’S CIVIL 
COURTS 
 
INTERVIEW QUESTIONS FOR LAWYERS (GENERAL INTERVIEW) 
 
This is a semi-structured interview schedule designed to follow the various phases of a court case, 
focusing on specific issues encountered due to litigating against self-represented litigants. The 
questions are also designed to explore the lawyer’s perception of the purpose of the court system and 
the place of a self-represented litigant in that system. 
 
Opposing SRLs 
Communicating with SRLs 
1. Do you find that your communications (in person or by correspondence) with SRLs is any 
different to when you are communicating with a lawyer? 
2. Do you ever suggest to SRLs that they should seek representation? Why or why not? 
3. Are you comfortable talking to SRLs or do you prefer to deal with a lawyer? Why? 
4. Do you know of any ethical rules for dealing with an unrepresented party? Do you think it would 
help to have guidelines for how lawyers should deal with SRLs? 
 
Documents 
5. In your experience, can SRLs file documents with the same level of proficiency as a lawyer? If 
not, can you identify any particular difficulties SRLs have in producing court documents? 
 
Resolving the case 
6. Do you think that having an SRL as an opposing party effects the time it takes to resolve a case? 
Why? 
7. Do you think that having an SRL as an opposing party effects the cost of the case for the 
represented party? 
8. Do you think that having an SRL as an opposing party effects your ability to negotiate an out of 
court settlement to a case?  
 
In court 
9. Thinking about hearings [judicial settlement conference/case conferences etc] that you have 
appeared in opposing an SRL, do you think the SRL gained any advantages by the fact they were 
self-represented? What about disadvantages? 
10. Is there anything about your style of presentation that you change when the other party is self-
represented? 
11. Do you think SRLs can present a case in court [opening and closing/evidence/pre-trial 
applications] with the same level of proficiency as a lawyer?  
 
Courts and Self-Represented Litigants 
12. What do you see as the main purpose or purposes of the [Family/District/High] Court? 
13. What think are the main reasons that SRLs don’t have lawyers? 
14. Do you think that people should be allowed to be self-represented in the [Family/District/High] 
Court? Why or why not? 
15. If you don’t think people should be allowed to be self-represented in the [Family/District/High] 





Unbundled Legal Advice 
16. Have you ever given advice or drafted documents for someone who is self-represented?  
a. If yes – Did you charge for the advice or was it pro bono?  Was there a formal brief? If 
yes, what was the limit of your brief and how was this defined?  
b. If no – would you provide limited brief advice if approached (e.g. drafting a court 
document or offering advice on the next step to take to progress a case)? 







Appendix H – Information Sheet and Consent form for Judges 
 
Reference no 12/315 
23 November 2012 
 
 
GOING TO LAW WITHOUT A LAWYER: SELF-REPRESENTED LITIGANTS IN NEW ZEALAND’S CIVIL 
COURTS 
 
INFORMATION SHEET FOR JUDGES 
 
Thank you for showing an interest in this project. Please read this information sheet carefully before 
deciding whether or not to participate.  If you decide to participate we thank you.  If you decide not 
to take part there will be no disadvantage to you and we thank you for considering our request.   
 
What is the Aim of the Project? 
 
Self-represented litigants (SRLs) present unique challenges to the courts. Anecdotal evidence suggests 
the number of SRLs is increasing but there is little reliable data on how many SRLs there are in the civil 
courts, why they are self-represented and the experience of being an SRL, to litigate against them or 
to hear cases in which they appear. It is hoped this research will answer these questions and that the 
results of the research will help guide future policy and procedural reforms in the courts. This project 
is being undertaken as part of the requirements for a PhD (Doctor of Philosophy in Law). 
 
The research is funded by a New Zealand Law Foundation Doctoral Scholarship and has been approved 
by the Ministry of Justice and Judicial Research Committee.  
 
Who can take part in the study? 
 
Part of the research involves observations of SRLs who have cases in the Family Court, District Court 
and High Court in Auckland and Hamilton. The researcher will observe the SRLs as they attempt to 
negotiate the court process including court appearances.  
If one of the SRLs in this study is appearing in your court, you cannot participate in this study. All 
other judges of the New Zealand civil courts are eligible to participate.  
What will you be asked to do? 
 
You will be asked to participate in an interview of up to one hour in length. The interview will be 
about your experience of hearing cases involving SRLs. The questions will be provided to you in 
advance so you are aware of the topics to be discussed. The interview will be conducted at a time 
and venue convenient to you.  
Please be aware that you may decide not to take part in the project without any disadvantage to 
yourself of any kind. 
 
What information will we collect and what use will be made of it? 
The information to be collected will be your responses to the questions about your experience of 
hearing cases involving SRLs. The researcher will make notes during the interview and with your 
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agreement the interview will be recorded (audio only) so that key themes can be identified, and 
relevant quotes and examples can be retrieved (anonymously) for the research report.  
 
The information is being collected for the purpose of better understanding the experience of SRLs 
negotiating the New Zealand civil court system and the effect they have on all the other actors 
involved in the system. The project will be helpful to the New Zealand judiciary’s knowledge of how 
to best manage SRLs. The research findings will be published as part of the researcher’s PhD thesis 
and will also be used for conference presentations and journal publications in New Zealand and 
internationally.  
 
The only people who will have access to the information collected will be the researcher and the 
supervisor. It will be stored securely so that only the researcher and the supervisor can access it. The 
information collected will be retained for at least 5 years in secure storage. Any personal 
information held about you, such as your contact details, will be destroyed at the completion of the 
research even though the data derived from the research will, in most cases, be kept for much 
longer or possibly indefinitely. 
 
The research report will provide an overview of the key themes emerging across all the interviews 
with the Judges. Anonymous quotes and examples of judicial practice will also be included to 
illustrate these themes. No individual Judge or their location will be identified.  
 
The results of the project may be published and will be available in the University of Otago Library 
(Dunedin, New Zealand) but every attempt will be made to preserve your anonymity. 
 
You can request a copy of your interview summary and you can correct or withdraw any information 
you provide at any time following the interview and before the writing up of the research results. 
 
At the conclusion of the project, we will be pleased to provide you with a copy of the research report 
(including an executive summary) and any journal articles the researcher writes. In addition, the 
researcher will be very willing to attend any judicial seminars to discuss the findings with you and your 
colleagues.  
 
Can you change your mind and withdraw from the project? 
 
You may withdraw from participation in the project at any time and without any disadvantage to 
yourself of any kind. 
 
What if you have any questions? 
If you have any questions about our project, either now or in the future, please feel free to contact 
either:- 
Bridgette Toy-Cronin (Researcher) and/or  Professor John Dawson (Supervisor) 
Faculty of Law, University of Otago   Faculty of Law, University of Otago 
022 315 5972      03 479 8909 
 
Email: law.selfrepresented@otago.ac.nz   Email: john.dawson@otago.ac.nz 
 
This study has been approved by the University of Otago Human Ethics Committee. If you have any 
concerns about the ethical conduct of the research you may contact the Committee through the 
Human Ethics Committee Administrator (ph 03 479 8256). Any issues you raise will be treated in 




Reference no 12/315 
23 November 2012 
 
 
GOING TO LAW WITHOUT A LAWYER: SELF-REPRESENTED LITIGANTS IN NEW ZEALAND’S CIVIL 
COURTS 
 
CONSENT FORM FOR JUDGES 
 
I have read the Information Sheet concerning this project and understand what it is about.  All my 
questions have been answered to my satisfaction.  I understand that I am free to request further 
information at any stage. 
I know that:- 
1. My participation in the project is entirely voluntary; 
 
2. I am free to withdraw from the project at any time without any disadvantage; 
 
3. Personal identifying information (field work notes that have my name and contact details and any 
audio recording) will be destroyed at the conclusion of the project but any raw data on which the 
results of the project depend will be retained in secure storage for at least five years; 
 
4. The results of the project may be published and will be available in the University of Otago Library 
(Dunedin, New Zealand) but every attempt will be made to preserve my anonymity. 
 
 
     
 
 










.............................................................................    ............................... 
       (Signature of participant)      (Date) 
 
This study has been approved by the University of Otago Human Ethics Committee. If you have any 
concerns about the ethical conduct of the research you may contact the Committee through the 
Human Ethics Committee Administrator (ph 03 479 8256). Any issues you raise will be treated in 






Appendix I – Interview Questions for Judges 
 
GOING TO LAW WITHOUT A LAWYER: SELF-REPRESENTED LITIGANTS IN NEW ZEALAND’S CIVIL COURTS 
 
INTERVIEW QUESTIONS FOR JUDGES 
 
Hearings involving SRLs 
1. At the beginning of a case with an SRL, do you routinely explain the court process to them or give any 
introduction that you would not give if both parties are represented? Why or why not? 
2. Do you make any changes to your usual style of interaction with counsel when you are dealing with 
an SRL, for example changes to your language or tone? If yes, do you find it difficult to make those 
changes? 
3. In cases you’ve heard with a SRL, have you made allowances for SRLs failing to follow procedural rules 
that you wouldn’t have made for counsel? If yes, please tell me about what happened and how you 
dealt with it. 
4. Have you ever felt conflicted between wanting to explain procedure or substantive law to an SRL to 
ensure the proceedings are fair and avoiding giving advice? If yes, please tell me about what 
happened and how you dealt with it. 
5. When hearing a case with an SRL, have you ever felt concerned that in assisting the SRL to ensure the 
proceedings are fair, the represented party will think you are biased towards the SRL? 
6. Do you see SRLs as falling into different groups? If so, what distinctions do you draw?   
7. Are there any differences in your approach to dealing with an SRL who is in one category or another 
category [referring to the Judge’s own categorisation]? 
8. Have you heard cases where the SRL is accompanied by a McKenzie Friend? [If yes] Thinking about 
cases you’ve heard with and without a McKenzie Friend accompanying the SRL, do you think the 
McKenzie Friends are helpful to you or would you rather deal directly with an SRL? Why?  
 
Burden on the Court 
9. Do you think that hearing a case where one party is an SRL take any longer than a hearing where both 
parties are represented? If yes, why? 
10. Do you think the number of SRLs in your court in the last five years has increased, decreased or 
stayed the same? [If the Judge thinks the number has changed] What do you think the reason is for 
that change? [If thinks it is financially motivated] Do you think the number of querulous litigants and 
those representing themselves because they think they can do a better job than counsel has 
changed? 
11. Have you had any training or received any guidelines on dealing with SRLs? Do you think [more] 
training or guidelines would be helpful to you or are you comfortable that you have an approach with 
SRLs that works? 
 
Fulfilling the Court’s function and SRLs 
12. What do you see as the main functions of the [Family/District/High Court] in our justice system?  
13. Do you think that SRLs have any effect on the ability of the Court to discharge that function [adopting 




14. Do you see the need for systemic change to accommodate SRLs? If so, what sort of changes do you 




Appendix J – Information and Consent Form for Court Staff 
 
Reference no 12/315 
23 November 2012 
 
 
GOING TO LAW WITHOUT A LAWYER: SELF-REPRESENTED LITIGANTS IN NEW ZEALAND’S CIVIL 
COURTS 
 
INFORMATION SHEET FOR COURT STAFF AND ADVISERS TO SELF-REPRESENTED LITIGANTS 
 
Thank you for showing an interest in this project. Please read this information sheet carefully before 
deciding whether or not to participate.  If you decide to participate we thank you.  If you decide not 
to take part there will be no disadvantage to you and we thank you for considering our request.   
 
What is the Aim of the Project? 
Self-represented litigants (SRLs) present unique challenges to the courts. Anecdotal evidence suggests 
the number of SRLs is increasing but there is little reliable data on how many SRLs there are in the civil 
courts, why they are self-represented and the experience of being an SRL, to litigate against them or 
to hear cases in which they appear. It is hoped this research will answer these questions and that the 
results of the research will help guide future policy and procedural reforms in the courts. This project 
is being undertaken as part of the requirements for a PhD (Doctor of Philosophy in Law). 
 
The research is funded by a New Zealand Law Foundation Doctoral Scholarship and has been approved 
by the Ministry of Justice and Judicial Research Committee.  
 
Who can take part in the study? 
The study is taking place in the Family, District and High Courts. We are inviting the court staff of 
these Courts to participate in the study (Court Staff). We are also inviting the staff of Community Law 
Centres, Citizen Advice Bureaux and other organisations and individuals who frequently advise SRLs 
to participate (Advisers).  
 
What will you be asked to do? 
If you agree to take part in this research you will be asked to participate in a 30-40 minute taped 
interview. Depending on your organisation and your role within that organisation, you will be asked 
questions about the challenges of dealing with a self-represented litigant, what resources your 
organisation can offer and what resources you think would be helpful. You will also be asked about 
your perception of the purpose of the court system and the place of a self-represented litigant in 
that system. The interview will be conducted at a time and venue convenient to you.  
Please be aware that you may decide not to take part in the project without any disadvantage to 
yourself of any kind. 
 
What information will we collect and what use will be made of it? 
The information to be collected will be your responses to the questions about your experience of 
dealing with SRLs. The researcher will make notes during the interview and with your agreement the 
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interview will be taped so that key themes can be identified, and relevant quotes and examples can 
be retrieved for the research report.  
The information is being collected for the purpose of better understanding the experience of SRLs 
negotiating the New Zealand civil court system and the effect they have on all the other actors 
involved in the system, including Court Staff and Advisers. The research findings will be published as 
part of the researcher’s PhD thesis but will also be used for conference presentations and journal 
publications in New Zealand and internationally.  
 
The only people who will have access to the information collected will be the researcher and the 
supervisor. It will be stored securely so that only the researcher and the supervisor can access it. The 
information collected will be retained for at least 5 years in secure storage. Any personal 
information held about you, such as your contact details, will be destroyed at the completion of the 
research even though the data derived from the research will, in most cases, be kept for much 
longer or possibly indefinitely. 
 
The research report will provide an overview of the key themes emerging across all the interviews 
with Court Staff and Advisers. Anonymous quotes and examples of practice will also be included to 
illustrate these themes. No individual person or their location will be identified.  
 
The results of the project may be published and will be available in the University of Otago Library 
(Dunedin, New Zealand) but every attempt will be made to preserve your anonymity. 
 
You can request a copy of your interview summary and you can correct or withdraw any information 
you provide at any time following the interview and before the writing up of the research results. 
 
Can you change your mind and withdraw from the project? 
 
You may withdraw from participation in the project at any time and without any disadvantage to 
yourself of any kind. 
 
What if you have any questions? 
If you have any questions about our project, either now or in the future, please feel free to contact 
either:- 
Bridgette Toy-Cronin (Researcher) and/or  Professor John Dawson (Supervisor) 
Faculty of Law, University of Otago   Faculty of Law, University of Otago 
022 315 5972      03 479 8909 
 
Email: law.selfrepresented@otago.ac.nz   Email: john.dawson@otago.ac.nz 
 
This study has been approved by the University of Otago Human Ethics Committee. If you have any 
concerns about the ethical conduct of the research you may contact the Committee through the 
Human Ethics Committee Administrator (ph 03 479 8256). Any issues you raise will be treated in 
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GOING TO LAW WITHOUT A LAWYER: SELF-REPRESENTED LITIGANTS IN NEW ZEALAND’S CIVIL 
COURTS 
 
CONSENT FORM FOR COURT STAFF AND ADVISERS TO SELF-REPRESENTED LITIGANTS 
 
I have read the Information Sheet concerning this project and understand what it is about.  All my 
questions have been answered to my satisfaction.  I understand that I am free to request further 
information at any stage. 
I know that:- 
1. My participation in the project is entirely voluntary; 
 
2. I am free to withdraw from the project at any time without any disadvantage; 
 
3. Personal identifying information (field work notes that have my name and contact details and any 
audio file) will be destroyed at the conclusion of the project but any raw data on which the results 
of the project depend will be retained in secure storage for at least five years; 
 
4. The results of the project may be published and will be available in the University of Otago Library 
(Dunedin, New Zealand) but every attempt will be made to preserve my anonymity. 
 
 









.............................................................................    ............................... 
       (Signature of participant)      (Date) 
 
This study has been approved by the University of Otago Human Ethics Committee. If you have any 
concerns about the ethical conduct of the research you may contact the Committee through the 
Human Ethics Committee Administrator (ph 03 479 8256). Any issues you raise will be treated in 








Appendix K – Interview Questions for Court Staff 
 
INTERVIEW QUESTIONS FOR COURT STAFF 
 
This is a semi-structured interview schedule designed to elicit specific challenges presented in dealing 
with a self-represented litigant. The questions are also designed to explore the court staff member’s 
perception of the purpose of the court system and the place of a self-represented litigant in that 
system. Some questions may not be relevant to particular staff member, depending on their roles 
such as court manager, registrar or counter staff.  
 
Systems 
• Does this court have any specific procedures or systems for dealing with SRLs? For example 
someone assigned to each SRL specifically? 
• Do you have any written materials you give specifically to SRLs? 
 
Advice to SRLs 
• Do you think SRLs take any more of the court staff’s time than represented litigants? If so, in 
what ways? 
• Do you ever feel unsure about how much assistance you can give an SRL and whether the 
assistance you are providing amounts to “legal advice”? Where do you draw the line? Have you 
had training on this issue? If so, what was it? Are there guidelines you are aware of? 
• In general, do SRLs accept that you can’t give them legal advice? Have you ever had SRLs 
become frustrated with you because you can’t give them more information?  
• Do you suggest to the SRL that they seek representation? Why or why not? 
• Do you provide SRLs with information about where they can get further advice? If so, what 
information do you give them? 
 
Documents 
• In general, do SRLs have difficulties with the form of the documents they need to file? What sort 
of problems? Have you encountered the same problem(s) when a lawyer files these documents?  
• Do you check the documents of SRLs? Does your check of SRL documents differ in any way from 
checks of documents prepared by lawyers? 
• Do you help SRLs correct problems with their documents? Do you give the same help to 
lawyers? 
• Do you think, as the rules stand at the moment, the requirements for the documents create any 
unfairness to SRLs? What about to represented litigants?  
• Do you think that the documents parties need to file could be simplified at all to make it easier 
for SRLs? Why or why not?  
 
SRLs in court 
• Is there anything you do differently in court because a party is self-represented? 
• Thinking about cases that you’ve listened to in court where one party is an SRL, do you think the 
SRL gains any advantages by the fact they were self-represented? What about disadvantages? 
• In general do you think SRLs get a fair hearing? Why or why not? Any examples of when they 
don’t get a fair hearing? 
 
Courts and Self-Represented Litigants 
• What do you see as the main purpose or purposes of the [Family/District/High] Court? 
• Do you think that people should be allowed to be self-represented in the [Family/District/High] 
Court? Why or why not? 
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• If you don’t think people should be allowed to be self-represented in the [Family/District/High] 
Court, what should be done for people who can’t afford a lawyer? What about people who just 
don’t want a lawyer? 
• What, if anything, do you think this court could do to better assist SRLs? Are there any other 









Appendix L - Codes 
People Institutions Attitudes 
Court staff Citizens Advice Bureau Mixed 
Expert Witnesses Community Law Negative 
Judges Companies Neutral 
Lawyer Court Positive 
Amicus Family and Friends  
Lawyer for Child JCC Impact 
Opposing Counsel Legal Profession (In)ability to progress case 
LIP's new lawyer Media Facilitates 
LIP's previous lawyer MP/Ombusman/Govt agencies Increases costs 
MacKenzie Friends NGOs Slowing 
Represented Litigants NZLS  
LiPs Online Groups Culture 
Persistent LiPs  local - small towns 
  Popular 
   
Beliefs about law and the legal 
system 
Stages Issues 
Complexity Preparing the case Choice to LiP or not 
Corruption Becoming an LiP  Class 
Fairness Litigation Companies 
Favouritism  Filing a case Emotion vs Fact 
Fixed vs flexible Preparing for Court  Family Law Reforms 
Truth Appearing in court Gender 
 Costs Right to self-represent 
Beliefs about representation Enforcing a judgment Seating in the courtroom 
Cost Writing Judgments LiP access and comprehension 
Following instructions Reflecting on being LiP Evidence 
Influence on speed  Legal culture 
Influence on treatment  Legalese 
Influence on outcome  Procedure 
  Substantive law 
   
Strategies for LiPs Strategies for dealing with LiPs Activities performed for LiPs 
Breaching orders Advising to get a lawyer Accompanying to court 
Calling on prior knowledge Being very careful Advising (free) 
Complaining Bending over backwards Advising (paid) 
Copying Limiting - Closing down Drafting documents 
Following Judges' Lead Coming down to LiPs level Strategising 
Getting information Deferring to opposing counsel  Supporting 
Asking questions Encouraging settlement  
Lumping it Explaining process or law  
Researching Letting them talk  
Getting lay advice Limited brief advice  
Getting legal advice (free) Procedure  
Getting legal advice (paid or 
unbundled) 
Altering  
Settling Strictly adhering  
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